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This doctoral thesis presents a novel research approach toward 
human-level artificial intelligence. 
The approach involves developing an AI system using a language of 
thought based on the unconstrained syntax of a natural language; 
designing this system as a collection of concepts that can create and 
modify concepts, expressed in the language of thought, to behave 
intelligently in an environment; and using methods from cognitive 
linguistics such as mental spaces and conceptual blends for multiple 
levels of mental representation and computation. Proposing a design 
inspection alternative to the Turing Test, these pages discuss ‘higher-
level mentalities’ of human intelligence, which include natural language 
understanding, higher-level forms of learning and reasoning, imag-
ination, and consciousness. 
This thesis endeavors  to address all the major theoretical issues and 
objections that might be raised against its approach, or against the 
possibility of achieving human-level AI in principle. No insurmountable 
objections are identified, and arguments refuting several objections are 
presented. 
This thesis describes the design of a prototype demonstration 
system, and discusses processing within the system that illustrates the 
potential of the research approach to achieve human-level AI. 
This thesis cannot claim to actually achieve human-level AI, it can 
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Augustine describes the learning of human language as 
if the child came into a strange country and did not 
understand the language of the country; that is, as if it 
already had a language, only not this one. Or again: as 
if the child could already think, only not yet speak. And 
“think” would here mean something like “talk to itself.” 
~ Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 1953 
 
1.1 Can Machines Have Human-Level Intelligence? 
In 1950, Turing’s paper on Computing Machinery and Intelligence 
challenged scientists to achieve human-level artificial intelligence, 
though the term ‘artificial intelligence’ was not officially coined until 
1955, in the Dartmouth summer research project proposal by McCarthy, 
Minsky, Rochester, and Shannon. 
In considering the question “Can machines think?” Turing suggested 
scientists could say a computer thinks if it cannot be reliably 
distinguished from a human being in an “imitation game”, which is 
now known as a Turing Test. He suggested programming a computer to 
learn like a human child, calling such a system a “child machine”, and 
noted the learning process could change some of the child machine’s 
operating rules. Understanding natural language would be important 
for human-level AI, since it would be required to educate a child 
machine, and would be needed to play the imitation game. 
McCarthy et al. proposed research “to proceed on the basis of the 
conjecture that every aspect of learning or any other feature of 
intelligence can in principle be so precisely described that a machine can 
be made to simulate it.” They proposed to investigate “how to make 
machines use language, form abstractions and concepts, solve kinds of 
problems now reserved for humans, and improve themselves” and to 
study topics such as neural nets, computational complexity, 
randomness and creativity, invention and discovery.  
McCarthy proposed that his research in the Dartmouth summer 
project would focus on “the relation of language to intelligence”. Noting 
that “The English language has a number of properties which every 
formal language described so far lacks”, such as “The user of English 
Introduction 
2 
can refer to himself in it and formulate statements regarding his 
progress in solving the problem he is working on”, he wrote: 
“It therefore seems to be desirable to attempt to construct an 
artificial language which a computer can be programmed to use 
on problems requiring conjecture and self-reference. It should 
correspond to English in the sense that short English statements 
about the given subject matter should have short 
correspondents in the language and so should short arguments 
or conjectural arguments. I hope to try to formulate a language 
having these properties and in addition to contain the notions of 
physical object, event, etc., with the hope that using this 
language it will be possible to program a machine to learn to 
play games well and do other tasks.” 
Turing’s 1950 paper concluded: 
“We may hope that machines will eventually compete with men 
in all purely intellectual fields. But which are the best ones to 
start with? Even this is a difficult decision. Many people think 
that a very abstract activity, like the playing of chess, would be 
best. It can also be maintained that it is best to provide the 
machine with the best sense organs that money can buy, and 
then teach it to understand and speak English. This process 
could follow the normal teaching of a child. Things would be 
pointed out and named, etc. Again I do not know what the right 
answer is, but I think both approaches should be tried. We can 
only see a short distance ahead, but we can see plenty there that 
needs to be done.”                     
The first approach, playing chess, was successfully undertaken by AI 
researchers, culminating in the 1997 victory of Deep Blue over the world 
chess champion Gary Kasparov. We 4 now know this approach only 
scratches the surface of human-level intelligence. It is clear that 
                                                          
4 In these pages, “we” often refers to the scientific community, or to 
people in general, e.g. “We now know X”. It may also refer to the author 
plus the reader, e.g. “We next consider Y’, or as a “royal we” to just the 
author, e.g. “We next present Z”. Yet in no case does “we” refer to 
multiple authors: this thesis presents the doctoral research of just one 
author, P.C.J. 
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understanding natural language is far more challenging: No computer 
yet understands natural language as well as an average five year old 
human child. No computer can yet replicate the ability to learn and 
understand language demonstrated by an average toddler. 
Though Turing’s paper and the Dartmouth proposal both stated the 
long-term research goal to achieve human-level AI, for several decades 
there were few direct efforts toward achieving this goal. Rather, there 
was research on foundational problems in a variety of areas such as 
problem-solving, theorem-proving, game-playing, machine learning, 
language processing, etc. This was perhaps all that could be expected, 
given the emerging state of scientific knowledge about these topics, and 
about intelligence in general, during these decades. 
There have been many approaches at least indirectly toward the 
long-term goal. One broad stream of research to understanding 
intelligence has focused on logical, truth-conditional, model theoretic 
approaches to representation and processing, via predicate calculus, 
conceptual graphs, description logics, modal logics, type-logical 
semantics, and other frameworks. 
A second stream of research has taken a bottom-up approach, 
studying how aspects of intelligence (including consciousness and 
language understanding) may emerge from robotics, connectionist 
systems, etc., even without an initial, specific design for representations 
in such systems. A third, overlapping stream of research has focused on 
‘artificial general intelligence’, machine learning approaches toward 
achieving fully general artificial intelligence.  
Parallel to AI research, researchers in cognitive linguistics have 
developed multiple descriptions for the nature of semantics and concept 
representation, including image schemas, semantic frames, idealized 
cognitive models, conceptual metaphor theory, radial categories, mental 
spaces, and conceptual blends. These researchers have studied the need 
for embodiment to support natural language understanding, and 
developed construction grammars to flexibly represent how natural 
language forms are related to meanings. 
To summarize the current state of research, it has been clear for 
many years that the challenges to achieving human-level artificial 
intelligence are very great, and it has become clear they are somewhat 
commensurate with the challenge of achieving fully general machine 
understanding of natural language. Progress has been much slower 
than Turing expected in 1950. He wrote:  
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“I believe that in about fifty years' time it will be possible to 
programme computers, with a storage capacity of about 109, to 
make them play the imitation game so well that an average 
interrogator will not have more than 70 per cent. chance of 
making the right identification after five minutes of 
questioning. … I believe that at the end of the century the use of 
words and general educated opinion will have altered so much 
that one will be able to speak of machines thinking without 
expecting to be contradicted.” 
While people do informally speak of machines thinking, it is widely 
understood that computers do not yet really think or learn with the 
generality and flexibility of humans. While an average person might 
confuse a computer with a human in a typewritten Turing Test lasting 
only five minutes, there is no doubt that within five to ten minutes of 
dialog using speech recognition and generation (successes of AI 
research), it would be clear a computer does not have human-level 
intelligence. 
Progress on AI has also been much slower than McCarthy expected. 
For a lecture titled “Human-level AI is harder than it seemed in 1955”, 
he wrote: 
“I hoped the 1956 Dartmouth summer workshop would make 
major progress. … If my 1955 hopes had been realized, human-
level AI would have been achieved before many (most?) of you 
were born. Marvin Minsky, Ray Solomonoff, and I made 
progress that summer. Newell and Simon showed their 
previous work on IPL and the logic theorist. Lisp was based on 
IPL+Fortran+abstractions. … My 1958 ‘Programs with common 
sense’ made projections (promises?) that no-one has yet 
fulfilled. That paper proposed that theorem proving and 
problem solving programs should reason about their own 
methods. I’ve tried unsuccessfully. Unification goes in the 
wrong direction. … Getting statements into clausal form throws 
away information … Whither? Provers that reason about their 
methods. Adapt mathematical logic to express common sense. 
A continuing problem.” (McCarthy, 2006) 
Indeed, while many scientists continue to believe human-level AI 
will be achieved, some scientists and philosophers have for many years 
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argued the challenge is too great, that human-level AI is impossible in 
principle, or for practical reasons. Some of these arguments relate 
directly to elements of the approach of this thesis. Both the general and 
specific objections and theoretical issues will be discussed in detail, in 
Chapter 4. 
In sum, the question remains unanswered:  
How could a system be designed to achieve human-level artificial intelligence? 
The purpose of this thesis is to help answer this question, by 
describing a novel research approach to design of systems for human-
level AI. This thesis will present hypotheses to address this question, 
and present evidence and arguments to support the hypotheses. 
1.2 Thesis Approach 
Since the challenges are great, and progress has been much slower 
than early researchers such as Turing and McCarthy expected, there are 
good reasons to reconsider the approaches that have been tried and to 
consider whether another, somewhat different approach may be more 
viable. In doing so, there are good reasons to reconsider Turing’s and 
McCarthy’s original suggestions. 
To begin, this thesis will reconsider Turing’s suggestion of the 
imitation test for recognizing intelligence. While a Turing Test can 
facilitate recognizing human-level AI if it is created, it does not serve as 
a good definition of the goal we are trying to achieve, for three reasons: 
First, as a behaviorist test it does not ensure the system being tested 
actually performs internal processing we would call intelligent. Second, 
the Turing Test is subjective: A behavior one observer calls intelligent 
may not be called intelligent by another observer, or even by the same 
observer at a different time. Third, it conflates human-level intelligence 
with human-identical intelligence. These issues are further discussed in 
§2.1.1. This thesis will propose an alternative approach, augmenting the 
Turing test, which involves inspecting the internal design and operation 
of any proposed system, to see if it can in principle support human-level 
intelligence. This alternative defines human-level intelligence by 
identifying and describing certain capabilities not yet achieved by any 
AI system, in particular capabilities this thesis will call higher-level 
mentalities, which include natural language understanding, higher-level 
forms of learning and reasoning, imagination, and consciousness. 
Second, this thesis will reconsider Turing’s suggestion of the child 
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machine approach. Minsky (2006) gives a general discussion of the 
history of this idea, also called the “baby machine” approach. He notes 
that to date this idea has been unsuccessful, having encountered 
problems related to knowledge representation: A baby machine needs 
to be able to develop new ways of representing knowledge, because it 
cannot learn what it cannot represent. This ability to develop new forms 
of representation needs to be very flexible and general. Chapter 2 
discusses the problems Minsky identified for knowledge representation, 
in more detail. 
It is not the case that people have been trying and failing to build 
baby machines for the past sixty years. Rather, as noted above, most AI 
research over the past sixty years has been on lower-level, foundational 
problems in a variety of areas such as problem-solving, theorem-
proving, game-playing, machine learning, etc. Such research has made 
it clear that any attempts to build baby machines with the lower-level 
techniques would fail, because of the representational problems Minsky 
identifies.  
What we may draw from this is that the baby machine approach has 
not yet been adequately explored, and that more attention needs to be 
given to the architecture and design of a child or baby machine, and in 
particular to the representation of thought and knowledge. This 
provides motivation for Hypothesis I of this thesis (stated in §1.4 below) 
which describes a form of the baby machine approach. This thesis will 
discuss an architecture for systems to support this hypothesis, and make 
some limited progress in investigation of the baby machine approach. 
Chapters 3 and 4 will analyze theoretical topics related to this 
architecture, and discuss how the approach of this thesis addresses the 
representational issues Minsky identified for baby machines. 
Next, this thesis will reconsider approaches toward understanding 
natural language, because both Turing and McCarthy indicated the 
importance of natural language in relation to intelligence, and because it 
is clear this remains a major unsolved problem for human-level AI. 
Indeed, this problem is related to Minsky’s representational problems 
for baby machines, since the thoughts and knowledge that a human-
level AI must be able to represent, and a baby machine must be able to 
learn, include thoughts and knowledge that can be expressed in natural 
language. 
Although McCarthy in 1955 noted English has properties “every 
formal language described so far lacks”, and proposed to develop a 
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formal language with properties similar to English, his subsequent work 
did not exactly take this direction, though it appears in some respects he 
continued to pursue it as a goal. He designed a very flexible program-
ming language, Lisp, for AI research, yet beginning in 1958 his papers 
concentrated on use of predicate calculus for representation and infer-
ence in AI systems, while discussing philosophical issues involving 
language and intelligence. In an unpublished 1992 paper, he proposed a 
programming language to be called Elephant 2000 that would imple-
ment speech acts represented as sentences of logic. McCarthy (2008) 
wrote that grammar is secondary, that the language of thought for an AI 
system should be based on logic, and gave objections to using natural 
language as a language of thought. 
McCarthy was far from alone in such efforts: Almost all AI research 
on natural language understanding has attempted to translate natural 
language into a formal language such as predicate calculus, frame-based 
languages, conceptual graphs, etc., and then to perform reasoning and 
other forms of cognitive processing, such as learning, with expressions 
in the formal language. Some approaches have constrained and 
‘controlled’ natural language, so that it may more easily be translated 
into formal languages, database queries, etc. 
Since progress has been very slow in developing natural language 
understanding systems by translation into formal languages, this thesis 
will investigate whether it may be possible and worthwhile to perform 
cognitive processing directly with unconstrained natural language, 
without translation into a conventional formal language. This approach 
corresponds to thesis Hypothesis II, also stated in §1.4 below. This thesis 
will develop a conceptual language designed to support cognitive 
processing of unconstrained natural language, in Chapters 3 and 5, and 
discuss the theoretical ramifications of the approach. Chapter 4 will give 
a response to McCarthy’s objections to use of natural language as a 
language of thought in an AI system, and to other theoretical objections 
to this approach. 
Finally, in considering how to design a system that achieves the 
higher-level mentalities, this thesis will reconsider the relationship of 
natural language understanding to other higher-level mentalities and 
will consider the potential usefulness of ideas developed for 
understanding natural language, in support of higher-level mentalities. 
This approach corresponds to Hypothesis III of this thesis, also stated in 
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§1.4 below. The thesis will make progress in investigation of this 
hypothesis, beginning in Chapter 3. 
1.3 Terminology: Tala and TalaMind 
To further discuss the approach of this thesis, it will be helpful to 
introduce some terminology to avoid cumbersome repetition of phrases 
such as “the approach of this thesis”. (Other terms defined throughout 
the thesis are collected in the Glossary.) 
The name Tala refers to the conceptual language defined in Chapter 
5, with the proviso that this is only the initial version of the Tala 
language, open to revision and extension in future work. 5  In general 
throughout this thesis, the word concept refers to linguistic concepts, i.e. 
concepts that can be represented as natural language expressions (cf. 
Evans & Green, 2006, p. 158). The term conceptual structure will refer to 
an expression in the Tala conceptual language. 
The name TalaMind refers to the theoretical approach of this thesis 
and its hypotheses, and to an architecture the thesis will discuss for 
design of systems according to the hypotheses, with the same proviso. 
TalaMind is also the name of the prototype system illustrating this 
approach. 
1.4 TalaMind Hypotheses 
The TalaMind approach is summarized by three hypotheses: 
I. Intelligent systems can be designed as ‘intelligence kernels’, 
i.e. systems of concepts that can create and modify concepts 
to behave intelligently within an environment. 
II. The concepts of an intelligence kernel may be expressed in 
an open, extensible conceptual language, providing a 
representation of natural language semantics based very 
largely on the syntax of a particular natural language such 
as English, which serves as a language of thought for the 
system. 
                                                          
5 The name Tala is taken from the Indian musical framework for 
cyclic rhythms, pronounced “Tah-luh”, though the author pronounces it 
to rhyme with “ballad” and “salad”. The musical term tala is also 
spelled taal and taala, and coincidentally taal is Dutch for “language”. 
Tala is also the name of the unit of currency in Samoa. 
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III. Methods from cognitive linguistics may be used for 
multiple levels of mental representation and computation. 
These include constructions, mental spaces, conceptual 
blends, and other methods. 
Previous research approaches have considered one or more aspects 
of these hypotheses, though it does not appear all of them have been 
previously investigated as a combined hypothesis. For each hypothesis, 
the following pages will discuss its meaning and history relative to this 
thesis. The testability and falsifiability of the hypotheses are discussed 
in §1.6. Their relation to the Physical Symbol System Hypothesis is 
discussed in §1.4.4. 
1.4.1 Intelligence Kernel Hypothesis 
I. Intelligent systems can be designed as ‘intelligence kernels’, 
i.e. systems of concepts that can create and modify concepts 
to behave intelligently within an environment. 
This hypothesis is a description of a baby machine approach, stated 
in terms of conceptual systems, where concepts can include descriptions 
of behaviors, including behaviors for creating and modifying concepts. 
This hypothesis may be viewed as a variant of the Physical Symbol 
System Hypothesis (Newell & Simon, 1976), which is discussed in 
§1.4.4. It may also be viewed as a combination of the Knowledge 
Representation Hypothesis and the Reflection Hypothesis (Smith, 1982), 
which are discussed in §2.3.5, along with other related research. 
Since the author had written a book surveying the field of artificial 
intelligence published in 1974, upon entering graduate school in 1977 he 
decided to investigate how it might be possible to achieve “fully general 
artificial intelligence”, AI at a level comparable to human intelligence. 
The resulting master’s thesis (Jackson, 1979) formulated what is now 
Hypothesis I, and discussed the idea of an intelligence kernel in which 
all concepts would be expressed in an extensible frame-based concept 
representation language. 6 Hypotheses II and III of this thesis were not 
                                                          
6  The wording in Jackson (1979) was “intelligent systems can be 
defined as systems of concepts for the development of concepts”. It 
separately described an intelligence kernel as a system of initial 
concepts that could develop and extend its concepts to understand an 
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present in Jackson (1979). It also did not envision the TalaMind 
demonstration design and story simulations, which have been 
important for illustrating the TalaMind approach.  
This thesis will investigate Hypothesis I by examining how 
executable concepts can be represented in natural language, and how an 
executable concept can create and modify an executable concept, within 
a story simulation. This will illustrate how behaviors can be discovered 
and improved, and how (as McCarthy sought in 1955) an AI system can 
refer to itself and formulate statements about its progress in solving a 
problem. There is much more work on intelligence kernels to be done in 
future research.  
1.4.2 Natural Language Mentalese Hypothesis 
II. The concepts of an intelligence kernel may be expressed in 
an open, extensible conceptual language, providing a 
representation of natural language semantics based very 
largely on the syntax of a particular natural language such 
as English, which serves as a language of thought for the 
system. 
This is an hypothesis that natural language syntax provides a good 
basis for a computer language of thought, 7  and a good basis for 
representing natural language semantics. It disagrees with the view that 
“English is important for its semantics – not its syntax” (McCarthy, 
2005) and posits instead that a natural language such as English is 
important because of how well its syntax can express semantics, and 
that the unconstrained syntax of a natural language may be used to 
support representation and processing in human-level AI. The word 
syntax is used in a very general sense, to refer to the structural patterns 
                                                                                                                                
environment. The present wording embeds the definition of 
‘intelligence kernel’ within the hypothesis, and says “can be designed” 
rather than “can be defined”, since a definition of something is different 
from a design to achieve it. 
7 To be clear, this thesis does not claim that people actually use 
English or other natural languages as internal languages of thought. 
Such claims are outside the scope of this thesis, which is focused only on 
how machines might emulate the capabilities of human intelligence. 
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in a natural language that are used in communication. 8 This thesis will 
limit discussion of the hypothesis to the syntax of sentences, with topics 
such as morphology and phonology intended for future research. 
The Tala conceptual language developed according to this 
hypothesis will have properties McCarthy initially proposed in 1955: It 
will support self-reference and conjecture, and its sentences will be as 
concise as English – since they will be isomorphic to English. As will be 
explained further beginning in §1.5, computer understanding of natural 
language semantics will require conceptual processing of the language 
of thought, relative to a conceptual framework and an environment. 
That is, understanding of semantics (and pragmatics in general) is a 
process that involves encyclopedic knowledge and at least virtual 
embodiment (an idea discussed in §2.2.3).  
Fodor (1975) considered that a natural language like English might 
be used as a language of thought, extending a child’s innate, preverbal 
language of thought. There is a long philosophical history to the idea of 
natural language as a language of thought, which this thesis does not 
attempt to trace. Even so, it appears there has been very little 
investigation of this idea within previous AI research. As noted in §1.2, 
research on natural language understanding has focused on translating 
natural language to and from formal languages. Russell & Norvig (2009) 
provide an introduction to the theory and technology of such 
approaches. While inference may occur during parsing and 
disambiguation, inference is performed within formal languages. Hobbs 
(2004) gives reasons in favor of first-order logic as a language of 
thought, discussed in §2.3.1. Wilks has advocated use of natural 
language for representing semantics, though his practical work has used 
non-natural language semantic representations. Section 2.2.1 discusses 
the ‘language of thought’ idea in greater detail. 
Hart (1979, unpublished) discussed use of natural language syntax 
for inference in an AI system. Further information and 
acknowledgement are given in the Preface. 
                                                          
8 The word ‘grammar’ could be used instead, but has alternate senses 
that encompass linguistic meaning and “the psychological system that 





1.4.3 Multiple Levels of Mentality Hypothesis 
III. Methods from cognitive linguistics may be used for 
multiple levels of mental representation and computation. 
These include grammatical constructions, mental spaces, 
conceptual blends, and other methods.  
This is an hypothesis that theoretical ideas developed for 
understanding natural language will be useful for achieving the higher-
level mentalities of human-level intelligence, i.e. higher-level forms of 
learning and reasoning, imagination, and consciousness. 
Hypothesis III was developed while working on this thesis. This 
hypothesis is equally important to the first and second, and in some 
ways more important, since it identifies a direction toward achieving 
the higher-level mentalities of human-level intelligence, leveraging the 
first and second hypotheses. Of course, it does not preclude the use of 
other ideas from cognitive science, to help achieve this goal. 
This hypothesis is a result of pondering the multiple levels of mental 
representation and processing discussed by Minsky (2006), and 
considering how they could be represented and processed using a 
natural language mentalese. This led to the idea that the higher-level 
mentalities could be represented and processed within an intelligence 
kernel using a natural language mentalese with constructions, mental 
spaces and conceptual blends. It does not appear there is other, previous 
AI research exploring an hypothesis stated in these terms, where 
‘multiple levels of mental representation and computation’ includes the 
higher-level mentalities discussed in this thesis. 
1.4.4 Relation to the Physical Symbol System Hypothesis 
The TalaMind hypotheses are essentially consistent with Newell and 
Simon’s (1976) Physical Symbol System Hypothesis (PSSH). They 
described a physical symbol system as having the following properties, 
where an expression is a structure of symbols:  
“(1) A symbol may be used to designate any expression 
whatsoever. That is, given a symbol, it is not prescribed a priori 
what expressions it can designate. This arbitrariness pertains 
only to symbols; the symbol tokens and their mutual relations 
determine what object is designated by a complex expression. 
(2) There exist expressions that designate every process of 
which the machine is capable. (3) There exist processes for 
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creating any expression and for modifying any expression in 
arbitrary ways. (4) Expressions are stable; once created they will 
continue to exist until explicitly modified or deleted. (5) The 
number of expressions that the system can hold is essentially 
unbounded.”9  
Given these conditions, they hypothesize (PSSH): “A physical 
symbol system has the necessary and sufficient means for general 
intelligent action.” 
If the word “concept” is substituted for “expression”, then (2) and (3) 
together imply that a variant of PSSH is TalaMind Hypothesis I: 
“Intelligent systems can be designed as ‘intelligence kernels’, i.e. 
systems of concepts that can create and modify concepts to behave 
intelligently within an environment.” 
Newell & Simon stipulated that expressions can designate objects 
and processes. If expressions can also designate abstractions in general, 
then functionally there is not a difference between an expression and a 
conceptual structure, as the term is used in this thesis. The range of 
abstractions that can be designated in the Tala conceptual language is a 
topic discussed in Chapter 3. 
In defining expressions as structures of symbols, PSSH implicitly 
suggests an intelligent system would have some internal language for 
its expressions. Newell & Simon discussed computer languages such as 
Lisp, and also mentioned natural language understanding as a problem 
for general intelligence. However, in discussing PSSH they did not 
hypothesize along the lines of TalaMind Hypotheses II or III, which are 
consistent with PSSH but more specific. 
In presenting PSSH, Newell and Simon were not specific about the 
nature or definition of intelligence. They gave a brief comparison with 
human behavior as a description: 
“By ‘general intelligent action’ we wish to indicate the same 
scope of intelligence as we see in human action: that in any real 
situation behavior appropriate to the ends of the system and 
adaptive to the demands of the environment can occur, within 
some limits of speed and complexity.” 
                                                          




In §2.1.2 this thesis identifies specific features of human-level 
intelligence that need to be achieved in human-level AI. 
The TalaMind hypotheses are only “essentially” consistent with 
PSSH, because they are open to Nilsson’s (2007) observation that “For 
those who would rather think about … perception and action … in 
terms of signals rather than symbols, the ‘sufficiency’ part of the PSSH 
is clearly wrong. But the ‘necessity’ part remains uncontested, I think.” 
The TalaMind approach is open to use of non-symbolic processing, in 
addition to symbolic processing, as will be discussed in the next section.  
1.5 TalaMind System Architecture 
This thesis next introduces an architecture it will discuss for design 
of systems to achieve human-level AI, according to the TalaMind 
hypotheses. This is not claimed to be the only or best possible 
architecture for such systems. It is presented to provide a context for 
analysis and discussion of the hypotheses. Figure 1-1 on the next page 
shows elements of the TalaMind architecture. In addition to the Tala 
conceptual language, the architecture contains two other principal 
elements at the linguistic level:  
• Conceptual Framework. An information architecture for 
managing an extensible collection of concepts, expressed in 
Tala. A conceptual framework supports processing and 
retention of concepts ranging from immediate thoughts and 
percepts to long term memory, including concepts 
representing definitions of words, knowledge about 
domains of discourse, memories of past events, etc. 
• Conceptual Processes. An extensible system of processes that 
operate on concepts in the conceptual framework, to 
produce intelligent behaviors and new concepts. 
The term Tala agent will refer to a system with the architecture 
shown in Figure 1-1. 
Gärdenfors (1994) discussed three levels of inductive inference, 
called the linguistic, conceptual, and subconceptual levels. This thesis 
considers all three levels to be conceptual levels, due to its focus on 
linguistic concepts, and because an argument could be made that 
associative concepts exist. Hence the middle is called the archetype level 
to avoid describing it as the only conceptual level, and as a concise 
description that does not favor any particular cognitive concept 
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representation. (It is not called the “cognitive level” since cognition also 
happens at the linguistic level, according to this thesis.) Section 2.2.2 
further discusses the nature of concept representation at these levels.  
This thesis will discuss how the TalaMind architecture at the 
linguistic level could support higher-level mentalities in human-level 
AI. In general, this thesis will not discuss the archetype and associative 
levels. Hence, throughout this thesis, discussions of “TalaMind 
architecture” refer to the linguistic level of the architecture, except 
where other levels are specified, or implied by context. 
The TalaMind hypotheses do not require a ‘society of mind’ 
architecture (§2.3.3.2.1) in which subagents communicate using the Tala 
conceptual language, but it is consistent with the hypotheses and 
natural to implement a society of mind at the linguistic level of the 
TalaMind architecture. This will be illustrated in Chapters 5 and 6. 
Figure 1-1  TalaMind System Architecture 
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This thesis does not discuss spatial reasoning and visualization, 
which may also occur in conceptual processing and are topics for future 
extensions of this approach. 
From the perspective of the linguistic concept level, the lower two 
non-linguistic levels of concept processing may be considered 
“environment interaction” systems. This interaction may be very 
complex, involving systems at the archetype level for recognizing 
objects and events in the environment, leveraging systems at the 
associative level, as well as sensors and effectors for direct interaction 
with the environment. While these environment interaction levels are 
very important, they are not central to this thesis, which will limit 
discussion of them and stipulate that concepts expressed in the Tala 
mentalese are the medium of communication in a Conceptual Interface 
between the linguistic level and the archetype level. 
If environment interaction systems recognize a cat on a mat, they 
will be responsible for creating a mentalese sentence expressing this as a 
percept, received in the conceptual framework via the conceptual 
interface. If the conceptual processes decide to pet the cat on the mat, 
they will transmit a mentalese sentence describing this action via the 
conceptual interface to environment interaction systems responsible for 
interpreting the sentence and performing the action. This idea of a 
conceptual interface is introduced to simplify discussion in the thesis, 
and to simplify development of the thesis demonstration system: It 
enables creating a demonstration system in which Tala agents 
communicate directly with each other via the conceptual interface, 
abstracting out their environment interaction systems. As the TalaMind 
approach is developed in future research, the conceptual interface may 
become more complex or alternatively, it may disappear through 
integration of the linguistic and archetype levels. For instance, §§3.6.1 
and 3.6.7.7 stipulate that concepts at the linguistic level can directly 
reference concepts at the archetype level.  
In addition to action concepts (“effepts”), the linguistic level may 
send “control concepts” such as questions and expectations to the 
archetype level. For example, a question might ask the archetype level 
to find another concept similar to one it perceives, e.g. “What does the 
grain of wheat resemble?” and a percept might be returned “the grain of 
wheat resembles a nut”. Expectation concepts may influence what the 
archetype level perceives in information received from the associative 
level, and cause the archetype level to focus or redirect attention at the 
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associative level. These are important topics, but they will be outside the 
focus of this thesis. Some discussion will be given related to them, in 
considering interactions between consciousness, unconsciousness, and 
understanding (§4.2.4). 
This thesis relaxes PSSH conditions (2) and (3) quoted in §1.4.4, by 
not requiring that all conceptual processes be describable in the Tala 
conceptual language, nor that all conceptual processes be alterable or 
created by other conceptual processes: It is allowed that some 
conceptual processes may result from lower-level symbolic or non-
symbolic processing. Hence, TalaMind Hypothesis I may be considered 
a variant of PSSH, but not identical to PSSH. 
1.6 Arguments & Evidence:  Strategy & Criteria for Success 
It should be stated at the outset that this thesis does not claim to 
actually achieve human-level AI, nor even an aspect of it: rather, it 
develops an approach that may eventually lead to human-level AI and 
creates a demonstration system to illustrate the potential of this 
approach. 
Human-level artificial intelligence involves several topics each so 
large even one of them cannot be addressed comprehensively within the 
scope of a Ph.D. thesis. The higher-level mentalities are topics for a 
lifetime’s research, and indeed, several lifetimes. Therefore, this thesis 
cannot claim to prove that a system developed according to its 
hypotheses will achieve human-level artificial intelligence. This thesis 
can only present a plausibility argument for its hypotheses. 
To show plausibility, the thesis will: 
• Address theoretical arguments against the possibility of 
achieving human-level AI by any approach. 
• Describe an approach for designing a system to achieve human-
level AI, according to the TalaMind hypotheses. 
• Present theoretical arguments in favor of the proposed 
approach, and address theoretical arguments against the 
proposed approach. 
• Present analysis and design discussions for the proposed 
approach. 
• Present a functional prototype system that illustrates how the 
proposed approach could in principle support aspects of 
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human-level AI if the approach were fully developed, though 
that would need to be a long-term research effort by multiple 
researchers. 
After these elements of the plausibility argument are presented in 
Chapters 3 through 6, Chapter 7 will evaluate the extent to which they 
have supported the TalaMind hypotheses. Showing the plausibility of 
hypotheses will not be as clear-cut a result as proving a mathematical 
theorem, nor as quantitative as showing a system can parse a natural 
language corpus with a higher degree of accuracy than other systems. 
The general strategy of this thesis is to take a top-down approach to 
analysis, design and illustration of how the three hypotheses can 
support the higher-level mentalities, since this allows addressing each 
topic, albeit partially. In discussing each higher-level mentality, the 
strategy is to focus on areas that largely have not been previously 
studied. Areas previously studied will be discussed if necessary to show 
it is plausible they can be supported in future research following the 
approach of this thesis, but analyzing and demonstrating all areas 
previously studied would not be possible in a Ph.D. thesis. Some 
examples of areas previously studied are ontology, common sense 
knowledge, encyclopedic knowledge, parsing natural language, 
uncertainty logic, reasoning with conflicting information, and case-
based reasoning. 
The success criteria for this thesis will simply be whether researchers 
in the field deem that the proposed approach is a worthwhile direction 
for future research to achieve human-level AI, based on the arguments 
and evidence presented in these pages. 
The TalaMind approach is testable and falsifiable. There are 
theoretical objections that would falsify Hypothesis II and the Tala 
conceptual language. Some of these objections, such as Searle’s Chinese 
Room Argument, would falsify the entire TalaMind approach, and 
indeed, all research on human-level AI. Objections of this kind are 
addressed in Chapter 4. 
The Tala syntax defined in Chapter 5 could be shown to be 
inadequate by identifying expressions in English that it could not 
support in principle or with possible extensions. Tala's syntax has been 
designed to be very general and flexible, but there probably are several 
ways it can be improved. 
Due to its scope, the TalaMind approach can only be falsified within 
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a Ph.D. thesis by theoretical or practical objections, some of which are 
not specific to Tala. For example, the theoretical objections of Penrose 
against the possibility of achieving human-level AI would falsify the 
TalaMind approach, if one accepts them. Objections of this kind are also 
addressed in Chapter 4. 
1.7 Overview of Chapters 
Chapter 2 provides a review of previous research on human-level 
artificial intelligence and natural language understanding, and proposes 
an alternative to the Turing Test, for defining and recognizing human-
level AI. Chapter 3 will discuss the TalaMind architecture in more 
detail, to analyze theoretical questions and implications of the TalaMind 
hypotheses, and discuss how a system developed according to the 
hypotheses could achieve human-level AI. Chapter 4 discusses 
theoretical issues and objections related to the hypotheses. Chapter 5 
presents the design for a TalaMind prototype demonstration system. 
Chapter 6 describes processing within this system, which illustrates 
learning and discovery by reasoning analogically, causal and purposive 
reasoning, meta-reasoning, imagination via conceptual simulation, and 
internal dialog between subagents in a society of mind using a language 
of thought. The prototype also illustrates support for semantic 
disambiguation, natural language constructions, metaphors, semantic 
domains, and conceptual blends, in communication between Tala 
agents. Chapter 7 evaluates how well the preceding chapters support 
the hypotheses of this thesis. Chapter 8 gives a summation of this thesis. 
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2. Subject Review: Human-Level AI & Natural Language 
Those who are enamoured of practice without science 
are like the pilot who gets into a ship without rudder or 
compass and who never has any certainty where he is 
going. Practice should always be based on sound 
theory, of which perspective is the guide and the 
gateway, and without it nothing can be done well in 
any kind of painting. 
~ Leonardo da Vinci, Notebooks, ca. 1510 10 
 
2.1 Human-Level Artificial Intelligence 
2.1.1 How to Define & Recognize Human-Level AI 
As stated in §1.2, a Turing Test can facilitate recognizing human-
level AI if it is created, but it does not serve as a good definition of the 
goal we are trying to achieve, for three reasons. 
First, the Turing Test does not ensure the system being tested 
actually performs internal processing we would call intelligent, if we 
knew what is happening inside the system. As a behaviorist test, it does 
not exclude systems that mimic external behavior to a sufficient degree 
that we might think they are as intelligent as humans, when they are 
not. 
For example, with modern technology we could envision creating a 
system that contained a database of human-machine dialogs in previous 
Turing Tests, with information about how well each machine response 
in each dialog was judged in resembling human intelligence. Initial 
responses in dialogs might be generated by using simple systems like 
Eliza (Weizenbaum, 1966), or by using keywords to retrieve information 
from Wikipedia, etc. The system might become more and more 
successful in passing Turing Tests over longer periods of time, simply 
by analyzing associations between previous responses and test results, 
and giving responses that fared best in previous tests, whenever 
                                                          
10 From Irma A. Richter’s selection, edited by Thereza Wells, Oxford 
University Press, 2008, p.212. This quotation is from Leonardo’s 
manuscript G, which the edition’s Chronology dates to 1510.  
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possible. 
In 2011, a sophisticated information retrieval approach enabled the 
IBM Watson system to defeat human champions in the television quiz 
show Jeopardy! (Ferrucci et al., 2010). A more limited technology using 
neural nets enables a handheld computer to successfully play “twenty 
questions” with a person (Burgener 2006). Both these are impressive, 
potentially useful examples of AI information retrieval, but they only 
demonstrate limited aspects of intelligence – they do not demonstrate 
true understanding of natural language, nor do they demonstrate other 
higher-level mentalities such as consciousness, higher-level reasoning 
and learning, etc. 
The second reason the Turing Test is not satisfactory as a definition 
of human-level AI is that the test is subjective, and presents a moving 
target: A behavior one observer calls intelligent may not be called 
intelligent by another observer, or even by the same observer at a 
different time. To say intelligence is something subjectively recognized 
by intelligent observers in a Turing test, does not define where we are 
going, nor suggest valid ways to go there.  
A third reason the Turing Test is not satisfactory is that it conflates 
human-level intelligence with human-identical intelligence, i.e. 
intelligence indistinguishable from humans. This is important, for 
instance, because in seeking to achieve human-level AI we need not 
seek to replicate erroneous human reasoning. An example is a common 
tendency of people to illogically chain negative defaults (statements of 
the form Xs are typically not Ys). Vogel (1996) examines psychological 
data regarding this tendency. 
Noting others had criticized the Turing Test, Nilsson (2005) 
proposed an alternative he called the “employment test”: 
“To pass the employment test, AI programs must be able to 
perform the jobs ordinarily performed by humans. Progress 
toward human-level AI could then be measured by the fraction 
of these jobs that can be acceptably performed by machines.” 
While Nilsson’s test is an objective alternative to the Turing Test, it 
too is a behaviorist test, with similar issues. Also, though most ordinary 
jobs require natural language understanding and commonsense 
reasoning, as well as domain-specific intelligence, arguably most do not 
require all the higher-level mentalities of human-level intelligence to be 
discussed in the next section. It might not suffice to define the scope of 
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Nilsson’s test as “all jobs” or  “economically important jobs”, because 
some abilities of human intelligence may be shown outside of 
employment, or may not be recognized as economically important. (The 
relationship of AI to employment is further discussed in §7.9.) 
Some AI researchers may respond to such definitional problems by, 
in effect, giving up, and saying it is not possible to define human-level 
intelligence, even by external, behaviorist tests. Yet as discussed in §1.1, 
if we go back to the early papers of the field it is clear the original spirit 
of research was to understand every ability of human intelligence well 
enough to achieve it artificially. This suggests an intuition that it should 
be possible to have an internal, design-oriented explanation and 
definition of human-level intelligence. 
The fact that we do not yet have such an explanation or definition 
does not mean it is impossible or not worth seeking, or that human 
intelligence inherently must be defined by external, behaviorist tests. It 
may just mean we don't understand it well enough yet. The history of 
science is replete with things people were able to recognize, but for ages 
were unable to explain or define very well. This did not stop scientists 
from trying to understand. It should not stop us from trying to 
understand human intelligence well enough to define and explain it 
scientifically, and to achieve it artificially if possible. 
Throughout the history of AI research, people have identified 
various behaviors only people could then perform, and called the 
behaviors “intelligent”. Yet when it was explained how machines could 
perform the behaviors, a common reaction was to say they were not 
intelligent after all. A pessimistic view is that people will always be 
disappointed with any explanation of intelligent behavior. A more 
optimistic and objective response is to suppose that previously 
identified behaviors missed the mark in identifying essential qualities of 
human intelligence. Perhaps if we focus more clearly on abilities of 
human intelligence that remain to be explained, we will find abilities 
people still consider intelligent, even if we can explain how a computer 
could possess them. These may be internal, cognitive abilities, not just 
external behaviors. This will be endeavored, beginning in the next 
section. 
Completeness is a very useful concept in this matter: People can 
always deny a system is intelligent, but one can always turn the tables 
around, and ask “Can you show me something that in principle the 
system cannot do, which you or someone else can do?” Completeness 
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arguments are a form of scientific falsifiability. If one can find 
something human intelligence can do, that an AI system cannot, then a 
claim the AI system is “human-intelligence complete” is falsified. 
At present it is easy to find things existing AI systems cannot do. 
Perhaps someday that may not be the case. Perhaps someday a system 
will exist with such a complete design no one will be able to find 
something in principle it could not do, yet which humans can. Perhaps 
just by studying and testing its design and operation, reasonable people 
will arrive at the conclusion it is human-intelligence complete, in the 
same way we say programming languages are Turing-complete because 
we cannot find any formal systems that exceed their grasp.  
To summarize, an analysis of design and operation to say a system is 
human-intelligence complete would not be a behaviorist test. It would 
be an analysis that supports saying a system achieves human-level 
artificial intelligence, by showing its internal design and operation will 
support abilities we would say demonstrate human-level intelligence, 
even when we understand how these abilities are provided. 
2.1.2 Unexplained Features of Human-Level Intelligence 
Given the previous discussion, this section lists some of the 
unexplained characteristics of human-level intelligence, concentrating 
on essential attributes and abilities a computer would need, to possess 
human-level artificial intelligence. 
2.1.2.1 Generality 
A key feature of human intelligence is that it is apparently 
unbounded and completely general. Human-level AI must have this 
same quality. In principle there should be no limits to the fields of 
knowledge the system could understand, at least so far as humans can 
determine. 
Having said this, it is an unresolved question whether human 
intelligence is actually unbounded and completely general. Some 
discussion related to this is given in Chapter 4. Here it is just noted that 
while we may be optimistic human intelligence is completely general, 
there are many limits to human understanding at present. For instance: 
• Feynman at times suggested quantum mechanics may be 
inherently impossible for humans to understand, because 
experimental results defy commonsense causality. Yet at least 
people have been able to develop a mathematical theory for 
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quantum mechanics, which has been repeatably verified by 
experiments, to great precision. 
• General relativity and quantum theory are not yet unified. 
Astronomers have evidence black holes exist, which implies 
existence of gravitational singularities. 
• At present scientists are having great difficulty explaining 
multiple, independent observations that appear to prove 95% of 
the universe consists of matter and energy we have not yet been 
able to directly observe, causing galaxies and galaxy clusters to 
rotate faster than expected, and causing the expansion of the 
universe to accelerate. (Gates, 2009) 
• Beyond this, there are several other fundamental questions in 
physics one could list, which remain open and unresolved. And 
there are many open, challenging questions in other areas of 
science, including the great question of precisely how our brains 
function to produce human intelligence. 
There is no proof at this point we cannot understand all the phenomena 
of nature. And as Chapter 4 will discuss, it is an unsettled question 
whether human-level artificial intelligence cannot also do so. Hopefully 
human-level AI will help us in the quest. 
2.1.2.2 Creativity & Originality 
A key feature of human intelligence is the ability to create original 
concepts. Human-level AI must have this same quality. The test of 
originality should be whether the system can create (or discover, or 
accomplish) something for itself it was not taught directly -- more 
strongly, in principle and ideally in actuality, can it create something no 
one has created before, to our knowledge? This is Boden’s (2004) 
distinction of (personal, psychological) P-creativity vs. (historical) H-
creativity. 
2.1.2.3 Natural Language Understanding 
A key feature of human intelligence is the ability to understand 
natural languages, such as English or Dutch. Understanding natural 
language is still largely an unexplained skill of human-level intelligence. 
Attempts to build systems that process natural language have made 
substantial progress in many areas of syntax processing, but still 
founder on the problem of understanding natural language in a general 
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way.  
2.1.2.4 Effectiveness, Robustness, Efficiency 
The system must be effective in solving problems, and behave 
successfully within its environment. The system must be able to deal 
with conflicting and uncertain information. The system must be able to 
identify and correct logical errors. The system must be able to rapidly 
acquire human-level knowledge, and deal with intractable domains, 
and large amounts of information, at least as well as people do.  
These are very important requirements for eventually achieving 
human-level artificial intelligence, but they will only be discussed in this 
thesis relative to its primary focus, to show how higher-level mentalities 
can in principle be supported by the TalaMind approach. Hence, this 
thesis will be more concerned with effectiveness and robustness, than 
with efficiency and scalability, e.g. because we will need to discuss how 
a system that reasons with a natural language mentalese can detect and 
resolve contradictions. Efficiency and scalability issues will be noted in 
discussing other topics, but work on them will be a major topic for 
future research. 
2.1.2.5 Self-Development & Higher-Level Learning 
A variation of the requirement for originality is a requirement for 
‘self-development’. People not only discover new things, they develop 
new skills they were not taught by others, new ways of thinking, etc. A 
human-level AI must have this same capability. More specifically, 
human-level intelligence includes the following higher-level forms of 
learning: 
o Learning by induction, abduction, analogy, causal and 
purposive reasoning. 
• Learning by induction of new linguistic concepts. 
• Learning by creating explanations and testing 
predictions, using causal and purposive reasoning. 
• Learning about new domains by developing analogies 
and metaphors with previously known domains. 
o Learning by reflection and self-programming. 
• Reasoning about thoughts and experience to develop 
new methods for thinking and acting. 
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• Reasoning about ways to improve methods for thinking 
and acting. 
o Learning by invention of languages and representations. 
We shall use the term higher-level learning to describe these 
collectively and distinguish them from lower-level forms of learning 
investigated in previous research on machine learning (viz. Valiant, 
2013). To support higher-level learning, as well as originality and 
imagination, an intelligent system must have another general trait, 
‘curiosity’, which at the level of human intelligence may be described as 
the ability to ask relevant questions. 
2.1.2.6 Meta-Cognition & Multi-Level Reasoning 
Meta-cognition is “cognition about cognition”, cognitive processes 
applied to cognitive processes. Since cognitive processes may in general 
be applied to other cognitive processes, we may consider many different 
forms of meta-cognition11, for example: 
Reasoning about reasoning. 
Reasoning about learning. 
Learning how to reason. 
Learning how to learn. 
… 
Some of these may be more or less prosaic or exotic. Thus if learning is 
described as the acquisition of knowledge, then learning how to learn 
could include learning how to read, and it could also include discovery 
of the scientific method. 
While in principle one may argue all forms of meta-cognition could 
be supported by the TalaMind approach, attention in this thesis is 
limited to meta-reasoning (reasoning about reasoning), and to reasoning 
in general. For concision, the term multi-level reasoning will be used to 
refer collectively to the reasoning capabilities of human-level 
intelligence, including meta-reasoning, analogical reasoning, causal and 
purposive reasoning, abduction, induction, and deduction. It remains a 
challenge to include multi-level reasoning in a unified framework for 
                                                          
11 Others have focused on different aspects of meta-cognition, such 
as “knowing about knowing” or “knowing about memory”. 
Consciousness may also be considered an aspect of meta-cognition. 
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human-level artificial intelligence, integrated with other unexplained 
features of intelligence. 
2.1.2.7 Imagination 
Imagination allows us to conceive things we do not know how to 
accomplish, and to conceive what will happen in hypothetical 
situations. To imagine effectively, we must know what we do not know, 
and then consider ways to learn what we do not know or to accomplish 
what we do not know how to do. A human-level AI must demonstrate 
imagination. 
2.1.2.8 Consciousness 
To act intelligently, a system must have some degree of awareness 
and understanding of its own existence, its situation or relation to the 
world, its perceptions, thoughts and actions, both past and present, as 
well as potentials for the future. Without such awareness, a system is 
greatly handicapped in managing its interactions with the world, and in 
managing its thoughts. Thus, at least some aspects of consciousness are 
necessary for a system to demonstrate human-level intelligence. 
In stating this requirement, this thesis goes beyond what has in the 
past been a standard assumption of many AI researchers. Thus, Turing 
(1950) wrote: 
“I do not wish to give the impression that I think there is no 
mystery about consciousness … But I do not think these 
mysteries necessarily need to be solved before we can answer 
the question with which we are concerned in this paper.”  
And Russell & Norvig (2009) write: 
“Turing himself concedes that the question of consciousness is a 
difficult one, but denies that it has much relevance to the 
practice of AI … We agree with Turing—we are interested in 
creating programs that behave intelligently. The additional 
project of making them conscious is not one that we are 
equipped to take on, nor one whose success we would be able 
to determine.” 
On the other hand, both McCarthy (1995, 2002) and Minsky (2006) 
have discussed how AI systems might emulate aspects of consciousness. 
Section 2.3.4 will discuss research on ‘artificial consciousness’ conducted 
by Aleksander et al. (1992 et seq.) and others. 
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The perspective of this thesis is that it is both necessary and possible 
for a system to demonstrate at least some aspects of consciousness, to 
achieve human-level artificial intelligence. This thesis accepts the 
objection given by AI critics that a system which is not aware of what it 
is doing, and does not have some awareness of itself, cannot be 
considered to have human-level intelligence. Further, consciousness is 
intertwined with understanding of natural language, and 
understanding in general, as we shall see in §4.2.4’s discussion of 
Searle’s Chinese Room Argument. 
2.1.2.9 Sociality, Emotions, Values 
A human-level AI will need some level of social understanding to 
interact with humans. It will need some understanding of cultural 
conventions, etiquette, politeness, etc. It will need some understanding 
of emotions humans feel, and it may even have some emotions of its 
own, though we will need to be careful about this. One of the values of 
human-level artificial intelligence is likely to be its objectivity, and 
freedom from being affected by some emotions. From the perspective of 
this thesis it is not required that a human-level AI system be able to 
experience human emotions. 
A human-level AI must have values that guide its efforts to 
understand and act within its environment, and with human beings. It 
must have some understanding of human values to interact successfully 
with us. 
Questions related to sociality, emotions and values are even more 
difficult and at a higher level than the issues that are the primary focus 
of this thesis. Section 3.7.5 will give some preliminary remarks about 
this topic, within the TalaMind approach. 
2.1.2.10 Other Unexplained Features 
In addition, there are other features of human-level intelligence one 
could imagine eventually wishing to address in artificial intelligence, 
yet which are even more difficult and remote from consideration at this 
time. 
One such feature is ‘freedom of will’. This is a difficult philosophical 
topic, with debate about its nature and whether humans truly possess it 
in a universe apparently predetermined by the laws of physics. It will be 
a topic outside the scope of this thesis. 
Beyond emotions, values and freedom of will, unexplained features 
include ‘virtues’. There may be no reason in principle why we would 
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not want an artificial intelligence to possess a virtue such as wisdom, 
kindness, or courage, if the situation merited this (cf. McCarthy, 2004). 
Yet what little wisdom the present author possesses indicates it would 
not be wise to discuss wisdom or other virtues in this thesis. It is 
challenging enough to discuss higher-level mentalities such as 
imagination and consciousness. 
2.2 Natural Language 
2.2.1 Does Thought Require Language? 
This is an old and important question, reflected at the start of 
Chapter 1 in a quote from Wittgenstein about Augustine. Augustine12 
described the language learning process as if each child has a ‘private 
language’ preceding and enabling the acquisition of external, public 
languages like English or Latin. 
Wittgenstein’s own thoughts about the relationship between thought 
and language may be difficult to discern, because he discusses the topic 
throughout his Philosophical Investigations in a series of Socratic 
questions to himself and the reader, often seeming to answer each 
question with another question. Mulhall (2007) notes that Wittgenstein 
is open to the idea that an individual may talk to himself, but questions 
whether an individual can have a private language to express inner 
experiences that are inherently private, such as sensations of pain. It 
does not appear Wittgenstein considered the possible role of a language 
of thought in a society of mind (§2.3.3.2.1), i.e. it appears he took the 
unity of self as axiomatic.  
Fodor (1975 et seq.) argued in favor of a language of thought 
hypothesis, essentially in agreement with Augustine. This has been the 
subject of lengthy philosophical arguments pro and con, e.g. concerning 
issues such as whether an innate language is needed to learn an external 
language and the degree to which an innate language must contain all 
possible concepts, or constrains the concepts that can be learned and 
expressed. Fodor (2008) accepts the principle of semantic 
                                                          
12 Viz. Augustine’s Confessions, Book I, Chapter VIII paragraph 13. 
Augustine also suggests humans have an innate gestural natural 
language, which supports learning of spoken natural languages – an 
idea being explored in modern work, e.g. by Sloman (2008). See also 
Tomasello (2003) regarding the importance of gestures for acquiring 
natural language. 
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compositionality, an issue in earlier philosophical debates. Fodor (1975) 
considered that a natural language like English might be used as a 
language of thought, extending a child’s innate, preverbal language of 
thought. He reasoned the innate language of thought must be as 
powerful as any language learnable by humans, though extensions such 
as English would enable concise expression of concepts not primitive in 
the innate language. He also described the innate language of thought 
as a metalanguage, in which natural language extensions could be 
defined. 
Sloman (1979 et seq.) contended that the primary role of language is 
the representation of information within an individual, and its role in 
communication is an evolutionary side effect, i.e. human-level 
intelligence requires some innate, internal language for representation 
of thoughts, prior to learning and using natural language. (Viewed this 
way, the existence of an internal representation language can be seen as 
a corollary of the Physical Symbol System Hypothesis.) Sloman 
disagreed with Fodor about the necessary content of the innate 
language, arguing that in principle a system can learn new concepts 
(which may be represented by new words or symbols) that may not be 
definable in terms of previously known concepts, words or symbols. 
Thus, he emphasized the extensibility of innate representation 
languages, which he calls “Generalised Languages (GL’s)” (Sloman, 
2008). Sloman notes that a GL must “provide meta-semantic 
competences, e.g. the ability to represent and reason about one’s own or 
others’ goals, beliefs, thought processes, preferences, planning, 
strategies, etc.” 
Nirenburg & Wilks (2001) give a dialog on four questions, one of 
which is “Are representation languages (RLs) natural languages (NLs) 
in any respect?” In this dialog, Wilks essentially argues the affirmative, 
and Nirenburg the negative. 13 Wilks suggests that the predicates of any 
semantic representation language will either inherently or eventually 
represent natural language words, and have the ambiguity of NL 
words. Nirenburg contends that predicates can be defined as distinct 
senses of NL words. This is consistent with Wilks’ previous theoretical 
                                                          
13  The other three questions were: Are languages (natural or 
representational) necessarily extensible as to sense? Are language 
acquisition and extensibility linked? If automatic acquisition is possible, 
what are the consequences for any RL/NL difference?  
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work, and with the view of Wittgenstein (and some of his other 
followers, e.g. Masterman and Spärck Jones), that the meaning of words 
depends on how they are used, and that “meaning is other words”.  
It is tempting to say if we restrict ‘language’ to verbal or written, 
serial human natural languages such as English, Chinese, etc., then 
thought is possible without language: People can solve some kinds of 
problems using spatial reasoning and perception that are at least not 
easy to express in English. Children can display intelligence and 
thinking even if they haven't yet learned a language such as English. 
Pinker (1995) cites medical and psychological evidence showing 
thought and intelligence are not identical to the ability to understand 
spoken, natural languages.  
Pinker also argues against the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis that language 
determines and limits our thinking abilities, providing a variety of 
arguments and evidence to refute a strict interpretation of Sapir-Whorf. 
On the other hand, Boroditsky & Prinz (2008) discuss evidence that 
“statistical regularities found in natural languages (e.g., English, 
Russian, Kuuk, Thaayorre) play an important role in constructing and 
constituting thought, and that speakers of different natural languages 
may in fact think in interestingly different ways.” 
There is an elegant argument that concepts must be expressed as 
sentences in a mental language (viz. Jackendoff, 1989): Since natural 
language sentences can describe an effectively unlimited number of 
concepts, and the brain is finite, concepts must be represented internally 
within the mind as structures within a combinatorial system, or 
language. Jackendoff (1983 et seq.) developed a theory of conceptual 
semantics to provide a linguistic description of concepts corresponding 
to the semantics of natural languages. 
Pinker (2007, p. 150) agrees human intelligence may rely on 
conceptual semantics as an internal language of thought (“mentalese”) 
distinct from spoken natural languages: 
“The theory of conceptual semantics, which proposes that word 
senses are mentally represented as expressions in a richer and 
more abstract language of thought, stands at the center of this 
circle, compatible with all of the complications.” 
Spoken natural languages may be seen as ways of "serializing" 
mentalese concepts for communication between people. The 
psychological experiments cited against the equivalence of language 
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and thought may only show cases where the mechanisms for spoken 
language are impaired, while the mechanisms for mentalese continue to 
function, or vice versa. 
The expressive capabilities of natural languages should be matched 
by expressive capabilities of mentalese, or else by Jackendoff's argument 
the mentalese could not be used to represent the concepts expressed in 
natural language. The ability to express arbitrarily large, recursively-
structured sentences is plausibly just as important in a mentalese as it is 
in English. The general-purpose ability to metaphorically weld concepts 
together across arbitrary, multiple domains is plausibly just as 
important in a mentalese as it is in English. Sloman’s (2008) ‘meta-
semantic competences’ described above are just as important in a 
mentalese as they are in English. 
This is not to say mentalese would have the same limitations as 
spoken English, or any particular spoken natural language. In 
mentalese, sentences could have more complex, non-sequential, 
graphical structures not physically permitted in speech, and indeed this 
thesis will use hierarchical list structures for representing English 
syntax, to facilitate conceptual processing. 
2.2.2 What Does Meaning Mean? 
To address this question, this section briefly discusses Peirce and 
Wittgenstein’s theories of understanding and meaning. Wilks et al. 
(1996a) survey the “history of meaning” including views of other 
thinkers. Nirenburg & Raskin (2004) discuss the evolution of formal 
representations for semantics and ontologies. 
Besides understanding natural language, Peirce also considered 
understanding of phenomena in general, e.g. developing and using 
explanations of how (by what cause) and why (for what purpose) 
something happens or is done. Peirce discussed language as a system of 
signs, and wrote: 14 
“A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to 
somebody for something in some respect or capacity. It 
                                                          
14 Reprinted by permission of the publisher from Collected Papers of 
Charles Sanders Peirce: Volume II, Elements of Logic edited by Charles 
Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, p.135, Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, Copyright © 1932, 1960 by the 
President and Fellows of Harvard College. 
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addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person 
an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. That sign 
which it creates I call the interpretant of the first sign. The sign 
stands for something, its object.” (Peirce, CP 2.228)  
This may be taken as a general description of the process of 
understanding something. The initial sign (thing to be understood) is 
what Peirce calls the representamen – It is typically something external 
in the environment. It may be a symbol printed on paper (such as a 
Chinese symbol for “lamp”  ), or smoke perceived at a distance, or to 
use Atkin’s (2010) example a molehill in one’s lawn, or a natural 
language utterance (such as “the cat is on the mat”), or anything else 
that is a perception from the environment. 
The process of understanding the representamen leads the mind to 
conclude it stands for (or represents, or suggests the existence of) 
something, called the object. The object of the Chinese symbol might be 
a real lamp, the object of the smoke might be a fire that produces it, the 
object suggested by the molehill could be a mole that created it, the 
object of the natural language utterance could be a cat on a mat, etc. 
So, from Peirce’s perspective, the process of understanding a sign or 
representamen involves developing an explanation for the meaning or 
cause of the sign. Peirce used the term abduction to refer to reasoning 
that develops explanations: 
“The surprising fact, C, is observed; 
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course, 
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true.”  
(Peirce, CP 5.189) 15 
Understanding involves developing explanations for what is 
observed. This applies to both understanding natural language, and 
understanding in general for human intelligence (cf. Hobbs et al., 1993; 
Bunt & Black, 2000). 
According to Peirce, the mind does not go directly from the 
                                                          
15 Reprinted by permission of the publisher from Collected Papers of 
Charles Sanders Peirce: Volume V, Pragmatism and Pragmaticism edited by 
Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, p.117, Cambridge, Mass.: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Copyright © 1934, 1961 by 
the President and Fellows of Harvard College. 
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representamen to the object in developing an explanation for what is 
observed. The mind internally creates another sign, called the 
interpretant, which it uses to refer to the object. 16 Vogt (2000 et seq.) has 
used computer simulation of the Peircean triad, in studies of symbol 
grounding and language learning; also see Vogel & Woods (2006).  
We do not have to know precisely how this internal sign is 
represented in the brain, to believe some pattern of physical information 
must exist in the brain to represent an internal sign, providing a link 
between the external representamen and the external object. 
Importantly, we do not have to believe there is just one kind of physical 
information pattern used to represent all internal meanings – the brain 
could use a variety of different physical information media and patterns 
for representing meanings. 
Though Wittgenstein (1922) presented a purely logical description of 
the relationship between language and reality in Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus, he later restated much of his philosophy about language 
in Philosophical Investigations. A central focus of Investigations was the 
idea that the meaning of words depends on how they are used, and that 
words in general do not have a single, precisely defined meaning. As an 
example, Wittgenstein considered the word “game” and showed it has 
many different, related meanings. What matters is that people are able 
to use the word successfully in communication about many different 
things. Wittgenstein introduced the concept of a “language game” as an 
activity in which words are given meanings according to the roles that 
words perform in interactions between people. 17 
It does not appear there is any fundamental contradiction between 
Wittgenstein and Peirce. Rather, what Wittgenstein emphasized was 
that an external representamen may stand for many different external 
objects. From a Peircean perspective this implies the representamen 
may have many different internal signs, or interpretants, corresponding 
to different external meanings in different situations. A Peircean 
understanding process needs to support disambiguation (via abductive 
                                                          
16  Viz. Atkin’s (2010) discussion of how Peirce’s theory of signs 
evolved throughout his lifetime. 
17 Vogt (2005) showed that perceptually grounded language games 
can lead to the emergence of compositional syntax in language 
evolution. Also see Bachwerk & Vogel (2011) regarding language 
evolution for coordination of tasks. 
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inference) of different interpretants to understand what a usage of an 
external sign means in a particular context. 
These considerations can be summarized by saying that just as a 
word like “game” can have many different meanings, the word 
meaning itself can in principle have many different meanings. Hence 
the TalaMind architecture is open to many different ways of 
representing meanings at the three conceptual levels, for example: 
o Linguistic Level: Linguistic Concept Structures 
• Concepts represented as sentences in a language of 
thought 
• Semantic domains – Collections of sentences about a 
topic. 
• Mental spaces, conceptual blends 
• Scenarios for simulation of hypothetical contexts 
• Grammatical constructions for translation and 
disambiguation of linguistic meanings 
• Executable concepts for representing and developing 
complex behaviors 
• Finite state automata for representing simple behavioral 
systems 
• Formal logic representations, e.g. predicate calculus or 
conceptual graphs. 
o Archetype Level: Cognitive Concept Structures 
• Idealized Cognitive Models (Lakoff, 1987) 
• Conceptual Spaces as topological or metric structures 
(e.g. convex regions) in multiple quality dimensions 
(Gärdenfors, 2000), with support for prototype effects, 
similarity detection, etc. 
• Radial Categories (Lakoff, 1987) 
• Image Schemas (Johnson, 1987; Talmy, 2000) 
• Semantic Frames (Fillmore, 1975 et seq.) and Conceptual 
Domains (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Langacker, 1987) 
• Perceptual Symbols (Barsalou, 1993 et seq.) 
o Associative Level: Associations & Data Analysis 
• Neural networks (e.g. Hinton, 2006) 
• Expressions or data structures induced via machine 
learning algorithms (e.g. Valiant, 2013) 
• Bayesian networks (e.g. Pearl, 1988 et seq.) 
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This is just an illustrative, not exhaustive list of different ways to 
represent meanings at different conceptual levels, which will be 
discussed in greater detail as needed in the following chapters. Note 
that a representation of meaning may span levels and forms of 
representation, e.g. a linguistic concept structure may reference a 
cognitive concept structure. Also, some authors may disagree with this 
placement at different levels. Thus, Fauconnier and Turner might argue 
mental spaces and conceptual blends should be at the archetype level. 
While conditional probabilities fit the associative level, Bayesian 
networks may represent semantics of sentences at the linguistic level, in 
future research. Within the scope of this thesis, precisely how concepts 
are represented in the archetype and associative levels is not crucial. A 
Tala agent may not need to include all the different forms of concept 
representation listed above, particularly at the archetype level, since 
these overlap in representing concepts. Ways to unify representations 
within or across the three levels may be a worthwhile topic for future 
research. 
2.2.3 Does Human-Level AI Require Embodiment? 
Though the TalaMind approach focuses on the linguistic level of 
conceptual processing, a Tala agent also includes environment 
interaction systems with lower levels of conceptual processing, as 
discussed in §1.5 and shown in Figure 1-1. Consequently a Tala agent 
can in principle be embodied in a physical environment. So, to the 
extent that understanding natural language requires embodiment, the 
TalaMind approach supports this. 
However, embodiment does not require that an intelligent system 
must have physical capabilities exactly matching those of human 
beings. This would imply human-level intelligence requires the human 
physical body, and could only be possessed by people. Yet we know 
people have human-level intelligence even when born without senses 
like sight or hearing. Also, the unexplained features of human-level 
intelligence, and in particular the higher-level mentalities, can be 
described in terms that are essentially independent of the human body 
(viz. §2.1.2).18  So, there should be no reason in principle why human-
                                                          
18 Perhaps the only exception would be the first-person, subjective 
experience of consciousness. Yet the possibility that other species might 
possess human-level intelligence suggests that human-level intelligence 
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level artificial intelligence must require human physical embodiment.  
And we should note that embodiment for humans is not what 
people normally think it to be: We do not have direct knowledge of 
external reality, nor even direct knowledge of our bodies. Instead, we 
have an internal, projected reality (Jackendoff, 1983) constructed from our 
perceptions of external reality, and our perceptions of our bodies. This 
can be appreciated by considering various illusions, both in our 
perceptions of external reality, and in our perceptions of our bodies (e.g. 
virtual body illusions). Such illusions show our perceptions are internal 
constructs that indirectly represent external reality and our bodies, 
sometimes incompletely, inaccurately or paradoxically. It is only 
because our perceptions generally track reality very closely, that we 
normally think we directly perceive reality. 
The TalaMind approach accepts that a language of thought must be 
embodied by reference to perceptions of an environment, yet that such 
perceptions are generally incomplete and potentially inaccurate. 
Understanding of concepts related to the environment, one’s body, or 
physical systems in general, can be achieved indirectly by representing 
knowledge of physical systems, and reasoning within and about such 
representations. Such reasoning may amount to a mental simulation. A 
variety of different kinds of representations may be useful, e.g. image 
schemas, finite state automata for representing behaviors of simple 
systems, mental spaces, conceptual simulation, etc. These 
representations may exist within a Tala agent’s projected reality or 
elsewhere in its conceptual framework. 
In these pages, this idea is called virtual embodiment. It allows an 
intelligent system to understand and reason about physical reality, and 
to transcend the limitations of its physical body (or lack thereof) in 
reasoning about the environment – perhaps in the same way a person 
blind from birth may reason about sight, without direct experience or 
memory of sight. The projected reality of a TalaMind conceptual 
framework will be virtual and indirect, though it could in principle be 
                                                                                                                                
does not require the subjective experience of what it is like to have a 
human body. Thus it’s clear other species (e.g. dolphins, whales, octopi, 
elephants, ...) have substantial intelligence and yet have very different 
physical senses and embodiment. And it’s at least conceivable that 
extraterrestrial intelligence may exist comparable or superior to 
humans, yet with different physical bodies from humans. 
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interfaced with physical reality (viz. §4.2.2.4). 
To appreciate how limited our perceptions are of reality, consider 
that the frequency of visible light ranges from about 400 to 800 trillion 
cycles per second, while our nerve cells can only transmit about 1000 
pulses per second. So, the reality we see visually is producing waves 
that oscillate hundreds of billions of times faster than we can perceive. 
The processing of information by 140 million neurons in each 
hemisphere’s visual cortex, as well as many more neurons elsewhere, 
enables a 100 billion neuron human brain to perceive a visual projected 
reality with great complexity. Yet what we perceive is only a miniscule 
fraction of the complexity of events around us, happening at different 
scales of space and time within external reality. 
Also, what we perceive of reality is qualitatively different from what 
actually exists. For example, we now know that what we perceive as 
solid objects are in reality almost entirely empty space pervaded by 
force fields and subatomic particles (Close, 2009). So, our human 
projected reality is inaccurate at the lowest levels of physics, though it is 
pragmatically very accurate at our day-to-day level of existence. 
Our ability to have this knowledge, and to transcend our projected 
reality, is an example of our own virtual embodiment: It is only by 
applying human-level intelligence that after generations of thought and 
experiment we have been able to find ways to virtually perceive aspects 
of reality that are either too small or too fast for us to perceive in 
projected reality (such as viruses, microbes, molecules, atoms, 
subatomic particles, the speed of light, etc.) or too large or too slow for 
our projected reality (such as Earth’s precession about its axis, evolution 
of species, continental drift, the Sun’s lifecycle, the size and age of the 
universe, etc.) 
2.3 Relation of Thesis Approach to Previous Research 
2.3.1 Formal, Logical Approaches 
As noted in §1.1, one broad stream of research related to 
understanding intelligence has focused on formal logical approaches to 
representation and processing. If one accepts the physical symbol 
systems hypothesis (§1.4.4), then one may argue these approaches have 
in principle the ability to support intelligent systems, based on their 
generality for representing symbolic systems. So this thesis accepts the 
potential value of formal theoretic approaches, and acknowledges much 
has been accomplished with them. Further, the TalaMind architecture is 
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open to use of formal, logical systems within it, including systems based 
on predicate calculus, conceptual graphs, etc. 
Thus, we note in particular the work of Hobbs et al. (1993 et seq.) 
regarding “Interpretation as Abduction” in understanding natural 
language using first order predicate calculus; the work of Sowa (1984 et 
seq.) and others on conceptual graph structures; and McCarthy’s papers 
on artificial intelligence cited in the Bibliography, as research directions 
to consider in future extensions of the TalaMind approach. 
However, the formal, logical approaches do not seem to easily 
provide the broad range of representations we express with natural 
language, e.g. features of natural language like self-reference, meta-
expressions, metaphor, mental spaces, conceptual blends, idioms, modal 
verbs, verb aspect and tense, de dicto and de re expressions, metonymy, 
anaphora, mutual knowledge, etc. – though in principle each of these 
features should be possible to represent within formal, logical 
approaches, and many of them have been investigated. For instance, 
Vogel (2011) discusses a formal model of first-order belief revision to 
represent dynamic semantics for metaphors and generic statements. 
Doyle (1980) described a formal logic approach to reflection and 
deliberation, discussed further in §2.3.5. 
In discussing abduction in natural language understanding, Hobbs 
(2004) lists the following requirements for a language of thought to 
support commonsense reasoning: 
“Conjunction: There is an additive effect (P ˄ Q) of two distinct 
concepts (P and Q) being activated at the same time. 
“Modus Ponens: The activation of one concept (P) triggers the 
activation of another concept (Q) because of the existence of 
some structural relation between them (P → Q). 
“Recognition of Obvious Contradictions: The recognition of 
contradictions in general is undecidable, but we have no trouble 
with the easy ones, for example, that cats aren't dogs. 
“Predicate-Argument Relations: Concepts can be related to 
other concepts in several different ways. For example, we can 
distinguish between a dog biting a man (bite(D, M)) and a man 
biting a dog (bite(M, D)). 
“Universal Instantiation (or Variable Binding): We can keep 
separate our knowledge of general (universal) principles (“All 
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men are mortal”) and our knowledge of their instantiations for 
particular individuals (“Socrates is a man” and “Socrates is 
mortal”). 
Hobbs writes “Any plausible proposal for a language of thought 
must have at least these features, and once you have these features you 
have first-order logic”. He notes higher-order languages can be recast 
into first-order logic using reification (Hobbs, 1985). In addition, he says 
the logic for a language of thought must be nonmonotonic: It must be 
possible for us to change what we believe to be the truth value of a 
statement, if we gain more information. Hobbs (2004) advocates 
abduction (reasoning to determine best explanations) to support 
commonsense, nonmonotonic reasoning for a language of thought. 
Hobbs et al. (1993) discuss how abduction with first order logic can be 
used to solve a variety of problems in natural language understanding, 
including reference resolution, ambiguity resolution, metonymy 
resolution, and recognizing discourse structure. Hobbs (2004) discusses 
how it can be used to recognize a speaker’s plan or intentions. 
However, Hobbs (2004) only claimed a language of thought must 
have at least the features he listed. While these features are necessary, it 
does not appear they are sufficient in general for a language of thought. 
Chapter 3 will present reasons why a language of thought should be a 
higher level language than first order logic, though it may sometimes be 
worthwhile to translate into first order logic. 
Wilks et al. (1996b) criticize Hobbs’ approach and contend that 
abduction as a form of logical proof is not adequate for semantic 
interpretation. They note that given a false premise, one can prove 
anything, so abduction needs to filter out false hypotheses. Abduction 
needs to be guided by meta-knowledge and meta-reasoning, to 
determine which hypotheses are most relevant. In general, their 
criticisms show the importance of viewing abduction as providing 
explanations, rather than just logical proofs – a perspective consistent 
with Peirce’s view of abduction, and with Wittgenstein’s view of 
meaning as involving explanations (viz. §2.2.2). 
2.3.2 Cognitive Approaches 
If formal, logical approaches are one broad stream of research 
related to understanding intelligence and natural language semantics, 
then cognitive approaches may be considered as ‘everything else’. This 
includes a wide variety of approaches by researchers in Artificial 
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Intelligence, Linguistics, Anthropology, Psychology, Neuroscience, 
Philosophy, and Education.19  
In AI research, cognitive approaches include Minsky’s society of 
mind architecture, Wilks’ work on preference semantics, Schank’s work 
on narrative case-based dynamic memory structures, Sloman’s (1971 et 
seq.) research, Sowa’s cognitive architecture, and work by many 
researchers on neural networks. 
Outside of AI, linguists, psychologists, philosophers, neuroscientists 
and researchers in other fields have developed approaches to 
understanding intelligence and natural language. Many of these 
researchers would not agree their approaches can be replicated by 
computers: There is no general agreement among cognitive scientists 
that human-level AI is possible. Perhaps the only general agreement 
within cognitive science is that what happens within the human brain 
cannot be explained simply by observing external behavior, i.e. 
behaviorist psychology is not sufficient, and one must consider internal 
information and processes in the brain, to understand the mind. 
The TalaMind approach is consistent in many respects with 
cognitive linguistics research on “embodied construction grammars”, 
such as the ECG work of Feldman, Bergen, Chang et al. (2002 et seq.) or 
the research of Steels, de Beule et al. (2005 et seq.) on Fluid Construction 
Grammar. ECG provides a computable approach to construction 
grammar, with embodiment represented via simulation of discrete 
events. ECG also has grounding in a connectionist, neural theory of 
language. ECG is relevant to this thesis by providing an existence proof 
that a computational approach may be considered “embodied”. Fluid 
Construction Grammar research has focused on demonstrating the 
evolution and emergence of language, using constraint processing for 
identification and matching in embodied systems, which is an 
interesting topic for future research in the TalaMind approach, outside 
the scope of this thesis. 
One difference of the TalaMind approach appears to be that previous 
approaches do not provide constructions for an internal language of 
thought. Rather, they provide constructions for external natural 
language parsing and generation, with internal representations of 
semantics that in general have been somewhat restricted, and 
                                                          
19 Fields included within Cognitive Science, by the Cognitive Science 
Society. 
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apparently not described as languages of thought.  
Many researchers in cognitive linguistics have not supported a 
language of thought hypothesis, but have developed multiple other 
descriptions for the nature of internal conceptualizations. 20  Some 
cognitive linguists have expressly rejected a computational language of 
thought hypothesis. Thus, Lakoff (1987, p. 343) presented arguments 
against the viability of an artificial mentalese, concluding: “[T]hose who 
really believe in the mind-as-machine paradigm, in computational 
realism, in objectivist AI, and in the idea that the symbols in a computer 
language really can be ‘internal representations of external reality’… are 
simply wrong”. However, Lakoff  leaves the door open that “something 
like the experientialist approach…to what AI researchers call 
representations and what I have called cognitive models will mesh 
better with empirically responsible AI research.”  
Evans (2009) presents a cognitive linguistics account of meaning 
construction in natural language called Lexical Concepts and Cognitive 
Models (LCCM) theory, which is consistent with the TalaMind 
approach. He writes: 
“LCCM Theory suggests that rather than the semantic 
representation encoded by language being equated with 
conceptual structure, semantic structure takes a distinct form. 
Specifically, semantic structure, unlike conceptual structure, is 
directly encoded in language, and takes a specialized and 
highly elaborate form: what I refer to as lexical concepts. While 
lexical concepts are concepts, they encode a highly schematic 
form of semantic representation, one that is specialized for 
being directly encoded in and externalized via language. In 
contrast, conceptual structure takes a qualitatively distinct form, 
which I model in terms of the theoretical construct of the 
cognitive model.” 
Evans describes lexical concepts as being based on construction 
grammar, so that by extension it appears his semantic structures can 
include multi-word expressions, e.g. sentences. He describes LCMM 
                                                          
20 Thus the terms mentalese and language of thought are not mentioned 
in either of the comprehensive texts on cognitive linguistics by Evans & 
Green (2006) or by Croft & Cruse (2004). 
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cognitive models as being similar to Barsalou’s (1999) description of 
simulators and perceptual symbols (§4.2.2.4), and encompassing frames 
and simulations. Thus, Evans’ lexical concepts correspond to the 
linguistic level of Figure 1-1, and his cognitive models for conceptual 
structure correspond to elements of the archetype level (although not 
identical to Lakoff’s idealized cognitive models). 
LCCM theory is consistent with the TalaMind approach in using 
conceptual structures based on natural language at the linguistic level, 
interacting with an archetype level. LCCM theory is different from the 
TalaMind approach in several respects. For instance, LCCM is not a 
theory of how to achieve human-level AI; it does not describe a 
conceptual framework at the linguistic level; it does not include 
Hypotheses I and III of this thesis; it does not discuss support of higher-
level mentalities.  
2.3.3 Approaches to Human-Level Artificial Intelligence 
This section gives some further discussion of research toward 
human-level AI, augmenting the brief discussion in §§1.1 and 1.2. 
2.3.3.1 Sloman 
Sloman (1978) published a high-level “sketch of an intelligent 
mechanism” to describe “the overall architecture of a computing system 
which could cope with a variety of domains of knowledge in a flexible 
and creative way, so that, like people, it can use available information, 
skills and procedures in order to solve new problems, or take decisions 
in new situations, in ways which were not explicitly foreseen or planned 
for by the programmer.” He wrote that to achieve artificial intelligence 
comparable to an adult human, it would be necessary to “produce a 
baby mind with the ability to absorb a culture through years of 
interaction with others.” In general, Sloman’s (1978) discussion and his 
subsequent work have been in a similar direction to this thesis, though 
with different focus. Sloman’s (2008) discussion of “Generalised 
Languages” for innate representation (cf. §2.2.1) is similar though not 
identical to the TalaMind natural language mentalese hypothesis. 
2.3.3.2 Minsky 
2.3.3.2.1 The Society of Mind Paradigm 
As noted in §1.5, the TalaMind hypotheses do not require a ‘society 
of mind’ architecture, but it is consistent with the hypotheses and 
natural to implement a society of mind at the linguistic level. Since 
Subject Review: Human-Level AI & Natural Language 
44 
Minsky (1986) described the society of mind as a theory of human-level 
intelligence, this section provides a brief discussion of his ideas and of 
similarities and contrasts with the TalaMind approach. 
Minsky wrote: 21 
"I'll call 'Society of Mind' this scheme in which each mind is 
made of many smaller processes. These we'll call agents.22 Each 
mental agent by itself can only do some simple thing that needs 
no mind or thought at all. Yet when we join these agents in 
societies - in certain very special ways - this leads to true 
intelligence."  
Singh (2003) gave an overview of the history and details of Minsky's 
theory, noting that Minsky and Papert began work on this idea in the 
early 1970’s. Minsky’s description and choice of the term ‘society of 
mind’ were evocative, inspiring research on cognitive architectures 
more broadly than he described, to the point that the idea may be 
considered a paradigm for research. Thus, the term may be used in 
either of two senses: 
1. The society of mind as proposed by Minsky, including a 
specific set of methods for organizing mental agents and 
communicating information, i.e. K-lines, connection lines, 
nomes, nemes, frames, frame-arrays, transframes, etc. 
2. A society of mind as a multiagent system, open to methods 
for organizing agents and communication between agents, 
other than the methods specified by Minsky, e.g. including 
languages of thought.  
This thesis uses ‘society of mind’ with the second, broader sense, 
though not precluding future research on use of Minsky’s proposed 
methods for organization and communication within TalaMind 
architectures. 
To give a few examples of the second perspective, Doyle (1983) 
described a mathematical framework for specifying the structure of 
                                                          
21 Quotations in this section are used by permission of Simon & 
Schuster Publishing Group from The Society of Mind by Marvin L. 
Minsky. Copyright © 1985, 1986 by Marvin Minsky. All rights reserved. 
22 In other sections, the term ‘subagent’ will refer to an agent in a 
society of mind within a Tala agent (§1.5). 
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societies of mind having alternative languages of thought. 23  More 
recently, Wright (2000) discussed the need for an economy of mind in 
an adaptive, multiagent society of mind. Bosse & Treur (2006) gave a 
formal logic discussion of the extent to which collective processes in a 
multiagent society can be interpreted as single agent processes. Shoham 
& Leyton-Brown (2008) provide an extensive text on multiagent 
systems, including a chapter on communication between agents. Sowa 
(2011) describes communication of conceptual graphs between 
heterogeneous agents in a framework inspired by Minsky’s society of 
mind.  
Minsky described a society of mind as an organization of diverse 
processes and representations, rejecting the idea that there is a single, 
uniform process or representation that can achieve human-level 
intelligence: 
 “What magical trick makes us intelligent? The trick is that there 
is no trick. The power of intelligence stems from our vast 
diversity, not from any single, perfect principle. “ (Minsky, 
1986, p.308) 
This thesis is compatible with Minsky’s tenet – the TalaMind 
architecture is envisioned to enable integration of diverse processes and 
representations. 
However, issues related to a language of thought are an area of 
difference between the TalaMind approach and Minsky’s theory. He 
considered that because agents would be simple and diverse, in general 
they would not be able to understand a common language. Agents 
would need different representations and languages, which would tend 
to be very specialized and limited.  He wrote (1986, pp.66-67): 
“If agent P asked any question of an unrelated agent Q, how 
could Q sense what was asked, or P understand its reply? Most 
pairs of agents can’t communicate at all.  …The smaller two 
languages are, the harder it will be to translate between them. 
This is not because there are too many meanings, but because 
there are too few. The fewer things an agent does, the less likely 
                                                          
23 As example languages, Doyle discussed logic (FOL – Weyhrauch, 
1980), list structures and rational algebraic functions (CONLAN – 
Sussman & Steele, 1980), and nodes and links (NETL – Fahlman, 1979). 
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that what another agent does will correspond to any of these 
things. And if two agents have nothing in common, no 
translation is conceivable.” 
Thus, Minsky did not describe agents in a society of mind sharing an 
interlingua. He described other, lower-level ways for agents to partially 
communicate, which he called K-lines and connection lines. To 
exchange more complex descriptions, Minsky proposed an ‘inverse-
grammar-tactic’ mechanism for communication by re-constructing 
frame representations (viz. Singh, 2003). 
In contrast, the TalaMind approach enables agents in a society of 
mind to share a language of thought based on the syntax of a natural 
language. 24 Two agents can communicate to the extent that they can 
process concepts using common words, and can share pointers to 
referents and senses of the words. Pattern-matching can be used to 
enable an agent to recognize concepts it can process, that were created 
by other agents. This will be discussed and illustrated further in 
Chapters 3, 5, and 6. An agent in a society of mind may reason directly 
with concepts expressed in the Tala mentalese, or it may translate to and 
from other representations and languages, if needed. 
Chapter 3 will also discuss how the Tala mentalese can support 
representing and reasoning with underspecification in natural language. 
This is compatible with Minsky’s discussion of ambiguity in thought 
within a society of mind: 
“We often find it hard to ‘express our thoughts’—to summarize 
our mental states or put our ideas into words. It is tempting to 
blame this on the ambiguity of words, but the problem is 
deeper than that. Thoughts themselves are ambiguous! …We can 
tolerate the ambiguity of words because we are already so 
competent at coping with the ambiguity of thoughts.” (Minsky, 
1986, p.207) 
Although Minsky attributed the ambiguity of thought to the act of 
                                                          
24 This corresponds somewhat to the idea of a “network of question-
answerers” described in Jackson (1974, p.328) which suggested a form 
of emergence for such systems, in the potential for a network of 
question-answerers to answer a question that could not be answered by 
a single agent in the system. 
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expression being a process that simplifies descriptions of mental states, 
the TalaMind approach allows individual thoughts to be ambiguous, 
just as natural language sentences can be.  For instance, in the TalaMind 
approach the agents in a society of mind could communicate and 
process the thought “In most countries most politicians can fool most people 
on almost every issue most of the time” (Hobbs, 1983) without needing to 
consider all the sentence’s different logical interpretations, and without 
needing to consider nonsensical interpretations (viz. §3.6.3.7). 
Per §1.6, a society of mind will only be developed in this thesis to a 
limited extent, as needed to illustrate the thesis approach. 
2.3.3.2.2 Theoretical Issues for Baby Machines 
Minsky (2006, p. 178-182) is not optimistic about the prospects for 
the ‘baby machine’ approach to human-level AI. He cites several 
previous research efforts toward general-purpose learning systems and 
says: 25 
“… each such system  made progress at first but eventually 
stopped extending itself. I suspect that this usually happened 
because these programs 26 failed to develop good new ways to 
represent knowledge. Indeed, inventing good ways to represent 
knowledge has long been a major goal in computer science.  
“… each human child makes extensive use of … high-level 
structures to develop our uniquely human ways to represent 
new kinds of knowledge and processes. It seems clear to me 
that this is why the attempts to make baby-machines have led to 
unimpressive results: you cannot learn things that you cannot 
represent. 
“… I do not mean to dismiss all prospects of building a baby-
machine, but I suspect that any such system would develop too 
                                                          
25 Quotations in this section are used by permission of Simon & 
Schuster Publishing Group from The Emotion Machine by Marvin L. 
Minsky. Copyright © 2006 by Marvin Minsky. All rights reserved. 
26 The previous research efforts cited by Minsky appear to all be 
experiments in general-purpose learning systems based on lower-level 
representation and search methods. None appear to consider 
representation of concepts using a conceptual language with syntax 
based on natural language.  
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slowly unless (or until) it was equipped with adequate ways to 
represent knowledge.”  
The Tala mentalese will have the same extensibility as natural 
language, for developing new representations of concepts. So at least in 
principle, a Tala agent should be able to represent and discover any 
concepts that can be expressed via natural language, once this approach 
has been fully developed and implemented. 
In addition and related to the knowledge representation problem, 
Minsky (2006) cites other problems for baby-machines and general 
learning systems: 
“The Optimization Paradox: The better a system already works, 
the more likely each change will make it worse – so it gets more 
difficult for it to find more ways to improve itself. 
“The Investment Principle: The better a certain process works, the 
more we will tend to rely on it, and the less we will be further 
inclined to develop new alternatives – especially when a new 
technique won’t yield good results until you become proficient 
with it. 
“The Complexity Barrier: The more that the parts of a system 
interact, the more likely each change will have unexpected side 
effects.” 
These are important issues, addressable with an appropriate 
language for concept representation, and a suitable conceptual 
framework and conceptual processes. Indeed, in discussing these 
problems Minsky (2006, p.181) notes the importance of “language-like 
systems” that enable societies of “higher animals” to overcome such 
learning problems more quickly than genetic evolution can. We’ll return 
to these issues later, in §§3.7.2.3 and 4.2.6. 
2.3.3.3 McCarthy 
Two papers by McCarthy (2007, 2008) considered the general 
problem of how to achieve human-level artificial intelligence. The first 
gave a general discussion of how to go “from here to human-level AI”. 
He wrote “The key to reaching human-level AI is making systems that operate 
successfully in the common sense informatic situation”, which he defined as 
the situation in which: known facts are incomplete; there are no a priori 
limits on what facts are relevant; it cannot be decided in advance what 
Relation of Thesis Approach to Previous Research 
49 
phenomena are to be considered; concepts and theories are approximate 
and cannot be fully defined; nonmonotonic reasoning is need to reach 
conclusions; introspection may be needed about the system’s mental 
state. 
Though McCarthy supported extending mathematical logic 
formalisms to operate in common sense informatic situations, he noted 
some other approach might work: 
“Since it seems clear that humans don't use logic as a basic 
internal representation formalism, maybe something else will 
work better for AI. Researchers have been trying to find this 
something else since the 1950s but still haven't succeeded in 
getting anything that is ready to be applied to the common 
sense informatic situation. Maybe they will eventually succeed. 
However, I think the problems listed [below] will apply to any 
approach to human-level AI.” 
McCarthy (2007) identified the following problems for any approach to 
human-level AI:  
• Representation of common sense knowledge of the world, in 
particular the effects of actions and other events; 
• Epistemologically adequate languages that can be used to 
express what a person or robot can learn about the world; 
• Elaboration tolerance – the ability to add information without 
starting over in the representation of previous information; 
• Nonmonotonic reasoning – the ability to reason with partial 
information, where additional information may change one’s 
conclusions; 
• Contexts as objects – the ability to reason about contexts “from 
the outside” about contexts as well as internally within a 
context; the ability to transcend the current context of thinking 
and reason about it; 
• Introspection – the ability for a system to reason about its 
mental state and processes; 
• Action – reasoning about strategies of action, considering 
multiple actors, concurrent and continuous events; 
• Heuristics – the ability to give programs domain and problem 
dependent heuristic advice. 
Humans have historically used natural language to describe and 
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help solve the above problems, and natural language already possesses 
syntax to represent their semantics. Hence these problems may be 
plausibly represented and solved within a human-level AI, using a 
mentalese with the expressive scope of natural language, as proposed in 
this thesis. 
McCarthy (2008) discussed the design of a baby-machine approach 
to human-level artificial intelligence. In general, his discussion is 
consistent with the approach of this thesis, which would agree the 
system needs to have an initial set of concepts corresponding to innate 
knowledge about the world. He lists several kinds of innate conceptual 
knowledge the system should have, which in general could be 
supported in the TalaMind architecture. It appears the major difference 
between McCarthy’s perspective and this thesis is regarding the nature 
of the language of thought that a well-designed baby-machine should 
have. McCarthy wrote that grammar is secondary, that the language of 
thought should be based on logic, and not on natural language. 
Responses to his objections will be presented in Chapter 4, along with 
discussion of other theoretical objections to the TalaMind approach. 
2.3.3.4 Reverse-Engineering the Brain 
Markram (2006) describes the ongoing Blue Brain project, for which 
the long-term goal is to perform detailed, biologically accurate 
computer simulations of a human brain’s neural processing. This 
approach, reverse-engineering the brain, appears to have the potential 
to achieve human-level AI. Arguably, the physical processes used by 
the brain to achieve intelligence could be simulated by computers – 
especially since if needed, emerging technologies for computation could 
be applied, e.g. nanotechnology, quantum computation, etc. However, it 
is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss the technical feasibility of 
this approach. At minimum the Blue Brain project, and related research, 
should yield insights into human brain function, and could also help 
support other research toward human-level AI. For example, such 
research may identify computational neural modules that could be 
simulated in the associative level of a Tala agent, perhaps supporting 
Barsalou’s perceptual symbols (§4.2.2.4). 
2.3.3.5 Cognitive Architectures & AGI 
Several authors have conducted research into cognitive architectures 
and/or ‘artificial general intelligence’ (AGI). This includes research 
discussed in Albus & Meystel (2001), Cassimatis (2002 et seq.), Doyle 
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(1980 et seq.), Forbus & Hinrichs (2006), Goertzel & Pennachin (2007), 
Laird (2008), Langley (2006), Lenat (1995), Pollock (1990 et seq.), 
Schlenoff et al. (2006), Schmidhuber (1987 et seq.), Sowa (2011), Swartout 
et al. (2006), and Wang & Goertzel (2012). In general, these efforts do not 
discuss research in the same direction as the TalaMind approach, i.e. an 
intelligence kernel using a language of thought based on the syntax of 
natural language. 
Yudkowsky (2007) advocates levels of organization in “deliberative 
general intelligence” (DGI) as a direction for future research in AGI. The 
DGI paper proposes a research direction somewhat similar to the 
TalaMind approach, although the DGI and TalaMind approaches were 
developed independently. The DGI paper does not present a prototype 
design or demonstration of its proposed approach. It includes a 
proposal for “Seed AI” that is similar to the TalaMind intelligence 
kernel hypothesis (§§1.4.1, 2.3.5). DGI’s five levels of organization map 
into the three levels of conceptual processing discussed in §1.5. In 
particular, the archetype level corresponds to DGI’s layer for 
“concepts”, and the linguistic level includes DGI’s layers for “thoughts” 
and “deliberation”.  Yudkowsky’s description of the “thoughts” layer 
(2007, p.407) is similar to the TalaMind natural language mentalese 
hypothesis (§1.4.2), and similar to Evans’ LCCM theory (§2.3.2). 
However, it appears Yudkowsky (2007, pp.458-461) does not expect that 
DGI thoughts will (at least initially) be represented as sentences in a 
natural language mentalese, nor propose representing thoughts in 
structures corresponding to parse-trees of natural language expressions, 
as this thesis discusses in §§3.3, 3.4, 3.5. Also, DGI focuses on mental 
images for reasoning. To contrast, this thesis focuses on linguistic 
reasoning, with spatial reasoning and visualization left as topics for 
future research. 
To the extent that DGI envisions internal use of concept structures 
different from the Tala natural language mentalese, its proposed 
research direction appears similar to that investigated by Sloman 
(§2.3.3.1), or to that implemented independently by Sowa’s (2011) 
VivoMind Cognitive Architecture (VCA). Sowa describes VCA as using 
conceptual graphs for communication within a society of mind 
architecture (§2.3.3.2.1), and as a scalable, efficient system supporting 
applications that include natural language processing. 
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2.3.3.6 Other Influences for Thesis Approach 
The approach proposed in this thesis has been influenced by several 
previous research efforts related to the analysis of human-level 
intelligence, including: Gärdenfors’ (2000) discussion of conceptual 
spaces; Gelernter’s (1994) discussion of focus of attention and the 
‘cognitive pulse’; Hofstadter’s (1995) discussions of fluid concepts and 
analogies; Mandler’s (1988 et seq.) study of how babies develop an 
extensible representation system with conceptual primitives. 
2.3.4 Approaches to Artificial Consciousness 
Blackmore (2011, pp.286-301) gives an overview of research on 
artificial consciousness. Much of this research has derived from work in 
robotics, and has focused on the associative level of conceptual 
processing (viz. Figure 1-1). Following is a brief summary of research: 
Aleksander (1996) writes that in 1991 he began investigating artificial 
consciousness based on neural nets. He and Morton (2007) propose five 
“axioms of being conscious”, using introspective statements:  
1. I feel as if I am at the focus of an ‘out there’ world. 
2. I can recall and imagine experiences of feeling in an out there 
world. 
3. My experiences in 2 are dictated by attention, and attention is 
involved in recall. 
4. I can imagine several ways of acting in the future. 
5. I can evaluate emotionally ways of acting into the future in 
order to act in some purposive way. 27 
Aleksander uses first person statements to address Chalmers’ (1995) 
“Hard Problem” of explaining the subjective experience of 
consciousness, by asking “What do I need to have in my head to believe 
that I am conscious?” and “What does a machine need to have for it to 
believe it is conscious?” (Aleksander 1996, p.31). 
This approach does not fully address the Hard Problem though it 
does support one answer, namely that if the subjective, first person 
aspect of consciousness is an illusion, then in principle machines could 
also have this illusion (viz. Blackmore 2011, p. 285). Of course, we are 
not interested in machines simply giving canned responses saying they 
                                                          
27  Earlier versions of these axioms were given by Aleksander & 
Dunmall (2003) and Aleksander (2005). 
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believe they are conscious: We want to be able to point to the  internal 
design of the machine and the processing within it, that supports a 
machine have perceptions of itself, developing beliefs and acting as if it 
believes it is conscious (viz. §2.1.2.8). Section 4.2.7 will discuss the 
relationship of the Hard Problem to the TalaMind approach. 
Aleksander & Morton’s five axioms may be taken as theoretical 
requirements for the TalaMind architecture to demonstrate aspects of 
consciousness, discussed further in §§3.7.6 and 4.2.7, though this thesis 
intentionally omits discussion of emotion in relation to consciousness, 
and does not focus on attention in recall – these are topics for future 
research. In addition, reflective observation is included in the list of 
theoretical requirements for TalaMind to demonstrate consciousness, 
which seems to be implicit in Aleksander’s discussions. 
Aleksander & Morton (2007) discuss “depictive architectures” to 
satisfy these axioms, focusing on the “kernel architecture” proposed by 
Aleksander (2005). They define a depiction as “a state in a system S that 
represents as accurately as required by the purposes of S the world, 
from a virtual point of view within S” and describe kernel architectures 
in terms of neural state machines. This is analogous to the TalaMind 
approach, which §3.7.6 discusses at the linguistic concept level, while 
depictive architectures are discussed at the associative concept level 
(viz. Figure 1-1). 
Aleksander (1996, 2001) accepts Searle’s arguments against symbolic 
AI, and does not appear to allow his approach to go beyond the 
associative level of concept processing. This thesis leverages 
Gärdenfors’ (1994) discussion of three levels of inductive inference 
(§1.5), and does not accept Searle’s arguments, in agreement with 
Chalmers as well as many AI researchers (viz. §4.2.4). 
Sun (1997 et seq.) describes research on learning and artificial 
consciousness, representing explicit knowledge via symbolic rules and 
implicit knowledge via neural networks. Symbolic rules can be 
extracted from neural networks, and selected via hypothesis testing, to 
support learning. He gives experimental results on performance of the 
approach in learning tasks such as the Tower of Hanoi, artificial 
grammar learning, process control, and minefield navigation. 
Chella et al. (1997 et seq.) discuss the integration of three levels of 
concept representation to support artificial consciousness, including 
symbolic concepts expressed as semantic networks (“in the tradition of 
KL-ONE”) and cognitive concepts represented via conceptual spaces 
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(Gärdenfors, 2000), with expectations at the linguistic level helping to 
guide recognition at lower levels. This is consistent with the TalaMind 
approach. 
Rosenthal’s (2005) theory of consciousness in terms of “higher-order 
thoughts” is synergistic with the TalaMind approach, though he 
discounts the value of using natural language as a representation for 
internal thoughts, claiming “Our thoughts, by contrast, seldom need to 
respect the fine-grained semantic distinctions inherent in natural 
language.” The use of natural language syntax in the Tala conceptual 
language greatly facilitates expression of higher-order thoughts, since it 
allows Tala conceptual sentences to include other sentences, nested to 
an arbitrary degree. The use of the reserved variable ?self  in 
TalaMind appears equivalent to Rosenthal’s discussion of the need for a 
first-person indexical in higher-order thoughts. Investigation of 
Rosenthal’s theory within the TalaMind approach would be an 
interesting topic for future work.  
2.3.5 Approaches to Reflection and Self-Programming 
Another perspective on artificial intelligence, related to artificial 
consciousness, is given by research on the topics of reflective and self-
programming systems. It is an old, but as yet unrealized and still largely 
unexplored idea that computer programs should be able to extend and 
modify themselves, to achieve human-level AI. 
In this thesis, self-programming is proposed by the intelligence 
kernel hypothesis (§1.4.1), which is a variant of Newell & Simon’s (1976) 
Physical Symbol System Hypothesis (§1.4.4). Other authors have 
proposed similar ideas: Schmidhuber (1987 et seq.) has investigated self-
referential, self-improving systems. Nilsson (2005) 28  proposed that 
human-level AI may need to be developed as a “core” system able to 
extend itself when immersed in an appropriate environment, and wrote 
that similar approaches were suggested  by Wegbreit, Brooks (1997), 
McCarthy, and Hawkins & Blakeslee (2004). Yudkowsky (2007) 
proposed creating “seed AI”, i.e. “an AI designed for self-
understanding, self-modification, and recursive self-improvement.” In 
2011, papers by Goertzel, Hall, Leijnen, Pissanetzky, Skaba, and Wang 
                                                          
28 Nilsson cited a private communication from Ben Wegbreit ca. 1998, 
and the 1999 version of McCarthy’s The well-designed child, cited here as 
McCarthy (2008). 
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were presented at a workshop on self-programming in AGI systems. 
Thórisson (2012) discusses a “constructivist AI” approach toward 
developing self-organizing architectures and self-generated code. 
Coincidentally, the prototype TalaMind demonstration system 
illustrates some of the architectural principles Thórisson advocates (e.g. 
temporal grounding, self-modeling, pan-architectural pattern-
matching), at least to a limited degree (§§5.4.14, 5.4.9, 5.5.3). 
Doyle (1980) discussed how a system could defeasibly perform 
causal and purposive reasoning, to reflectively modify its actions and 
reasoning. He described a conceptual language based on a variant of 
predicate calculus, in which theories could refer to theories as objects, 
and in which some concepts could be interpreted as programs. Doyle 
noted the use of predicate calculus was “inessential”, but did not 
discuss a language of thought based on the syntax of a natural 
language. His thesis did not include a prototype demonstration, though 
elements of the approach were partially implemented by himself and 
others. He expected the approach would require “machines a thousand 
times larger (and perhaps faster)” than computers available in 1980. The 
TalaMind approach is compatible with Doyle’s thesis, and following 
chapters explore similar ideas to a limited extent, as a subset of the 
TalaMind architecture. 
Smith’s (1982) doctoral thesis studied “how a computational system 
can be constructed to ‘reason’ effectively and consequentially about its 
own inference processes”. Though he focused on a limited aspect of this 
problem (procedural reflection, allowing programs to access and 
manipulate descriptions of their operations and structures), he gave 
remarks relevant to human-level AI. He stated the following “Knowledge 
Representation Hypothesis”, as descriptive of most AI research at the time: 
“Any mechanically embodied intelligent process will be 
comprised of structural ingredients that a) we as external 
observers naturally take to represent a propositional account of 
the knowledge that the overall process exhibits, and b) 
independent of such external semantical attribution, play a 
formal but causal and essential role in engendering the behavior 
that manifests that knowledge.” 
This may be considered as a variant of PSSH (§1.4.4), and describes 
much AI research up to the present. It is consistent with Hypothesis I of 
this thesis, to the extent that concepts are considered as symbolic 
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structures (expressions) that represent knowledge. Though in the 
TalaMind approach, conceptual structures may also represent 
questions, hypotheses, procedures, etc., each of these may be considered 
a form of knowledge. Thus, a question may be considered as a 
statement that something is not known. 
Smith provided the following “Reflection Hypothesis” as a statement 
guiding his research into self-reflective systems: 
“In as much as a computational process can be constructed to 
reason about an external world in virtue of comprising an 
ingredient process (interpreter) formally manipulating 
representations of that world, so too a computational process 
could be made to reason about itself in virtue of comprising an 
ingredient process (interpreter) manipulating representations of 
its own operations and structures.” 
This is also consistent with PSSH, and with Hypothesis I of this thesis. 
Thus, Hypothesis I may be seen as combining Smith’s two hypotheses 
into a single statement. 
 Smith gave general remarks about reflection and representation, 
which are consistent with the TalaMind approach and architecture. 
More specifically, he wrote: 
“The successful development of a general reflective calculus 
based on the knowledge representation hypothesis will depend 
on the prior solution of three problems: 
1. The provision of a computationally tractable and 
epistemologically adequate descriptive language, 
2. The formulation of a unified theory of computation and 
representation, and 
3. The demonstration of how a computational system can 
reason effectively and consequentially about its own 
inference processes.” 
Smith did not pursue the first problem, “ in part because it is so ill-
constrained.” This thesis adopts Hypothesis II, within the TalaMind 
architecture, to investigate the first problem.  
Regarding the second problem, Smith wrote that “every 
representation system proposed to date exemplifies what we may call a 
dual-calculus approach: a procedural calculus…is conjoined with a 
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declarative formalism (an encoding of predicate logic, frames, etc.).” He 
suggested “this dual-calculus style is unnecessary and indicative of 
serious shortcomings in our conception of the representational 
endeavor.” However, he wrote “this issue too will be largely ignored” 
in his thesis. 
In developing Hypotheses I and II within the TalaMind architecture, 
this thesis investigates a unified approach to the second problem: The 
Tala conceptual language provides a representation for both declarative 
and procedural knowledge, based on the syntax of a natural language. 
Smith’s thesis focused on the third problem he identified, discussing 
a limited aspect of this problem. He translated the higher-level problem 
of how a system could reason about its inference processes into a lower-
level problem, i.e. how a programming language could support 
procedural reflection, allowing programs to access and manipulate 
descriptions of their operations and control structures, dynamically 
affecting their interpretation at runtime. This implicitly connects 
procedural reflection with a form of self-programming. Smith showed 
how procedural reflection could be incorporated into a variant of Lisp, 
to support continuations with a variable number of arguments, improve 
support of macros, etc. Coven (1991) gave further discussion of 
reflection within functional programming languages, toward support of 
systems that could in principle reflect on their own reasoning processes 
and learning algorithms. 
Effective reflection and self-programming in human-level AI require 
computers to have what Smith called ‘semantic originality’ (in other 
literature called ‘original intentionality’), i.e. to be able to attribute 
meaning to symbols and processes independently of human 
observation. Smith (1982) noted that computers could not yet attribute 
meaning to what they do, but suggested the possibility they could do so 
in principle. Haugeland (1985) discussed the topic and its philosophical 
history at some length, and left open the possibility computers could in 
principle attribute meaning. Dretske (1985) discussed the “entrance 
requirements” for computers to ascribe meaning. Dennett (1987) argued 
that humans have no greater semantic originality than computers do in 
principle, because we are biomolecular machines constructed by 
evolution. Searle (1992) argued that computers cannot in principle 
attribute semantics – Chalmers (1996) refutes Searle’s argument. 
Regarding arguments that the meanings of computational systems are 
intrinsically derivative or attributed by humans, Smith (1996, p.10) said 
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he was “dubious about the ultimate utility (and sharpness) of this 
distinction, and also about its applicability to computers…” Section 
3.7.2.2 explains how Tala agents can have semantic originality. 
2.4 Summary 
This chapter discussed the relation of the TalaMind hypotheses to 
previous research, and presented the approach of this thesis to verifying 
whether a system achieves human-level AI. This approach (design 
inspection for support of higher-level mentalities) is different from 
previous research focused on behavioristic comparisons, e.g. via the 
Turing Test. It is also different from research that seeks to achieve 
human-level AI through general methods without specifically 
addressing higher-level mentalities. This chapter’s review of previous 
research has not found an equivalent discussion of the TalaMind 
hypotheses as a combined approach.  
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3. Analysis of Thesis Approach to Human-Level AI 
Logical analysis is not an analysis into existing 
elements. It is the tracing out of relations between 
concepts on the assumption that along with each given 
or found concept is given its negative…  
~ Charles Sanders Peirce, Collected Papers, 1.294, ca. 1905 29 
 
3.1 Overview 
Chapter 1 presented three hypotheses to address the open question: 
How could a system be designed to achieve human-level artificial intelligence? 
This chapter will analyze theoretical questions for the hypotheses, 
and discuss how a system could in principle be designed according to 
the hypotheses, to achieve the higher-level mentalities of human-level 
AI. This discussion will use elements of the TalaMind architecture to 
help answer theoretical questions, and discuss theoretical design issues 
for elements of the architecture, focusing in particular on the Tala 
conceptual language. (Appendix A gives a list of theoretical questions 
considered in this chapter.) 
Per §1.6, the analysis presented in this chapter cannot say completely 
how the proposed architecture should be designed to achieve human-
level AI. In general, the author can only present theoretical discussions 
of requirements, design and feasibility for elements of the architecture. 
Chapters 5 and 6 discuss what has been done relative to these elements 
in a prototype demonstration system. Some elements of the design of 
the prototype system will be used to illustrate the thesis approach in 
this chapter, but this chapter is not about the design of the 
demonstration system, per se. It is about more general, theoretical issues, 
which would apply to any system built according to the TalaMind 
hypotheses. 
                                                          
29 Reprinted by permission of the publisher from Collected Papers of 
Charles Sanders Peirce: Volume I, Principles of Philosophy edited by Charles 
Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, p.146, Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, Copyright © 1931, 1959 by the 
President and Fellows of Harvard College. 
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For instance, one of the theoretical issues to be considered is how to 
represent natural language syntax in a conceptual language based on 
English. Another set of issues involves how to  determine and represent 
different interpretations and implications of a sentence in the conceptual 
language. A related set of theoretical issues involves how to represent 
contexts, and what types of contexts need to be represented in the 
TalaMind architecture. For each of the higher-level mentalities, we shall 
need to consider how it can be supported by the proposed architecture, 
at least in principle theoretically. Such issues will be considered in this 
chapter as constructive questions, with answers that comprise 
theoretical arguments in favor of the thesis approach, while Chapter 4 
will address theoretical objections to the approach. 
3.2 Theoretical Requirements for TalaMind Architecture 
This section considers theoretical questions about requirements 
implied by the hypotheses presented in Chapter 1 for the Tala 
conceptual language, conceptual framework and processes, to achieve 
human-level AI. 
3.2.1 Conceptual Language 
‽ What is required for a conceptual language to serve as a 
language of thought for a system with human-level artificial 
intelligence? 
This thesis defines the term language of thought for an AI system as a 
language of symbolic expressions comprising conceptual structures that 
the system can develop or process. Arguably, a human-level AI system 
must be able to develop and process conceptual structures that 
correspond to any linguistically expressible thoughts that a human 
being can have: If there were some such thoughts that a human being 
could have, for which an artificial system could not develop and process 
corresponding conceptual structures, then these thoughts would 
comprise a realm of thinking beyond the capabilities of the artificial 
system, and it would not have human-level AI. Therefore it will be 
taken as a general principle that for a conceptual language to serve as a 
language of thought for a system with human-level AI, it should 
include expressions that can represent (correspond to) any human 
linguistically expressible thought. 
Note that we are here making a distinction between thoughts and 
emotions or sensations. While it is important for a human-level AI 
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system to have some understanding of human emotions or sensations, 
from the perspective of this thesis it is not required that a human-level 
AI system be able to experience them (cf. §§2.1.2.9 and 2.2.3). A thought 
or statement that someone has an emotion, is of course different from 
experiencing the emotion. 
‽ What is the relation of thoughts expressible in natural language 
to the range of thoughts that need to be expressible in the Tala 
conceptual language, to achieve human-level AI? 
It follows from the preceding answer that the range of thoughts that 
need to be expressible in the Tala conceptual language includes the 
thoughts that can be expressed in natural language, since the thoughts a 
human being can have include those expressible in natural language. 
A human-level AI will need to represent other kinds of thoughts, 
which cannot be easily expressed in natural language. Below the 
linguistic conceptual level, the TalaMind architecture includes non-
linguistic levels of concept representation (Figure 1-1). The topic of 
whether and how the linguistic level may support concepts not easily 
expressible in natural language is discussed later. Here it is emphasized 
that the range of thoughts expressible in natural language is extremely 
broad, and includes statements about statements, and statements about 
theories or models, to support meta-reasoning. This implies a language 
of thought should be a language at a higher level than first order logic 
(cf. §2.3.1). 
‽ What properties must the Tala conceptual language have, to 
represent concepts that can create and modify concepts, to 
behave intelligently in an environment? 
This question is motivated by considering Hypothesis I in 
conjunction with the definition that Tala as a language of thought 
provides linguistic representation of concepts that a TalaMind system 
can develop or process. 
There are many concepts that may be said to create and modify 
concepts. A simple example is a rule of inference, which is a concept 
that in effect creates a concept, given other concepts as premises. More 
generally in accordance with Hypothesis I, this thesis will consider 
concepts that describe processes for creating and modifying concepts. 
A conceptual language for a system with human-level AI must be 
able to represent concepts that describe processes, since these are 
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important concepts that people use natural language to communicate in 
describing how to perform actions, achieve goals, etc. Intelligent 
systems need to be able to communicate and follow process descriptions 
that include sequences of steps to perform, conditional performance of 
steps, and conditional iteration of steps. Thus, Tala as a conceptual 
language has an implied requirement to be as expressive in describing 
processes as a universal programming language30, though there is no 
requirement that it be a conventional programming language. Tala must 
be able to represent concepts that describe how to perform at least 
simple processes, with descriptions that are based very largely on the 
syntax of a natural language. This thesis calls concepts that describe 
how to perform processes “executable concepts” or “xconcepts”. 
Of course, people do more than just communicate and follow 
process descriptions: We think about how to change and improve 
processes, and communicate about this. Thus a conceptual language for 
a system with human-level AI must be able to represent concepts that 
describe how to modify processes, including in principle executable 
concepts that describe how to modify executable concepts. Again by 
Hypothesis II, this should be based very largely on the syntax of a 
natural language. The TalaMind demonstration system will illustrate 
this ability, in a story simulation where a Tala agent reasons about how 
to change its process for making bread. 
Executing executable concepts requires an interpreter process, which 
by the definition of conceptual processes in §1.5 is effectively a primitive 
conceptual process in the TalaMind architecture. The set of conceptual 
processes may be extended by defining executable concepts, but some 
conceptual processes may also be defined or emergent at lower levels of 
processing. 
‽ What other properties must the Tala conceptual language have, 
to support human-level artificial intelligence? 
                                                          
30  To be universal (able to describe any process that could be 
performed by a Turing machine) a programming language need 
provide only three basic control structure mechanisms: 1) Sequential 
execution of one statement followed by another; 2)  Conditional 
execution of one statement or another, based on the value of a Boolean 
variable; 3)  Iterative execution of statements, until a Boolean variable is 
true (Bohm & Jacopini, 1966).  Viz. §5.5.2. 
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In addressing theoretical questions related to support for higher-
level mentalities, the following pages will identify other properties Tala 
should have. As a starting point, these include the properties identified 
by McCarthy (1955):  
• Tala will have the same extensibility as English, in allowing 
other languages to be defined within it, and used as appropriate. 
• The design of Tala will permit extensions to represent 
mathematical expressions, and to support mathematical 
arguments 
• Tala will enable a Tala agent to refer to itself and formulate 
statements regarding its progress in solving problems. 
• The Tala conceptual language will enable expression of rules of 
conjecture, and the TalaMind architecture will support 
hypothetical reasoning. 
• Tala will be as concise as English, because its sentences will be 
isomorphic to English sentences. 
• The Tala conceptual language will enable expression of concepts 
involving physical objects, events, etc. 
McCarthy (1980) proposed circumscription as a rule of conjecture to 
address the qualification problem in representing commonsense 
knowledge. This topic will be discussed below in connection with 
representation of problem contexts (§3.6.7.11). 
‽ To what extent might a conceptual language need to go beyond 
the syntax of a natural language? 
People have invented other languages and notations to represent 
concepts in some domains more concisely and clearly than is possible in 
natural language. A simple example is any notation or diagram that 
depicts a relationship that exists at certain points of an array, and not at 
others. This may be the best way to concisely and precisely describe a 
situation summarized by a sentence like “Five Englishmen talked with 
seven Frenchmen”, if not every Englishman talked with every 
Frenchman. In general, representation of spatial concepts is facilitated 
by maps, diagrams, and images – “One picture is worth a thousand 
words”. Predicate calculus, conceptual graphs and mathematical 
notations are other examples of languages outside the syntax of natural 
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language, which could be worthwhile as alternatives or extensions for 
the Tala conceptual language (viz. §4.2.2.3). 
A conceptual language may need to go beyond the syntax of a 
natural language by enabling semantic annotation of expressions (Bunt, 
2007 et seq.) to support conceptual processing. Semantic annotation may 
be supported within the conceptual language itself, or by integrating 
other, formal languages for this purpose. This topic will be further 
discussed below. 
As McCarthy (1955) wrote, “English is universal in the sense that it 
can set up any other language within English” and “The language of 
thought may undergo major reorganizations” (McCarthy, 2008). Natural 
language includes the ability to extend itself, since it includes 
expressions of the form “X means Y”, where X and Y may be words or 
syntactic forms. Thus, per Hypothesis III, Tala includes grammatical 
constructions. In principle, Tala should have the same extensibility as 
English, to support definition of new languages. 
3.2.2 Conceptual Framework 
‽ What capabilities must the TalaMind conceptual framework 
have, to support achieving human-level AI, according to the 
TalaMind hypotheses? 
Section 1.5 defined a TalaMind conceptual framework as “an 
information architecture for managing an extensible collection of 
concepts, expressed in Tala”. The term ‘information architecture’ is used 
as a general, technology-independent description. The TalaMind 
approach does not prescribe any particular implementation 
technologies. The term ‘managing’ means storing, retrieving, and if 
necessary deleting concepts. 
To support achieving human-level AI according to the TalaMind 
hypotheses, the following are implied theoretical requirements for 
capabilities to be provided by a conceptual framework: 
• Manage concepts representing current thoughts. Since Tala is the 
language of thought in the TalaMind architecture (viz. §3.2.1), 
the conceptual framework has an implied requirement to 
support storing and retrieving thoughts represented as 
sentences in Tala. 
• Manage concepts representing definitions of words. Since Tala as a 
language of thought is based on the syntax of a natural 
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language (English), its expressions use English words. The 
conceptual framework has an implied requirement to support 
storing and retrieving definitions of words, represented as 
sentences in Tala. Section 3.6.1 discusses theoretical 
requirements for the Tala lexicon. One such requirement is to be 
integrated with encyclopedic knowledge, discussed below. 
• Manage executable concepts, for conceptual processing. Theoretical 
requirements for executable concepts were discussed in §3.2.1. 
Since the TalaMind architecture must support representing and 
executing executable concepts, the conceptual framework has 
an implied requirement to support storing and retrieving them. 
• Manage concepts for a perceived / projected reality. As discussed in 
§2.2.3, a Tala agent must have concepts representing its 
perceptions of the current state of its environment. Following 
Jackendoff (1983), this set of concepts is called ‘projected (or 
perceived) reality’. The conceptual framework has an implied 
requirement to support storing and retrieving concepts 
(percepts) from a projected / perceived reality. As discussed in 
§1.5, this thesis stipulates that percepts at the linguistic level in 
the TalaMind conceptual framework are represented as Tala 
sentences, provided via a conceptual interface by lower levels of 
conceptual processing that interact with the environment (viz. 
Figure 1-1).  
• Manage concepts for an “event-memory” of previous events. As 
discussed in §2.3.5, Smith (1982) noted that one of the 
requirements for reflective learning (a higher-level mentality, 
per §2.1.2.5) is “the ability to recall memories of a world 
experienced in the past and of one’s participation in that 
world”. Therefore, the conceptual framework has an implied 
requirement to support storing and retrieving concepts 
representing such memories. We shall refer to this set of 
concepts as an ‘event memory’. This thesis will stipulate that the 
event memory in the conceptual framework is a record of 
previous states of perceived reality, including a Tala agent’s 
percepts and effepts within its environment, expressed as Tala 
sentences. The event memory will also include a record of a 
Tala agent’s thoughts relative to previous states of reality, so 
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that an agent can create reflective thoughts in forms such as 
“When X happened, I thought Y and did Z”. 
• Manage concepts for encyclopedic and commonsense knowledge. It is 
accepted in cognitive semantics that “word meaning cannot be 
understood independently of the vast repository of 
encyclopedic knowledge to which it is linked [and] grounded in 
human interaction with others (social experience) and the world 
around us (physical experience).” Evans & Green (2006, p. 206) 
describe this as a “central assumption” of cognitive semantics, 
but it is more than an assumption, it is accepted based on 
arguments and evidence adduced by researchers. Here it will be 
called the principle of encyclopedic semantics. Hence, the 
conceptual framework has an implied requirement to store and 
retrieve encyclopedic knowledge, integrated with the Tala 
lexicon. This thesis will stipulate that encyclopedic knowledge 
at the linguistic level in the conceptual framework is 
represented as a collection of Tala sentences, not precluding 
other languages and notations (per §3.2.1) and not precluding 
representations at lower levels of Figure 1-1. Encyclopedic 
knowledge is further discussed in §3.6.7.4. 
• Manage contexts of concepts. The meanings of natural language 
sentences depend on the contexts in which they occur. This 
thesis will stipulate that at the linguistic level of concept 
representation, contexts can be represented by collections of 
Tala sentences. The conceptual framework therefore has an 
implied requirement to manage contexts. Section 3.6.6 discusses 
the role of contexts in semantic inference. Section 3.6.7 discusses 
different types of contexts that are needed to support higher-
level mentalities, and includes perceived reality, event memory, 
encyclopedic and commonsense knowledge as types of  
contexts.  
3.2.3 Conceptual Processes 
‽ What capabilities must the TalaMind conceptual processes 
have, to support achieving human-level AI, according to the 
TalaMind hypotheses? 
Section 1.5 defined TalaMind conceptual processes as “An extensible 
system of processes that operate on concepts in the conceptual 
Representing Meaning with Natural Language Syntax 
67 
framework, to produce intelligent behaviors and new concepts.” A 
general requirement assumed by the TalaMind hypotheses is that the 
potential scope of conceptual processes is computationally universal. 
That is, the scope should be equivalent to any processes that can be 
performed on symbolic expressions by a universal computer. This 
follows from §1.4.4’s discussion that the TalaMind hypotheses are 
essentially consistent with the Physical Symbol System Hypothesis, 
since Newell and Simon (1976) defined physical symbol systems as 
being realized by universal computers. 
In analyzing theoretical questions related to the Tala conceptual 
language, and to support for higher-level mentalities, the following 
pages will identify specific capabilities to be provided by conceptual 
processes. As noted in §§3.2.1 and 1.5, the set of conceptual processes 
may be extended by defining executable concepts, but some conceptual 
processes may also be defined or emergent at lower levels of processing. 
3.3 Representing Meaning with Natural Language Syntax 
‽ Is it theoretically possible to use the syntax of a natural 
language to represent meaning in a conceptual language? 
Though it might be considered obvious and a truism that syntax can 
represent semantics, there have been contrary philosophical arguments. 
Chapter 4 responds to such arguments. This section argues that it is 
theoretically possible to use the syntax of a natural language to 
represent meaning as expressed in natural language, at least for the 
purposes of a conceptual language at the linguistic level of  the 
TalaMind architecture. 
When people communicate using natural language, they exchange 
syntactic information which they use to help understand intended 
meanings. People also rely on shared knowledge of word meanings, 
and shared commonsense and encyclopedic knowledge, much of which 
is also communicated in natural language syntax. Thus, natural 
language syntax is used frequently to represent natural language 
meanings by humans. 31 
                                                          
31 This may be augmented by information in the form of physical 
gestures. Indeed, physical gestures may convey all the syntactic 
information when communicating in sign language for the deaf, another 
form of natural language. 
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The fact that the reader can understand these sentences proves this 
assertion. The only information available to represent the semantics of 
these sentences is provided by their syntax, and by shared knowledge of 
word meanings, shared knowledge of commonsense reasoning and 
encyclopedic knowledge. There is no direct physical knowledge 
available to support understanding these sentences, no use of physical 
gestures to support them. 
This argument does not claim or imply that all knowledge necessary 
to understand natural language semantics can be represented by natural 
language syntax, nor that all concepts and semantics can be represented 
using natural language syntax. Figure 1-1 shows that concepts may be 
represented at other conceptual levels than the linguistic level. A system 
that does not have human embodiment may at best have limited, 
indirect understanding of such concepts through virtual embodiment 
(§2.2.3). 
This argument also does not claim or imply that all concepts at the 
linguistic level can be represented using natural language syntax. 
Hypothesis II only posits that the Tala conceptual language may be 
based “very largely” on natural language syntax, yet allows that other 
kinds of syntax may be needed for some concepts at the linguistic level. 
This is further discussed below. 
The point remains that natural language syntax is used frequently to 
represent natural language semantics by humans. It is therefore at least 
theoretically possible to use the syntax of a natural language to 
represent natural language semantics in a conceptual language at the 
linguistic level of  the TalaMind architecture. 
‽ Is it theoretically possible to reason directly with natural 
language syntax? 
There is no reason in principle why inference cannot be performed 
with a conceptual language based on natural language syntax. Chapters 
5 and 6 will present a demonstration system to support this claim. 
Following is an argument that this is theoretically possible: 
When inference is performed with a formal language not based on 
natural language syntax, such as predicate calculus, the syntax of the 
formal language is needed to support the operations of inference. It is 
syntax that enables taking what might otherwise be considered a 
random string of symbols, and recognizing clauses, variables, logical 
operators, etc. It is syntax that enables matching these elements in 
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sentences in predicate calculus, to perform an inference and construct 
an implied sentence in predicate calculus. 
Prior to the invention of formal languages, people for millennia used 
natural language to support inference. Just as they use natural language 
syntax to represent the semantics of natural language in 
communication, people also use the syntax of natural language to 
support inference during communication (apart from whatever 
mentalese syntax may be used internally for inference). 
Formal languages such as predicate calculus and existential graphs 
were originally developed to support inferences that had previously 
been expressed in natural language. Sowa (2007a) notes that “every 
operator of any version of logic is a specialization of some word or 
phrase in natural language”, “every formula in any notation for logic 
can always be translated to a sentence that has the same meaning”, and 
“every step of every proof in any formal logic can be translated to an 
argument in ordinary language that is just as correct and cogent as the 
formal version.” Further, he writes: 
“What makes formal logic hard to use is its rigidity and its 
limited set of operators. Natural languages are richer, more 
expressive, and much more flexible. That flexibility permits 
vagueness, which some logicians consider a serious flaw, but a 
precise statement on any topic is impossible until all the details 
are determined. As a result, formal logic can only express the 
final result of a lengthy process of analysis and design. Natural 
language, however, can express every step from the earliest 
hunch or tentative suggestion to the finished specification.” 
The topic of vagueness will be discussed in following sections. Here, 
we note that a major strength of natural language is its provision of 
syntax that can support multi-level reasoning in human-level AI, i.e. 
meta-reasoning, analogical reasoning, causal and purposive reasoning, 
abduction, induction, and deduction.  
‽ Is it theoretically valid to choose English as a basis for the Tala 
conceptual language, rather than other natural languages? 
As discussed above, the range of thoughts that need to be 
expressible in the Tala conceptual language includes the thoughts that 
can be expressed in natural language. Almost all natural languages have 
equivalent scope in being able to express human thoughts, though some 
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concepts may be easier to express in some languages than in others 
(Pinker, 1995). Therefore it is theoretically valid to choose English as a 
basis for the Tala conceptual language, and it would be valid to choose a 
different natural language. 
There are some reasons for choosing English. In particular, its syntax 
has been thoroughly studied and documented. Hudson (2010) writes 
“No other language has received so much attention in the last few 
decades, so English has a very special status as the testing ground for 
theories of language.” 
‽ Which elements of English syntax are important to Tala? What 
about morphology and phonology? 
From the perspective of Hypothesis II, the elements of natural 
language syntax that are important are those that help to represent 
semantics. In English, virtually every element of sentence and lexeme 
syntax supports representing some aspect of semantics. 
Also, from a practical standpoint, all elements of natural language 
syntax may need to be represented in a Tala conceptual language, for 
any natural language that is used as its basis, to support generating 
output that appears fluent to humans. 
Per §1.4.2, morphology and phonology are topics intended for future 
research, outside the scope of this thesis. It appears they should be 
possible to include within the TalaMind approach, using representation 
techniques similar to those described for sentential syntax in this thesis. 
3.4 Representing English Syntax in Tala 
This section will present arguments for certain theoretical principles 
to follow in developing the design of Tala, and then describe a 
particular design according to these principles, not precluding other 
designs. Chapter 5 will present the design of Tala that has been 
developed for the prototype demonstration system, as a work in 
progress. 
3.4.1 Non-Prescriptive, Open, Flexible 
A Tala agent should be able to understand and communicate with 
natural language as it is actually used by people. The Tala language 
should therefore be able to represent how sentences are actually 
expressed, so that meta-reasoning can occur about the way they are 
expressed. 
For example, Sag et al. (2003, p. 37) list the following as grammatical 
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and non-grammatical sentences: 
The defendant denied the accusation. 
The problem disappeared. 
*The defendant denied. 
*The teacher disappeared the problem. 
A traditional prescriptive grammar might not permit the two starred 
expressions, by specifying that deny requires an object while disappear 
does not permit one. Yet a Tala agent could encounter both in the real 
world, and should be able to process them in contexts such as: 
Question: Did the defendant admit or deny the accusation?  
Answer: The defendant denied. 
A child speaking: The magician disappeared the rabbit! 
It sometimes seems that almost every example which may be cited as 
ungrammatical could happen in real-world usage, whether expressed 
by children or adults learning a language, by people speaking 
colloquially or poetically, people writing concise notes, etc. The Tala 
syntax should therefore be non-prescriptive, open and flexible. The 
syntax presented in Chapter 5 will use a small set of production rules, 
which describe the structure of Tala sentences, not limited to 
expressions people might consider perfectly grammatical English. For 
instance, the syntax will allow that a verb may or may not have a subject 
and/or object. Conceptual processing relative to the context for use of a 
verb will be responsible for understanding an expected though missing, 
or unexpected yet present subject or object. (A subject for a verb is 
normally missing in an imperative sentence, and could be missing in a 
concise expression such as “Looks good.”) So, a Tala sentence can 
express an utterance that may not be a grammatical English sentence. 
3.4.2 Semantic & Ontological Neutrality & Generality 
To support representing the broad range of human thoughts, the 
syntax for Tala should, as much as possible, be semantically and 
ontologically neutral and general: The syntax should minimize 
assumptions and implications about the concepts that may be expressed 
in the Tala language. There should be minimal built-in dependencies or 
restrictions to any predefined ontology, or to any predefined 
encyclopedic knowledge. Instead, the Tala language should be flexible 
and powerful enough that sentences in Tala can be used to describe any 
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particular ontology, or set of semantic domains for any particular 
concepts. 
To a large extent this design principle is a given, and something to be 
preserved in basing Tala on natural language syntax, which does not 
imply which words should be used to describe reality, in general. The 
only exceptions are those built into a natural language and its syntax: 
For instance, English has some built-in ontological preconceptions about 
time for expression of verb tense and aspect, about point of view 
reflected in first, second and third person pronouns, etc. 
3.5 Choices & Methods for Representing English Syntax 
Having identified certain theoretical principles, we next discuss 
specific choices and methods for representing English syntax in Tala 
according to these principles. 
3.5.1 Theoretical Approach to Represent English Syntax 
‽ Which theoretical option is chosen for representing English 
syntax in Tala? 
This thesis follows a dependency grammar approach to English 
syntax: In representing the syntax of an English sentence, the 
corresponding Tala sentence will show syntactic relations between 
words, and will not distinguish words from phrase structures. The 
English syntax for Tala presented in Chapter 5 is similar in spirit to 
Hudson’s “Word Grammar” for English. Some differences in detail will 
be noted, as well as opportunities for future development of Tala. 
It should be noted that the use of dependency grammar is not 
required by the TalaMind approach. Other options for representing 
English syntax are consistent with Hypothesis II and could be explored 
in future research. 
3.5.2 Representing Syntactic Structure of NL Sentences 
Another principle in designing the syntax of Tala is that sentences in 
Tala should describe the syntactic structure of corresponding natural 
language sentences. The reason for this is that the TalaMind approach 
seeks to emulate the ability of human-level intelligence to use the syntax 
of individual natural language sentences for representing and reasoning 
about their meaning. To support this, information about the syntax of 
individual natural language sentences needs to be represented in Tala 
conceptual structures. We shall refer to this as the structurality principle 
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for the Tala language. 
‽ How can the syntactic structure of individual natural language 
sentences be represented in Tala sentences, to support 
reasoning with syntactic structures? 
This is a method-oriented question, though here it is analyzed from a 
theoretical perspective to identify a viable approach. We first note that 
whatever method is selected, it will involve symbolic expressions 
representing the syntactic structure of English sentences, given that we 
are concerned with physical symbol systems, i.e. the TalaMind 
approach is a variant of the Physical Symbol System Hypothesis, as 
discussed in §1.4.4. By PSSH, the essence of symbolic processing is to 
manipulate symbolic expressions, to modify, delete or create new 
expressions. 
A dependency diagram of the syntax of an English sentence is 
essentially a tree structure, though re-entrant links or lattice structure 
may be needed (cf. triangular dependencies in Hudson, 2010). 
Therefore, to represent a dependency diagram of the syntax of an 
English sentence as a symbolic expression, one needs a symbolic 
representation of tree structures, that can also support re-entrant links 
and lattice structures. This symbolic representation needs to be flexible 
in allowing syntactic information to be at each node. And this 
representation needs to be accessible in data structures for symbolic 
processing within some programming environment, to enable 
construction of a TalaMind architecture that performs conceptual 
processing of Tala sentences.  
Hierarchically nested list structures are a natural choice for all these 
purposes, supported by symbolic processing environments in Lisp 
dialects (McCarthy, 1960). Pointers can be used to represent re-entrant 
links and lattices in list structures. Therefore, Tala sentences are 
expressed as hierarchically nested list structures, representing the 
syntactic structure of natural language sentences according to a 
dependency grammar of English. This format supports reasoning, and 
conceptual processing in general, in Lisp-dialect symbolic programming 
environments. Following is an example of a Tala expression for the 
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 (ask  
  (wusage verb)  
  (subj Leo)  
  (indirect-obj Ben) 
  (obj  
   (turn  
    (wusage verb)  
    (modal can)  
    (sentence-class question)  
    (subj you)  
    (obj  
     (grain  
      (wusage noun) 
      )) 
    (into  
     (fare (wusage noun)  
      (for  
       (people (wusage noun)) 
        )))))  
  (tense present)  
  (subj-person third-singular)] 
For sake of uniformity, each level of the list structure starts with a 
symbol, followed by an association list. The symbol that starts each level 
alternates between an English word and a syntactic keyword (obj, subj, 
…), with prepositions treated as keywords. 
It may be noted that the choice of list structures and Lisp is not 
required by the TalaMind hypotheses. Other representations for 
dependency tree structures could be appropriate in different 
programming environments, e.g. some might prefer XML. A specific 
design choice for Tala is needed within this thesis to present examples 
for theoretical discussions, and to support the demonstration system. 
There are strong technical arguments in favor of list structures and Lisp. 
And since Tala responds to McCarthy’s 1955 proposal for an artificial 
language corresponding to English, it is altogether fitting to choose Lisp 
for Tala. 
In addition to structural relationships within sentences, the syntax of 
English includes several words that in conceptual processing effectively 
function as logical operators, variables, or constants, within or between 
sentences. These amount to primitive words in the syntax of English, 
and include prepositions, conjunctions, pronouns, determiners and 
certain nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs. They will be discussed 
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3.6 Semantic Representation & Processing 
3.6.1 Lexemes, Senses, Referents and Variables 
‽ How can a Tala agent represent the different possible meanings 
of an English word? 
According to cognitive lexical semantics, the possible meanings of a 
commonly used English word are not bounded by a finite list of precise 
definitions. Rather, most commonly used words have many different 
meanings that may at best be approximately described by a list of 
definitions, and more adequately represented by cognitive constructs 
such as radial categories (viz. Evans & Green, 2006, p. 328). 
The architecture shown in Figure 1-1 includes two non-linguistic 
levels to represent concepts structured according to typicality effects, 
relative to prototypes. This thesis recognizes their importance, but the 
specifics of such representations are not central to this thesis. Rather, the 
TalaMind approach is open to alternatives and future research 
regarding them. 
Although the possible meanings of common words cannot be 
completely enumerated, definitions are nonetheless useful in 
constructing meaning. And if a human-level AI is to have semantic 
originality, then it must be able to express definitions, to declaratively 
represent that “X means Y” (viz. §§2.3.5, 3.7.2.2). Hence, one of the roles 
of the TalaMind conceptual framework is to include concepts 
representing definitions of words. Per Hypothesis II, these concepts 
should be expressed as sentences in the Tala conceptual language, based 
on the syntax of natural language, though it should be possible to have 
pointers from Tala sentences to concepts represented in the non-
linguistic levels.  
Although this thesis refers to the Tala lexicon as if it were a distinct 
part of the conceptual framework, by the principle of encyclopedic 
semantics (§3.2.2) the lexicon should be integrated with encyclopedic 
knowledge, also to be stored in the conceptual framework. Encyclopedic 
knowledge is further discussed in §§3.6.7.4 and 3.6.7.7.  
The TalaMind hypotheses do not prescribe any particular approach 
to structuring the Tala lexicon within the conceptual framework. A 
natural approach would be to structure the Tala lexicon as a network or 
lattice, with each node representing a possible meaning of a word and 
containing information expressed in Tala sentences. This could 
correspond to network and inheritance approaches described by 
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Daelemans et al. (1992 et seq.), Tyler & Evans (2003), Hudson (2007 et 
seq.), and other researchers. 32 
‽ How can a Tala agent represent the specific senses of the words 
in a given sentence? 
A Tala sentence uses words as both lexemes and word senses, 
distinguishing lexemes with the wusage syntax field. To represent the 
sense in which a word is used, a wsense syntax field can point to a 
particular meaning in the Tala lexicon, represented as a natural 
language sentence or phrase, or to a concept represented non-
linguistically. If the lexicon is structured as a network of concepts, then 
the wsense field would contain a pointer to a node in the network. Such 
notations are not problematic from a theoretical perspective, so this 
thesis will not define a notation for pointers into the lexicon, nor for that 
matter, pointers to concepts in the non-linguistic levels of Figure 1-1. 
However, a pointer notation will be introduced later for use within Tala 
sentences, to support representing various kinds of interpretations. 
As will be discussed in §3.6.3, the wsense field can also be used for 
semantic annotation within Tala sentences, e.g. to indicate that “an” is 
used in a sentence with a specific or non-specific sense. The senses 
defined in the lexicon can help construct intended meanings, but do not 
prohibit other meanings, since in general word senses cannot be finitely 
enumerated, and can be underspecified. And of course, people often 
convey meaning without adhering to definitions. 
‽ How can a Tala agent represent the specific referents of words 
in a given sentence? 
Though the wusage and wsense fields allow representing that the 
lexeme ‘bat’ is used as a noun with the sense “nocturnal flying 
mouselike mammal”, the question remains how to represent that it 
refers to a specific bat, e.g. one observed flying in the evening. 
To represent the referent of a word in a sentence, a wreferent 
syntax field can point to a particular concept in the Tala conceptual 
framework, or to a concept represented non-linguistically. Within the 
                                                          
32 WordNet (Miller, 1991) would be a natural resource to leverage in 
building a Tala lexicon. Automatic parsing of WordNet definitions 
could be used to generate definitions expressed in Tala. 
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linguistic level of Figure 1-1, one of the roles of the conceptual 
framework is to include concepts representing percepts. Such concepts 
may also be represented at the non-linguistic levels. The wreferent 
syntax field enables words in Tala sentences to point to percepts, with 
the pointer notation syntax being implementation-dependent. 
The wreferent field can contain a pointer to another Tala expression 
to support coreference within Tala sentences, e.g. to specify referents of 
anaphora (§§3.6.3.12, 3.6.8), “shell nouns” (Schmid, 1997 et seq.), etc. 
Section 3.6.6.2 gives an example of a wreferent pointer for the shell 
noun “statement” in representing the Liar’s Paradox. 
‽ How can a Tala agent determine the specific senses and 
referents of the words in a given sentence? 
Per §1.5’s description of the TalaMind architecture, there are 
logically three ways that a Tala sentence can originate within a 
conceptual framework. First, it can be an innate sentence, created when 
the architecture is constructed. Second, it can be created as a result of 
conceptual processing of other Tala sentences that exist in a conceptual 
framework. Third, it may be received via the conceptual interface from 
environment interaction systems. In general, all these methods may be 
expected to provide Tala sentences that already specify word usages, 
senses and referents, with one important exception: Environment 
interaction systems may provide Tala words or sentences originating in 
English spoken or written by people, which may be incomplete in 
specifying usages, senses and referents. 
Natural language parsing to determine word usages may occur in 
the environment interaction layers of Figure 1-1, or as conceptual 
processing within the TalaMind architecture, or both. The syntax of Tala 
is a reasonable target for natural language parsing, but developing 
parsing approaches is a topic for future research, per §1.6. 
Per §1.5, it is the role of conceptual processing to determine how to 
elaborate Tala words or sentences to specify senses and referents of 
words, and even word usages if not determined by parsing. If a Tala 
agent receives the sentence “There is a bat” in its conceptual framework 
as a spoken utterance via the conceptual interface, it is the role of 
conceptual processing to determine the word sense and referent for 
“bat”. Determining that it refers to a specific flying mammal requires 
abductive processing of information available in context, within the 
conceptual framework. This will involve use of percepts, interactive 
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context, and encyclopedic and commonsense knowledge in the 
conceptual framework (viz. §3.6.7.4). To support abductive conceptual 
processing, the TalaMind approach and architecture are open to use of 
computational linguistics methods for word sense disambiguation (viz. 
Navigli, 2009), though this is a topic for future research. 
Prior to determining sense and referent, an English word is 
essentially a variable in Tala. As these are determined within a context, 
the variable becomes bound. To the extent its sense and referent are not 
bound, an English word’s presence in a Tala concept is a form of 
underspecification, akin to a metaconstant or metavariable in a formal 
language for underspecification (cf. Bunt, 2008). In addition to English 
words as variables, Tala also provides a separate syntax for variables 
that can be bound to words and Tala expressions, to support pattern-
matching and pointer references within the conceptual framework. 
There are some additional aspects of this topic related to meanings of 
primitive words in Tala and English, which will be discussed in §3.6.8, 
after more groundwork has been established. 
3.6.2 Multiple Representations for the Same Concept 
‽ Can there be different Tala sentences that express the same 
concept? 
Yes. Answering this question “No” appears to have motivated much 
work on previous concept representation approaches. For example, 
Schank (1973, p.191) stated this precept for his work on conceptual 
dependency structures: 
“The conceptual structures that will be described in this paper 
are intended to represent the meaning of natural language 
utterances in one unambiguous way. That is, any two 
utterances that can be said to mean the same thing, whether 
they are in the same or different languages, should be 
characterized in only one way by the conceptual structures.” 
Relative to this question, the only implication of Hypothesis II in this 
thesis is that every sentence expressible in natural language has a 
corresponding Tala sentence. Since a concept may be expressed by 
many natural language sentences, it may also have many Tala sentences 
that express it. This may be considered a theoretical advantage of the 
TalaMind approach, because different ways of expressing a concept 
may express important information, such as focus of attention, or 
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pragmatic information about how the concept was expressed.  
Representing the precise way a concept was expressed supports meta-
reasoning about how it was expressed, in addition to reasoning with the 
concept itself. It is also a practical advantage, since it avoids significant 
extra work from researchers striving to agree on a single way to 
represent each concept expressible in natural language. 
3.6.3 Representing Interpretations 
‽ How can a Tala agent represent different possible inter-
pretations of an English sentence? 
If a Tala representation of an English sentence has multiple possible 
interpretations then it follows from Hypothesis II that in general more 
specific interpretations may be represented by other Tala sentences. 
Exceptions are allowed per §3.2.1, but this rule handles several 
problems discussed below. 
As noted in §3.2.1, a conceptual language may need to go beyond the 
syntax of a natural language by enabling semantic annotation of 
expressions (Bunt, 2007 et seq.). Slots such as (wsense), (wreferent) 
and the (<- ?p) syntax for pointers (which provides a form of 
coreference representation; viz. §5.3.11) are forms of semantic 
annotation within Tala. Similarly, quantifiers like ‘all’ or ‘an’ can be 
annotated in Tala by adding (wsense collective) or (wsense 
specific) slots. Developing a complete syntax for semantic 
annotations in Tala is a topic for future research, as is potential 
integration of Tala with other formal languages for semantic annotation. 
3.6.3.1 Underspecification 
In human conversation it is often not necessary to express a sentence 
that has only one possible interpretation, and in fact it may be difficult 
to do so, since most common words have many possible meanings, and 
most sequences of words can be interpreted in multiple ways. Natural 
language expressions are often used with ambiguities because the 
speaker doesn't think at the level of precision corresponding to the 
disambiguated readings, thinks it is immaterial which interpretation is 
chosen, and/or because the context makes one specific interpretation 
much more plausible than others. 
In the TalaMind architecture, conceptual processing of a Tala 
sentence can occur at the level of precision in which a sentence is 
expressed, without using a more precise interpretation. The Tala 
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conceptual language is effectively a language for underspecified 
semantic representations (cf. Bunt & Black, 2000, p.24) using the syntax 
of natural language, rather than creating a separate formal language for 
underspecification. In the TalaMind approach for achieving human-
level artificial intelligence, a Tala agent has the same ability and burden 
for its internal conceptual processing that human intelligence has in 
external communication, to use ambiguous sentences or to create more 
specific interpretations when appropriate.  
3.6.3.2 Syntactic Elimination of Interpretations 
Since a Tala sentence represents a dependency parse-tree of an 
English sentence, its structure can eliminate some possible 
interpretations of a linear text sentence. Consider the classic example, 
“Time flies like an arrow”. A Tala conceptual structure for the normal 
interpretation is: 
 (fly  
  (wusage verb)  
  (subj 
   (time 
    (wusage noun) 
    )) 
  (like 
   (wusage prep) 
   (arrow 
    (wusage noun) 
    (det a) 
    )) 
  (tense present)  
  (subj-person third-singular)] 
This conceptual structure eliminates the interpretation that the 
sentence is an instruction to measure (time) the speed of flies the same 
way that one would measure the speed of an arrow, since in that 
interpretation “time” would be a verb, and “fly” would be a noun. 
The conceptual structure still has other ambiguities. For example, the 
meaning of the adverbial preposition “like” and the verb “fly” may be 
ambiguous, relative to the noun “time”. With further conceptual 
processing, another conceptual structure could be created to represent a 
more specific interpretation, such as: 
 “time passing” resembles “an arrow passing”. 
 (resemble 
  (wusage verb) 
  (subj 
   (pass  
    (wusage verb)  
    (aspect continuous) 
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    (subj 
     (time 
      (wusage noun) 
      )))) 
  (obj 
   (pass  
    (wusage verb) 
    (aspect continuous) 
    (subj 
     (arrow 
      (wusage noun) 
      (det an) 
      )] 
At this point the conceptual structure is a more reasonable 
expression of a normal interpretation of the original sentence. It could 
be made more specific by identifying senses of its nouns and verbs 
within the conceptual structure. Further conceptual processing could 
develop other, related concepts as interpretations or inferences from the 
original concept. 
3.6.3.3 Generic and Non-Generic Interpretations 
An example of a sentence that has such interpretations is “The lion is 
a dangerous animal”. Depending on context, the interpretations can be 
represented by different Tala sentences, e.g. corresponding to “In 
general, each lion is a dangerous animal” and “The lion in that cage is a 
dangerous animal”. 
3.6.3.4 Specific and Non-Specific Interpretations 
An example of a sentence that has such interpretations is “Mary 
wants to marry an Irishman.” Depending on context, the interpretations 
can be represented by different Tala sentences, e.g. corresponding to 
“Mary wants to marry a specific Irishman” and “Mary wants whomever 
she marries to be an Irishman, but does not want to marry a specific 
man.” These interpretations could also be represented by semantically 
annotating “an” in the original sentence with either a (wsense 
specific) or (wsense non-specific) marker. 
It may be noted that “Mary wants to marry a specific Irishman” still 
has multiple interpretations, according to how the Irishman may be 
specified. The normal interpretation is that Mary can identify one man 
whom she wants to marry, who happens to be Irish. Yet a technically 
valid interpretation would be “Mary wants to marry the specific 
Irishman who happens to win the next National Lottery of Ireland.” In 
that case she cannot yet identify the particular individual, but it could 
be argued there is a specific Irishman she wants to marry. The point 
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remains that either interpretation of the original sentence can be 
expressed in a Tala sentence, if necessary. 
3.6.3.5 Individual and Collective Interpretations 
An example of a sentence that has such interpretations is “Two men 
lifted the piano”. Depending on context, the interpretations can be 
represented by different Tala sentences, e.g. corresponding to “Two 
men working together at the same time lifted the piano” and “Two men 
lifted the piano, at different times, each acting individually”.  
3.6.3.6 Count and Mass Interpretations 
An example of a sentence that has such interpretations is “There's no 
chicken in this chicken soup”. Depending on context, the interpretations 
can be represented by different Tala sentences, e.g. corresponding to 
“There is not an entire chicken bird in this soup made of chicken meat” 
and “There is not any chicken meat in this soup claimed to be made 
with chicken meat.”  
3.6.3.7 Quantificational Interpretations 
If a natural language sentence has multiple quantifiers to be 
interpreted for scope and distributivity, there may be multiple ways 
they can be interpreted. Some simple examples of such sentences are: 
Five Englishmen talked with seven Frenchmen. 
Every male student dates an undergrad. 
Every representative of a company saw most samples. 
Each of the above sentences has only a single, obvious dependency 
parsing, corresponding to a Tala sentence, but has at least two 
interpretations: 
Five Englishmen talked with seven Frenchmen. 
A group of five Englishmen talked with a group of 
seven Frenchmen. 
A total of five Englishmen talked with a total of seven 
Frenchmen, in unspecified groups. 
Every male student dates an undergrad. 
Each male student dates an undergrad, who is typically 
a different person for each male student. 
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Each male student dates an undergrad, who is the same 
person for all male students.  
Every representative of a company saw most samples. 
Every representative of each company saw most 
samples. 
Every representative of one company saw most 
samples. 
In the last example, a normal interpretation of ‘most samples’ is that 
it varies for different representatives and companies, but technically it 
could also mean the same majority set of samples was seen by each 
representative and company. ‘Most’ can also be interpreted as an 
aggregate across other variables, e.g. “A minority of taxpayers pay most 
of the taxes” does not mean that each taxpayer in the minority pays 
most of the taxes, but that together they do. ‘Few’, ‘some’ and ‘all’ have 
similar variations in interpretation. A more complex quantified sentence 
may have many more possible interpretations, and a corresponding 
predicate calculus expression may become implausibly long and 
complicated as a meaning representation. For example: 
In most democratic countries most politicians can fool most of 
the people on almost every issue most of the time. (Hobbs, 1983) 
A normal interpretation is that the quantifier ‘most’ varies across 
countries, politicians, people and issues in an unspecified manner that 
may not be important.33 Yet technically the sentence has interpretations 
where the quantifier does not vary. For example, one precise 
interpretation is that people between the ages of 10 and 80 can be fooled 
about the same majority set of issues across a certain majority of 
democratic countries, but only between 2 a.m. and 5 p.m. Such an 
interpretation is not supported by commonsense, but is logically 
permitted. A human-level AI should not need to consider it, since it 
does not affect how humans might discuss Hobbs’ example sentence. 
Quantified sentences are often cases where natural language enables 
people to summarize situations imprecisely, leveraging 
                                                          
33  If it is important, then depending on context in discourse, a 
speaker may wish to claim that particular issues, countries, etc. are 
exceptions. 
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underspecification to support reasoning without considering more 
complex precise interpretations. Typically what matters when such 
sentences are used is only a general result or implication, not a specific, 
precise interpretation. Human intelligence can reason with imprecise, 
underspecified sentences as if they are true, even if some interpretations 
are false or nonsensical, or contradictory to other interpretations. 
Human-level AI must be able to do the same, for people to judge that a 
system possess human-level intelligence. 
To illustrate, a salesman may want to know that many of his sample 
products were seen by representatives of many companies at a trade 
show. He might ask an associate “Were our products seen by many 
companies at the show?” and receive the answer “Every representative 
of a company saw most samples.”  
   (see 
    (wusage verb) 
    (tense past) 
    (subj 
     (representative 
      (wusage noun) 
      (det every) 
      (of 
       (company 
        (wusage noun) 
        (det a) 
        )))) 
    (obj 
     (sample 
      (wusage noun) 
      (number plural) 
      (det most] 
He interprets this as an affirmative answer to his question, because 
in conceptual processing of the Tala or English sentence, it is simple to 
interpret the determiner “a” as “each”, yielding “Every representative 
of each company saw most samples.” (This is similar to interpreting 
“The lion is a dangerous animal” as “In general, each lion is a 
dangerous animal.”) The salesman may not even consider the 
interpretation “Every representative of one company saw most 
samples” since he asked a question about many companies, and the 
reply is easily translated as about each company, which refers to every 
company individually. The salesman also avoids any need for a precise 
interpretation of how the quantifier ‘most’ varies within the sentence, 
specifying which representatives of which companies saw which 
samples. If he cares about that relationship, he may ask for it 
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specifically, using this natural language which-expression. 
To summarize, Tala enables representation and facilitates conceptual 
processing of both precise and imprecise quantifications. This is a 
theoretical advantage of adopting Hypothesis II for a conceptual 
language, in support of human-level AI, compared with attempting to 
reason in formal languages such as predicate calculus. It enables Tala to 
be used as a language for underspecified semantic representations 
rather than creating a separate, conventional formal language for 
underspecification. 
3.6.3.8 De Dicto and De Re Interpretations 
McCarthy (2008) noted that a language of thought would need to 
include pointers to support certain kinds of internal mental references. 
The Tala (<- ?p) pointer-binding syntax for coreference (§5.3.11) can 
support representing de re interpretations. Consider the example: 
Columbus believed that Cuba was India. 
The de re interpretation is that Columbus believed the location now 
called Cuba was the same as the location called India. This 
interpretation is essentially correct, though Columbus was in error and 
they are not the same location. It can be represented in Tala as follows: 
  (and 
     (denote (wusage verb) 
       (subj India) 
       (obj (location (wusage noun) (<- ?i))) 
       ) 
     (denote (wusage verb) 
       (subj Cuba) 
       (obj (location (wusage noun) (<- ?c))) 
       ) 
  (be (wusage verb) 
       (adv not)  
       (subj ?i) 
       (obj ?c) 
       ) 
     (believe (wusage verb) 
       (subj Columbus) 
       (tense past) 
       (aspect perfect) 
       (obj  
          (be (wusage verb)  
                (tense past) 
            (obj ?i) 
              (subj ?c) 
             ] 
This uses the syntax (<- ?i) to bind the variable ?i to a pointer 
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referring to the Tala expression in which (<- ?i) occurs. So the Tala 
sentence says that “India” and “Cuba” denote locations which are not 
the same, which Columbus believed were the same. 
The de dicto, literal interpretation that Columbus thought a location 
he knew was named Cuba was the same as a location named India, can 
be represented as follows: 
(believe (wusage verb) 
   (subj Columbus) 
   (tense past) 
   (aspect perfect) 
   (obj 
      (be (wusage verb)(tense past) 
        (subj  
          (location (wusage noun) 
            (obj-of  
              (denote (wusage verb) 
                (tense past) 
                (aspect perfect) 
                (subj Cuba))))) 
        (obj  
          (location (wusage noun) 
            (obj-of  
              (denote (wusage verb) 
                (tense past) 
                (aspect perfect) 
                (subj India] 
3.6.3.9 Interpretations of Compound Noun Structures 
An interpretation of a compound noun structure can be represented 
as a Tala concept structure: 
"steel ship engine" 
(engine 
 (wusage noun) 
 (obj-of 
  (use 
   (subj 
    (ship 
     (wusage noun) 
     (subj-of 
      (make 
       (wusage verb) 
       (passive) 
       (aspect perfect) 
       (of 
        (steel 
         (wusage noun) 
         ] 
“Steel” may refer to the engine rather than the ship, or to what is 
transported by the ship, rather than its construction. Each of these 
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interpretations can be represented as a Tala concept structure. Some 
other examples are provided by Bunt & Black (2000, p.8):34 
Dynamic random access memory – memory that can be 
accessed randomly and changed dynamically. 
The Passport office – the office that issues Passports. 
The Boston office – the office located in Boston, or the office that 
supports Boston, or the office that belongs to someone named 
Boston, … 
This approach extends to interpretations for adjectives and adverbs 
in compound phrases, allowing more specific representation of 
semantics than supposing they refer to simple attributes. 
“green reporter” – reporter who lacks experience. 
“green energy” – energy produced by an ecological process, or 
energy that when consumed does not harm the ecology. 
Similar remarks apply to representing interpretations for verb 
structures. 
3.6.3.10 Interpretations of Metaphors 
The sentence “That surgeon is a butcher” has both literal and 
metaphorical interpretations. These can be represented with other Tala 
sentences, corresponding to: 
That person is a surgeon and is also a butcher, and has 
appropriate skills in each profession. 
That person is an incompetent surgeon, whose skills as a 
surgeon would be more appropriate for a butcher. 
While there is no difficulty in representing either interpretation as a 
Tala sentence, there is a theoretical question regarding how an 
intelligent system could develop the second, metaphorical 
interpretation. It is an implication, since inference and encyclopedic 
knowledge are needed to recognize that describing a surgeon as a 
butcher is likely pejorative, even though both are skilled professions 
                                                          
34 Excerpts in these pages from Bunt (2000) and Bunt & Black (2000) 
are reprinted with kind permission of John Benjamins Publishing 
Company, Amsterdam/ Philadelphia. www.benjamins.com 
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when considered separately (Grady et al., 1999). This topic is discussed 
in the subsections on semantic inference (§3.6.6.5) and conceptual 
blends (§3.6.7.9). 
3.6.3.11 Interpretations of Metonyms 
The sentence “The ham sandwich is waiting for his check” (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1980) has a metonymical interpretation, if spoken in a 
restaurant: 
The customer who ordered the ham sandwich is waiting for his 
check. 
There is no difficulty in representing this interpretation as a Tala 
sentence, but developing it requires additional knowledge related to the 
context, so it is an implication. This topic is discussed in the subsections 
on semantic inference (§3.6.6.5) and conceptual blends (§3.6.7.9). 
3.6.3.12 Interpretations of Anaphora 
Anaphorical interpretations can be represented by pointer values in 
(wreference) slots on pronouns. These pointer values can be bound 
using the (<- ?p) notation, either in the same sentence or others within 
a context (viz. §5.3.11). In general, semantic inference (§3.6.6) is required 
to disambiguate these references. 
3.6.3.13 Interpretation of Idioms 
Fillmore, Kay and O’Connor (1988) found that idioms are 
problematic to interpret for the following reasons: non-conformance to 
ordinary English grammar (all of a sudden); inference does not predict 
conventional meaning from normal word senses (kick the bucket, spill the 
beans); inference does not predict conventionality (wide awake is 
conventional, but not wide alert); inference does not predict pragmatic 
usage from normal word senses (How do you do?); the idiom has an open 
form, for which inference does not readily predict usage with other 
words (…let alone…). 
This thesis adopts the approach Fillmore et al. advocated, which is to 
support interpretation of idioms via grammatical constructions. In a 
TalaMind architecture, grammatical constructions can be represented by 
executable concepts written as Tala sentences, called Tala constructions; a 
Tala construction can pattern-match all or part of another Tala sentence 
X and assert a new Tala sentence Y that is effectively an interpretation of 
X; the new sentence Y can contain content unrelated to X, and 
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(depending on the idiom) Y can also include information obtained from 
X; a Tala construction can match a sentence or phrase that is 
ungrammatical; and Tala constructions are composable, i.e. multiple 
constructions can perform translations in sequence. These features 
enable Tala constructions to construct meanings not implied by the 
expressions they match, a central ability of constructions discussed by 
Goldberg (1995 et seq.). 
The TalaMind architecture presented in this thesis does not go so far 
as to represent all the grammar of Tala via constructions, a direction the 
author expects would be advocated by proponents of construction 
grammars (cf. Kay & Fillmore, 1999; Goldberg, 1995 et seq.; Croft, 2002; 
Evans, 2009). Per §3.5.1, this is a possible direction for future research. 
On the other hand, Hudson (2007, pp.153-157) discusses how 
constructions can be used naturally in combination with a dependency 
grammar. Section 5.5.4 describes an initial implementation of Tala 
constructions for the TalaMind prototype demonstration system. 
Section 3.6.7.9 notes that constructions can be used to automatically 
translate conventionalized metaphorical expressions, as well as idioms.  
3.6.4 Semantic Disambiguation 
‽ How can a Tala agent determine which interpretations of an 
English sentence are appropriate? 
In the TalaMind architecture, conceptual processing is responsible 
for creating different interpretations of a Tala sentence, and for 
determining which interpretations are appropriate. It is also responsible 
for using a Tala sentence without creating other interpretations, if 
appropriate. Some conceptual processing may be relatively automatic. 
As discussed above, constructions may be applied to create new 
interpretations for a Tala sentence.  
The most appropriate interpretation of a Tala sentence may be an 
“indirect meaning” determined by pragmatic reasoning, not equivalent 
to a precise logical interpretation. An illustration of this was given in 
§3.6.3.7 for quantifications, where an interpretation involved changing 
the determiner “a” to “each”. Bunt & Black (2000) discuss other 
examples of pragmatic, indirect interpretations, e.g. “There’s a howling 
gale in here!” can be interpreted as “Shut the door/window!”. They note 
that the same expression (“On Sunday too.”) may be uttered twice with 
different indirect interpretations in a dialog about departure times for 
Analysis of Thesis Approach to Human-Level AI  
90 
an airplane flight, first as a request for verification and second as a 
confirmation. 
In general, determining which interpretations are appropriate 
involves abductive processing and pragmatic reasoning in contexts, 
relative to commonsense and encyclopedic knowledge, percepts and 
memories of events, etc. Thus it involves information in the conceptual 
framework, and information available from non-linguistic levels in 
Figure 1-1. The processing involved for disambiguation is in essence the 
same as determining which implications of a sentence are appropriate. 
So, method-oriented questions related to disambiguation will be 
discussed theoretically in §3.6.6 on semantic inference and §3.6.7 on 
representation of contexts. Chapters 5 and 6 provide examples in the 
prototype demonstration illustrating how the TalaMind approach can 
support disambiguation. 
3.6.5 Representing Implications 
‽ How can a Tala agent represent different possible implications 
of an English sentence? 
Hypothesis II implies that in general each implication of a Tala 
sentence may be represented by another Tala sentence. The term 
‘implication’ may be used broadly to refer to any concept that might be 
created by conceptual processing of one or more Tala sentences. So, in 
addition to logical consequences this usage includes interpretations of a 
Tala sentence, indirect meanings, and also questions, goals 35 , new 
(perhaps domain-specific) rules of inference, meta-statements, and so 
on, ad infinitum. It is straightforward to represent these in natural 
language, and so to express them as Tala sentences. Some natural 
language sentences prompt for the creation of contexts, e.g. through 
expressions like “Once upon a time…” (viz. §3.6.7.8). These may be 
considered a special case of this rule, since contexts will be represented 
by collections of Tala sentences, to be discussed in §3.6.7. 
 
                                                          
35 A goal may be represented by a Tala sentence of the form “I want 
X”, with the reserved variable ?self used in place of the first-person 
singular pronoun. Evans (2009) notes that the meaning of want depends 
on its object. In principle a Tala agent can specify X internally well 
enough to represent the meaning of its goals for its own purposes. 
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3.6.6 Semantic Inference 
‽ How can a Tala agent determine which implications of an 
English sentence are appropriate? 
Considering the broad idea of implication mentioned above, which 
includes questions, goals, meta-statements, etc., this amounts to a 
discussion of how higher-level mentalities can be supported  in the 
TalaMind architecture, which will be taken up in §3.7. There are several 
natural, lower-level questions about inference in the TalaMind 
approach, to be considered here.  
‽ How can logical inference be performed using the Tala 
conceptual language, working directly with natural language 
syntax? 
Tala’s use of nested list structures to represent syntactic structures 
facilitates pattern-matching of Tala sentences, which combined with a 
syntax for variables in Tala, and representation of inference rules as if-
then sentences, enables the mechanics of logical inference. Examples of 
this will be given in Chapter 6. 
3.6.6.1 Representation of Truth 
‽ How is truth represented in the TalaMind architecture? 
This thesis stipulates that Tala sentences will exist within contexts in 
the TalaMind architecture, and that if a Tala sentence exists within a 
context, this represents the sentence may be processed as if it is true in 
that context. For example, it may be used as the premise of an inference 
rule to create another Tala sentence in the same context. 
This thesis stipulates that a context is a collection of Tala sentences. 
There are a variety of different kinds of contexts to be discussed in more 
detail in §3.6.7. Here we focus just on the general, theoretical nature of 
inference within a context. Note that these stipulations are not required 
by the TalaMind hypotheses, but are given to describe a viable 
approach for implementing the hypotheses. 
3.6.6.2 Negation and Contradictions 
‽ How are negation and falsity represented in the TalaMind 
architecture? 
This thesis stipulates that if a negation of a Tala sentence A exists in 
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a context, this represents the negation is processed as if it is true in the 
context, and that A may be considered false in the context, to the extent 
it is negated (as explained below). If neither A nor a negation of A exists 
in a context, then neither A nor its negation is explicitly represented as 
true or false in the context. Of course, there may be other sentences in 
the context that imply A or a negation of A. 
Per §3.4.1, Tala is designed to represent how English sentences are 
actually expressed by people. Negation in Tala is therefore expressed in 
the same ways it is expressed in English. Negation occurs in English by 
various forms of grammatical marking, in which ‘not’, ‘never’, ‘no’ and 
other negative words are used within phrases, and in which negative 
morphemes (e.g. ‘un’, ‘dis’, ‘anti’) are used within words.  
The extent to which these markings express negation in English is 
often not as straightforward a matter as negation is in symbolic logic. 36 
Their meanings depend on where they occur in larger expressions and 
contexts, and also depend on social and idiomatic conventions. 
Conceptual processing is responsible for determining such meanings, 
using encyclopedic and commonsense knowledge. Thus while ‘not’ is a 
primitive word in English, it does not have a fixed, constant 
interpretation. In this respect it is similar to other primitive words in 
English (viz. §3.6.8). 
For example, scalar negations are often not treated as they would be 
in symbolic logic. Thus the sentence “He was standing not six feet from 
me” has the conventional interpretation “He was standing less than six 
from me” rather than permitting the subject to be seven feet or further 
away. Similarly “He is not happy” is conventionally interpreted as 
meaning the subject is sad, distressed, or perhaps angry, while 
interpretations such as “He is apathetic / puzzled / philosophical…” are 
often not considered. 
                                                          
36 Horn (2001, p. xx) writes “Marked negation is not reducible to a 
truth-functional one-place connective with the familiar truth table 
associated with logical negation, nor is it definable as a distinct logical 
operator; it represents, rather, a metalinguistic device for registering an 
objection to the content or form of a previous utterance (not to a 
proposition) on any grounds whatever, including the implicatures 
(conventional and conversational), the grammatical and phonetic form, 
or the register associated with that utterance.” The complexity of 
negation is indicated by the fact that Horn’s study of it spans 500 pages. 
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Double negatives are another, classic example of natural language 
expressions often not interpreted according to symbolic logic. 
Expressions such as “I don’t get no respect!” 37  are interpreted as 
intensifying a single negation, not reversing it. Double, triple and even 
quadruple negatives are often used with this intention, and must be 
understood by a system with human-level AI. Double negatives can 
also involve problematic scalar negations, e.g. “He is not unhappy” 
does not necessarily mean “He is happy”. 
Negation can also be implied by sentences worded without 
negations, by conventions that do not follow symbolic logic. For 
example, “If I had won the lottery, I would own a Rolls Royce” 
conventionally implies one did not win the lottery and does not own a 
Rolls, though neither of these follow according to symbolic logic. 
Likewise “Some of my funds are in cash” conventionally implies not all 
of one’s funds are in cash, though this does not follow logically. “That 
surgeon is a butcher” metaphorically implies someone is not a 
competent surgeon, even though surgeons and butchers are usually 
competent when considered separately. 
Human-level AI will have the same challenges as human 
intelligence, in understanding negations expressed in natural language. 
It is an advantage of the TalaMind approach that negations are 
expressed within a conceptual language based on the syntax of natural 
language, in a structure that makes them accessible for conceptual 
processing based on encyclopedic knowledge, including knowledge of 
idioms, social conventions, etc. This gives reason to think the challenges 
of understanding negations are surmountable via the TalaMind 
approach: In principle, conceptual processing can translate “I don’t get 
no respect” into “I don’t get any respect” or translate “not six feet 
away” into “probably less than six feet away”. Semantic annotation can 
be used to record decisions to treat negations in a Tala sentence as literal 
or intensified, etc. Counterfactual implications can be interpreted using 
mental spaces (Cutrer, 1994; viz. §3.6.7.8). Metaphorical implications can 
be developed using conceptual blends (§3.6.7.9). Per §3.2.1, symbolic 
logic can still be used when appropriate. However, per §1.6 this thesis 
will not attempt to fully design how negations in natural language 
should be interpreted by a TalaMind architecture to achieve human-
level AI – this remains a topic for future research. 
                                                          
37 The catchphrase of the respected comedian Rodney Dangerfield. 
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‽ How does the TalaMind architecture guarantee that if a Tala 
sentence is true, its negation is false? 
In general, there is no such guarantee. Conceptual processing is 
responsible for detecting that contradictory sentences exist in a context, 
and resolving inconsistencies, if possible and appropriate. Meta-
reasoning may occur about the sentences in a context, and about the 
consistency, usefulness, etc. of a context. 
In some contexts, such as mathematical and logical theories, it is 
crucial that no contradictions exist, and if a contradiction is deduced, 
the context is invalidated. In other real-world contexts it is likely 
contradictions will exist, and they may not be possible to resolve, yet the 
context remains valid for conceptual processing. Human-level AI has 
the same problem as human intelligence, to manage contradictions in 
such contexts. 
Suppose a Tala agent encounters Captain Kirk who says “This 
statement is false.” While this sentence could be interpreted as referring 
to some other sentence depending on the context, it could also be 
interpreted as referring to itself. That interpretation could be 
represented in Tala as: 
(be  (<- ?x)(wusage verb) 
 (adv not) 
 (subj 
  (statement 
   (wusage noun) 
   (det this) 
   (wreferent ?x))) 
 (obj (true (wusage adj)] 
The Tala agent should not go into an infinite loop processing the 
Liar’s Paradox, emitting sparks and smoke.38 Its conceptual processing 
should detect that the interpretation is self-contradictory, and stop 
processing it. There is no reason in principle why computers cannot use 
meta-reasoning to recognize and transcend logical paradoxes, in the 
same way people do. 
Individuals may hold conflicting views and say self-contradictory 
things. Thus, Othello may say “I love Desdemona” and “I do not love 
Desdemona”. If a Tala agent were to encounter Othello making both 
statements, it should not invalidate its context for reality, nor for 
                                                          
38 Star Trek: The Original Series, “I, Mudd”, episode 37, 1967, based on 
a story by Gene Roddenberry. 
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Shakespeare’s play. 39  Nor should it conclude Othello is completely 
inconsistent in all his thoughts and will believe anything. Rather, a Tala 
agent should become circumspect regarding implications it might 
derive from either statement Othello makes about Desdemona. It could 
withdraw all such implications from its context for Shakespeare’s play, 
and just wait and see what happens. It could make very limited, 
tentative predictions about what might happen. It could reason about 
why Othello has made conflicting statements, and whether both 
statements are true but in different ways or at different times. If it has 
cultural knowledge about watching plays, then it knows it cannot talk 
to Othello or Desdemona, nor interrupt the play and annoy the 
audience.  
Per §3.6.3.7, real-world contexts are often different from 
mathematical logic. Logicians are concerned with determining if a 
sentence is true for all possible interpretations. Human-level 
intelligence, on the other hand, is able to use natural language sentences 
that have many possible interpretations, without considering or 
evaluating all of them. People frequently use sentences as if they are 
true, even though there are some interpretations that are false or 
nonsensical. When people do interpret a sentence, they create a context 
dependent interpretation, and only become concerned about other 
possible interpretations if their initial interpretation appears to be 
inconsistent within the context. The processing to detect an 
inconsistency may be general and domain independent, or it may be 
domain specific. To achieve human-level AI, a Tala agent will need to 
emulate these abilities, to understand intended interpretations of 
natural language sentences, without insisting on sentences that do not 
have possibly false interpretations. 
‽ How can it be determined that two concepts are contradictory? 
Disagreements between sentences occur within contexts. It can be 
relatively straightforward for conceptual processing to recognize 
contradictions and disagreements between sentences, for relatively 
clear, simple statements of facts. Yet in general, per the discussion of 
negation above, it requires commonsense, encyclopedic knowledge, and 
                                                          
39 “Excellent wretch! Perdition catch my soul, but I do love thee! and 
when I love thee not, Chaos is come again.” Othello, Act 3, Scene 3, ca. 
1603 by William Shakespeare. 
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inference to determine that two sentences imply a contradiction, and it 
may not always be possible to recognize one. Human-level AI will have 
to perform much the same kind of conceptual processing that human 
intelligence does in relation to negation and contradictions, with similar 
limitations. 
3.6.6.3 Inference with Commonsense 
‽ How does the TalaMind architecture guarantee that, if “John 
and Mary live in Chicago” is true, the sentence “Mary and John 
live in Chicago” is also true (both on the individual and on the 
collective readings)? 
Via the representation of commonsense and encyclopedic 
knowledge, integrated with the Tala lexicon in the conceptual 
framework, for the words in a particular sentence. For the verb “live”, 
the default commonsense knowledge is that if “A and B live”, then they 
do so both collectively and individually, and that the order of 
specification is irrelevant. Conceptual processes are responsible for 
generating entailments of Tala sentences, using the appropriate 
knowledge in context. For a different verb and object, like “have a 
baby”, the commonsense knowledge in the conceptual framework 
should be different, specifying that if “A and B have a baby” then they 
do so collectively, order of specification irrelevant, though only the 
female does so individually. 
3.6.6.4 Paraphrase and Inference 
‽ How can conceptual processing deal with the fact that the same 
concept may be expressed in different ways? 
Leveraging commonsense and encyclopedic knowledge, the 
TalaMind architecture permits use of constructions and other executable 
concepts to translate Tala conceptual structures from one form to 
another, so that different conceptual structures with the same meanings 
can be processed if Tala conceptual processes need them to be expressed 
in different ways. 
3.6.6.5 Inference for Metaphors and Metonyms 
‽ How can conceptual processing determine the implications of a 
metaphorical or metonymical expression? 
As noted in §§3.6.3.10 and 3.6.3.11, determining the implications of 
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metaphors and metonyms requires inference and encyclopedic or 
context-specific knowledge. For example, to interpret the metaphor 
“That surgeon is a butcher” as a pejorative statement, encyclopedic 
knowledge must be used in the following inferences (Grady et al., 1999): 
Since most people have only one skilled profession, the literal 
interpretation that the sentence describes someone who is both 
a skilled surgeon and a skilled butcher is unlikely. 
Therefore it is more likely the sentence uses ‘is’ metaphorically, 
saying the surgeon is like a butcher. 
The goals and methods of a surgeon are different from those of 
a butcher. A surgeon having the goals and methods of a butcher 
would not be a competent surgeon.  
Therefore a metaphorical interpretation is “That surgeon is 
incompetent.” 
In accordance with Hypothesis III, and without precluding other 
approaches, this thesis will discuss the use of conceptual blends 
(Fauconnier & Turner, 2002) for conceptual processing of metaphors. 
This is discussed in §3.6.7.9, along with discussion of metonyms. 
Interpreting metaphors is an extremely important problem for 
natural language understanding and human-level AI. If “syntax is the 
nerve of thought” 40  then metaphors are major signals carried by it. 
Metaphoric expressions are so common that natural language is 
“saturated with metaphor” (Steiner, 2011, p.30). Hence a system that is 
not adept at understanding metaphors will not be considered to have 
human-level intelligence.  
One need not fully endorse Steiner’s essay that human thought itself 
is poetic, 41 to recognize the importance of metaphors in reasoning by 
                                                          
40  An apt metaphoric remark by George Steiner in his Lustrum 
Lecture at Tilburg University (viz. Steiner, 2013, p.36). 
41  While there are points of agreement between this thesis and 
Steiner’s (2011) essay, it is beyond this thesis to address his essay 
specifically. This thesis is not about human psychology per se, but about 
how computers might emulate the capabilities of human intelligence. 
Also, just as emotions are outside the scope of this thesis, so is 
aesthetics. The creation and appreciation of beauty in music, visual arts 
and poetry would be higher-level mentalities for future research. 
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analogy, and imagination. Indeed, this importance has been discussed 
by several cognitive scientists, including Lakoff, Johnson, Turner, and 
Fauconnier. Per Hypothesis III, mental spaces and conceptual blends 
support the TalaMind approach for higher-level mentalities, as 
discussed in §3.7.  
3.6.7 Representation of Contexts 
‽ What is context? 
From the perspective of computational pragmatics, context may be 
construed as “the totality of conditions that influence the understanding 
and generation of linguistic behavior” (Bunt, 2000). Due to the centrality 
of linguistic processing in the TalaMind approach, from its perspective 
context may be construed as the totality of conditions that influence 
human-level artificial intelligence. In the TalaMind architecture, this 
amounts to saying context is the totality of Tala sentences that influence 
the conceptual processing of a Tala agent. 
3.6.7.1 Dimensions of Context 
To be more specific, in discussing computational pragmatics it is 
helpful to distinguish “dimensions of context” (Bunt 2000). These may 
be adapted for the TalaMind architecture, as follows: 
• Linguistic context: Information ranging from definitions in the 
Tala lexicon to both raw and analyzed linguistic material in 
current media being processed by a Tala agent, current dialog 
history, etc. 
• Semantic context: Information ranging from encyclopedic and 
commonsense concepts to concepts about topics of current 
linguistic media being processed by a Tala agent, e.g. current 
tasks or situations being discussed or considered by the agent. 
• Cognitive context: Concepts describing a Tala agent’s 
conceptual processing, and describing the conceptual 
processing of others, e.g. beliefs about beliefs and intentions of 
others. Also hypothetical contexts, contexts representing 
problems and theories, and contexts representing ongoing 
communications, are in this category. 
• Physical and perceptual context: Concepts ranging from a Tala 
agent’s perceived reality and memory of events, to concepts 
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about the availability of communicative and perceptual 
channels, the presence and attention of partners in 
communication, etc. 
• Social context: Concepts about the social aspects of situations, 
e.g. communicative rights, obligations, and constraints of 
participants in dialogs. 
For the TalaMind architecture there is some overlap in these 
dimensions, but it is not necessary that they be completely separate in 
describing aspects of context. For example, knowledge of semantic 
domains overlaps linguistic, semantic and cognitive contexts.  
In studies of dialog pragmatics, it is helpful to distinguish global vs. 
local aspects for each dimension, where global refers to information that 
tends to remain constant throughout a dialog and affects general 
characteristics of the dialog, and local refers to information that can be 
changed through communication in a dialog (Bunt, 1994 et seq.). The 
global vs. local distinction is also very relevant in the TalaMind 
architecture, and will be used in the following pages to characterize 
contexts, though virtually any kind of information can change for 
conceptual processing in general: New definitions and new 
encyclopedic knowledge can be developed, new perceptions of reality, 
etc. 
‽ What types of contexts should be represented and processed in 
the TalaMind approach? 
Following Hypothesis III this thesis will discuss how mental spaces 
and conceptual blends may be used as contexts supporting higher-level 
mentalities. Also, the discussion of theoretical questions in previous 
pages indicates additional context types should be included in the 
TalaMind architecture, to represent commonsense and encyclopedic 
knowledge, theories, perceived reality, event memory, hypothetical 
contexts, interactive contexts, and problem contexts. Representation of 
each of these context types will be discussed from a theoretical 
perspective in the following subsections. Conceptual processing of them 
will be discussed in §3.7 on theoretical support of higher-level 
mentalities. 
These context types are reasonably well-defined and accepted ideas 
in cognitive linguistics, cognitive science and AI, but they do not have 
definitions with the level of precision found in discussions of formal 
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theories. Hence, this chapter can only present general descriptions of 
these context types, viewed as collections of Tala sentences, and general 
discussions of their requirements and feasibility, from a theoretical 
perspective. What has been implemented relative to these elements in 
the prototype demonstration system is discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. 
Further, if context is construed as the totality of conditions that 
influence human-level artificial intelligence, then per §1.6 this thesis 
cannot claim to identify all the types of contexts that need to be 
represented and processed, to achieve human-level artificial 
intelligence. The TalaMind approach and architecture are not limited to 
representing only certain types of contexts, a priori. 
‽ How can contexts be represented in the TalaMind approach? 
Sowa (2001) discusses several approaches to the formal 
representation of contexts, which relate mostly to the cognitive 
dimension, but have overlap with other dimensions. These include the 
possible worlds of Leibniz, Kripke, and Montague; model sets of 
Hintikka; situation theory of Barwise and Perry; Peircean contexts; 
McCarthy’s formalism for contexts; and Sowa’s representation of 
contexts via conceptual graphs. Sowa notes distinctions between actual 
and possible propositions and contexts, and that Peirce distinguished 
between logical possibility (a proposition p is consistent with the facts 
and not proven false or true), subjective possibility (p is believable and 
not known to be false), and objective possibility (p is physically 
possible). Additionally a proposition may be questioned, or permissible. 
For each of these distinctions there is also a corresponding negation. All 
of these modalities may be mixed within a context, and in addition 
agents may have propositional attitudes (intentions) toward contexts 
and propositions. For example, agents may want, fear or hope a 
proposition to be true in a context. 
This thesis stipulates that a context is a collection of Tala sentences. 
Given the universality of natural language, Tala has in principle the 
ability to express all the distinctions needed to represent actual, possible 
and intentional propositions.42  
                                                          
42  Cf. Sowa (2010), “Natural languages have words for all the 
operators of first-order logic, modal logic, and many logics that have yet 
to be invented.” 
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‽ Do contexts have attributes or features in the TalaMind 
approach? 
Though a context is a collection of sentences, different context types 
will need to have other features or attributes represented. For instance, 
per §3.6.6.2 one attribute is whether a context tolerates or does not 
tolerate contradictory sentences within it, and how conceptual 
processing should behave if a contradiction is detected. As another 
example, a context may have a default temporal or spatial location 
relative to the Tala agent, e.g. a hypothetical context may have a relative 
temporal location in the future, present or past. A third example is the 
epistemic mode of a context, an attribute characterizing whether the 
sentences in a context represent factual knowledge, an imaginary or 
fictional situation, perceptual concepts, etc. (viz. §§3.6.7.7, 3.6.7.8, 4.2.8). 
The following pages will give initial discussions of attributes and 
features as needed within this thesis, for different context types. 
‽ Do contexts have internal structures in the TalaMind approach? 
Though a context is a collection of sentences, it will typically need to 
have additional structure, depending on the type of context. For 
instance, an interactive context will have a temporal structure, 
identifying a sequence of interactions. The following pages will give 
initial discussions of internal structures as needed within this thesis, for 
different context types. 
3.6.7.2 Perceived Reality 
As discussed in §3.2.2, a Tala agent’s conceptual framework has a 
requirement to include a set of concepts representing its projected / 
perceived reality, i.e. its perceptions of the current state of its 
environment expressed in Tala sentences, not precluding 
representations at lower levels of Figure 1-1. Perceived reality can be 
referenced in ongoing local, interactive contexts (§3.6.7.5) or in 
hypothetical contexts (§3.6.7.6) considering possible future scenarios. 
Since perceived reality is a collection of Tala sentences, it is a context 
type. 
3.6.7.3 Event Memory 
As discussed in §3.2.2, a Tala agent’s conceptual framework has a 
requirement to include a set of concepts representing the agent’s 
memories of past events expressed in Tala sentences, not precluding 
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representations at lower levels of Figure 1-1. Event memory can be 
referenced in local, interactive contexts (§3.6.7.5) ongoing within 
perceived reality, or in hypothetical contexts (§3.6.7.6) to consider 
counterfactual scenarios. Since event memory is a collection of Tala 
sentences, it is a context type. 
3.6.7.4 Encyclopedic & Commonsense Knowledge 
As discussed in §3.2.2, a Tala agent’s conceptual framework has a 
requirement to include concepts comprising encyclopedic and 
commonsense knowledge, expressed as a collection of Tala sentences, 
not precluding representations at lower levels of Figure 1-1. 
Encyclopedic and commonsense knowledge is effectively a global 
context, which may be referenced and applicable in other, local contexts. 
Section 3.6.7.7 discusses semantic domains for access and organization 
of encyclopedic and commonsense knowledge. For concision, in general 
this thesis will use ‘encyclopedic knowledge’ to include commonsense 
knowledge. 
More specifically, the scope of this knowledge includes: 
• Propositional knowledge typically found in human 
encyclopedias and dictionaries, about any topic. 
• Sociocultural knowledge about interactional norms and goals in 
different kinds of situations.  
• Commonsense knowledge, considered so widely known it is 
often not written down.  
• Perceptual and behavioral knowledge, needed to recognize or 
perform what words describe. 
As we proceed down this list, the extent to which knowledge can be 
expressed using natural language diminishes, and these forms of 
knowledge are increasingly represented at lower levels of Figure 1-1. 
Thus, encyclopedic knowledge spans all three conceptual levels in 
Figure 1-1. This list agrees with a description of encyclopedic 
knowledge given by Evans (2009). 
Per §1.6, the topic of encyclopedic knowledge is outside the scope of 
this thesis, and intended for future research. It is claimed by virtue of 
the ontological universality of natural language as a basis for Tala and 
the stipulated computational universality of TalaMind conceptual 
processes, that encyclopedic knowledge can be represented and 
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processed in the TalaMind architecture – particularly since the lower 
levels of Figure 1-1 offer generality in representing concepts not easily 
expressed in natural language. This is a strong claim in the sense of 
being likely true theoretically, but a weak claim in the sense of not being 
specific about directions for future research. 
Therefore, the author will offer some brief remarks about the 
feasibility of acquiring and representing encyclopedic knowledge at the 
linguistic level, and suggest some directions and possibilities for future 
research, while avoiding speculation. 
Section 3.6.1 notes that WordNet (Miller, 1991) would be a natural 
resource to leverage in building a Tala lexicon. Likewise, Wikipedia 
would be a natural resource to leverage for the propositional knowledge 
typically found in human encyclopedias, and indeed, it has already 
been the subject of research on semantic analysis. For instance, 
Flickinger et al. (2010) discuss research on syntactic parsing and 
semantic annotation of Wikipedia. It appears in principle such an 
approach could create Tala sentences expressing encyclopedic 
knowledge from Wikipedia, though this remains to be explored in 
future research. 
Lenat (1995) describes the Cyc project to represent commonsense 
knowledge, which began in 1984 and still continues. The effort has 
shown that such knowledge is vast, and time-consuming to acquire and 
represent, at least in the formal language (CycL) developed for the 
project. Sowa (2010) writes: 
“Although formal logic can be studied independently of natural 
language semantics, no formal ontology that has any practical 
application can ever be developed and used without 
acknowledging its intimate connection with NL 
semantics…These philosophical observations explain why large 
knowledge bases such as Cyc…have failed to achieve true 
artificial intelligence. An inference engine attached to a large 
collection of formally defined facts and axioms can prove 
theorems more efficiently than most people, but it lacks the 
flexibility of a child in learning new information and adapting 
old information to new situations.” 
Since commonsense knowledge is outside the scope of this thesis, the 
author will not comment on the extent to which Cyc may be useful for 
future research in the TalaMind approach. Here it will only be 
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suggested that the TalaMind approach may avoid some of the problems 
Sowa describes: Being based on natural language, Tala’s support for 
underspecification, negation, paraphrase, metaphor, metonymy and 
idioms may enable representing commonsense knowledge more flexibly 
than is possible in existing formal languages (cf. §4.2.2.3). 
Similar remarks apply to sociocultural knowledge. Being based on 
natural language, Tala can be used to describe interactive norms and 
goals in typical situations, enabling this form of encyclopedic 
knowledge to be represented in semantic domains (§3.6.7.7) at the 
linguistic level, and augmented by representation in semantic frames at 
the archetype level of Figure 1-1. 
To a limited extent, Tala can also be used to represent perceptual and 
behavioral knowledge at the linguistic level. For instance, Tala 
executable concepts can describe how to perform procedures and 
describe where an agent should look for something, or what something 
looks like, etc. However, the lower levels of Figure 1-1 are needed to 
fully represent and implement perceptual and behavioral knowledge 
within a physical environment. 
The prototype TalaMind demonstration system illustrates how a 
very limited amount of encyclopedic knowledge can support higher-
level mentalities of human intelligence. Small semantic domains for 
encyclopedic knowledge about nuts, grain and people are used to 
illustrate learning by reasoning analogically, causal and purposive 
reasoning, etc. (viz. Chapters 5 and 6). 
3.6.7.5 Interactive Contexts and Mutual Knowledge 
Extending the idea of dialog contexts, a Tala agent’s conceptual 
framework should support representation and conceptual processing of 
interactive contexts, i.e. contexts for interaction of a Tala agent with 
humans and other Tala agents. The temporal dimension of an 
interactive context includes sequences of Tala sentences, communicated 
between Tala agents and humans. For example, playing a game, 
negotiating a business deal, working in a team, trying a court case, 
waging a political campaign, writing and reading a book, are interactive 
contexts. All involve communication and mutual knowledge 
representation. 
Bunt (2000) categorizes “dialog acts” necessary for successful 
participation in a dialog. Besides task-oriented dialog acts (speech acts 
communicating information related to the topic of the dialog, the 
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speaker’s intentions and beliefs, etc.) there are “dialog control acts” of 
three kinds: 
• Feedback acts that allow participants to indicate whether they 
comprehend each other, or believe the other comprehends 
them. 
• Interaction management acts that allow a participant to retract 
or correct remarks, pause, exchange turns, request confirmation, 
change topics, etc. 
• Social obligations management acts including greetings, 
introductions, apologies, and thanks. 
These have not been studied in this thesis but in principle should be 
possible to support, e.g. in a semantic domain giving Tala sentences as 
definitions for various dialog control acts. This is a topic for future 
research. 
Bunt (2000) discusses the importance of representing mutual 
knowledge of beliefs and intentions, for natural language 
understanding in dialogs: 
“A model of the other agent’s model of the local context, within 
an agent’s local cognitive context, is needed since any time a 
dialogue act is performed concerning some aspect of local 
context … an assumption is made about the corresponding 
component of the other agent’s context model … This causes 
recursion in the model structure.” 
“The most complex kind of local cognitive context information 
… is formed by the participant’s recursive beliefs and intentions 
… since this information combines the inherent complexity of 
the semantic context information with that of nested 
propositional attitudes. An adequate representation of this 
information therefore calls for a logically sophisticated 
formalism with associated inference machinery.” 
A Tala agent’s conceptual framework can support recursively nested 
conceptual contexts. For example, a Tala agent can have an interactive 
context representing its belief and intentions within a dialog, and within 
this context have a nested context modeling another participant’s beliefs 
and intentions, and so on. The mechanics for this also supports 
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hypothetical contexts and nested conceptual simulation, discussed in 
the next section. A demonstration of this is given in Chapter 6. 
Also, Tala sentences can provide a “lightweight” representation of 
mutual knowledge, allowing statements about mutual knowledge to be 
expressed declaratively, and used for inference. For example: 
Peter knows Da Vinci painted the picture and knows John knows 
it. 
(know 
 (wusage verb) 
 (subj Peter) 
 (obj 
  (and 
   (paint 
    (<- ?p) 
    (wusage verb) 
    (tense past) 
    (subj ("Da Vinci" (wusage noun)  
      (naming proper))) 
    (obj 
     (picture 
      (wusage noun) 
      (det the) 
      ))) 
   (know 
    (subj John) 
    (obj ?p)] 
The (<- ?p) expression provides a coreference pointer, allowing the 
sentence to express that Peter knows Da Vinci painted the picture and 
knows John knows the same thing. Of course, this does not provide a 
complete model of John’s knowledge, nor guarantee that Peter’s 
knowledge about John’s knowledge is correct. Also, the above 
expression does not describe infinite recursion of shared knowledge. 
That can be represented (finitely) as follows: 
Peter knows Da Vinci painted the picture and knows John knows 
it and knows John knows Peter knows it, ad infinitum. 
(know 
 (<- ?k) 
 (wusage verb) 
 (subj Peter) 
 (obj 
  (and 
   (paint 
    (<- ?p) 
    (wusage verb) 
    (tense past) 
    (subj ("Da Vinci" (wusage noun) 
      (naming proper))) 
    (obj 
     (picture 
      (wusage noun) 
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      (det the) 
      ))) 
   (know 
    (subj John) 
    (obj  
     (and ?p ?k)] 
It can also be important to declaratively represent that knowledge 
and beliefs are not shared (Silverman & Whitney, 2012): 
Peter thinks Da Vinci probably painted the picture and thinks 
the seller does not think so. 
(think 
 (wusage verb) 
 (subj Peter) 
 (obj 
  (and 
   (paint (wusage verb) 
    (<- ?p) 
    (tense past) 
    (adv probably) 
    (subj ("Da Vinci" (wusage noun) 
      (naming proper))) 
    (obj 
     (picture 
      (wusage noun) 
      (det the) 
      ))) 
   (think 
    (wusage verb) 
    (adv not) 
    (subj 
     (seller 
      (wusage noun) 
      (det the) 
      )) 
    (obj ?p)] 
3.6.7.6 Hypothetical Contexts 
To support reasoning about potential future events, and 
counterfactual reasoning about past and present events, a Tala agent’s 
conceptual framework should support creation and conceptual 
processing of hypothetical scenarios of events. Logically, these should  
have the same properties as event memory or perceived reality, and 
interactive contexts, with the difference that a Tala agent’s conceptual 
processing can simulate the evolution of events within hypothetical 
contexts. Thus a hypothetical context may include models of other 
agent’s beliefs and goals, to support simulating what they would think 
and do, hypothetically. The term nested conceptual simulation is used to 
refer to an agent’s conceptual processing of hypothetical scenarios, with 
possible branching of scenarios based on alternative events, such as 
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choices of simulated agents within scenarios. There may be no 
difference in the conceptual framework between mental spaces (§3.6.7.8) 
and hypothetical contexts, or a mental space may be a lightweight 
hypothetical context. This is a topic for design. Chapters 5 and 6 discuss 
nested conceptual simulation in the prototype. 
3.6.7.7 Semantic Domains 
Section 3.6.1 discussed the Tala lexicon for storing definitions of 
words within the conceptual framework, and noted that the lexicon 
must be integrated with encyclopedic knowledge, by the principle of 
encyclopedic semantics (§3.2.2). 
This thesis will refer to “the encyclopedic knowledge to which a 
meaning of a word is linked” as a semantic domain for a sense of the 
word. The semantic domain includes the definition of the sense of the 
word, if there is a definition (viz. §3.6.8) and Tala sentences using that 
sense of the word, relating it to other concepts. Since a semantic domain 
is a collection of sentences, it is a type of context. 
This description of semantic domains corresponds to Langacker’s 
(1987 et seq.) description of conceptual domains in cognitive grammar, 
which he referred to simply as domains. Evans & Green (2006) discuss 
“Langacker’s proposal that encyclopedic knowledge consists of an 
inventory of basic and more abstract domains” organized hierarchically, 
stating that a domain “provides background information against which 
lexical concepts can be understood and used in language” and that 
words “…serve as ‘points of access’ to vast repositories of knowledge 
relating to a particular concept or conceptual domain (e.g. Langacker, 
1987).” They write: 
“Langacker’s theory of domains is…concerned with conceptual 
ontology: the structure and organisation of knowledge, and the 
way in which concepts are related to and understood in terms 
of others.”  
Essentially the same idea of conceptual domains supports Lakoff & 
Johnson’s (1980, 1999) theory of conceptual metaphors and metonyms. 
This thesis uses the term ‘semantic domain’ rather than ‘conceptual 
domain’, to specifically include Tala sentences in semantic domains at 
the linguistic level of Figure 1-1, stipulating that Tala sentences can refer 
to concepts in the archetype level. The next two sections will discuss 
semantic domains in support of mental spaces, conceptual blends and 
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conceptual metaphors. 
Multiple words can each provide access to a common semantic 
domain, and a word may have more than one sense in a semantic 
domain, e.g. if used as a noun and a verb. The concepts in a semantic 
domain can often be defined or described using word senses that occur 
in other semantic domains. The set of semantic domains thus referenced 
by a semantic domain is called its ‘domain matrix’ (cf. Langacker, 1987). 
Evans (2009) notes “the sort of encyclopedic knowledge to which [a] 
word provides access is a function of the context in which the word is 
embedded. That is, the linguistic context in part serves to narrow the 
sort of encyclopedic knowledge to which [a word] relates…” This 
implies a theoretical requirement that a semantic domain can be 
accessed by specifying a combination of words or Tala expressions 
provided by linguistic context (interactive contexts, perceived reality, 
etc.). It suggests the potential for TalaMind semantic domains to 
support domain-driven word sense disambiguation (Gliozzo et al., 2004; 
Buitelaar et al., 2006), though this is a topic for future research. In this 
regard, a TalaMind semantic domain is compatible with the description 
given by Gliozzo & Strapparava (2009, p.6) for their use of the term: 
“Semantic Domains are Semantic Fields characterized by high 
lexical coherence. The concepts denoted by words in the same 
field are strongly connected among each other, while words 
belonging to different fields denote basically unrelated 
concepts.” 
Fillmore (1977, 2002) uses the term ‘semantic domain’ with 
compatible meaning referring to the subject areas of ‘semantic frames’, 
his theoretical description of conceptual structures needed to 
understand meanings of a group of related words (Fillmore, 1975 et 
seq.). Fillmore’s semantic frames are complementary to Langacker’s 
domains, with additional focus on concepts for interactive norms and 
goals in situations or scenes – conceptual content also discussed by 
Minsky (1974) and Schank & Abelson (1977). Per §3.6.7.4, encyclopedic 
knowledge includes sociocultural knowledge about interactive norms 
and goals. Hence, such concepts also exist as Tala sentences in TalaMind 
semantic domains, at the linguistic level of Figure 1-1. 
Since encyclopedic knowledge can have various epistemic modes 
(§3.6.7.1), different semantic domains can have different epistemic 
modes. For instance, the word “klingon” is linked to a fictional semantic 
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domain, while the word “human” is linked to a factual domain (viz. 
§4.2.8).  
Since a TalaMind semantic domain is a context, in principle inference 
can be performed within it, i.e. using the sentences already in the 
semantic domain as premises to derive new sentences that can be added 
to it. To the extent that semantic domains and encyclopedic knowledge 
are global (i.e., relatively constant as described in §3.6.7.1) such 
inference will be relatively infrequent, compared to inference in local 
contexts. 
3.6.7.8 Mental Spaces 
Of course, constructing interpretations for sentences involves much 
more than retrieving definitions of words and encyclopedic knowledge 
in semantic domains. A human-level AI must construct meanings for 
sentences that are appropriate relative to its perceived reality, event 
memory, and ongoing interactive contexts. While inference (§3.6.6) is 
clearly required for disambiguation and meaning construction, it is 
desirable to identify and support other specific conceptual processes for 
constructing meaning of natural language sentences, especially if such 
processes can also support other higher-level mentalities. This motivates 
Hypothesis III’s inclusion of mental spaces and conceptual blends in the 
TalaMind approach. The present section discusses mental spaces as a 
context type in TalaMind architectures, while the next discusses 
conceptual blends. Their usage to support higher-level mentalities is 
discussed in §3.7. 
Evans & Green (2006, pp.363-396) outline Fauconnier’s (1984 et seq.)  
theory of mental spaces, describing it as a “highly influential cognitive 
theory of meaning construction”, situated within “the cognitive 
view…that conceptualisation emerges from language use in context”. 
Unlike semantic domains, which are global, relatively static contexts of 
encyclopedic information, mental spaces are dynamic, local, temporary 
contexts created by a Tala agent when understanding natural language 
sentences. Constructing an interpretation for a single natural language 
sentence can cause the creation of multiple mental space contexts. These 
can be reused and extended to understand subsequent natural language 
sentences that occur in an interactive context (§3.6.7.5). An agent can 
import information from a semantic domain into a mental space and 
perform inference within a mental space. 
At the linguistic level in a TalaMind architecture, mental spaces are 
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collections of Tala sentences, and therefore a context type. Additionally, 
a mental space identifies a set of ‘elements’, which are entities 
represented by noun expressions or pronouns. These elements are either 
constructed while processing a discourse, or pre-existing in the 
conceptual framework. For instance, elements may correspond to noun 
expressions described by encyclopedic knowledge. The Tala sentences 
within a mental space express relationships between its elements. 
Mental spaces theory describes how mental spaces are created, 
during conceptual processing of a natural language sentence. Again 
citing Evans & Green: 
“Mental spaces are set up by ‘space builders’, which are 
linguistic units that either prompt for the construction of a new 
mental space or shift attention back and forth between 
previously constructed mental spaces. Space builders can be 
expressions like prepositional phrases (in 1966, at the shop, in 
Fred’s mind’s eye, from their point of view), adverbs (really, 
probably, possibly, theoretically), connectives (if . . . then . . .; either . 
. . or . . .), and subject-verb combinations that are followed by an 
embedded sentence (Fred believes [Mary likes bananas], Mary 
hopes . . ., Susan states . . .), to name but a few.”  
Mental spaces theory says that mapping relationships (also called 
connectors) between the elements of different mental spaces are created 
to help represent interpretations of a natural language sentence. These 
mappings can be represented by Tala sentences. 
Considering the above descriptions as requirements, a mental space 
can be represented minimally within a TalaMind architecture by a data 
structure such as: 
 (<space-number> ;a unique identifier for each mental space 
  (elements ;Tala noun concepts 
            ) 
  (concepts ;Tala sentences 
   )) 
A set of connectors between mental spaces can be represented 
minimally by a list of Tala sentences. (‘Minimally’ means that additional 
information could be included in these structures, or other data 
structures could be used if needed, e.g. for scalability.) 
For example, Fauconnier (1985, 1994; pp.36-37) discussed how the 
following compound sentence can be represented using mental spaces:  
Analysis of Thesis Approach to Human-Level AI  
112 
“Suppose a movie is made about Alfred Hitchcock’s life; the 
main role (Hitchcock) is played by Orson Welles, but Hitchcock 
himself plays a minor role (the man at the bus stop).” 
Following are TalaMind data structures representing two mental 
spaces and associated connectors for this situation. The first mental 
space is created for the initial discourse context of the speaker’s reality, 
the second represents the imaginary movie. 
  (1 
   (<- ?s1) 
   (relative-time present)(epistemic-mode reality) 
   (elements 
    ("Orson Welles" 
     (<- ?a1) 
     (wusage noun) 
     (naming proper) 
     ) 
    ("Alfred Hitchcock" 
     (<- ?b1) 
     (wusage noun) 
     (naming proper) 
     ) 
    ) 
   (concepts 
    (suppose (wusage verb) 
     (obj 
      (make (wusage verb) (tense present) 
       (passive) 
       (subj ?m) 
       ))))) 
  (2 
   (<- ?s2) 
   (relative-time  
    (before ?s1)) 
   (epistemic-mode imaginary) 
   (elements 
    ("Alfred Hitchcock" 
     (<- ?b2) 
     (wusage noun) 
     (naming proper) 
     (in ?m) 
     ) 
    (man 
     (<- ?b3) 
     (wusage noun) 
     (det the) 
     (in ?m) 
     (at 
      (stop (wusage noun) 
       (comp (bus (wusage noun)) 
       (det the) 
       ))) 
    (movie (wusage noun) 
     (<- ?m) 
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     (det a) 
              (about ?b1) 
     ) 
    ) 
   (concepts 
    ;Hitchcock shoots the man at the bus stop. 
    (shoot (wusage verb) 
     (subj ?b2) 
     (obj ?b3) 
                   (in ?m) 
     ) 
    )) 
 
  (connectors 
   ;Orson Welles plays Alfred Hitchcock in the movie. 
   (play (wusage verb) 
    (wsense acting) 
    (subj ?a1) 
    (obj ?b2)) 
   ;Alfred Hitchcock plays the man at the bus stop 
                ;in the movie. 
   (play (wusage verb) 
    (wsense acting) 
    (subj ?b1) 
    (obj ?b3)) 
   ;Hitchcock in the movie portrays Hitchcock 
                ;in reality. 
   (portray 
    (wusage verb) 
    (subj ?b2) 
    (obj ?b1)) 
   ;The mental space ?s2 represents the movie 
   (represent 
    (wusage verb) 
    (subj ?s2) (obj ?m)] 
Fauconnier uses this example (presented as a diagram) to show that 
different elements representing Hitchcock must be provided in the 
mental spaces to represent unambiguous interpretations of sentences 
such as “Hitchcock liked himself in that movie” or “In the movie, 
Hitchcock shoots the man at the bus stop” (an interpretation of the latter 
is included above). 
In the above examples, two attribute slots are added to each mental 
space to describe their relative time and epistemic modes. Evans & 
Green (2006, pp.387-396) discuss in some detail the research of Cutrer 
(1994) and others regarding mental spaces and the English tense-aspect-
modality system. 
There is much more that can be said about mental spaces, and which 
has been said by Fauconnier and others, regarding their use in meaning 
construction for natural language. However, the above paragraphs will 
suffice to support discussions throughout this thesis. There do not 
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appear to be any theoretical issues that prevent representation and use 
of mental spaces within a TalaMind architecture. 
3.6.7.9 Conceptual Blends 
While inference is clearly required for meaning construction, it is 
desirable to identify and support other specific conceptual processes for 
understanding natural language, especially if such processes can also 
support other higher-level mentalities. And as discussed in §3.6.6.5, 
interpreting meaning for metaphors is essential for understanding 
natural language as well as humans do. Conceptual blends are an 
extension of mental space theory developed to explain how metaphors 
are understood, and claimed to support human imagination 
(Fauconnier & Turner, 1994 et seq.). These considerations motivate 
Hypothesis III’s inclusion of conceptual blends in the TalaMind 
approach. This section describes conceptual blends, focusing on how 
they support metaphors. The use of blends to support higher-level 
mentalities is discussed in §3.7. 
Evans & Green (2006, pp.400-440) outline Fauconnier & Turner’s 
theory of conceptual blends, which they describe as the subject of 
“research carried out by a large international community of academics”, 
giving rise to the view that “conceptual blending is central to human 
thought and imagination...”  
Fauconnier & Turner’s basic 
diagram (Figure 3-1) for a 
conceptual blend ‘integration 
network’ includes four mental 
spaces: A generic space of 
background information, two 
input spaces and a space that 
integrates (blends) concepts 
from the two input spaces. As 
with an ordinary mental spaces 
diagram, there are connectors 
going vertically between the 
spaces (shown as dotted lines) 
specifying relationships between 
elements of the spaces. The 
integration network also in-
cludes horizontal connectors between the input spaces, shown as solid 
Figure 3-1  Basic Diagram of a 
Conceptual Blend 
    (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002, p.46) 
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lines. These specify relationships used by conceptual processing to 
construct concepts in the blend space. The square represents emergent 
structure in the blend space.  
The generic space subsumes concepts available to interpret a 
metaphorical expression: encyclopedic and commonsense knowledge, 
perceived reality, event memory, ongoing interactive contexts, etc. The 
input spaces contain concepts retrieved from semantic domains 
identified in the natural language expression being interpreted. For the 
‘surgeon as butcher’ metaphor there is an input space for ‘surgeon’ and 
another for ‘butcher’. Conceptual integration networks can have more 
than two input spaces if needed. 
Blending theory describes a series of conceptual processes that 
construct integration networks and integrate concepts within them: 
• A matching process performs a partial matching to identify 
counterpart elements in the input spaces and establish cross-
space connectors between them. These counterpart connectors 
can be based on several kinds of ‘vital relations’ between the 
elements, e.g. identity, role, cause-effect, etc., as well as 
metaphoric specification.  
• Selective projection is a conceptual process that projects concepts 
from the input spaces into the blend space. Not all the concepts 
in the inputs are projected to the blend, only those related to the 
metaphorical expression being interpreted, and to the cross-
space connectors between the input spaces. 
• Composition is a conceptual process that composes separate 
elements from the input spaces into a single element in the 
blend space. For the ‘surgeon as butcher’ blend this process 
creates concepts representing a surgeon who has the goals, 
skills and tools of a butcher, in the blend space. 
• Completion is a conceptual process that recruits additional 
concepts from background information into the blend space, 
prompted for by composition or the next process, elaboration. 
For example, in the ‘surgeon as butcher’ blend, completion 
might recruit additional encyclopedic and commonsense 
knowledge into the blend, to support a conclusion that patients 
would die in operations performed by a surgeon with the goals, 
skills and tools of a butcher. 
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• Elaboration is a conceptual process that develops additional 
concepts in a blend by “treating them as simulations and 
running them imaginatively according to the principles that 
have been established for the blend” (Fauconnier & Turner, 
2002, p.48). This involves inference within the blend, and is the 
same kind of process as nested conceptual simulation in 
hypothetical contexts (§3.6.7.6). For the ‘surgeon as butcher’ 
blend, this process would conclude that a surgeon with the 
goals, skills and tools of a butcher would be an incompetent 
surgeon (Grady et al., 1999). 
Researchers have studied governing principles and constraints for 
these processes, which are not deterministic: “different language users, 
or even the same language user on different occasions, can produce 
different blends from the same inputs” (Evans & Green, 2006, p.409).  
Together, these conceptual processes produce emergent conceptual 
structures in the blend, concepts not specified in the original 
metaphorical expression. Other contexts can be modified as a result. 
Concepts from the blend can be projected backwards to the input spaces 
or to contexts in the generic space. For the ‘surgeon as butcher’ 
metaphor, a disanalogy relationship between the input spaces can be 
created, and the original interactive context can be modified, attributing 
to its speaker a negative comment on the surgeon’s competence. 
Though the metaphor was understood dynamically, if it is salient for 
other situations it can become conventionalized so that future 
interpretation is automatic, e.g. using a construction to perform 
metaphoric translations (§5.4.13). 
Conceptual blends are complementary to Lakoff & Johnson’s 
(1980,1999) conceptual metaphor theory in several respects (Grady et al., 
1999; Evans & Green, 2006). This theory discussed how metaphors can 
be represented by unidirectional mappings between conceptual 
domains, stored in long-term memory, but did not discuss dynamic, 
temporary mental spaces or blend spaces. In principle in a TalaMind 
architecture, conceptual metaphors can initially be understood using 
mental spaces with concepts projected from semantic domains. If 
salient, metaphors can become conventionalized and used for relatively 
stable knowledge representation in semantic domains. Vogel (2011) 
gives a formal logic approach to metaphors. 
Lakoff & Johnson (1980,1999) also presented a conceptual theory of 
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metonymy, noting that a metonymical reference allows one entity to 
stand for (provide access to) another in the same conceptual domain. 
This is a different kind of mapping from that involved in metaphor 
(Evans & Green, p.312; Kövecses & Radden, 1998). It can also be 
supported in a TalaMind architecture, in principle: Since metonyms are 
ad hoc, they can be disambiguated within a temporary mental space, 
using concepts projected from a semantic domain, i.e. metonyms do not 
require a four-space conceptual integration network. 
There does not appear to be any a priori limit on the nature or form 
of metaphors that can be interpreted using conceptual integration 
networks. For example, XYZ metaphors (“Brevity is the soul of wit”, 
“Politics is the art of the possible”, “Language is the mirror of the 
mind”, etc.) can be interpreted using conceptual blends. Besides 
metaphors, conceptual integration networks can be used for other 
aspects of natural language understanding, e.g. counterfactual 
semantics, compound words, etc. (viz. Evans & Green, 2006). 
There is much more that can be said about conceptual blends, and 
which has been said by Fauconnier and Turner, and others, regarding 
meaning construction for natural language. However, the above 
paragraphs will suffice to support discussions throughout this thesis. 
There do not appear to be any theoretical issues that prevent 
representation and use of conceptual blends within a TalaMind 
architecture, using its representation for mental spaces (§3.6.7.8). Use of 
conceptual blends in the TalaMind approach does not preclude other 
methods for interpreting metaphors.  
3.6.7.10 Theory Contexts 
A human-level AI must have the ability to develop theories, and to 
reason with and about theories, so that it can create theoretical 
explanations and predictions of its environment, to behave intelligently 
within its environment. Hence it must have the ability to represent 
theories. 
An explanation or theory can sometimes be stated in a single 
sentence, e.g. “Everything is made out of earth, air, fire and water.” Yet 
we can develop more complex theories that support multiple 
conclusions and are reusable in multiple situations. Such theories can be 
stated as collections of Tala sentences, and are therefore a type of 
context, which this thesis calls (TalaMind) theory contexts, or simply 
‘theories’. 
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A TalaMind theory context includes the following kinds of 
sentences: 
• An initial set of Tala sentences giving definitions of terms (word 
senses), used in the theory. A theory may also use ‘undefined’ 
terms that do not have definitions included in the theory. 
Undefined terms may or may not have definitions outside the 
theory. 
• An initial set of Tala sentences stating relationships between the 
terms of the theory. This set of sentences can have various 
names, such as axioms, premises or hypotheses – in this 
discussion the name does not matter, and the term ‘premises’ 
will be used. 
• A set of Tala sentences that can be derived directly or indirectly 
from the definitions and premises of the theory. This set of 
sentences also has various names, such as theorems, 
predictions, conclusions, etc., which do not matter in this 
discussion. 
• A set of Tala sentences expressing conjectures, questions, and 
derivations for sentences in the theory. A derivation can be 
expressed using the Tala syntax for a sequence of steps, which 
is also used in an executable concept. Thus, a derivation can be 
represented as a conceptual structure, available for conceptual 
processing to verify or dispute. 
Conceptual processing is responsible for deriving conclusions in a 
theory context from the premises, definitions, and previous conclusions 
derived in the context. Since Tala sentences are based on natural 
language, a TalaMind theory context has the potential for ambiguity 
and underspecification found in natural language. So, it is not limited to 
the semantics of a formal theory stated in predicate calculus, or other 
precise logical formalisms. TalaMind theory contexts provide a general 
representation of informal, natural language-based theories. Per §3.2.1, 
this does not preclude the use of formal, logical languages in 
mathematical or scientific theories. 
When it is initially developed a theory context is a ‘local’, temporary 
context. If it is successful as a theory, it will eventually become a ‘global’ 
context for a Tala agent, included in its encyclopedic knowledge. 
Depending on the nature of the concepts involved, it may or may not be 
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possible for a Tala agent to augment or express a TalaMind theory 
context by a formal theory, in a precise mathematical or logical 
language. As will be discussed in §3.6.7.14, a theory context can also 
have a meta-context for meta-reasoning about the theory. The TalaMind 
approach permits a meta-theory context that is about multiple other 
theories. 
3.6.7.11 Problem Contexts 
Within a context a Tala agent may have goals, which can be 
represented as Tala sentences of the form “I want X”, where X does not 
yet exist in the context. Achieving a goal may be considered a problem, 
and the context considered a ‘problem context’. If there is not yet a 
known way to achieve a goal, then an agent can reason about ways to 
achieve it. This may involve nested conceptual simulation within the 
problem context. If a solution is discovered, it may be described as a 
Tala sentence, for reuse in future similar problem contexts. This 
sentence will typically be of the form “If I want X then do Y” where Y 
may be a verb expression, and the verb may be defined by an executable 
concept. 
Meta-statements about how to find solutions in problem contexts are 
of interest theoretically. McCarthy (1955) termed such statements ‘rules 
of conjecture’ and in 1980 proposed circumscription as a rule of 
conjecture to address the qualification problem in representing 
commonsense knowledge. Circumscription is equivalent to a meta-
statement saying a problem context contains all the facts relevant to 
solving a problem, and that no new entities or facts may be introduced 
into the context to determine how to solve it. This is a relevant meta-
statement when one wishes to consider whether a problem is logically 
solvable or unsolvable, and if it is solvable, what is the most efficient 
solution. 
In real-world problem contexts one may have a different rule of 
conjecture, for example that the problem context includes the initial 
facts known to be relevant to stating the problem, but not necessarily all 
the facts relevant to a solution. This is a more accurate statement for 
practical and scientific problems when one wants to find any possible 
way to solve a problem and then evaluate its practicality. So, if a real-
world problem is isomorphic to the Missionaries and Cannibals 
problem, it may be completely legitimate to consider whether a bridge 
exists nearby. 
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Just as Tala is useful for semantic inference with underspecification, 
it may be useful for problem solving without considering all possible 
conditions for performing an action. Section 4.1.1 discusses this topic 
further, in addressing Dreyfus’ criticism of AI regarding the 
qualification problem. Chapter 6 illustrates how the TalaMind approach 
can support problem-solving in the demonstration system. 
3.6.7.12 Composite Contexts 
In a TalaMind architecture, contexts will need to be constructed 
dynamically that combine aspects of the context types described above. 
For instance, a context may need to be a hypothetical interactive 
problem context, based on perceived reality and event memory. It is 
theoretically possible to have composite contexts if attributes of context 
types are consistent (viz. §3.6.7.1). 
3.6.7.13 Society of Mind Thought Context 
Per §§1.5 and 3.2.2, the conceptual framework has an implied 
requirement to support storing and retrieving thoughts represented as 
sentences in Tala. Any Tala sentence may be considered as a thought 
when it is created in any context within the conceptual framework. 
However, if a TalaMind system includes a society of mind architecture 
(§2.3.3.2.1) in which subagents communicate using the Tala conceptual 
language, then it is implied that these subagents will have an interactive 
context (§3.6.7.5). This will be termed a society of mind ‘thought 
context’. The TalaMind hypotheses do not require a society of mind 
architecture but it is consistent with the hypotheses and natural to 
implement one at the linguistic level of Figure 1-1. Hence this chapter 
does not present theoretical requirements or analysis related to a society 
of mind. The prototype TalaMind architecture presented in Chapters 5 
and 6 includes a simple society of mind in which multiple subagents 
communicate in a thought context. 
3.6.7.14 Meta-Contexts 
McCarthy (1995) wrote, “The ability to transcend one's present 
context and think about it as an object is an important form of 
introspection…reasoning about theories as objects is not different in 
principle from reasoning about other objects.” Accordingly, this thesis 
stipulates that in addition to being able to perform inference within a 
context, using the sentences already in the context, a human-level AI 
needs to be able to perform inference about a context. Logically, the 
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collection of sentences expressing statements about a context A is 
context about the context A, i.e. a meta-context for A. Thus the 
TalaMind approach stipulates that meta-contexts are needed. This 
implies, incidentally, that it must be possible to refer to a context by a 
name or a pointer, which is not theoretically problematic in a TalaMind 
architecture. The example given in §3.6.7.8 uses the (<- ?p) pointer 
notation for references to mental space contexts. 
The attributes and features of a context can be expressed by Tala 
sentences in its meta-context. For example, if a Tala agent determines 
that a context contains a contradiction, it can create a sentence saying 
that the context contains contradictory sentences. Similarly, a Tala agent 
can have sentences in a meta-context expressing rules of conjecture for a 
problem context (§3.6.7.11), or describing the epistemic mode of a 
semantic domain (§§3.6.7.7, 4.2.8)  
The question arises, how to avoid an infinite regress of contexts 
about contexts? The TalaMind approach does not require or imply any 
particular method for this. It appears a good approach would be to not 
have any preset limit, but to effectively limit the levels of meta-contexts 
by a resource constraint making it increasingly less likely an agent will 
create higher levels of meta-contexts. This is a topic for future research. 
3.6.8 Primitive Words and Variables in Tala 
‽ Does Tala contain primitive words, and if so, how are their 
meanings represented and determined? 
This question has confronted previous work on formal concept 
representation languages for AI. For example, Dreyfus (1992) noted that 
Schank’s work on conceptual dependency and scripts seemed to face an 
endless task: 
“But Schank passes over this difficulty…by stipulating a few 
more ad hoc primitives…If these primitives don't account for our 
understanding…Schank is ready, as always, to add a few 
more.” 
This problem does not confront the TalaMind approach in quite the 
same way. For Tala to support understanding natural language, we do 
not need to stipulate ad hoc, context-free primitives in a formal 
language for representing the semantics of words separate from natural 
language. However, we do need to address the topic of primitives in 
natural language itself, i.e. primitive words in a particular natural 
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language such as English. This question will be given a case-by-case 
answer, for different grammatical categories of English words.  
Since new words are typically defined in terms of previous words, it 
is natural to think there is some set of words that are most basic, or 
primitive, in terms of which other words are ultimately defined. If 
people try to define such words, they may create circular definitions, or 
define them by reference to context, e.g. pointing to objects or events in 
the environment. Other primitive words, e.g. prepositions, conjunctions, 
and articles, are effectively built into the syntax of English, and may be 
even more difficult to define. 
It is possible to create a list of proposed primitive words for English 
(or any other natural language) and several researchers have studied 
this topic. There is substantial agreement in primitives suggested by 
several sources, including Bateman et al., Dolan et al., Jackendoff, Kay & 
Samuels, Mandler, Masterman, Wierzbicka & Goddard, and 
Zholkovsky. Benedetti (2011, pp.17-18) reports comparing Wierzbicka’s 
primitives with the Swadesh words used in glottochronology to 
determine kindred relationships of languages, writing that the Swadesh 
list is used in almost all languages. Benedetti finds substantial 
agreement in both sets of words, though they were developed for 
different purposes. 
However, different words may be considered primitive, from 
different theoretical perspectives. For example, the Swadesh list of basic 
words includes man, woman, bird, dog, etc. It does not include electron 
or atom, which from a physics perspective could be considered more 
primitive. Nor does Swadesh contain abstract terms such as entity or 
relation, which could be considered primitive for an ontology.  
In a TalaMind architecture, all nouns are equally accessible, and 
reasoning can occur with each of them directly, without necessarily 
having to reason about how a noun is defined in terms of other words. 
A noun may be used as an index for a semantic domain, which will 
provide encyclopedic and commonsense knowledge about it. This 
information will be available for abductive reasoning to disambiguate 
its sense and reference, supported by lower levels of conceptual 
processing and the environment interaction systems (Figure 1-1). 
Disambiguation of a noun is a form of variable binding, as discussed in 
§3.6.1. So, the TalaMind approach does not require or depend on a list 
of primitive nouns for English, per se, although if the senses of Tala 
nouns are defined in semantic domains that are organized in a lattice, 
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and circular definitions not allowed, then it follows that some nouns 
will not be defined in terms of other nouns. 
The semantics for articles (a, an, all, some, most, the, …) and 
conjunctions (or, and, if, then, while, …) is determined by the 
conceptual processing of Tala sentences that contain these words. That 
is, there is no need to define these primitive words in terms of other 
words. Their meaning derives from how they are interpreted and/or 
semantically annotated during conceptual processing. This will often 
involve underspecification, per §3.6.3.7. 
The semantics of pronouns depends on abductive disambiguation 
performed by conceptual processing, to determine most likely 
references in context. That is, these primitives are disambiguated as 
context-sensitive references, which may be represented using pointers 
either within Tala concept structures, or to percepts in the conceptual 
framework. To illustrate, here is a Tala interpretation of an example 
from Bunt & Black (2000, p.9): 
 If the baby doesn’t thrive on cow’s milk, boil it. 
 (if 
(thrive 
 (wusage verb) 
 (adv not) 
 (subj 
  (baby (wusage noun)(det the))) 
 (on 
  (milk 
   (<- ?m) 
   (wusage noun) 
   (from 
    (cow (wusage noun)(number plural))) 
    ))) 
(then 
 (boil 
  (wusage verb) 
  (obj  
   (it (wreferent ?m)] 
The semantics of prepositions is more complex but also depends on 
abductive disambiguation by conceptual processing, to disambiguate in 
context. Two classes of prepositions may be distinguished: those which 
appear to have a collection of somewhat distinct, different meanings, 
and those which have broadly varying meanings, and serve mainly to 
guide interpretation in context. In the first class are prepositions like 
‘over’, for which Tyler & Evans (2003) found fifteen distinct meanings – 
abductive disambiguation with encyclopedic knowledge is needed to 
select the most likely meaning in context. The preposition ‘of’ is in the 
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second class. It indicates a variable relationship between two entities. 
The nature of the relationship depends on the specific entities and must 
be determined by abductive conceptual processing in context. 43 
For verbs the situation is often the same as for nouns in the 
TalaMind approach. That is, verbs can also be indexes for semantic 
domains, and reasoning about the meaning of a verb can occur in much 
the same way as for a noun. However, certain primitive verbs such as 
‘is’, ‘have’, ‘do’, ‘go’, etc. are exceptions to this. These can have variable 
meanings requiring abductive disambiguation in context, similar to the 
disambiguation of prepositions described above. This will be illustrated 
in Chapters 5 and 6. 
The TalaMind approach is similar for adjectives and adverbs: 
disambiguation involves abductive reasoning with encyclopedic 
knowledge in context, to select the most likely meanings, resulting in 
translation of conceptual structures (cf. §3.6.3.9). 
Tala will need to have some primitive, undefined reserved words 
and variables not specifically related to the semantics of English, e.g. to 
support definition of executable concepts. Chapter 5 discusses some 
initial primitives used in the demonstration system, such as the reserved 
variable ?self, function names used as primitive verbs to invoke con-
structions, etc.  
3.7 Higher-Level Mentalities 
The preceding sections have discussed how the TalaMind approach 
could support natural language understanding, which is one of the 
higher-level mentalities listed in §2.1.2. This section considers the 
following theoretical questions for the other  higher-level mentalities: 
‽ What is theoretically required, to claim a system achieves each 
higher-level mentality? 
‽ How can each higher-level mentality be supported by the 




                                                          
43 Evans (2009) discussed revisions to the approach of Tyler & Evans 
(2003) that “reformulated the methodology...building the notion of 
context into the decision principles…” 
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3.7.1 Multi-Level Reasoning 
Following are theoretical arguments that the TalaMind architecture 
can perform each of the kinds of reasoning included within multi-level 
reasoning as defined in §2.1.2.6. 
3.7.1.1 Deduction 
Deduction has classically been described using natural language 
expressions, e.g. 
All men are mortal. 
Socrates is a man. 
Therefore, Socrates is mortal. 
As noted in §3.6.6, Tala’s use of nested list structures to represent 
natural language syntactic structures facilitates pattern-matching of Tala 
sentences. Combined with a syntax for variables in Tala, and 
representation of inference rules as if-then sentences, these symbolic 
processing mechanisms enable logical deduction, within contexts. 
3.7.1.2 Induction 
If a Tala agent develops a set of observations which support the 
truth table corresponding to A → B, then the agent may conditionally, 
though not certainly infer the rule A → B by induction.  
The introduction of conditional inference and associative 
observations opens the door to probabilistic inference (Pearl, 1988 et 
seq.). Moreover, Pearl suggests Bayesian logic should be integral with 
the representation of contexts:  
“Bayesian philosophers see the conditional relationship as more 
basic than that of joint events – that is, more compatible with 
the organization of human knowledge. In this view, B serves as 
a pointer to a context or frame of knowledge, and A | B stands 
for an event A in the context specified by B… Consequently, 
empirical knowledge invariably will be encoded in conditional 
probability statements…” (Pearl, 2009, p.4) 
This would be an interesting topic for future research in the 
TalaMind approach. 
3.7.1.3 Abduction 
Abduction is a reasoning process that develops explanations (see 
§2.2.2): 
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C is true 
A → C 
Therefore, perhaps A is true. 
Abduction is possible within a TalaMind architecture, using the same 
symbolic processing mechanisms that support deduction. When 
abducing A as an explanation for C, where does the rule A → C come 
from? One answer is to construct rules via inductive observation, as 
described above; another is to use analogy to construct new rules – see 
next. 
3.7.1.4 Analogical Reasoning 
Analogical reasoning is of the form: 
A → B 
C is similar to A 
Therefore perhaps C → B 
Or more generally: 
A → B 
C is similar to A 
D is similar to B 
Therefore perhaps C → D 
This is also called case-based reasoning, if A → B is a previous case, 
and we are trying to determine how to process C. Similarity may be 
recognized at the archetype or associative levels in Figure 1-1, or it may 
be determined based on linguistic descriptions, e.g. a system may 
consider that “date wine” is similar to “grape wine”, since both are 
linguistically described as types of wine (cf. Sowa & Majumdar, 2003). 
Examples of analogical reasoning within a TalaMind architecture will be 
given in Chapter 6, for the prototype demonstration system. 
3.7.1.5 Causal and Purposive Reasoning 
Natural language syntax enables concise, direct representation of 
causal and purposive relationships, e.g. via subordinating conjunctions ( 
“because”, “since”, “why”, “how”,…), or via verb or noun expressions 
(“X causes Y”, “The purpose for doing X was Y”), etc. Thus Tala enables 
one to easily say “The O ring shattered because the temperature was 
below freezing”, i.e. to state a causal relationship between arbitrarily 
complex expressions, with the causal link being accessible for pattern-
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matching and inference. 
Since these relationships can be directly expressed in natural 
language syntax, and in the Tala conceptual language, reasoning about 
such relationships can be supported within the TalaMind architecture.44 
Examples of this will be given in Chapter 5 and 6, for the prototype 
demonstration system. The TalaMind approach is also open to use of 
probabilistic logic for reasoning about causality (Pearl, 2009) as a topic 
for future research. 
3.7.1.6 Meta-Reasoning 
Meta-reasoning is reasoning about reasoning, so it includes 
reasoning about reasoning processes, reasoning about the validity of 
arguments, deciding to abandon a theory, etc. In principle, it is 
theoretically possible to perform meta-reasoning within the TalaMind 
architecture, because: 
• A concept represented by a Tala expression can refer to other 
concepts. A Tala sentence can declaratively express knowledge 
about knowledge (§3.6.7.5). 
• Per §§3.6.7.10 and 3.6.7.14, TalaMind systems can in principle 
reason about theories, treating them as objects that have 
properties such as consistency or inconsistency. 
• Executable concepts in outer contexts can access (“observe”) 
concepts in nested contexts (§3.6.7.6), using observations for 
decision logic and meta-concepts. 
• Reasoning by analogy may be combined with causal reasoning, 
as well as purposive reasoning about why something should be 
done, to determine if an activity is worthwhile. 
• Conceptual processes can create concepts to record traces of 
their execution, which can be the subject of observation and 
reasoning by other conceptual processes.  
Meta-reasoning supports recognition of paradoxes, and termination 
of unproductive mental loops. 
                                                          
44  As noted by Sowa & Majumdar (2003), causal and purposive 
reasoning may be used to determine whether analogical inferences are 
relevant. 
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3.7.2 Self-Development & Higher-Level Learning 
3.7.2.1 Learning by Multi-Level Reasoning 
While induction is considered a form of inference, it is also a form of 
learning. Thus Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett and Thagard (1986, p.1) 
consider induction to include “all inferential processes that expand 
knowledge in the face of uncertainty.” Processes for induction of new 
inference rules can be extended to learning new concepts in general. 
New concepts may be described in Tala sentences at the linguistic 
conceptual level in the TalaMind architecture, or may be learned and 
represented at the archetype and associative levels. 
Other forms of inference, such as abduction, analogical reasoning 
and causal and purposive reasoning, enable corresponding forms of 
learning. Given the abductive ability to create an explanation, a Tala 
agent can make predictions based on such explanations. The success or 
failure of predictions can be used to improve explanatory theories. 
Likewise, reasoning by analogy enables developing explanations and 
theories for new domains based on analogies with previously known 
domains. Causal and purposive reasoning enables developing causal 
and purposive explanations, which again supports testing of predictions 
and improving explanatory theories. Thus, reasoning combined with 
experimentation can be used to support higher-level learning, 
leveraging the domain-independence and semantic generality of the 
Tala language. Chapters 5 and 6 illustrate this in the prototype 
demonstration system, showing how a Tala agent could learn about a 
new domain (making grain edible) via analogies with a previously 
known domain (eating nuts). 
3.7.2.2 Learning by Reflection & Self-Programming 
This form of higher-level learning (§2.1.2.5) includes: 
• Reasoning about thoughts and experience to develop new 
methods for thinking and acting. 
• Reasoning about ways to improve methods for thinking and 
acting. 
Several capabilities can be identified as requirements for learning by 
reflection and self-programming in human-level AI: To reflect, a 
human-level AI must be able to recall memories of past events, and 
imagine how things could have happened differently, in a hypothetical 
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world. For reflection to be effective (for it to “matter”) the system must 
be able to examine its own behaviors45 (including its thought processes 
and speech acts), imagine how these might be improved, and then 
change its future behaviors – hence effective reflection involves self-
programming. For reflection to be successful, the system must have 
some representation of goals relative to which it can evaluate success, 
and it must be able to reason about how its behaviors relate to achieving 
its goals. For reflection to be effective and successful at a level 
corresponding to human-level intelligence, the  system must be able to 
represent and reason with any concept that can be expressed in natural 
language. For reflection to be effective and successful, a human-level AI 
system must be able to attribute significance to events that it observes, 
and attribute meaning to what it hears and reads, and to what it does, 
says and writes. It must use abductive reasoning to understand the 
meaning of others’ words and actions, and causal reasoning to 
understand the consequences of its own thoughts and actions. Hence, 
effective reflection in human-level AI involves the ability for computers 
to have semantic originality, i.e. to be able to attribute meaning to words 
and actions, independently of human observation (viz. §2.3.5). 
In principle, all of these can be supported within the TalaMind 
architecture. Recollection of past events is supported by an event 
memory, and counterfactual imagination is supported by nested 
conceptual simulation in hypothetical contexts. Recollection and 
analysis of previous thoughts could be supported by storing mental 
speech acts (‘meffepts’)46 in event-memory, with trace information about 
the executable concepts that produced them. Goals can be represented 
as Tala sentences within contexts. The Tala conceptual language 
includes executable concepts that have the ability to create and modify 
executable concepts. Chapter 6 illustrates some of these theoretical 
capabilities in the prototype demonstration system, showing how a Tala 
agent could improve its method for making bread, by reasoning about 
how to change the process for making flat bread to create a new process 
                                                          
45 This implies that system should be able to refer to itself, or as 
Smith (1982) wrote “we want the process as a whole to be able to refer 
to its whole self.” In the TalaMind architecture the variable ?self  is a 
reserved name allowing a Tala agent to refer to itself. 
46  See the Glossary and §§5.4.3, 5.4.4 regarding speech acts and 
mental speech acts. 
Analysis of Thesis Approach to Human-Level AI  
130 
that makes leavened bread. 
The TalaMind architecture supports abductive and causal reasoning 
to understand the meaning and importance of words and actions. A 
Tala agent can declaratively represent that words have meanings, with 
definitions in Tala or with declarative statements about usage of a word 
in a semantic domain. Senses and referents of words can point to 
cognitive concept structures that in turn are grounded in perceptions of 
the environment (Figure 1-1). Likewise a Tala agent can declaratively 
describe relations between its actions and their consequences. Thus a 
Tala agent can declaratively represent knowledge of what its words and 
actions mean. In principle it can develop this knowledge autonomously, 
independently of human observation or action, by virtue of the 
computational universality of TalaMind conceptual processes. Further, 
TalaMind conceptual processes can actively use and apply declarative 
knowledge about the meanings of words and the consequences of 
actions. Thus in principle a Tala agent can have semantic originality. 
Note that this does not mean a Tala agent must have knowledge and 
understanding of every detail of its construction and processing at 
lower levels of representation, just as semantic originality does not 
require humans to have such knowledge about themselves. 
If executable concepts and conceptual processes are computationally 
universal, then the ability to develop new methods for human-level AI 
is very general, in principle. Reflection and self-programming can be 
guided within the TalaMind architecture by mechanisms for meta-
reasoning and learning. Further, a Tala agent’s reasoning about how to 
create new methods can leverage new languages and representations 
for a domain, addressing Minsky’s knowledge representation problem 
for baby-machines. 
3.7.2.3 Learning by Invention of Languages 
As noted by McCarthy (1955), “English is universal in the sense that 
it can set up any other language within English and then use that 
language where it is appropriate.” Per §3.2.1, the Tala conceptual 
language retains this ability of English. Per Hypothesis III, Tala includes 
constructions to support extensions. 
Language and representation have two important aspects for 
learning in the TalaMind approach. The first is that a conceptual 
language both constrains and facilitates expression of concepts, which 
has a corresponding effect on what concepts can be learned. The second 
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is that a key to success in solving a problem, or learning about a 
domain, is often the ability to represent certain problem or domain-
specific concepts, i.e. to find and use a particular representation for the 
problem or domain.  
Historically, one of the best examples of the first aspect was the co-
invention by Newton and Leibniz of different mathematical languages 
for representing concepts in differential and integral calculus. The 
clarity and concision of Leibniz’ notation was superior to Newton’s, 
which had important consequences for their respective use in learning 
about new domains. 
A classic example of the second aspect is the “mutilated chessboard 
problem” (Gamow & Stern, 1958), which asks whether an NxN 
chessboard can be exactly covered by 2x1 sized dominoes, after 
removing two diagonally opposite corners of the board. It is 
exponentially hard to solve the problem by searching over all possible 
ways to tile the chessboard with dominoes. But if one can represent 
certain concepts it is easy to prove the problem is unsolvable. The 
concepts that need to be represented are: a) every domino must cover a 
black and white square; b) the mutilated chessboard will have unequal 
numbers of black and white squares. 
Since Tala includes the ability to say “X means Y” to support 
extending English, and since any symbolic data structures and syntax 
could be defined as extensions, there is in principle no limit to the 
nature of new languages that could be supported. More specifically, the 
invention of new languages and representations can be guided within 
the TalaMind architecture by mechanisms for meta-reasoning and 
learning; that is, in principle a Tala agent can reason about the need for 
a new language to describe concepts in some domain, and then create or 
improve one. Constructions may be used as conceptual structures to 
declaratively represent the syntax and semantics of a new language, 
enabling it to be created and improved by conceptual processes. The 
invention of a new language can then help accelerate learning in a 
domain, by enabling more effective development of concepts in the 
domain via induction, abduction, analogy, etc. If a new language is used 
for cooperation in a domain by Tala agents, then its invention 
corresponds to creation of a Wittgensteinian ‘language game’. (See 
Vogt’s 2005 paper on language evolution in language games. Also see 
Bachwerk & Vogel (2011) regarding language evolution for coordination 
of tasks.) 
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Thus, in principle a Tala agent could demonstrate human-level 
intelligence in creating new representations. Due to Minsky’s 
identification of the knowledge representation problem for baby-
machines, this is a major strength of the TalaMind approach. 
3.7.3 Curiosity 
To support higher-level learning, an intelligent system must have 
another general trait, ‘curiosity’, which at the level of human 
intelligence may be described as the ability to ask relevant questions. In 
maintaining the ontological generality of English, questions expressed 
in Tala can be about anything, at any level of reasoning or meta-
reasoning, in or about any context. A question (not asked rhetorically) 
has an implication that a Tala agent knows it does not know something. 
So, to ask a relevant question a Tala agent needs to identify something it 
does not know, which is relevant to know in or about some context. 
Per §3.6.6.1, if a Tala sentence X appears in a context, it represents 
that X is considered true in that context. Implicitly, if X exists in a 
context, a Tala agent can also assert “I know X” within that context. 




A statement of this form might be asserted if it is needed by a 
conceptual process, and the design of conceptual processing could 
prevent an infinite loop asserting “I know I know I know … X”. Instead, 
if it is necessary to represent infinite recursion of self-knowledge of X, a 
Tala agent could assert: 




(obj (and X ?k)] 
Likewise, if “I do not know X” is asserted in a context then a Tala 
agent could also assert “I know I do not know X”, if needed in the form: 






  (know 
   (wusage verb) 
   (adv not) 
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   (subj ?self) 
   (obj X) 
   ) 
  ?k] 
There are several ways a statement of the form “I do not know X” 
can originate depending on the context and nature of X, and that 
corresponding, relevant questions can be created. For example: 
• A Tala agent may perceive something in the environment, 
which it is unable to recognize via processing at its associative 
and archetype levels, causing the percept at its linguistic level “I 
do not know what ?x is”, where ?x refers to whatever is 
perceived. This leads to a corresponding question “What is ?x 
?”, the relevance of which may be determined by the 
environment interaction levels. Relevance itself may be 
represented by Tala sentences, such as “ ‘What is ?x ?’ is 
relevant because ?x creates a loud noise.” 
• A Tala agent may learn about things that are not known in the 
same way people do, by being told or reading about them. Thus 
a Tala agent may read “No one knows how to travel faster than 
light.” If the Tala agent does not have any knowledge of its 
own, then it can accept this as a sentence about its own 
knowledge, yielding corresponding questions such as “How 
can one travel faster than light?”. The Tala agent may learn 
about the relevance of such questions from the media that 
report them, e.g. “The light speed barrier limits our ability to 
physically explore the universe”. 
• A Tala agent may also learn that it does not know something, in 
the process of trying to achieve a goal, and encountering an 
obstacle it does not know how to overcome. This is also a 
natural way that people learn they do not know something. The 
relevance of a question about how to overcome the obstacle, 
then depends on the importance and relevance of the goal. 
• Questions may also be created in a more general, undirected 
fashion, based on observations, goals, etc. Thus, if O is 
observed, a Tala agent may automatically create questions like 
“Why was O observed?”, “Was O a coincidence?”, “What 
caused O?”, “What will O cause?”, etc. For any answers to such 
questions, further questions of the same form may be generated, 
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as young children enjoy proving. The relevance of such 
questions depends on pragmatic issues: To what extent does an 
answer have practical bearing on other, relevant questions, to 
what extent is it possible to answer a question. 
In general, both generating questions and reasoning about their rel-
evance can be guided within the TalaMind architecture by mechanisms 
for reasoning and learning based on abduction, analogy, causal and 
purposive reasoning, and self-programming. Given the broad generality 
of these mechanisms, and the ontological generality of Tala, in principle 
a Tala agent could demonstrate human-level intelligence in identifying 
and asking relevant questions. Chapters 5 and 6 illustrate how questions 
can be supported in the demonstration system, showing how a Tala 
agent could improve its method for making bread by asking a relevant 
question, "What other features would thick, soft bread have?" 
3.7.4 Imagination 
The word imagination in its common usage refers to the ability to 
create mental stories, and to mentally construct and simulate ways to 
solve a problem. Imagination allows us to conceive things we do not 
know how to accomplish, and to conceive what will happen in 
hypothetical situations. To imagine effectively, we must know what we 
do not know, and then consider ways to learn what we do not know or 
to accomplish what we do not know how to do. 
The previous section, on curiosity, discussed how a Tala agent can 
know what it does not know, relevant to a context. There are several 
ways a Tala agent can use imagination to satisfy its curiosity, 
corresponding to the abilities of human-level intelligence: 
If a Tala agent does not recognize something perceived in the 
environment, and humans or other Tala agents don’t know what it is, 
the Tala agent can reason about its purpose and nature, e.g. based on 
observations of its shape and behavior. This reasoning may involve 
nested conceptual simulation of how the object might be used or might 
behave in hypothetical situations, or experimentation in real situations. 
This reasoning may or may not be successful, but then people are often 
unable to discern the nature and purpose of a strangely shaped object 
never seen before. 
For other kinds of known unknowns, a Tala agent can reason about 
ways to answer questions or solve problems, depending on what is 
unknown and the context. This may involve nested conceptual 
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simulation of hypothetical contexts, or experimentation in real 
situations. It may leverage the multi-level reasoning and higher-level 
learning abilities of human-level intelligence, including abductive, 
analogical, causal and purposive reasoning. Per Hypothesis III, it can 
involve processing of mental spaces and conceptual blends (viz. 
Fauconnier & Turner’s (2002) discussion of the Buddhist Monk riddle). 
This reasoning may or may not be successful, but the point remains that 
these forms of imagination to resolve unknowns can be supported in 
principle by the TalaMind architecture. 
In addition to imagination for answering questions and finding ways 
to accomplish what could not previously be done, the word 
‘imagination’ is also used in another sense, corresponding to dreams or 
daydreams, inventing stories and plays, etc. In principle, a Tala agent 
could engage in such imagination, using the mechanisms previously 
discussed for nested conceptual simulation, analogical, causal and 
purposive reasoning, conceptual blends, etc. There might be some value 
for a Tala agent to do so occasionally, as a way of generating new ideas. 
In principle, nested conceptual simulation could simulate multiple 
levels of stories within stories, or plays within plays, or combinations of 
these. 
3.7.5 Sociality, Emotions, Values 
The TalaMind approach supports nested conceptual simulation of 
hypothetical scenarios by Tala agents, to support reasoning about other 
agents’ perceptions and attitudes in response to one’s actions. This 
provides a starting point toward reasoning about emotions and 
developing values and social understanding, along the lines described 
by Adam Smith’s (1759) Theory of Moral Sentiments, as well as more 
recent discussions, e.g. Ortony et al. (1988), Ridley (1996), Pinker (2002) 
and Minsky (2006). Lacking human bodies and sensory abilities, such 
systems could never fully appreciate human sympathies. Yet this could 
theoretically enable AI systems to have some limited understanding of 
human emotions and values. This is a topic for future research. 
3.7.6 Consciousness 
What is theoretically required, to claim a system has consciousness? 
To support answering this question, this thesis adapts the “axioms of 
being conscious” proposed by Aleksander and Morton (2007), viz. 
§2.3.4. To claim a system achieves consciousness it should demonstrate: 
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Observation of an external environment 
Observation of oneself in relation to the external environment. 
Observation of internal thoughts. 
Observation of time: of the present, the past, and potential futures. 
Observation of hypothetical or imaginative thoughts. 
Reflective observation: Observation of having observations. 
In addition to these capabilities, there is also Chalmers’ Hard 
Problem, regarding whether a system can have the first-person, 
subjective experience of consciousness that people have. This will be 
discussed separately, as a theoretical issue in §4.2.7. 
A Tala agent can perform all of the above forms of observation, at 
least in principle. 47  Observation of an external environment is 
supported by environment interaction systems, which perform ob-
servations that may be expressed as percepts at the linguistic level of 
concept representation in the TalaMind architecture. Such concepts may 
represent a Tala agent’s observations of itself in relation to the external 
environment, using sentences with the reserved Tala variable ?self  as 
the object or subject of verbs.  
A Tala agent’s internal thoughts are concepts expressed as Tala 
sentences. These are created and processed by conceptual processes. 
Matching and processing Tala sentences amounts to observing them, 
within the TalaMind architecture. Such observations may be recorded in 
other Tala sentences, which may themselves be matched and processed, 
supporting reflective observations that may be expressed in sentences 
representing recursive self-knowledge (cf. §§3.7.2.2, 3.6.7.6). The 
TalaMind architecture allows an agent to have multiple subagents 
engage in self-talk, communicating in the Tala conceptual language of 
thought, each referring to the Tala agent by a common reserved variable 
?self . This provides another mechanism for reflective observation.  
The TalaMind architecture includes contexts representing perceived 
                                                          
47 The term “awareness” is vague from a computational perspective, 
so for the TalaMind approach this thesis uses the term “observation”. 
Observation may be considered as a physical process that occurs when 
one physical system changes state or performs an action, as a result of 
gaining information about the state of another physical system. 
Observation is intrinsic to computation, because each step of a 
computation involves observation of symbols. 
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reality and event memory, supporting observation of Tala sentences in 
relation to time for the present and past. Conceptual processing may 
create and match Tala sentences that express hypothetical or 
imaginative thoughts, which may occur within hypothetical contexts 
representing potential futures. The Tala language allows representation 
of concepts that include or refer to concepts, supporting “higher-order 
thoughts” within a Tala agent (cf. Rosenthal, 2005).  
3.8 Summary 
This chapter has analyzed theoretical questions for the hypotheses, 
and discussed how a system could in principle be designed according to 
the hypotheses, to achieve the higher-level mentalities of human-level 
AI. It discussed theoretical issues for elements of the TalaMind 
architecture, and presented affirmative theoretical arguments and 
explanations for how the TalaMind approach can be developed 
successfully.  
This analysis showed that the TalaMind approach allows addressing 
theoretical questions that are not easily addressed by other, more 
conventional approaches. For instance, it supports reasoning in 
mathematical contexts, but also supports reasoning about people who 
have self-contradictory beliefs. Tala provides a language for reasoning 
with underspecification and for reasoning with sentences that have 
meaning yet which also have nonsensical interpretations. Tala sentences 
can declaratively describe recursive mutual knowledge. Tala sentences 
can express meta-concepts about contexts, such as statements about 
consistency and rules of conjecture. And the TalaMind approach 
facilitates representation and conceptual processing for higher-level 
mentalities, such as learning by analogical, causal and purposive 




4. Theoretical Issues and Objections 
So it is in contemplation: if a man will begin with 
certainties, he shall end in doubts; but if he will be 
content to begin with doubts, he shall end in 
certainties…For metaphysic…we will take this hold, 
that the invention of forms is of all other parts of 
knowledge, the worthiest to be sought, if it be possible 
to be found. As for the possibility, they are ill 
discoverers that think there is no land, when they can 
see nothing but sea. 
~ Francis Bacon, The Advancement of Learning, 1605 
 
The previous chapter presented constructive theoretical arguments 
supporting the TalaMind approach. This chapter addresses theoretical 
issues and objections for the possibility of achieving human-level AI in 
principle and for the TalaMind approach.  
4.1 Issues & Objections re the Possibility of Human-Level AI 
4.1.1 Dreyfus Issues 
Dreyfus48 (1992) presents several criticisms of AI research, identified 
from the 1960’s through the 1980’s. He identified theoretical issues for 
human-level AI to address, rather than theoretical objections to its 
possibility in principle, writing “no one has been able to come up with 
such a negative proof.” In discussing the future of AI research, Dreyfus 
(1992, pp.290-305) left open the possibility that a child machine 
approach (§1.1) could achieve human-level AI, if his theoretical issues 
could be addressed – though he has always been very skeptical about 
the potential to address these issues, practically. 
Russell & Norvig (1995, p. 830) write: 
“Many of the issues Dreyfus has focused on – background 
commonsense knowledge, the qualification problem,
                                                          
48 This discussion refers in general to Hubert L. Dreyfus, though 
some of his work has been co-authored with his brother Stuart E. 
Dreyfus. 
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uncertainty, learning, compiled forms of decision making, the 
importance of considering situated agents rather than 
disembodied inference engines – are now widely accepted as 
important aspects of intelligent agent design.” 
These are also important for research in the TalaMind approach, 
which incorporates responses to Dreyfus’ criticisms. For example, this 
thesis will focus on symbolic processing of conceptual structures, 
without claiming this is completely sufficient to achieve human-level 
AI. Other technologies may also be needed, such as connectionism or 
quantum information processing. Likewise, this thesis does not assume 
the mind operates with a fixed set of formal rules. In the TalaMind 
approach, executable concepts may be modified by other executable 
concepts, or accepted as input from the outside environment (analogous 
to how people can learn new behaviors when given instructions). The 
approach also includes a variety of other methods, including 
constructions, semantic domains, mental spaces, and conceptual blends. 
Nor do Tala executable concepts need to be context-free. Rather, the 
approach investigates how intelligent systems can understand language 
and behave intelligently in context-sensitive situations. 
In the TalaMind approach, substantial knowledge about the world 
(including encyclopedic and commonsense knowledge) can be 
represented in natural language descriptions that can be processed 
symbolically, but this is not a set of facts each logically independent of 
all others. Nor is this knowledge claimed to be completely sufficient for 
human-level AI: rather, an intelligent system will need to acquire some 
knowledge through interactions with its environment. 
Dreyfus (1992, p. 56) identified a “metaphysical assumption” of AI 
researchers: 
“[R]esearchers have implicitly tried to treat the broadest context 
or background as an object with its own set of preselected 
descriptive features. This assumption, that the background can 
be treated as just another object to be represented in the same 
sort of structured description in which everyday objects are 
represented, is essential to our whole philosophical tradition. 
Following Heidegger, who is the first to have identified and 
criticized this assumption, I will call it the metaphysical 
assumption.” 
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In the above quote, “broadest context or background” refers to “the 
background of commonsense know-how which guides our changing 
sense of what counts as the relevant facts.” Dreyfus notes that in 
general, the broadest context or background of any description is open-
ended, and potentially infinite. The problems Dreyfus identifies with 
this assumption are essentially those related to representing 
commonsense knowledge, and related to the qualification problem, i.e. 
how to avoid specifying an infinity of possible qualifications for a 
particular action or description – how to describe a process that can be 
successful when virtually anything could go wrong. 
The TalaMind approach is open to use of all the methods AI 
researchers have developed for the qualification problem (viz. Russell & 
Norvig, 2009). One possible method is to specify behaviors using 
generic descriptions and defaults, and to support open-ended, 
functional reasoning when defaults are not satisfied, without trying to 
specify everything that might be the case about the environment. For 
example, in the TalaMind ‘discovery of bread’ demonstration, a step 
occurs where one of the Tala agents, Ben, decides to pound some grain, 
to see if that removes shells from grain. At present, the demonstration 
does not specify how he pounds the grain, but it could be extended to 
support Ben reasoning as follows: 
Ben thinks he needs something harder than a shell to pound 
grain, to break a shell. 
Ben knows a hammer is a hard tool normally used for pounding. 
Ben looks for a hammer, but cannot find one. 
Ben looks for something else that is hard and can be used for 
pounding. 
Ben finds a nearby stick, and uses it to pound grain. 
Thus a Tala executable concept could specify “find something hard 
to pound grain” and not have to specify all the details of a context, for 
the executable concept to be useful for many contexts. The TalaMind 
approach allows specifying executable concepts very generally, and 
using or adapting such concepts to support actual, specific contexts, 
without having to specify all possible conditions of a context. Of course, 
it’s possible a Tala agent does not find a way to apply an executable 
concept in a particular context. 
4.1.2 Penrose Objections 
Penrose (1989 et seq.) has presented the following claims: 
1. Computers cannot demonstrate consciousness, understanding, 
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or human-level intelligence. 
2. Some examples of human mathematical insight transcend what 
could be achieved by computers. 
3. Theorems of Turing and Gödel showing theoretical 
unsolvability of certain logical problems imply human 
intelligence transcends computers. (Two arguments are given 
that relate to previous similar arguments presented by Lucas in 
1959 and Gödel in 1951.) 
4. Human consciousness depends on quantum gravity effects in 
microtubules within neurons (an hypothesis with Hameroff). 
Penrose (1994 – Shadows of the Mind) refined and extended 
arguments presented in 1989 (The Emperor’s New Mind) so this thesis 
will focus entirely on his 1994 book and later works. 
4.1.2.1 General Claims re Intelligence  
To begin, Penrose (1994, pp.37-40) says: 
a) Intelligence requires understanding. 
b) Understanding requires awareness. 
His view is that one cannot be genuinely intelligent about something 
unless one understands it, and one cannot genuinely understand 
something unless one is aware of it. He considers awareness to be the 
passive aspect of consciousness, with free will being the active aspect. 
These are commonsense49 notions of intelligence, understanding, and 
awareness, and this thesis is broadly in agreement with them. Chapter 2 
lists understanding and consciousness as unexplained features of 
human-level intelligence, that need to be supported in human-level AI.  
Penrose says intelligence, understanding, and consciousness are real 
phenomena, worthy and possible to understand scientifically, but he 
declines to define them, writing: 
“Of course, I have not defined any of the terms ‘intelligence’, 
                                                          
49 There are some fine points: Often one becomes conscious of things 
one does not understand, and one can also be unconscious of how one 
understands something – these points are important for later discussion 
of Searle’s Chinese Room argument. The topic of free will is outside the 
scope of this thesis. 
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‘understanding’, or ‘awareness’. I think it would be most 
unwise to attempt to give full definitions here. We shall need to 
rely, to some extent, on our intuitive perceptions as to what 
these words actually mean.” 
This thesis defines human-level intelligence by identifying and 
describing capabilities not yet achieved by any AI system, which 
include natural language understanding, higher-level forms of learning 
and reasoning, imagination, and consciousness. However, this thesis 
does not claim to give full definitions, nor does it claim to prove 
computers can achieve human-level intelligence, understanding or 
consciousness. Per §1.6, this thesis can at most present a plausibility 
argument. 
Penrose (1994, p. 53-55) explains his general claim that computers 
cannot achieve human-level intelligence, understanding and 
consciousness, by saying he does not believe computers can: 
• Achieve human-level understanding and visualization of 
commonsense knowledge about physical objects such as  block 
of wood, the motions of rope, or the fact that if Abraham 
Lincoln’s left foot is in Washington, it is very likely his right 
foot is also. 
• Achieve human-level understanding of the meanings of words 
and natural language, for communication with humans, about 
concepts such as ‘happiness’, ‘fighting’ and ‘tomorrow’, because 
a computer cannot have human-level awareness of experiences 
involving such concepts. 
This thesis does not focus on visualization of commonsense 
knowledge, though it does not appear there is any in-principle 
demonstration it is impossible for computers. (Computer simulation of 
physical motion in virtual reality is relevant.) Sections 2.2.3 and 3.7.5 
discuss understanding of experiences involving embodiment, emotions, 
etc.  
4.1.2.2 Claims re Human Logical Insight 
Penrose claims some examples of human logical and mathematical 
insight transcend what could be achieved by computers. The first claim 
is that a computer could not understand there are an infinity of natural 
numbers, based on a few examples of how the sequence can be 
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extended by addition. It does not appear there is any in-principle 
demonstration of this. Rather, it is similar to capabilities Lenat showed 
in the AM program (Lenat, 1976).50 It would require the program to 
include innate concepts for ‘equivalence class’, ‘infinite loop’ and 
‘infinite set’. Given these innate concepts, there is no reason in principle 
the program could not learn from examples that words like ‘zero’, ‘one’, 
‘two’, ‘three’, ‘four’ represent different equivalence classes, and that 
adding ‘one’ to any equivalence class gives a new, larger equivalence 
class. 
There is also no reason in principle a computer could not have some 
degree of awareness it was observing and learning these things. It 
would need to use meta-reasoning to recognize that adding ‘one’ can 
give an infinite loop, which it should not repeat forever, and that in 
principle this implies there are an infinity of numbers. This kind of 
meta-reasoning and concepts about infinite loops and infinite sets are 
important for an intelligence kernel to have, to support human-level AI. 
They are worthwhile and possible in principle. 
Regarding human logical insight, Penrose (1997, pp.102-106) gives 
two examples of chess positions, which a little human thought shows 
that White can play and draw, but for which an expert-level chess 
program playing White may take a rook and lose. These chess problems 
are examples where human meta-reasoning about chess positions 
trumps the lower-level search capabilities of conventional chess 
programs. They don’t prove computers in principle cannot employ such 
meta-reasoning, and approach chess problems the same way a human 
does. This does not require brute force search, as Penrose suggests. So, 
these particular examples do not support Penrose’s claim that human-
level intelligence is in principle non-computable. 
Penrose (1994) gives other examples of mathematical proofs that 
depend on human understanding of geometrical reasoning and 
mathematical induction. These include commutativity of multiplication, 
                                                          
50  AM started with concepts representing sets, substitutions, op-
erations, equality, etc. It did not have concepts for proof, single-valued 
functions or numbers. It simulated discovery of concepts for natural 
numbers, multiplication, factors and primes, but it did not have a built-
in concept of infinity. Its behavior leveraged built-in features of Lisp 
(list structures and recursive functions). 
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and a proof that a sum of successive hexagonal numbers 1, 6, 12, … 6n is 
always the cube of an integer. These are also cases where a computer 
program could in principle employ the same kind of reasoning, and do 
not prove human-level intelligence is noncomputable. 
4.1.2.3 Gödelian Arguments  
The situation becomes more challenging with Penrose’s arguments 
that theorems of Turing and Gödel imply human intelligence transcends 
computers. For clarity (and following others) these will simply be called 
Gödelian arguments, since Turing did not agree with them. Similar 
arguments were presented by Gödel himself, and by Lucas in 1959. 
Gödel (1951) stated his conclusion as a dichotomy:  
“Either ... the human mind … infinitely surpasses the powers of any 
finite machine, or else there exist absolutely unsolvable Diophantine 
problems...” [italics Gödel’s] 
Feferman (2006) analyzes Gödel's argument, writing:  
"My conclusion from all this is that – stimulating as Gödel's 
formulations ... of the consequences for mathematics of his 
incompleteness theorems are – they are a long way from 
establishing anything definitive about minds, in their general 
mathematizing capacity, and machines." 
Lucas (1996) summarizes his argument. Since it is along the same 
lines as the arguments of Gödel and Penrose, the following pages will 
focus on Penrose’s arguments, though first we note that Feferman (2011) 
discusses Lucas’ argument in some detail. To address Gödelian 
arguments in general, Feferman proposes the representation of human 
mathematical thought as an “open-ended schematic formal system”, for 
which the language of mathematics is considered to be extensible. This 
is compatible with the TalaMind approach, which uses an extensible 
language of thought. Lucas (forthcoming) responds to Feferman, 
writing that such a system “would be compatible with an open-ended 
and creative view of the human mind” but would not be acceptable to 
“the hard-line mechanist”, since it would not produce a deterministic 
machine. However, the TalaMind approach does not require human-
level AI to be deterministic. Rather, one could argue that human-level 
intelligence must be non-deterministic, in this sense of enabling open-
ended, creative development of concepts. 
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Penrose (1994) presented two arguments claiming the unsolvability 
of certain logical problems implies that human intelligence transcends 
computers. His first argument was based on Turing’s proof of 
undecidability for the halting problem. The second was based on 
Gödel’s incompleteness theorems for mathematical theories capable of 
expressing arithmetic. 
Each of the following authors wrote papers critical of Penrose’s first 
and/or second arguments: Chalmers (1995b), Feferman (1994), 
McCarthy (1995), McCullough (1995), McDermott (1995), and Moravec 
(1995). Penrose (1996) responded to each of these authors, accepting 
some of their corrections but disagreeing with their arguments and 
conclusions. Separately, Davis (1990, 1995) has criticized Penrose’s 
Gödelian arguments – the present author is unaware of a reply from 
Penrose to Davis. More recently, Franzén (2005), Lindström (2001, 2006), 
and Shapiro (2003) have given responses objecting to Penrose’s second 
argument – the present author is unaware of responses by Penrose. 
There the matter appears to stand. Penrose continues to believe he 
has put forward valid arguments that human intelligence transcends 
what can be achieved by computers, while several mathematicians and 
computer scientists disagree. Shapiro (1998) provides an analysis of the 
debate, which is critical of both sides. Shapiro concludes “there is no 
plausible mechanist thesis on offer that is sufficiently precise to be 
undermined by the incompleteness theorems” and “Given current 
epistemologies, it is hard to see how the mechanist is limited by these 
results.” 
This thesis cannot resolve this debate, involving mathematical logic, 
issues of philosophy of mind, and representation in human-level AI. Yet 
having summarized where the argument stands, the author will offer 
some remarks that may be helpful in considering the topic and its 
potential impact to the quest for human-level AI. 
To begin, Turing considered both his and Gödel’s theorems as 
possible objections in his 1950 paper on machine intelligence. Turing 
noted there is no proof these results do not also apply to human 
intelligence. This remains as an objection to Penrose’s arguments, 
though Penrose believes human intelligence is exempt because he 
thinks humans can understand a non-computational, ideal world of 
mathematical truths. 
Penrose (1997, pp.112-113) quotes Gödel: 
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“On … the basis of what has been proved so far, it remains 
possible that there may exist (and be empirically discoverable) a 
theorem-proving machine which in fact is equivalent to 
mathematical intuition, but cannot be proved to be so, nor even 
proved to yield only correct theorems of finitary number 
theory.”51 
Gödel seems to focus on the unknowability of the limits of human 
intelligence, as Penrose remarks. In contrast, Turing (1947) wrote: 
“In other words then, if a machine is expected to be infallible, it 
cannot also be intelligent. There are several theorems which say 
almost exactly that. But these theorems say nothing about how 
much intelligence may be displayed if a machine makes no 
pretence at infallibility.” 
That is, Turing did not claim human intelligence is unknowable or 
non-algorithmic, but instead that it is fallible. In response to Turing, 
Penrose (1997) writes: 
“So, his idea was that Gödel-Turing-type arguments can be 
reconciled with the idea that mathematicians are essentially 
computers if the algorithmic procedures they act according to, 
in order to ascertain mathematical truth, are basically 
unsound…I find this a rather implausible standpoint…” 
Considered generally, human intelligence (including that of 
mathematicians) is fallible. To require human-level AI to be infallible 
would be to require it to exceed human-level intelligence. We should 
not expect that if computers achieve human-level intelligence, then such 
computers will be infallible, because human-level AI will need to 
process incorrect and conflicting concepts received from humans, or 
developed by human-level AI. Human-level AI could be subject to 
many of the same limitations in perception, disambiguation, reasoning 
and unintended consequences that affect humans. 
It is one of the strengths of human-level intelligence that it can detect 
and deal with errors and logical inconsistencies, and overcome its 
fallibility. This is an aspect of robustness, one of the key features of 
human-level intelligence listed in §2.1.2. In developing human-level AI 
                                                          
51 From a communication of Gödel to Wang in 1972. Viz. Wang (1996, 
pp.184-185). 
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we should strive to emulate this capability, to enable human-level AI to 
detect, quantify, and limit errors as much as possible, but it would be a 
serious mistake to promise infallibility. 
Yet Penrose (1996) asks us to “Suppose that the totality of methods 
of (unassailable) mathematical reasoning that are in principle humanly 
accessible can be encapsulated in some (not necessarily computational) 
sound formal system F”. He then compares the performance of Turing 
machines versus this infallible, unassailable ideal. While he accepts that 
individual mathematicians can make errors, Penrose says human 
mathematicians must have some understanding of an ideal “Platonic 
world” of mathematical truth, which is beyond computation, to aid 
them in judging whether their ideas are correct and in seeking correct 
theories. He then asks: 
“How is it, if [human mathematicians] are mere computational 
entities, that they seem to have access to these non-computational ideal 
concepts?” [italics added] 
To address Penrose’s question, consider his (1994, pp.411-421) 
discussion of three worlds (Figure 4-1):  
• The physical world of reality, as 
governed by the laws of physics. 
• The mental world, i.e. the world of 
human consciousness, thoughts 
and perceptions. 
• The Platonic world, of mathematical 
truth, ideal mathematical forms, 
etc. 
The mental world emerges from the physical world, perceives the 
physical world, and constructs theories about laws of physics that 
govern the physical world. These theories are expressed in mathematics, 
using ‘ideal forms’ such as natural and real numbers, geometrical 
structures, etc. These ideal forms are references to the Platonic world, 
which seems to emerge from our mental world. Remarkably, we find 
the physical world conforms to mathematical theories of the laws of 
physics that predict it with great precision, at every scale. So, the 
physical world seems to be based on the Platonic world. 
    Figure 4-1  Three Worlds 
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Penrose’s italicized question above may be answered as follows: Per 
Figure 4-2, within the mental world the human mind constructs a 
“projected / perceived reality” 
of the physical world (viz. §2.2.3 
and Jackendoff, 1983). Likewise, 
we may also construct a pro-
jected / perceived reality of a 
Platonic world, which may be 
called the “projected Platonic 
world”. This would be a mental 
representation for our know-
ledge and understanding of a 
Platonic world. Initially, our 
projection of the Platonic world 
may derive from what we 
observe in the physical world, via projected reality. For example, our 
observation of spatial relationships in the physical world enables us to 
create a projected Platonic world that includes theories of geometry. 
Using concepts from our projected Platonic world, we may create 
theories to predict our projection of the physical world. Remarkably, 
our projection of the physical world obeys some of our theories very 
well, and we find we can measure and predict it with great accuracy 
using these theories. Yet to the extent our concepts in the projected 
Platonic world were derived from our observations of the physical 
world, it may be less remarkable that the physical world is consistent 
with itself, and conforms to theories based on projected Platonic 
concepts. 
In any case, we may think and act as though the Platonic world 
really exists, independent of our projection of it, just as we think and act 
as though the physical world exists independent of our projected 
reality, which it does. Indeed, we tend to think and act as though we 
directly perceive the physical world, and may likewise tend to think we 
directly perceive a Platonic world, even though we are only thinking 
and acting relative to projections we construct in our mental world. 
All of this may help guide mathematicians and physicists in their 
quests for theories, help them to judge theories, correct errors, etc. We 
may construct proofs, judge correctness and ‘mathematical beauty’ or 
symmetry, etc. relative to our perception of a projected Platonic world. 
However, it does not guarantee our projected Platonic world is correct, 
    Figure 4-2  Mental Projected Worlds 
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just as we are not guaranteed our projected reality is correct. We are 
subject to misconceptions about both. Occasionally, we may need to 
radically adjust our understanding of physical reality, and accordingly 
we may need to radically adjust our understanding of the Platonic 
world. When this happens, mathematical ideas previously considered 
‘un-Platonic’ may need to be accepted into the projected Platonic world. 
We might need to consider that parallel lines may eventually meet, or 
eventually diverge. 
As for whether the Platonic world really exists, separate from our 
projected Platonic world, and separate somehow from the physical 
world, pragmatically it may be impossible to test an answer to this 
question: An answer might not make any conceivable difference to us in 
our abilities to predict the physical world. 52 On the other hand, there are 
philosophical arguments for the existence of the Platonic world, e.g. the 
Quine-Putnam indispensability argument (viz. Colyvan, 2011). It’s 
beyond the scope of this thesis to consider this question further. 
Whether the Platonic world really exists or not, there is no reason in 
principle why a human-level AI could not have an internal conceptual 
construct, providing a projected Platonic world, making it a 
computational entity with access to projections of ideal concepts. These 
projections could be finite, discrete computational representations, even 
if the ideal concepts are non-computable: For example, the concept of a 
countable infinite set can be represented by a finite sentence stating that 
a non-terminating computation will generate all elements of the set. The 
concept that a set is uncountable can be represented by a finite, 
counterfactual sentence stating that if there were a countable list of all 
elements in the set, then a diagonalization would construct a new 
element of the set, not in the list. 
Penrose (1994, pp.147-149) also considers whether natural selection 
could have selected for mathematical ability, and suggests it is more 
                                                          
52  The quote at the beginning of this chapter is apropos. Bacon 
continued: “But it is manifest that Plato, in his opinion of ideas, as one 
that had a wit of elevation situate as upon a cliff, did descry that forms 
were the true object of knowledge; but lost the real fruit of his opinion, 
by considering of forms as absolutely abstracted from matter, and not 
confined and determined by matter; and so turning his opinion upon 
theology, wherewith all his natural philosophy is infected.” 
 
Theoretical Issues and Objections 
150 
likely to have selected for a general ability to understand – this does 
seem to be what has actually happened: Humans do have a general 
ability to understand, though few demonstrate advanced mathematical 
ability. To illustrate this, Penrose shows a drawing of a mathematician 
pondering geometrical diagrams while a sabertooth tiger is about to 
pounce on him, as other people in the distance focus on more practical 
matters for survival, “catching mammoths, building houses, growing 
crops, and so on”, noting these tasks “involve understanding but are not 
specific to mathematics”. (Penrose, 1997, p. 113) In considering whether 
human mathematical intelligence can be described by an algorithm, 
Penrose asks “How could this putative algorithm have arisen [via 
natural selection]?”  
The answer may be given by translating this into the question “How 
did natural selection give us, or how do we develop, a projected 
Platonic world?” 
An answer to this translated question is that nature selected for 
understanding spatial relationships and spatial forms, for us to 
successfully perform actions in the spatial, physical world. Natural 
selection also selected for linguistic concept representation and logical 
reasoning, for us to communicate and understand causal relationships 
and cooperate in catching mammoths, building houses, and growing 
crops. Also, nature would presumably have selected for an ability to 
detect and avoid infinite loops in our own reasoning, to recognize and 
transcend logical paradoxes, so we did not become transfixed by 
inconsistencies in our thinking when sabertooths were nearby. 
Thus natural selection could have given us the conceptual precursors 
that allow us to develop projected Platonic worlds in our minds. This 
explains why, as Penrose notes, a child is easily able to grasp the 
concept of an infinity of a natural numbers, after learning the concept 
that ‘adding one’ always creates a new natural number. And it explains 
how more complex mathematical concepts can be incorporated into a 
student’s projected Platonic world, through teaching or independent 
discovery. 
In sum, what is at issue in Penrose’s Gödelian arguments is the 
extent to which computers can recognize and transcend logical 
paradoxes, to reason about theories as well as within them, in the same 
way people do. In his response to Penrose, McCarthy (1995) made this 
point: 
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“The ability to transcend one's present context and think about 
it as an object is an important form of introspection, especially 
when we compare human and machine intelligence. ... 
[Penrose] reasons about theories in general, i.e. he uses 
variables ranging over theories. As far as I can see he never 
allows for the computer program doing that. However, 
reasoning about theories as objects is not different in principle 
from reasoning about other objects.” 
Human mathematicians can follow the arguments of Turing and 
Gödel, and reason about formal systems to recognize certain problems 
are unsolvable within them, without becoming trapped in infinite loops 
trying to solve the problems. Turing and Gödel’s unsolvability 
arguments are essentially examples of meta-reasoning, i.e. reasoning 
about what happens within logical systems to detect logical 
contradictions and potential infinite loops. There is no reason in 
principle why computers cannot also use meta-reasoning of this sort. 
This is an aspect of meta-cognition, one of the key features that Chapter 
2 lists for human-level intelligence. 
4.1.2.4 Continuous Computation 
It is tempting to suggest issues related to noncomputability might be 
avoided with continuous (and potentially chaotic) computation, using 
infinite precision real numbers. On the one hand research on 
“hypercomputation” and “super-Turing machines” provides arguments 
that various forms of continuous computation can transcend Turing 
machines (Copeland, 2002). Papers by Buescu, Graça and Zhong cited in 
the Bibliography study the extent to which mathematical problems in 
dynamical systems theory can be solved by symbolic computation, and 
show that solutions to some problems are in general not computable by 
Turing machines. 
On the other hand, there are issues with the physical realizability of 
such machines. Davis (2006) argues hypercomputation must be 
considered a “myth”. Penrose (1994, pp.21-26, 177-179) considers and 
discounts continuous computation and chaos theory as possible 
explanations for non-computability of human intelligence and 
consciousness. And if continuous computation can be physically 
realized, then in principle it should be usable by human-level AI, i.e. it 
does not appear to be theoretically restricted to natural intelligence. This 
is an interesting topic, but one outside the scope of this thesis. 
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4.1.2.5 Hypothesis re Orchestrated Objective Reduction 
Penrose and Hameroff have proposed a theory called Orchestrated 
Objective Reduction, or Orch OR, which conjectures that human 
consciousness depends on non-computable quantum gravitational 
effects in microtubules of neurons. Microtubules are nanoscale 
cylindrical lattices of a protein called tubulin, which they conjecture can 
act as biomolecular quantum computers. A recent paper describing 
Orch OR is (Penrose & Hameroff , 2011). 
It is out of scope for this thesis to discuss Orch OR in detail, since it 
involves topics in theoretical physics and neurobiology. Here it will 
simply be noted that Orch OR is a controversial hypothesis. This thesis 
will therefore take a neutral stance on Orch OR, and only consider the 
implications if it is correct.  
If microtubules actually are performing computations that support 
human-level intelligence achieved by the brain (which at this point is 
unproved), then the information processing capacity of the human brain 
could be orders of magnitude larger than would be estimated otherwise. 
Penrose & Hameroff (2011, pp.9-10) estimate potentially 108 tubulins in 
each neuron switching at 107 times per second, yielding potentially 1015 
operations per second per neuron. This would give each neuron a 
processing capacity one tenth what could otherwise be estimated for the 
entire brain (1011 neurons, 103 synapses per neuron, 102 transmissions 
per synapse per second = 1016 operations per second). And this would 
not count the potential combinatorial effect of quantum parallelism in 
microtubule computations. 
Such calculations should be considered very preliminary, 
astronomical upper bounds on what might be achieved. Yet they 
indicate quantum processing at the level of microtubules might add 
enormous computational power to the brain, if it is happening. 
However, this would not necessarily make human-level AI 
unobtainable. Penrose and Hameroff (2011) suggest that much of the 
microtubule processing in the brain may be allocated to perception 
(vision, hearing, touch, taste, etc.) rather than to cognition and 
consciousness. 53  Thus, microtubule computation might challenge AI 
                                                          
53 They write that only tens of thousands of neurons are considered 
to be involved in a human brain’s cognition and consciousness, at a 
time. In calculating a 40 Hz frequency (25 msec period) of Orch OR 
events to correspond with EEG gamma synchrony, they consider 1% of 
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most in areas that depend on massive perceptual processing, and 
perhaps not challenge AI as much in higher-level mentalities. There 
could still be a prospect that higher-level mentalities can be achieved 
using symbolic, discrete processing of conceptual structures, e.g. via the 
TalaMind approach. 
Further, the Orch OR theory does not imply artificial systems could 
not also use massive nanoscale quantum computation. Penrose (1994, 
pp.393-394) appears to agree with this, and it would be within the spirit 
of Turing’s 1950 paper to allow nanoscale quantum computation in 
achieving human-level AI. Turing wrote “It is natural that we should 
wish to permit every kind of engineering technique to be used in our 
machines.” He limited his conjecture to conventional digital computers 
in part to exclude human cloning as a technique that by definition 
would artificially create human intelligence. Yet Turing, like Penrose, 
was interested in quantum processes (viz. Hodges, 2011). 
4.2 Issues and Objections for Thesis Approach 
4.2.1 Theoretical Objections to a Language of Thought 
As noted in §2.2.1, the language of thought hypothesis is 
controversial and has perhaps not yet been widely accepted, because of 
philosophical arguments pro and con, e.g. concerning issues such as 
whether an innate language is needed to learn an external language and 
the degree to which an innate language must contain all possible 
concepts, or constrains the concepts that can be learned and expressed. 
However, there is an elegant argument that since natural language 
sentences can describe an effectively unlimited number of concepts, 
concepts must be represented internally within the mind as structures 
within a combinatorial system, or language (viz. Jackendoff, 1989):  
“Corresponding to the indefinitely large variety of syntactic 
structures, then, there must be an indefinitely large variety of 
concepts that can be invoked in the production and 
comprehension of sentences. It follows that the repertoire of 
concepts expressed by sentences cannot be mentally encoded in 
a list, but must be characterized in terms of a finite set of mental 
primitives and a finite set of principles of mental combination 
                                                                                                                                
the microtubules in 20,000 neurons might be involved in consciousness, 
for a total of 2 x 1010 microtubules.  
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that collectively describe the set of possible concepts expressed 
by sentences.” 
This provides a theoretical license for the TalaMind approach to 
include a conceptual language as a language of thought. Jackendoff’s 
argument does not preclude the use of a syntax based on a particular 
natural language to support representing and processing conceptual 
structures for the semantics of natural language. 
4.2.2 Objections to Representing Semantics via NL Syntax 
Sections 3.3 through 3.6 present affirmative theoretical arguments 
that in principle natural language syntax can be used to represent 
natural language semantics, and provide theoretical explanations for 
how to do so. This section further addresses specific theoretical 
objections. 
4.2.2.1 The Circularity Objection 
Some critics may object that using a mentalese with a syntax based 
very largely on the grammar of English to help represent the semantics 
of English seems circular (cf. §2.2.1). However, an impression that it 
seems circular is not a theoretical reason in principle why natural 
language syntax cannot be used by a conceptual language to support an 
AI system. Nor is such an impression correct. The TalaMind approach 
does not involve an infinite regression in representing syntax or 
semantics (cf. §4.2.8). Meaning may involve referent pointers (§3.6.1) to 
non-linguistic levels of Figure 1-1. 
4.2.2.2 Objection Syntax is Insufficient for Semantics 
Section 3.3 gave an argument that it is theoretically possible to 
represent natural language semantics using natural language syntax, 
but it expressly did not claim that all semantics can be represented by 
syntax. Nor does the TalaMind approach rely entirely on syntax to 
represent semantics. In addition to referent pointers (§3.6.1), the 
semantics of Tala conceptual structures also derives from how their 
syntax is processed by TalaMind conceptual processes in a conceptual 
framework, and how such processing supports a Tala agent’s 
interactions with its environment and other agents in the environment. 
The TalaMind approach does not claim that syntax is sufficient to 
represent semantics, only that some syntax is useful (even arguably 
necessary) for representing semantics. That is why natural languages 
have syntax, after all, and it is why an internal, conceptual language 
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needs a syntax. (See also §§4.2.4, 4.2.8.) 
4.2.2.3 Ambiguity Objections to Natural Language 
It may be objected that natural language sentences are ambiguous, 
and the inferences a natural language sentence allows depend on which 
of its interpretations is considered. Therefore, it may be argued that one 
of the requirements for a conceptual language should be that it is able to 
unambiguously represent specific interpretations of natural language 
sentences. 
As discussed in §3.6.3.7, people often reason with only partly 
disambiguated natural language sentences, using an interpretation that 
is specific to an extent appropriate in a given context. A Tala agent must 
do the same or else it will not converse with people in a way they 
consider achieves human-level intelligence. Tala supports representing 
and reasoning with natural language expressions that are ambiguous, 
while providing the flexibility to remove ambiguity when needed. 
Though Tala is based on a natural language, it augments natural 
language to support removing ambiguities in several ways, discussed in 
§3.6.3: Tala’s representation of natural language syntax can remove 
syntactic ambiguity. Lexical ambiguities can be removed with Tala 
(wsense) and (wreferent) expressions. Other forms of ambiguity, 
such as individual/collective, specific/non-specific can be removed by 
(wsense) semantic annotations for determiners, e.g. expressing a usage 
of “all” as either (wsense individual) or (wsense collective). 
Ambiguities related to co-reference can be removed using pointers and 
the (<- ?p) notation for binding pointers. 
A specific form of the ambiguity objection is the following: If a Tala 
representation of an English sentence has multiple possible 
interpretations then (according to §3.6.3) in general more specific 
interpretations may be represented by other Tala sentences. Yet if an 
ambiguity is resolved by replacing the sentence by another, typically 
more complex sentence, then that sentence will have its own 
ambiguities, with the danger of an infinite regress. 
This argument may be addressed with three remarks: Again first, we 
are not forced to remove all ambiguities, and indeed need to support 
reasoning with partly disambiguated sentences. Second, §§3.6.3 and 
3.2.1 allow exceptions to the method of representing interpretations via 
other sentences in Tala. We are not forced into an infinite regress if 
some other formal language or notation can represent an interpretation 
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more concisely or accurately than is possible in Tala, or if the ambiguity 
can be resolved by semantic annotation of the Tala sentence. 
Third, the meanings of some linguistic concepts depend on 
references to lower levels of concept representation in Figure 1-1. An 
embodied, situated, intelligent agent may ascribe meaning based on 
observations of its environment. Other symbols and concepts may be 
given meaning procedurally within an agent by virtue of how they 
affect and are processed by conceptual processing. 
For many concepts we can at best choose to believe we agree about 
their meanings. For higher-level concepts there may always be some 
ambiguity and uncertainty. Human-level AI will have the same 
challenge in this respect as human intelligence. 
4.2.2.4 Objection Thought is Perceptual, Not Linguistic 
It may be objected that the TalaMind approach cannot achieve 
human-level AI because human thought is not linguistic in nature, 
rather it is perceptual. This is an extension of the claim that human-level 
intelligence requires human physical embodiment, discussed in §2.2.3. 
For instance, Evans & Green (2006) write: 
“The thesis of embodied cognition central to cognitive 
linguistics entails that mental representations are perceptual in 
nature…encyclopedic knowledge, accessed via language, 
provides simulations of perceptual experience. This relates to 
recent research in cognitive psychology that suggests that 
knowledge is represented in the mind as perceptual symbols…” 
Similarly, Lakoff & Johnson (1999) write “there is no Chomskyan 
person, for whom language is pure syntax, pure form insulated from 
and independent of all meaning, context, perception, emotion, …” 
In the above quote, Evans & Green refer to the research of Barsalou 
(1993 et seq.), who describes perceptual symbols as “subsets of perceptual 
states in sensory-motor systems [that] are extracted and stored in long-
term memory to function as symbols.” However, Barsalou (2012) 
discusses how perceptual symbols may be used in the human 
conceptual system to support a “fully functional conceptual system”, 
and concludes:  
“As reviewed here, three basic accounts of the conceptual 
system exist in modern cognitive psychology, cognitive science, 
and cognitive neuroscience: (1) classic GOFAI approaches…(2) 
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statistical approaches, such as connectionism and neural 
nets…(3) simulated/embodied/situated approaches that ground 
conceptual knowledge in modality-specific systems, in the 
body, and in the environment…Successful theories in the future 
are likely to integrate all three frameworks into a single 
system…”54 
The approach of this thesis is in the direction Barsalou recommends. 
The three conceptual levels shown in Figure 1-1 correspond to the three 
accounts of the human conceptual system he describes. Although this 
thesis takes a direction at the linguistic level different from GOFAI for 
reasons explained in §1.2, it is open to using traditional AI methods as 
needed, per §3.2.1. The TalaMind approach is also open to perceptual 
symbols in the lower levels of Figure 1-1, integrated with the linguistic 
level. 
Barsalou (1999) writes that “a perceptual symbol system could be 
implemented in a current computer” though he expresses doubt that 
computers can achieve human-level intelligence because “they do not 
have the requisite sensory-motor systems for representing human 
concepts.” This appears to be a concern based more on the state of 
robotics technology than an in-principle theoretical objection. In either 
case, §2.2.3 addresses such concerns through its discussion of virtual 
embodiment. 
To summarize, this thesis holds that thought is both linguistic and 
perceptual in nature, and that neither can be totally sacrificed in 
achieving human-level artificial intelligence. While internally both 
humans and computers use physical symbols and processes without 
being aware of their meaning or even existence, at higher levels of 
representation both humans and Tala agents can in principle ascribe 
meaning to words and actions, and have semantic originality (§3.7.2.2). 
4.2.3 Weizenbaum’s Eliza Program 
The TalaMind approach, representing natural language semantics 
based largely on the syntax of a particular natural language, may 
                                                          
54GOFAI = Good Old-Fashioned Artificial Intelligence (Haugeland, 
1985). Incidentally, Barsalou’s research is sometimes described as 
investigating a “Perceptual Symbol Systems Hypothesis.” This 
hypothesis does not appear to have been formally stated as such, but is 
in effect described by Barsalou (1999). 
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encounter theoretical objections invoking Weizenbaum’s (1966) Eliza 
computer program (viz. Fauconnier & Turner, 2002). Eliza could interact 
with humans via text messages, and simulate a psychotherapist. People 
could type simple English sentences as input to Eliza, and Eliza would 
generate English sentences in response, using simple parsing and 
substitution of key words into standard phrases. Users who didn’t 
know how Eliza worked sometimes thought the program was 
intelligent. Here is a dialog the author created with the version of Eliza 
at http://www.chayden.net/eliza/Eliza.html: 55 
>> Hello. 
How do you do. Please state your problem. 
>> I need to finish my thesis on understanding natural 
language. 
Your thesis on understanding natural language  ? 
>> Yes, I need to explain how you work. 
You seem to be quite positive. 
>> Well, I'm certain that you don't understand me. 
Is it because you are certain that I don't understand you 
that you came to me ? 
>> Yes, very much so. 
You are sure. 
>> Well I do know how you work. 
Perhaps in your fantasies we do know what each other. 
>> I do fantasize that someday my own program may understand 
me. 
Why do you say your own program may understand you  ? 
>> My program will be based on cognitive linguistics and AI 
theory. 
Does that suggest anything else which belongs to you ? 
>> I need to get back to writing my thesis now. 
Is it important that your thesis now  ? 
>> Goodbye. 
Goodbye. Thank you for talking to me 
The theoretical objection critics may raise against the TalaMind 
approach would be to say it is just a glorified version of Eliza, and that 
like Eliza a Tala agent will just manipulate English sentences without 
understanding them. The response to this objection is that the TalaMind 
approach is very different from Eliza, and does have the potential for 
Tala agents to understand English sentences, unlike Eliza. In the 
TalaMind approach, a Tala agent will use encyclopedic and 
commonsense knowledge, to reason about the meanings of English 
sentences. A Tala agent will have a conceptual framework that includes 
a perceived / projected reality, giving it ‘virtual embodiment’. The 
                                                          
55 The website describes this version as “a complete and faithful 
implementation of the program described by Weizenbaum.“ 
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TalaMind approach will support learning and discovery by reasoning 
analogically, causal and purposive reasoning, meta-reasoning, 
imagination via conceptual simulation, and internal dialog between 
subagents in a society of mind (§2.3.3.2.1) using a language of thought. 
It will support semantic disambiguation, natural language 
constructions, metaphors, semantic domains, etc. Thus the TalaMind 
approach has the potential to emulate understanding of English 
sentences to a degree that humans may eventually say indicates human-
level intelligence, even when humans understand how the TalaMind 
system works. 
4.2.4 Searle’s Chinese Room Argument 
The TalaMind approach, representing natural language semantics 
based largely on the syntax of a particular natural language, must 
confront theoretical objections based on Searle’s “Chinese Room” 
philosophical thought experiment. It has been the subject of unresolved 
debate since 1980, though the philosophical issues are complex enough 
that people on both sides may believe they resolved it in their favor, 
long ago. Cole (2009) provides a survey of this debate. 
Searle and other proponents of the Chinese Room argument have 
claimed it shows human-level intelligence requires human physical 
embodiment, or at least the embodiment of mental processes within the 
human brain. Section 2.2.3 gives reasons for believing that human 
physical embodiment in general is not needed to understand natural 
language. 
The perspective of this thesis has been developed independently, 
though elements of it have been previously proposed by others. People 
on both sides of the Chinese Room argument have noted it depends on 
the nature of consciousness and understanding. This thesis will discuss 
these topics, but will not trace the relationships of its perspective to the 
large number of previous responses by other thinkers. 56, 57 
                                                          
56 This thesis will not rely on what Searle says is the most frequent 
reply he receives and does not accept, which he calls the “Systems 
Reply” – Russell & Norvig (1995, p.832-833) support the Systems Reply, 
noting that others including McCarthy and Wilensky have proposed it. 
The present author agrees with their arguments, and with the 
arguments given by Chalmers (1996), but presents a different argument 
to discuss how consciousness and understanding interact within the 
Theoretical Issues and Objections 
160 
Searle asks us to imagine a person placed in a room who 
understands English but does not understand Chinese. The person has 
instructions written in English that tell him how to process sentences 
written in Chinese. Through a slot in the room he receives pieces of 
paper with Chinese sentences on them. He follows his instructions in 
English to process the Chinese sentences and to write sentences in 
Chinese that he pushes through the slot out of the room. Searle asks us 
to consider the person in the Chinese Room as equivalent to a computer 
running a software program, and to agree that neither the Chinese 
Room and its contents nor the person inside it using English 
instructions understands Chinese, but that the person inside the room 
understands English. From this, Searle argues that no computer running 
a program can truly understand a natural language like English or 
Chinese. 
To an outside observer, it appears the Chinese Room (or the person 
inside it) understands Chinese, and it also appears the Chinese Room 
understands English, since if English sentences are put on paper pushed 
into the room, meaningful English replies are received from the room. 
So for the outside observer, the Chinese Room satisfies the Turing Test 
for Chinese and English. However, the person inside the room does not 
rely on the Turing Test. He ‘knows’ that he does not understand 
Chinese and ‘knows’ that he does understand English. It is important to 
ask: 
Precisely how does he know these things? 
Answering this question involves a discussion of how consciousness, 
knowledge and understanding interact within a mind. As discussed in 
§§2.3.4 and 3.7.6, consciousness includes the ability of a person to 
observe his thoughts, i.e. to observe in his own mind what he thinks or 
knows. To the extent that a person can observe his or her thoughts, 
much of the understanding process appears to happen seamlessly, and 
                                                                                                                                
mind.  
57 See also Mc Kevitt & Guo (1996) for a discussion addressing the 
Chinese Room by “defining vocabularies and primitives…in terms of 
spatial or pictorial representations to obtain meanings.” From a 
cognitive linguistics perspective their approach appears equivalent to 
image schemas (Johnson, 1987) or perceptual symbols (Barsalou, 1993 et 
seq.). 
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the person may only be conscious of the higher-level results of the 
process. Referring to the discussion of understanding given in §2.2.2, a 
person can be conscious that he or she is able or unable to understand 
meanings, yet not consciously perceive all the interpretants constructed 
in the mind, nor all the conceptual processing of interpretants that 
constitutes the understanding process. 
From this perspective, the person in the Chinese Room knows he 
does not understand Chinese because he is conscious that he is not able 
to create interpretants for the Chinese characters, i.e. he is conscious 
(observes in his own mind) that he does not know what the Chinese 
symbols represent. 
He knows that he does understand English because whenever he 
reads an English sentence he can observe at least indirectly in his own 
mind that interpretants are created representing its meaning. He is 
conscious (observes in his own mind) that he has an understanding of 
what the English sentence refers to. Thus the person in the room is 
conscious of the fact that he understands English, and conscious of the 
fact that he does not understand Chinese. Yet he is not fully conscious of 
how he understands English, i.e. what process he uses to understand 
English. 
Searle’s argument does not preclude the possibility that the person 
may subconsciously process symbols to understand English in 
essentially the same way that he consciously processes symbols to 
emulate understanding Chinese. The person may use a program 
expressed in his innate mentalese to support processing English 
subconsciously, in the same way that he uses the external instructions 
written in English to support processing Chinese consciously. He may 
have constructed his internal program for understanding English when 
he learned how to understand English as a toddler, and now be 
executing the program subconsciously. Thus we normally learn how to 
do new things consciously, and later perform complex processes 
unconsciously after they become “routine”. So from this perspective, 
Searle’s argument does not prove that symbol processing cannot 
constitute understanding of semantics. 
In Searle's 1980 paper, he discounted this possibility, on the grounds 
that it would appear “incredible” to claim or suppose that a program 
could have the same input-output performance as a native human 
speaker or to assume that human speakers can be described as program 
instantiations. In effect, Searle allowed his doubts regarding the 
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potential for computer programs to describe human-level intelligence 
and enable computers to understand natural language, to support his 
conclusion that they cannot do so. In his 1980 paper, Searle apparently 
did not fully consider that the person in the Chinese Room might 
unconsciously understand English in the same way he consciously 
emulates understanding Chinese. Thus, Searle’s Chinese Room 
argument does not disprove the potential value of the TalaMind 
approach, nor of the quest for human-level artificial intelligence in 
general. 
This discussion of how consciousness interacts with natural 
language understanding is relevant to understanding in general. Much 
of what we perceive and do happens automatically and unconsciously, 
with consciousness being drawn to things we do not understand, 
perceptions that are anomalous, actions and events that do not happen 
as expected, etc. Once we become conscious of something anomalous, 
we may focus on trying to understand it, or trying to perceive it 
correctly, or trying a different action for the same purpose. (Cf. 
Whitehead’s 1929, p.161, statement that consciousness is involved in the 
perception of contrast between an erroneous theory and a fact.) 
Searle (1992) gave a second theoretical argument against Strong AI, 
contending that computation can only be ascribed to physical processes 
when they are observed by human intelligence. Searle appears not to 
consider that physical observation and causality are intrinsic and 
essential to computation. While the arrangement of symbols on a tape is 
syntactic, Turing's definition of computation also describes physical 
observation (reading a tape) and physical actions (moving relative to the 
tape, and writing on it), as well as state changes within a machine. This 
carries over to modern computers, though they use other physical 
representations for symbols, and other physical processes than Turing 
described. Physical observation, actions and causality occur within a 
computer, even if the system is not conscious or intelligent. So, a 
computer can perform computations independently of whether it is 
observed externally by human observers. Further, a computer could in 
principle observe its computations and ascribe meaning to them, if it is 
computationally reflective (§3.7.2.2). Chalmers (1996) gives a more 
extensive refutation of Searle’s arguments.  
4.2.5 McCarthy’s Objections to Natural Language Mentalese 
McCarthy (2008) wrote that grammar is secondary, that the language 
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of thought should be based on mathematical logic, and not be based on 
natural language: 
“English and other spoken languages won’t do as languages of 
thought. Here are some reasons. 
• Much mental information is represented in parallel and is 
processed in parallel. 58 
• Reference to states of the senses and the body has to be done 
by something like pointers. Natural languages use 
descriptions, because one person can’t give another a pointer 
to his visual cortex. 
• We don’t think in terms of long sentences. 
• Much human thought is contiguous with the thought of the 
animals from which we evolved. 
• For robots, logic is appropriate, but a robot internal language 
may also include pointers. 
• A language of thought must operate on a shorter time scale 
than speech does. A batter needs to do at least some thinking 
about a pitched ball, and a fielder often needs to do quite a 
bit of thinking about where to throw the ball. Pointers to 
processes while they are operating may be important 
elements of its sentences.” 
From the perspective of this thesis, McCarthy was mistaken in 
discounting natural language as a basis for an AI system’s language of 
thought. His reasons indicate an incorrect assumption that the 
characteristics of external, public spoken or written natural language 
would necessarily obtain for an internal, private language of thought 
with a syntax based on natural language. Since McCarthy (2008) directly 
contradicts Hypothesis II of this thesis, the following paragraphs 
respond to each of his statements. 
The Tala conceptual language has a syntax that corresponds to 
natural language, but this syntax is not expressed within a purely linear 
string of words. Instead Tala sentences are expressed as tree-like list 
                                                          
58 Elsewhere McCarthy (2008) seemed to argue the opposite side, 
writing “On the other hand, our inability to think completely in parallel 
shows that many higher mental functions are done serially.” 
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structures. If necessary, such structures could be processed in parallel 
by multiple conceptual processes, and multiple conceptual processes 
could reason in parallel about the same structure, or different parts of a 
structure. 
Tala allows pointers to be used within conceptual structures based 
on natural language. Pointers are valid since they only need to be 
dereferenced within a Tala agent using the mentalese to refer to its own 
concepts, and mental or physical states. Thus, Tala includes a reserved 
variable ?self , which is an internal pointer a Tala agent uses to refer 
to itself. The Tala mentalese could also include reserved variables to 
serve as pointers to states of a Tala agent’s senses or body. This would, 
incidentally, address questions posed by Wittgenstein (1953) regarding 
how an agent could use a ‘private language’ to refer to personal 
sensations such as pain, which other agents cannot directly perceive. 
This does not mean that a Tala agent would need to use a single 
numeric value to represent pain or other sensations, or qualia. As 
McCarthy suggests by referring to the visual cortex, an agent could 
describe or refer to the state of  a complex field of sensory data. 
The claim that “We don’t think in terms of long sentences” is based 
on introspection, which may not be valid: How we perceive we think 
may not really be how we think. In any case, if we think of a thought as 
a ‘chunk’ rather than a long sentence, we may do so by using a pointer 
to the thought as a whole, independently of the structure of the thought. 
The thought might still have a complex structure, with a syntax and 
semantics that correspond to natural language. 
Likewise, the argument that “a language of thought must operate on 
a shorter time scale than speech” does not preclude use of a mentalese 
with syntax and semantics that correspond to natural language. We 
may process mentalese conceptual structures internally much faster 
than we can translate such structures into speech and perform physical 
speech acts. Natural language supports representing thoughts about 
“processes while they are operating”, and Tala pointers could point to 
such processes. (The TalaMind demonstration system includes ‘process 
objects’ representing active executable concepts.) 
The contention that “much human thought is contiguous with the 
thought of the animals from which we evolved” seems to preclude the 
possibility that other animals may have very simplified languages of 
thought, which apparently remains open to future research by 
neurobiologists. In any case, this thesis is not focused on how animals or 
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humans think, but on how machines might emulate human thought, 
and what languages machines might use for emulating thought. 
Emulation of mental capabilities may be accomplished without exact 
duplication or replication of the supporting physical processes, 
languages, etc. Thus, we know that human brains have different 
physical processes than electronic computers, and it is virtually certain 
no human brain uses the machine language of any electronic computer. 
So, if one is going to argue that predicate calculus and logic are 
adequate as an internal language for a robot achieving human-level AI, 
then one should accept the possibility that a logical formalism based on 
natural language may also be adequate. 
McCarthy augments the statement that “grammar is secondary” by 
saying “While most linguistic studies have focused on grammar, 
meaning is more important—in studying spoken language, in 
proposing a language of thought and in designing robots.” This 
discounts a major purpose of syntax, which is to help represent 
meaning. So, this is not a valid argument against using natural language 
as a basis for design of a language of thought. 
4.2.6 Minsky’s Issues for Representation and Learning 
Section 3.7.2.3 discussed how the TalaMind approach can address 
Minsky’s knowledge representation problem for baby-machines. As 
noted in §2.3.3.2.2, Minsky (2006) also cites three problems for general 
learning systems, related to self-programming. Minsky’s Optimization 
Paradox, Investment Principle and Complexity Barrier involve the 
nature of design and problem solving for creating large systems. 
If we consider any complex system and imagine making a random 
change to it, then the odds are the change will harm or disable the 
behavior of the system. However, well-designed systems are modular 
and hierarchical. They have limited, well-defined interfaces between 
different components. Each module has a specific, well-defined function 
within the system. Natural language or formal sentences may describe 
global and local characteristics of the modules, their interfaces and 
interactions. Someone who understands these descriptions of the system 
design can be successful in improving the system by making changes 
that improve how a module performs its function, without changing its 
interface to other modules, at any level of the hierarchy. This enables 
human intelligence to overcome Minsky’s Complexity Barrier and 
Optimization Paradox – though we must still allow time for debugging 
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unexpected problems. There is no reason in principle why the TalaMind 
approach cannot also support this ability of human-level intelligence (cf. 
Doyle, 1980, pp.33-38). 
Minsky’s Investment Principle is simply an economic fact of life, 
though it is very important: If a system works well in performing its 
function, then the time and costs necessary to identify and implement 
an improvement may prevent doing so. Properly viewed, higher-level 
learning by human intelligence is an economic process 59: An intelligent 
system must meta-reason about any new learning endeavor, to decide 
whether it is economically worthwhile to spend time thinking about 
how to improve or invent a system to achieve some purpose. Higher-
level learning may be considered as an “economy of mind” (Wright, 2000), 
an extension of the society of mind (§2.3.3.2.1). 
In principle the TalaMind approach can support higher-level 
learning processes relative to such considerations. The use of a natural 
language mentalese enables the TalaMind approach to represent and 
meta-reason with concepts about the difficulty and value of making an 
improvement to a method, as well to represent and reason about ways 
to improve a method, etc. 
4.2.7 Chalmers’ Hard Problem of Consciousness 
The “Hard Problem” of consciousness (Chalmers, 1995a) is the 
problem of explaining the first-person, subjective experience of 
consciousness. For this thesis, there is the theoretical issue of whether a 
Tala agent can have this first-person, subjective experience. This is a 
difficult, perhaps metaphysically unsolvable problem because science 
relies on third-person explanations, based on observations. Since there 
is no philosophical or scientific consensus about the Hard Problem, this 
thesis may not give an answer that will satisfy everyone. On the other 
hand, the TalaMind approach is open to different answers for the Hard 
Problem:  
If the answer to the Hard Problem is that the subjective 
experience of consciousness is a byproduct of neurobiological 
processes in the human brain, as suggested by Searle, then this 
thesis would agree with Chalmers that “implementing the right 
                                                          
59 Thus, the economic aspects of improvements and innovation were 
central to Adam Smith’s work, and even more so to the work of Joseph 
Schumpeter, and modern-day economists.  
Issues and Objections for Thesis Approach 
167 
computation suffices for rich conscious experience like our 
own” (Chalmers, 1996, p. 315), and argues that the TalaMind 
approach can theoretically provide the right computational 
approach. There does not appear to be sufficient reason to 
accept Searle’s claim that only neurobiological processes can 
produce consciousness. 
If the answer to the Hard Problem is that the subjective 
experience of consciousness is a byproduct of quantum 
information processing in the brain, as suggested by Penrose & 
Hameroff (2011), then the TalaMind approach is open to 
inclusion of quantum information processing, if necessary. 
However, §3.7.6 did not invoke quantum processing to describe 
how third-person aspects of consciousness could be supported 
in the TalaMind approach, and this author is not yet convinced 
that quantum processing is needed for the subjective, first-
person experience of consciousness. 
If the answer to the Hard Problem is that the subjective 
experience of consciousness is a byproduct of non-symbolic 
information processing in the brain, e.g. connectionism, then the 
TalaMind approach is open to inclusion of non-symbolic 
processing, if necessary. While this thesis discusses support of 
third-person consciousness via symbolic processing, perhaps 
other aspects of consciousness, such as fringe consciousness, 
may benefit from connectionism, holography, or other 
technologies – this would be a topic for future research. 
However, this author is not yet convinced that non-symbolic 
information processing is needed for the subjective, first-person 
experience of consciousness. 
If the answer to the Hard Problem is that the subjective 
experience of consciousness is an illusion, as suggested by 
Dennett and Blackmore, then the TalaMind approach could 
include conceptual processes that would simulate and report 
having such an illusion, if it is useful or important to do so. 
Blackmore (2011, p.285) notes this answer could also be given 
for other approaches to artificial consciousness. 
Observation is intrinsic to symbolic computation, and the theoretical 
requirements for TalaMind related to consciousness are stated in §3.7.6 
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in terms of observation. Another answer to the Hard Problem, 
consistent with the TalaMind approach, is that there is a first-person 
aspect inherent to observation: An observer encounters an observation 
from a first-person perspective, and others can only discuss the 
observer’s observation from a second or third-person perspective. This 
does not imply every physical system performing an observation is 
conscious, because most physical systems do not observe themselves, 
observe internal concepts, etc. A simple physical system like a 
thermostat is not conscious by these criteria, even though it performs 
physical observations of temperature. Yet a Tala agent performing all 
the observations required for consciousness discussed in §3.7.6 would 
encounter each of these observations from a first-person perspective. 
Arguably, this would give the Tala agent an intrinsic first-person 
experience of its consciousness, which others could only observe 
indirectly. Though with current technology that experience could not 
have the sensory richness of human consciousness, it could still be 
argued from a theoretical perspective that a first-person experience of 
consciousness exists. 
As Dennett and Blackmore note, our perceptions of consciousness 
are to some extent illusions, things that exist or happen but are not the 
way they seem. Thus we dynamically piece together our visual 
perception of the environment, perceiving a continuous unity in space 
and time out of saccadic eye motions. The perception that we have a 
single, unitary self may also be an illusion, considering evidence from 
split-brain experiments. Blackmore (2011) discusses Libet’s 
neurophysical experiments indicating that unconscious actions can 
precede conscious perceptions of intentions to perform the actions. If 
consciousness is an illusion, it may be an illusion that perceives itself, 
and an illusion that it can perceive itself.  
A Tala agent can have multiple subagents engage in self-talk, 
communicating in the Tala conceptual language of thought, each 
referring to the Tala agent by a common reserved variable ?self  (viz. 
§§3.6.7.13, 5.4.16). At least from a logical standpoint, this provides a 
representation of a single experiencer, composed of subagents. It may 
provide what Dennett calls a “narrative center of gravity” for 
perception of self.  
The TalaMind approach, including support for a projected reality 
within the conceptual framework, does not imply a homunculus within 
a “Cartesian Theatre”, leading to a problem of infinitely nested 
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homunculi. Rather, within a Tala agent’s society of mind (§2.3.3.2.1) two 
subagents can engage in mental dialogue, though more are permitted 
(the prototype demonstration system has three subagents within each 
Tala agent). The construction and use of a projected reality do not 
require infinite recursion, beyond what can be finitely represented, e.g. 
via circular pointers. 
No discussion of consciousness would be complete without some 
mention of philosophical arguments regarding “zombies”. A 
philosophical zombie is a hypothetical system with behavior 
indistinguishable from humans, yet which does not have consciousness, 
understanding or intelligence (cf. Searle, 2004, p.93). This concept is 
introduced to support a philosophical argument that consciousness 
does not logically follow from observations of external behavior. The 
issue is not relevant to the TalaMind approach, which requires us to 
observe the internal design and operation of the system, and to consider 
to what extent its internal conceptual processing supports aspects of 
consciousness. Because we are not confined to external behavior, 
TalaMind systems are not philosophical zombies. 
4.2.8 Smith’s Issues for Representation and Reflection 
Smith (1982) noted the lack of an accepted, theoretical definition of 
the term ‘representation’, writing: 
 “there is remarkably little agreement on whether a 
representation must ‘re-present’ in any constrained way (like an 
image or copy), or whether the word is synonymous with such 
general terms as ‘sign’ or ‘symbol’… further confusion is shown 
by an inconsistency in usage as to what representation is a 
relation between…Thus a KLONE structure might be said to 
represent Don Quixote tilting at a windmill; it would not be 
taken as representing the fact or proposition of this activity.” 
Since 1982, published research on conceptual graphs, description 
logic, ontology representation languages, etc., appears to have taken 
essentially a propositional approach. However, Smith’s definitional 
issues remain worthy of discussion in this thesis on representation and 
computation of meaning. The term ‘representation’ has multiple senses, 
each important in the TalaMind approach. 
One sense is synonymous with ‘sign’ or ‘symbol’. The discussions in 
§2.2.2 and Chapter 3 can be summarized by  adapting a diagram from 
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Smith (1982, p.62) in Figure 4-3. It shows relationships between three 
kinds of semantic functions. θ is a function mapping external sentences 
(notations) into internal con-
ceptual structures. Φ is a 
function mapping conceptual 
structures into their design-
nations in the world. Ψ is a 
function mapping conceptual 
structures into other conceptual 
structures corresponding to 
their interpretations or implica-
tions, within a Tala agent’s conceptual framework. Smith writes:  
“As an example to illustrate [Figure 4-3] suppose we accept the 
hypothesis that people represent English sentences in an 
internal mental language we will call mentalese … If you say to 
me the phrase “a composer who died in 1750” and I respond 
with the name “J. S. Bach”, then, in terms of the figure, the first 
phrase, qua sentence of English, would be N1; the mentalese 
representation of it would be S1, and the person who lived in 
the 17th and 18th century would be the referent D1. Similarly, 
my reply would be N2, and the mentalese fragment that I 
presumably accessed in order to formulate that reply would be 
S2. Finally, D2 would again be the long-dead composer; thus D1 
and D2, in this case, would be the same fellow. ”  
Though his wording in this excerpt is suggestive, Smith does not 
appear to have discussed the idea that mentalese could itself be based 
on the syntax of a natural  language, such as English. For the TalaMind 
architecture, conceptual structures S1 and S2 are of course expressions 
in the Tala mentalese. External notations N1 and N2 are typically 
written or spoken English sentences, but may be any kind of external 
percept that a Tala agent represents as a conceptual structure. However, 
because a Tala agent can only indirectly refer to the external world, the 
designations D1 and D2 are also conceptual structures in the agent’s 
conceptual framework. Thus, a Tala agent’s conceptual structures 
representing J. S. Bach would correspond to an entry for the long-dead 
composer in its encyclopedic knowledge. If in a different example, D1 
represented a physical person present in the external environment, then 
it would be a percept in the Tala agent’s perceived reality, i.e. again a 
Figure 4-3  Semantic Mapping Functions 
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conceptual structure in the agent’s conceptual framework. Finally, if N1 
were the phrase “Newton’s third law of motion”, then its designation 
D1 would be a Tala conceptual structure corresponding to “For every 
action there is an equal and opposite reaction”, again stored in the 
agent’s encyclopedic knowledge. 
This approach addresses the inconsistency in usage that Smith noted 
concerning “what representation is a relation between”, i.e. whether a 
conceptual structure represents an activity in external reality, or a 
statement of fact or proposition about an activity. Consider Smith’s 
example: 
Don Quixote is tilting at a windmill. 
(tilt 
 (wusage verb) (tense present) (aspect continuous) 
 (subj 
  (“Don Quixote” 
   (wusage noun) 
   (naming proper))) 
 (obj 
  (windmill 
   (wusage noun) 
   (det a)] 
Whether this Tala sentence represents (designates) an activity in 
external reality or is just a proposition depends on the epistemic mode 
(§3.6.7.1) of the context in which it occurs within the conceptual 
framework of a Tala agent, which affects how the sentence is 
conceptually processed by the agent. If the sentence occurs as a percept 
in the Tala agent’s perceived reality context, then it represents the 
agent’s perception of an activity in its environment, and may be 
conceptually processed as a statement of fact.60 If it occurs in the Tala 
agent’s event memory for perceived reality, then it represents a memory 
of an earlier percept. If it occurs in a hypothetical mental space or 
scenario context for nested conceptual simulation, then it represents a 
hypothetical activity in that context, effectively a hypothetical 
proposition. If the sentence occurs in a Tala agent’s encyclopedic 
knowledge for a scene in Cervantes’ novel about the “ingenious 
                                                          
60 However, its processing as a statement of fact about perceived 
reality may be modulated by other knowledge about what is happening 
in reality. For example, if the Tala agent happens to be watching a play 
about Don Quixote, then the agent may understand that the sentence 
represents what is currently happening in the play and that an actor is 
portraying Don Quixote. 
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gentleman” of La Mancha, then it is a proposition describing a fictional 
event, i.e. a statement of fiction. 
Because Tala sentences incorporate the syntax of English, such 
distinctions can be expressed directly within them. Thus, we may have a 
Tala sentence corresponding to “Cervantes wrote that a fictional 
character named Don Quixote tilted at windmills.” This is a statement 
of fact, a true proposition about reality, which a Tala agent may have as 
encyclopedic knowledge. Although it is a statement of fact, it 
specifically refers to a fictional character and event. 
Section 3.7.2.3 discusses how the TalaMind approach and 
architecture can support a second set of meanings for ‘representation’, 
related but not synonymous to semantic mappings between signs or 
symbols. This is the notion that a representation may be a particular 
way of describing a problem or situation, or multiple problems and 
situations. This could range from a particular set of sentences, to a 
notation or language. It is important for a Tala agent to be able to 
flexibly develop such representations, to address Minsky’s knowledge 
representation problem for achieving human-level AI (§4.2.6). 
Finally, Smith (1982) discusses a third meaning of the term 
‘representation’: 
“If nothing else, the word ‘representation’ comes from ‘re’ plus 
‘present’, and the ability to re-present a world to itself is 
undeniably a crucial, if not the crucial, ingredient in reflective 
thought. If I reflect on my childhood, I re-present to myself my 
school and the rooms of my house; if I reflect on what I will do 
tomorrow, I bring into the view of my mind’s eye the self I 
imagine that tomorrow I will be. If we take ‘representation’ to 
describe an activity, rather than a structure, reflection surely 
involves representation...” 
This meaning of representation is also open to support within the 
TalaMind architecture, if we take the “mind’s eye” of a Tala agent to 
mean whatever conceptual processes are currently active, and such 
processes have the ability to recall or imagine (simulate) spatial images. 
Also, it could be logically equivalent to recall or imagine (conceptually 
simulate) and process a collection of Tala sentences rather than spatial 
images. The notion of a mind’s eye in reflective thought overlaps 
previous discussions of observation within artificial consciousness (viz. 
§§3.7.6 and 4.2.7). 
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Some additional theoretical issues are found in six general properties 
that Smith (1982, pp.42-81) reasoned should be exhibited by any 
reflective system. Following is a summary of these properties, and 
discussion of how they are supported in the TalaMind approach and 
architecture: 
1) Reflection “matters”, i.e. it is causally-connected with behavior. 
The result of reflecting can affect future non-reflective behavior. 
Prior non-reflective behavior is accessible to reflective 
contemplation. A system can create continuation structures that 
can trigger reflection at later moments. 
This property is an aspect of the active side of consciousness, which 
some authors have equated with freedom of will, though it is more 
well-defined and easier to discuss. All of these causal connections 
between reflection and behavior can in principle be supported within 
the TalaMind architecture: Executable concepts can access and 
conceptually process (reflect upon) event memory of prior behavior. As 
a result, such reflective executable concepts can create new executable 
concepts that affect future non-reflective behavior, or which trigger 
reflection at later moments.  
2) Reflection involves self-knowledge, as well as self-reference, 
and knowledge is theory-relative. 
This property is also supported in the TalaMind architecture. Each 
agent has a reserved variable ?self for use in concepts representing 
knowledge about itself, and in executable concepts for reflection. Such 
concepts can exist within theories. 
3) Reflection involves an incremental “stepping back” for a system 
to process structures that describe its state ‘just a moment 
earlier’, and avoids a vicious circle of thinking about thinking 
about thinking…  
This property is also supported within the TalaMind architecture, 
via the ability for executable concepts to access event memory. There is 
no need for reflection to involve an infinite, vicious circle of thinking 
about thinking … However, it is a feature of the Tala language that it 
supports finite representations of infinitely recursive concepts (§3.6.7.5). 
4) Reflection allows a system to have fine-grained control over its 
behavior. What was previously an inexorable stepping from one 
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state to the next is opened up so that each step can be analyzed 
and changed in future. 
This property is also supported in the TalaMind architecture. Since 
executable concepts can be analyzed by other executable concepts, each 
step of an executable concept can be analyzed and changed in future 
behavior. 
5) Reflection is only partially-detached from what is reflected 
upon, and is animated by the same fundamental agencies and 
processes. 
This is also the nature of reflection within the TalaMind architecture. 
Much as Smith’s 3-Lisp reflective procedures were still written in 3-Lisp 
and animated by its processing, Tala reflective executable concepts 
would also be expressed in Tala, animated by TalaMind conceptual 
processing. 
6) The ability to reflect must be built into a system and its 
language. Rather than simply having  a model of itself, a system 
must be able to directly analyze and change itself. 
This is also possible in the TalaMind architecture, consistent with the 
TalaMind hypotheses. Executable concepts can directly analyze and 
change executable concepts, as discussed in §§3.7.2.2, 6.3.3.2. 
4.3 Summary 
This chapter discussed theoretical issues and objections for the 
TalaMind approach, or against the possibility of achieving human-level 
AI in principle. No insurmountable objections were identified, and 
arguments refuting several objections were presented. These pages have 
discussed the theoretical issues for AI identified by Dreyfus and 
philosophical arguments against AI, including Searle’s Chinese Room 
argument and the Gödelian arguments of Penrose and Lucas. The 
author has also discussed McCarthy’s objections to natural language as 
a mentalese, Minsky’s issues for representation and learning, Chalmers’ 
‘Hard Problem’ for consciousness, and Smith’s issues for representation 
and reflection. Considering all these discussions, it does not appear to 
the author that anyone has shown human-level AI is impossible in 
principle, nor that anyone has shown the thesis approach cannot 
succeed in principle. 
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5. Design of a Demonstration System 
In other words, we must try to design – as opposed to 
define – machines that can do what human minds do.  
~ Marvin Minsky, The Emotion Machine, 2006 61 
 
5.1 Overview 
Chapter 3 analyzed how a system could in principle be designed 
according to the TalaMind hypotheses, to achieve the higher-level 
mentalities of human-level intelligence. It discussed theoretical issues 
for elements of the TalaMind architecture. This chapter presents a 
design for a prototype demonstration system, in accordance with the 
analysis of Chapter 3. 
The purpose of the prototype is to illustrate how the thesis approach 
could support aspects of human-level AI if the approach were fully 
developed, though that would need to be a long-term effort by multiple 
researchers. Per §1.6, this thesis cannot claim to actually achieve human-
level AI. Hence the demonstration system cannot be claimed to actually 
achieve the higher-level mentalities of human-level intelligence, it can 
only illustrate how they may eventually be achieved. This illustration 
will involve functioning code in a prototype system, but it can only be a 
small step toward the goal. This distinction is further discussed in 
Chapter 6. 
Likewise, the purpose of the prototype design is not to show the best 
way to design a system having a TalaMind architecture, better than 
other possible designs. That is a topic for future research, since it will 
involve issues of efficiency and scalability, as well as issues of detailed 
design regarding completeness and generality. Such issues will be very 
important and challenging. However, if one can make workable design 
choices for a prototype, this may suggest possibilities for a more full 
and scalable implementation of TalaMind. Some of the design choices 
for the prototype may carry over to future systems, though many will 
not. 
                                                          
61 Used by permission of Simon & Schuster Publishing Group from 
The Emotion Machine by Marvin L. Minsky. Copyright © 2006 by Marvin 
Minsky. All rights reserved. 
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5.2 Nature of the Demonstration System 
The demonstration system is a functional prototype in which two 
Tala agents, named Ben and Leo, interact in a simulated environment. 
Each Tala agent has its own TalaMind conceptual framework and 
conceptual processes. Each Tala agent uses the Tala conceptual 
language as its internal mentalese for communication between 
subagents in its society of mind (§2.3.3.2.1). Ben and Leo can 
communicate with each other, and can also perform actions and 
perceive objects and events in the simulated environment. 
The simulation uses the Tala language to represent actions, percepts 
and communication between Tala agents. The simulation displays 
actions, events and communication between agents using English 
sentences, which are generated from Tala mentalese expressions, but the 
agents do not themselves parse English sentences as linear strings of 
symbols. The demonstration focuses entirely on conceptual processing 
using the Tala mentalese. The simulation can also display the internal 
thoughts (Tala conceptual structures) of each Tala agent, as English 
sentences. 
Thus, to the human observer, a simulation is displayed as a sequence 
of English sentences, in effect a story, describing interactions between 
Ben and Leo, their actions and percepts in the environment, and their 
thoughts. 62 The story that is simulated depends on the initial concepts 
that Ben and Leo have, their initial percepts of the simulated 
environment, and how their executable concepts process their 
perceptions to generate goals and actions, leading to further perceptions 
and actions at subsequent steps of the story. The story is ‘scripted’ in the 
sense that this author has written executable concepts that work 
                                                          
62  This form of scripted story simulation is different from other 
research approaches to automatic story generation, e.g. Meehan (1981), 
Turner (1994), Perez y Perez et al. (2004). Also, the system does not use 
scripts as described by Schank, to sequence the actions of an agent 
throughout a typical situation such as dining at a restaurant. In the 
TalaMind prototype, each simulation step involves a Tala agent 
processing different executable concepts. Executable concepts may 
guide the actions of an agent across time intervals, e.g. to support 
‘discovery loops’, and so in principle could support Schank’s scripts. 
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together to produce the story, to illustrate how Tala agents could 
perform different kinds of higher-level concept processing. 
For the simulations created to date, the stories have involved 
situations in which Ben is a cook and Leo is a farmer. Two stories have 
been developed, one about Ben and Leo discovering how to make bread 
from wheat, and another about Ben and Leo exchanging wheat for 
bread. Consequently, some examples discussed in this chapter may 
have references to wheat or bread, or to events in the stories. The stories 
are discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 
The TalaMind prototype demonstration system is written in 
JScheme, a Scheme dialect of Lisp implemented in Java – some lower-
level code is written in Java. The prototype does not integrate external 
corpora, nor does it support reasoning with large amounts of 
encyclopedic or commonsense knowledge. 
5.3 Design of Conceptual Language 
This section presents a design for the syntax of the Tala conceptual 
language. This syntax is fairly general and flexible, and covers many of 
the issues discussed by Hudson (2010) for Word Grammar dependency 
syntax. Such coverage is described to suggest that a Tala syntax could 
be comprehensive for English, since §1.6 identified this as an issue for 
the adequacy of the Tala syntax. However, developing a comprehensive 
Tala syntax for English is itself a very large effort that could occupy 
multiple researchers.63 The following pages identify topics for future 
work and there are probably several other ways the Tala syntax can be 
improved. 
Moreover, it should be noted that creating a comprehensive Tala 
syntax for English is not a prerequisite for success of the TalaMind 
approach. It is only necessary that Tala include sufficient syntax to 
enable representing the general, extensible semantics of English, and to 
support an intelligence kernel’s implementation of higher-level 
mentalities. Other variations in English syntax could later be added64 
                                                          
63  Thus, Hudson notes that comprehensive treatments of English 
grammar have spanned 1,000 to 2,000 pages each (citing Quirk et al., 
1985; Biber et al., 1999; Huddleston & Pullum, 2002; Carter & McCarthy, 
2006). 
64 Either manually by human researchers, or using machine learning 
techniques. 
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into Tala via constructions, if the syntax and semantics for Tala 
constructions are sufficiently general (cf. §§3.6.3.13, 5.5.4). Accordingly, 
the prototype simulations described in Chapter 6 need only use a subset 
of this section’s syntax to illustrate how the TalaMind approach can 
support the higher-level mentalities of human-level intelligence. 
Further, Vogt’s (2005) research on emergence of compositional 
structure suggests (at least to the present author) that if an intelligence 
kernel starts with less, rather than more Tala syntax for English, then 
this could be advantageous for learning both syntax and semantics via 
interaction with English speakers in a real-world environment. This 
may be a promising direction for future research, though it would also 
be a very large effort that could occupy multiple researchers. 
5.3.1 Tala Syntax Notation 
The syntax for Tala is presented using a modified Backus-Naur Form 
(BNF) notation: 
 :=      means "is defined as"  
 |         means "or"  
 < >       are used to surround category names.  
 ?         means that the item to the left can appear 
   zero or one times 
 *         means that the item to the left can 
   appear zero or many times 
 +        means that the item to the left appears one 
   or more times 
 {}       grouping symbols for syntax expressions 
 “”  used to quote a symbol or sequence of symbols 
 ;  prefixes a comment, not part of the syntax 
In this notation, ( and ) are terminal symbols of the Tala language, 
while { and } are used as grouping symbols of the modified BNF syntax 
metalanguage. Parentheses are terminal symbols because (per §3.5.2) a 
sentence in the Tala language will be a Lisp list structure that represents 
the syntactic structure of a corresponding English sentence. For 
example: 
({<adj-word> | <noun-word>}+) 
refers to a sequence of one or more adjectives or nouns, that is enclosed 
in parentheses, such as: 
(large gray steel oil pump piston) 
Of course, this example expression is not a sentence in Tala, nor does it 
correspond to a sentence in English. It only shows how parentheses as 
terminal symbols describe list structures. Also in examples throughout 
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this thesis, a right square bracket ] stands for as many right parentheses 
as are needed to close all open left parentheses, using a convention of 
Lisp programming environments. 
5.3.2 Nouns 
The Tala syntax for a noun is:  
<noun> := <common-noun>|<pronoun>|<gerund>|<infinitive>| 
  <c-conj-noun> 
<common-noun> := 
  (<noun-word> ;a word defined in the Tala lexicon as a noun 
     (wusage noun) 
     (det <det>)? 
     (number {singular | plural | mass})? 
     (agreement-number {singular | plural})? 
     (agreement-person {I | non-I})? 
     (naming proper)? 
     <prep-link>* 
     <adjective>* 
     (comp {<noun>|<c-conj-noun>})? 
     (subj-of <verb>+)? 
     (obj-of <verb>+)? 
     (indirect-obj-of <verb>+)? 
  <pointer-bind>? 
     (wsense <pointer>)? ;viz. §3.6.1 
     (wreferent <pointer>)? ;viz. §3.6.1 
     ) 
By convention in this thesis, if a Tala syntax rule specifies a list then 
after the first element specified by the rule, any order may be used for 
other elements. So, after a word is specified at the start of a noun 
expression, any of the other elements (wusage, det, number, …) may 
occur in any order. 
Since the Tala syntax is essentially a dependency grammar, a 
common noun may contain links to other nodes, corresponding to a 
noun expression. Each link corresponds to one of the slots in the noun 
expression, as follows: 
• det – specifies an optional determiner for a noun. 
• number – if not specified, by default the noun is singular. The 
syntax can express that a noun is plural or that it is used as a 
mass noun and not counted (e.g. “furniture”, “oxygen”), in 
which case its agreement-number is singular.  
• agreement-number and agreement-person – These are used to 
support English subject-verb agreement, according to the 
approach described by Hudson (1999). This is discussed in 
§5.3.12.2. 
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• naming – The syntax can express that a noun is being used as 
the name of a particular individual (proper). Otherwise by 
default it is a general noun usage.  
• prep-link – one or more prepositions can be specified as 
dependent on a noun. 
• adjective – one or more adjectives can be specified as 
dependent on a noun. 
• comp – optionally allows specifying compound noun 
expressions. 
• subj-of – optionally allows specifying the noun is the subject 
of a verb 
• obj-of – optionally allows specifying the noun is the object of a 
verb 
• indirect-obj-of – optionally allows specifying the noun is the 
indirect object of a verb. 
• pointer-bind – optionally allows binding a Tala pointer to a 
noun. 
Compound nouns are not supported by treating nouns as adjectives, 
since adjectives can be modified by adverbs and it would be 
ungrammatical to say “the extremely player piano”. Hence Tala 
provides a comp link to construct compound nouns. A conjunction of 
nouns may be used syntactically in place of a noun. 
Examples: 
the whole grain very thin flat bread 
(bread 
 (wusage noun) 
 (det the) 
 (adj  
  (flat 
   (wusage adjective) 
   (adj 
    (thin (wusage adjective) 
     (adv very) 
     )))) 
 (comp 
  (grain (wusage noun) 
   (adj whole] 
 
the salt and pepper shakers 
(shaker (wusage noun) 
 (number plural) 
 (comp 
  (and (wusage c-conj) 
   (salt (wusage noun)) 
   (pepper (wusage noun)) 
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   )) 
 (det the] 
 
the picture Leo painted 
(picture 
 (wusage noun) 
     (det the) 
 (obj-of 
  (paint (wusage verb) 
   (tense past) (aspect perfect) 
   (subj  
    (Leo (wusage noun) 
     (naming proper] 
 
the artist painting the picture 
(artist (wusage noun) 
 (det the) 
 (subj-of 
  (paint (wusage verb) 
   (tense present) (aspect continuous) 
   (obj 
    (picture (wusage noun) 
     (det the)] 
Other information about a noun would be stored in the Tala lexicon 
or encyclopedic knowledge if necessary, e.g. whether the noun typically 
indicates someone of a particular gender. It does not appear such 
information needs to be stored within each Tala sentence using an 
English noun, though it could be added into the syntax if necessary, in 
future research. 
An infinitive may also be used syntactically as a noun, with syntax 
specified in the next section. The syntax for a gerund supports using 
present participles of verbs as nouns: 
<gerund> := 
 (<verb-word> ;a word defined in the lexicon as a verb 
  (usage noun) ;here being used as a noun,  
       ;in its participle form 
  (det <det>)? 
  (tense present) 
  (aspect continuous) 
  (number {singular | plural}) 
  (agreement-number {singular | plural}) 
  (agreement-person non-I) 
  <prep-link>* 
  <adjective>* 
  (comp {<noun>|<c-conj-noun>})? 
  <pointer-bind>? 
  ) 
This syntax allows specifying determiners, adjectives and creating 
compound expressions using gerunds, and plurality for a gerund as if it 
were a noun. Thus it could support a noun expression  like “the 
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trainer’s frequent runnings and occasional winnings of the Kentucky 
Derby”. Note: A sentence like “Eating this cake is easy” can be 
represented as the verb expression “Eating this cake” being the subject 
of the verb expression “is easy”, using syntax in the next section. 
5.3.3 Verbs 
The Tala syntax for  a verb is:  
<verb> := <infinitive> | 
  (<verb-word> ; a word defined in the Tala lexicon 
       ; as a verb 
     (wusage verb) 
     (tense {present | past | future}) 
     (subj-number {singular | plural})? 
     (subj-person {I | non-I})? 
     (passive)? 
     (aspect {simple | perfect | continuous})? 
     (modal <modal>)? 
     <prep-link>* 
     <adverb>* 
     (subj <verb-subj>)? 
     (obj <verb-obj>)? 
     (indirect-obj <verb-obj>)? 
     (subj-of <verb>+)? 
     (obj-of <verb>+)? 
     (sentence-class 
 {statement | question | exclamation | 
          imperative })? 
     (silent)? 
     (speechform <word>)? 
     (speechorder ovs)? 
          (wsense <pointer>)? ;viz. §3.6.1 
          (wreferent <pointer>)? ;viz. §3.6.1 
       <pointer-bind>? 
     ) 
   
  <verb-subj> := <verb-obj> :=  
  <noun>|<verb>|<adjective>|<conjunction> 
<modal> := can | may | would | should | could... 
Since the Tala syntax is essentially a dependency grammar, a verb 
will contain links to other nodes corresponding to a verb expression. 
Each link corresponds to one of the slots in the verb expression, as 
follows: 
• tense – indicates a present, past or future tense of the verb. 
• subj-number and subj-person – support English subject-verb 
agreement, according to the approach described by Hudson 
(1999). This is discussed in §5.3.12.2 below. 
• passive – if specified, indicates the verb is performed on the 
subject, rather than performed by the subject. If not specified, 
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the verb is performed by the subject, i.e. the voice is active by 
default. 
• aspect - If not specified, then simple by default.  
• modal – indicates uncertainty or conditionality of the verb.  
• noun-mod – supports compound verbs in which a noun 
describes a verb. 
• subj – indicates subject of the verb.  
• obj – indicates object of the verb.  
• indirect-obj – indicates indirect object of the verb. 
• subj-of – indicates the verb is the subject of another verb or 
verbs. 
• obj-of – indicates the verb is the object of another verb or 
verbs.  
• sentence-class – indicates whether the verb is a statement, 
question, exclamation, or imperative.  
The syntax allows adverb and preposition dependencies within a 
verb expression, as well as subject and object dependencies. A verb can 
be the object or subject of another verb. By choosing combinations of 
tense and aspect values, the Tala syntax can specify: 
• present simple – “see” 
• past simple – “saw” 
• future simple – “will see” 
• present perfect – “have seen” 
• past perfect – “had seen” 
• future perfect – “will have seen” 
• present continuous – “am seeing” 
• past continuous – “was seeing” 
• future continuous – “will be seeing” 
In English, auxiliary (helping) verbs are used to express most of 
these combinations, but the Tala syntax can represent them without 
auxiliary verbs. Use of a modal supports expressions such as: “may be 
seeing”. To represent the following combinations in Tala requires 
nesting of verb expressions as objects of auxiliary verbs: 
• present perfect continuous – “have been seeing” 
• past perfect continuous – “had been seeing” 
• future perfect continuous – “will have been seeing” 
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The syntax above can support several forms of compound verbs. For 
example, “started reading” can be represented with “reading” being the 
object of “started”. This could also support a ‘stretched verb’ like “get 
rid of X from Y”, with “rid” being a verb nested in “get” – conceptual 
processing is responsible for treating the stretched verb as a 
combination of two verbs. Similarly, phrasal verbs combining verbs 
plus prepositions are supported (examples from Wikipedia 65): 
They pick on Billy. 
Who is looking after the kids? 
They brought that up twice = They brought up that twice. 
You should think it over = You should think over it. 
In each of these cases, the preposition can be treated as dependent on 
the verb, without a prepositional object, and the verb can be treated as 
having a direct object (respectively Billy, the kids, that, and it). 
Conceptual processing is responsible for treating a phrasal verb as a 
combination of the verb and preposition (cf. §3.6.8’s discussion of 
prepositions), leveraging idiomatic information in the Tala lexicon or 
encyclopedic knowledge. Slightly more complex examples, again from 
Wikipedia, are: 
Who can put up with that? (put + up) + (with that) 
The other tanks were bearing down on my Panther.  
(bear + down) + (on Panther) 
They were really teeing off on me. (tee + off) + (on me) 
We loaded up on soda pop and chips.  
(load + up) + (on soda pop and chips) 
Susan has been sitting in for me. (sit + in) + (for me) 
These have a similar treatment in which a preposition without an 
object is dependent on a verb, and another preposition with an object is 
also dependent on the verb. In some of these examples, the first 
preposition could meaningfully have an object, e.g. “Susan has been 
sitting in the meetings for me” or “We loaded up our shopping cart 
with soda pop and chips”. The sentence “She is looking forward to a 
                                                          
65 In these pages, examples are quoted from Wikipedia according to 
their Creative Commons License (viz. 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/)  
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rest” is similar, except that forward is an adverb. 
A slot could be added into the verb syntax to support representing 
compound verbs in which nouns modify verbs, e.g. “We water and 
sand blasted the sculpture.” However, typically these might be 
expressed as hyphenated verbs, or as compound words like 
“sandblast”. Since this borders on morphology, it is left for future 
research. 
Some slots in a verb expression are used at present only to control 
the display of the expression in demonstration output (FlatEnglish): 
• silent – Allows specifying that the verb is not displayed, to 
support hidden/silent verbs in expressions, e.g. “He made 
Madison [to be] secretary of state.” 
• speechorder - By default is subject-verb-object, but allows 
specifying object-verb-subject. 
• speechform - Allows displaying a verb using a different word. 
For example the verb might be an internal primitive has-part 
and the speechform might be has. 
The sentence-class slot affects whether a sentence is displayed 
ending with “.”, “?”, or “!”, and also affects conceptual processing of a 
sentence, in the prototype demonstration. 
The Tala syntax for infinitive verbs is: 
  <infinitive> := 
 (to (wusage prep) 
  <bare-infinitive> 
  ) 
  <bare-infinitive> := 
 (<verb-word> 
  (usage verb) 
  (tense present) 
  (aspect simple) 
          (subj-number singular) 
          (subj-person non-I}) 
      <prep-link>* 
  <adverb>* 
          (wsense <pointer>)? ;viz. §3.6.1 
          (wreferent <pointer>)? ;viz. §3.6.1 
  <pointer-bind>? 
  ) 
This syntax for infinitives allows split infinitives (per Huddleston & 
Pullum, 2005, p.206), and would support a sentence like “To really be 
about to go to press is exciting.” (The “to” in an infinitive is sometimes 
described as a particle rather than a preposition, but Huddleston & 
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Pullum (2005, p.144) say that particles are prepositions “with one or two 
exceptions”.) 
5.3.4 Prepositions 
The Tala syntax for a preposition is: 
<prep-link> := 
  (<prep-word> ;a word defined in the Tala lexicon 
     ; as a preposition 
      (wusage prep)  
      <prep-object>? 
      <pointer-bind>? 
      <c-conj-prep>* ;viz. coordinating conjunctions, 
       ; §5.3.9.1 
      <prep-link>* 
      (wsense <pointer>)? ;viz. §§3.6.1, 3.6.8 
      (wreferent <pointer>)? ;viz. §§3.6.1, 3.6.8 
      ) 
<prep-word> := to | for | from | of | after | when | ... 
<prep-object> := <noun>|<verb>|<adjective>|<prep-link>
      
Examples: 
government of, by and for the people 
(government 
 (wusage noun) 
 (of (wusage prep) 
  (people 
   (wusage noun) 
   (det the) 
   (<- ?p) 
   ) 
  (and (wusage conj) 
   (by (wusage prep) ?p) 
   (for (wusage prep) ?p) 
   ] 
 
He went to London on Tuesday and Birmingham on Wednesday. 
(Hudson, 2010) 
(go (wusage verb)(tense past)(aspect perfect) 
 (subj he) 
 (to (wusage prep) 
  (London 
   (wusage noun) 
   (naming proper) 
   (on (wusage prep) 
    (Tuesday (wusage noun) (naming proper)) 
    )) 
  (and (wusage conj) 
   (to (wusage prep) 
    (Birmingham 
     (wusage noun) 
     (naming proper) 
     (on (wusage prep) 
    (Wednesday (wusage noun) 
         (naming proper] 





dressed in red 
(dress 
 (wusage verb) 
 (tense past) 
 (in (wusage prep) 
  (red 
   (wusage adj)] 
 
The curtain fell after the fat lady sang. 
(fall 
 (wusage verb) 
 (tense past) (aspect perfect) 
 (subj 
  (curtain (wusage noun) (det the)) 
  ) 
 (after (wusage prep) 
  (sang 
   (wusage verb) 
   (subj 
    (lady (wusage noun) 
     (det the) 
     (adj fat) 
     ] 
 
I bought it for you to wear. (Hudson, 2010) 
(buy (wusage verb) (tense past) (aspect perfect) 
 (subj I) 
 (obj  
  (it (wusage pronoun) 
   (<- ?o) 
   )) 
 (for (wusage prep) 
  (you (wusage pronoun) 
   (<-? s) 
   ) 
  (to (wear (wusage verb) 
    (subj ?s) 
    (obj ?o) 
    ] 
The object of a preposition is optional, at least for some prepositions, 
e.g. one can say “I put the key in the lock and left it in” (Hudson, 2010). 
A grammatical variant of the example just above is “I bought it for to 
wear”, an awkward but acceptable expression leaving unspecified who 
will wear the item. Here is a parsing of a sentence that further illustrates 
nested prepositions: 
He went out with his hat on because of the risk of sunburn 
although it rained. (Hudson, 2010) 
(went 
 (subj he) 
 (out (wusage prep)) 
 (with (usage prep) 
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  (hat (wusage noun) 
   (det his) 
   (on (wusage prep) 
    (because (wusage prep) 
     (of (wusage prep) 
      (risk (wusage noun) 
       (det the) 
       (of (wusage prep) 
           (sunburn  
          (wusage noun)) 
        ))))))) 
 (although (wusage prep) 
  (rain (wusage verb) 
   (tense past) (aspect perfect) 
   (subj it) 
   ] 
Hudson (2010) writes “some of the most highly regarded modern 
grammatical analyses treat most subordinating conjunctions” as 
prepositions. The approach taken in this thesis is to allow a word to be 
used as either a preposition or a subordinating conjunction, much as a 
word may be used as either a noun or verb. Thus we could use “if” as a 
preposition in “one if by land”, but use “if” in a subordinating / 
structured “if-then-else” conjunction in an executable concept (§5.3.9.2). 
Of course, the TalaMind approach is not dependent on this; Tala could 
accommodate other linguistic analyses. 
5.3.5 Pronouns 
The standard English pronouns may be used in place of nouns: 
 <pronoun> := <pron>|<pron-poss>|<pron-det>| 
    <pronoun-quest>|<pronoun-exp> 
 <pron> : = ({I | you | he | she | it | we | they …} 
 <pron-poss> : = ({mine | yours | his | hers | ours | theirs} 
 <pron-det> : = { this | these | those | that | any | some | 
      all } 
 <pronoun-quest> : = { who | why | how | when | where |  
       what | which} 
 <pronoun-exp> := 
    ({<pron>|<pron-poss>|<pron-det>|<pronoun-quest> 
    (wusage pronoun) 
    (number {singular | plural)? 
    (agreement-number {singular | plural})? 
    (agreement-person {I | non-I})? 
    {subjective | objective}? 
           (wsense <pointer>)? ;viz. §3.6.1 
           (wreferent <pointer>)? ;viz. §3.6.1 
                <pointer-bind>? 
    ) 
Agreement number and person are used to support inflections 
according to the approach described by Hudson (1999), discussed in 
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§5.3.12.2. Some determiners may be used by themselves as pronouns, 
e.g. “this”, “that”, etc. The syntax allows these to also be specified with 
agreement number and person to support inflections. However, this 
syntax takes a different approach from Hudson (2010), who argues that 
all determiners should be considered as pronouns. The above syntax 
also supports words that may be used as subordinating-conjunctions or 
as interrogative pronouns (e.g. “how”, “why”, “when”, “where”, etc.).  
5.3.6 Determiners 
The Tala syntax for determiners is: 
 <det> := <pure-det>|<n-det>|<pron-det>|<det-quest>| 
   <poss-pron-det>| <clitic-poss-det>|<nested-det> 
     
 <pure-det> : = {the | a | an | some | no} 
     <n-det> := <number> 
 <pron-det> : = { this | these | those | that | any | 
      some | all | each …} 
 <poss-pron-det> : = { my | your | his | her | its | their} 
 <det-quest> : = { what | which} 
     <clitic-poss-det> := 
  (“’s” 
   {<noun> | 
    (<c-conj> 
    <noun> 
    <noun>+ 
    ) 
    }) 
 <nested-det> := 
  (<det> 
   (det 
    {<det>|<nested-det>} 
    (of <wusage prep>)? 
    )) 
Some determiners may be used as pronouns as discussed in the 
previous section. Possessive pronouns are also determiners. Some 
determiners are interrogative (e.g. “what”, “which”). So we can 
represent expressions like: 
the box, or the boxes 
some box, or some boxes 
this box, or these boxes 
his box, or his boxes 
which box, or which boxes 
The potential for future support of number agreement in 
determiners and complements is discussed in §5.3.12.1. The syntax 
above allows numeric counts as determiners, though the syntax for 
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specifying numbers is open for definition. At a minimum it could 
include integer numbers (e.g. “35”), or it could include English number-
word strings, e.g. “thirty-five”. This is also left as a topic for future 
work. Thus at a minimum, one could have a Tala expression like: 
 five boxes 
 (box 
  (wusage noun) 
  (number plural) 
  (det 5) 
  ) 
The Tala syntax above supports the clitic “’s” for creating possessive 
determiners from nouns and compound nouns (cf. Hudson, 2010): 
John's house 
(house 
 (wusage noun) 
 (det 
  ('s (John (wusage noun) (naming proper))) 
  ] 
 
John and Mary's house 
(house 
 (wusage noun) 
 (det 
  ('s  
   (and (wusage c-conj) 
    (John (wusage noun) (naming proper)) 
    (Mary (wusage noun) (naming proper)) 
    ] 
 
the room and board's daily cost 
(cost (wusage noun) 
 (det 
  ('s 
   (and (wusage c-conj) 
    (room (wusage noun) (det the)) 
    (board (wusage noun)) 
    ))) 
 (adj daily) 
 ) 
There does not appear to be a need for Tala syntax to support the 
clitic “’s” as an abbreviation for the verb “is”. It could be added into the 
syntax if needed. 
Finally, the syntax above shows an initial rule for defining nested 
determiners. This could support an expression like: 
 some of John's 5 accounts 
 (accounts (wusage noun) (number plural) 
  (det 
   (5 
    (det 
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     ('s (John (wusage noun) (naming proper)) 
         (det (some 
        (of (wusage prep)] 
The syntax above does not prevent generating nonsense nested 
determiners, such as “the of 5 her boxes”. This is left as a topic for future 
work. 
5.3.7 Adjectives 
The Tala syntax for an adjective is:  
<adjective> := 
  (adj {<adj-word>|<gerundive>|<c-conj-adj>}) | 
  (adj (<adj-word> ;a word defined in the Tala lexicon 
     ;as an adjective 
      (wusage adj) 
      <adjective>* 
      <adverb>* 
      <prep-link>* 
     <pointer-bind>? 
      (wsense <pointer>)? ;viz. §3.6.1 
      (wreferent <pointer>)? ;viz. §3.6.1 
      ) 
<gerundive> :=  ;past or present participle gerundive 
  (<verb-word> ;a word defined in the lexicon as a verb 
       (wusage adj) ;here being used as an adjective,  
      ;in participle form 
     (tense {present | past}) 
     (aspect {simple | continuous})? 
     (passive)? 
     (agreement-number singular) 
    (agreement-person non-I) 
     <adjective>* 
     <adverb>* 
     <prep-link>* 
    <pointer-bind>? 
     (wsense <pointer>)? ;viz. §3.6.1 
     (wreferent <pointer>)? ;viz. §3.6.1 
    ) 
Examples using the above syntax for adjectives: 
good in coffee 
old and new books 
eating place 
the eaten meal 
rapidly best selling item 
easily changed in a hurry costume 
5.3.8 Adverbs 
The Tala syntax for usage of an adverb is:  
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<adverb> := 
  (adv {<adv-word>|<c-conj-adv>}) | 
  (adv 
       <adv-word> ;a word defined in the Tala lexicon 
               ;as an adverb 
      (wusage adv) 
      <adverb>* 
      <prep-link>* 
      <verb>* 
     <pointer-bind>? 
      (wsense <pointer>)? ;viz. §3.6.1 
      (wreferent <pointer>)? ;viz. §3.6.1 
      ) 
This syntax allows concatenating adverbs (e.g. “very rapidly”), using 
conjunctions of adverbs ( e.g. “quickly and efficiently”) and modifying 
an adverb with a preposition (“he travelled rapidly by his method of 
measurement”, “similarly to all purchases”, “happily for now”…). 
“Conjunctive adverbs” are used to relate multiple verbs: “The wind 
died, consequently we rowed the sailboat”. Conjunctive adverbs could 
also be treated as subordinating conjunctions in the Tala syntax 
(§5.3.9.2). 
5.3.9 Conjunctions 
The Tala syntax for conjunctions is: 
<conjunction> := <c-conj> | <s-conj> 
5.3.9.1 Coordinating Conjunctions 
The Tala syntax for a coordinating conjunction is:  
<c-conj> := <c-conj-noun>|<c-conj-verb>|<c-conj-adj>| 
   <c-conj-adv>| <c-conj-prep> 
<c-conj-word> := and | or  
<c-conj-noun> := (<c-conj-word> (wusage conj) 
       <noun>+ <pointer-bind?>) 
<c-conj-verb> := (<c-conj-word> (wusage conj)  
       <verb>+ <pointer-bind?>) 
<c-conj-adj> :=  
   (<c-conj-word> (wusage conj)  
    <adjective>+ <pointer-bind?>) 
<c-conj-adv> :=  
   (<c-conj-word> (wusage conj) 
    <adverb>+ <pointer-bind?>) 
<c-conj-prep> :=  
   (<c-conj-word> (wusage conj) 
    <prep-link>+ <pointer-bind?>) 
The following illustrates coordinating conjunctions with shared 
dependencies across multiple parents and dependents, extending an 
example from (Hudson, 2010): 
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He and she buy and sell old and new houses and flats quickly 
and efficiently in London on Mondays and Birmingham on 
Tuesdays. 
(and 
 (wusage conj) 
 (buy 
  (wusage verb) 
  (subj 
   (and (wusage conj) 
    (<- ?subjs) 
    (he (wusage pronoun)) 
    (she (wusage pronoun)))) 
  (obj 
   (and (wusage conj) 
    (<- ?objs) 
    (house 
     (wusage noun) 
     (number plural) 
     (adj 
      (<- ?adjs) 
      (and (wusage conj) 
       (old (wusage adj)) 
       (new (wusage adj)) 
       ))) 
    (flat 
     (wusage noun) 
     (number plural) 
     ?adjs))) 
  (adv 
   (<- ?advs) 
   (and (wusage conj) 
    (quickly (wusage adv)) 
    (efficiently (wusage adv)) 
    )) 
  (in 
   (<- ?inprep) 
               (wusage prep) 
   (and 
    (wusage conj) 
    (London (wusage noun) (naming proper) 
     (on (Monday wusage noun)  
         (naming proper)  
         (number plural)) 
      )) 
    (Birmingham (wusage noun)(naming proper)) 
     (on (Tuesday wusage noun)  
         (naming proper)  
         (number plural)) 
      ))))) 
 (sell (wusage verb) 
   (subj ?subjs) 
   (obj ?objs) 
   ?advs ?inprep] 
This represents a dependency grammar parsing of the example 
sentence. Conceptual processing would be responsible for creating 
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separate interpretations if needed, in which “on Mondays” modifies 
“buy and sell” in London and “on Tuesdays” modifies “buy and sell” in 
Birmingham. 
This example also illustrates the value of using pointers in Tala 
expressions, to maintain concision equivalent to English. The above 
example would be combinatorially larger if the use of Tala variables as 
pointers were not allowed. Using pointers, the Tala expression is 
isomorphic to a dependency parse tree for the English sentence, and in 
this sense it is as concise as English. This notion of equivalent concision 
could be expressed more precisely by saying that the Tala expression 
has size complexity O(n), where n is the size of a dependency parse tree 
for an English sentence. Note that the pointers in the Tala expression 
correspond to extra arcs representing shared dependencies in a 
dependency parse diagram. 66  Per the structurality requirement to 
represent syntax in Tala (§3.5.2), this kind of equivalent concision is the 
best we can do: to make Tala expressions as short as linear strings of 
English words, in effect identical to English in concision, would sacrifice 
representation of syntactic structure. 
5.3.9.2 Subordinating / Structured Conjunctions 
As noted in §5.3.4, some authors argue that most subordinating 
conjunctions should be treated as prepositions. The Tala syntax allows 
certain words to be used as either prepositions or subordinating 
conjunctions, much as some words may be used as either nouns or 
verbs. The reason for this is that certain words often used as 
subordinating conjunctions are important in representing executable 
concepts and, per §3.2.1, Tala has a theoretical requirement to provide 
the syntax of at least a simple programming language. Thus we could 
use “if” as a preposition in “one if by land”, but in Tala we wish to use 
“if” in an “if-then-else” expression in an executable concept. In this case, 
“if” is no longer a preposition dependent on a verb. Nor is “if” even 
necessarily subordinate to a verb, since it may be at the outermost level 
of a Tala sentence. Hence for our purposes it is more accurate to refer to 
such conjunctions as “structured” rather than subordinating. (Arguably, 
                                                          
66 It is more precise to say a Tala expression is homomorphic to a 
dependency parse tree for an English sentence, since the inverse 
mapping from the parse tree to Tala would not restore information in 
(wsense) and (wreferent) expressions. 
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the term ‘conjunction’ is not accurate either. It is kept since it is already 
accepted in linguistics for describing words that may be disjuncts.) The 
Tala syntax for structured conjunctions is: 
<s-conj> := 
   <if-then-else-conj>|<how-conj>|<why-conj>| 
   <when-conj>|<while-conj>|<until-conj>|<typical-s-conj> 
If, Then, Else 
This structured conjunction is used for conditional expressions in 
Tala executable concepts (xconcepts). The syntax is: 
<if-then-else-conj> := 
  (if 
     (wusage s-conj) 
     <test> 
    (then <verb>+)? 
     (else <verb>+)? 
    <pointer-bind>?  
     ) 
<test> := <verb>|<c-conj-verb> 
The <test> in this expression is evaluated by conceptual processing 
to determine if its verb expression exists in a context. If it does, then the 
(then …) expression is processed, otherwise the (else …) expression 
is. If multiple verbs occur inside a (then …) or (else …), they are 
processed sequentially when an xconcept is interpreted. The s-
conjunction (steps …) may be used to list a sequence of verbs that can 
be performed sequentially, without specifying if-then-else. (This is 
further discussed in §5.5.) 
How 
This structured conjunction is used to refer to how something 
happens, and optionally to describe the method for performing an 
action.    
<how-conj> := 
 (how 
  (wusage s-conj) 
      <verb>? 
     (method <verb>)? 
       <pointer-bind>? 
     ) 
 
 ;example: how can I make grain be food for people? 
 (how 
  (wusage s-conj) 
  (make 
   (wusage verb) 
   (subj ?self) 
   (modal can) 
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   (sentence-class question) 
   (obj 
    (be 
     (wusage verb) 
     (subj  
      (grain 
       (wusage noun) 
       )) 
     (obj  
      (food  
       (wusage noun) 
       (for 
        (people 
         (wusage noun) 
         ] 
Why 
This structured conjunction is used to refer to why something 




     (wusage s-conj) 
  <verb>? 
    (cause <verb>)? 
     (purpose <verb>)? 
    <pointer-bind>? 
     ) 
When 
This structured conjunction is used to refer to when a test is satisfied, 
and optionally to describe an action to perform at that time. 
<when-conj> := 
  (when 
     (wusage s-conj) 
     <test> 
     (do <verb>)? 
    <pointer-bind>? 
     ) 
While 
This structured conjunction is used to refer to the time period during 
which a test is satisfied, and optionally to describe an action to perform 
during this period. 
<while-conj> := 
  (while 
     (wusage s-conj) 
     <test> 
     (do <verb>)? 
    <pointer-bind>?) 
 
Design of Conceptual Language 
197 
Until 
This structured conjunction is used to refer to the time period before 
a test is satisfied, and optionally to describe an action to perform during 
this period. 
<until-conj> := 
  (until 
     (wusage s-conj) 
     <test> 
     (do <verb>)? 
    <pointer-bind>? 
     ) 
Other Subordinating Conjunctions 
The syntax of other subordinating conjunctions would be consistent 
with representing them as prepositions (though Huddleston & Pullum 








<word> := after | although | as | because | before |  
      once | since | than | that | though |  
     whether | so | which | … 
5.3.9.3 Correlative Conjunctions 
Correlative conjunctions are words used together as conjunctions, e.g.:  
“both … and”  
“either … or” 
“neither … nor” 
“not only … but also” 
Some of these could be treated as logically equivalent to 
coordinating conjunctions, while others could be represented as 
structured conjunctions. This is left as a topic for future work. 
5.3.10 Interjections 
Interjections are words that convey emotion, and may not be 
grammatically related to other parts of a sentence, e.g. “Wow, that’s 
amazing!” It would be straightforward to extend the Tala syntax to 
allow interjections to be added to verbs. This is left as a topic for future 
work. 
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5.3.11 Tala Variables and Pointers 
A Tala variable (<tala-var>) is any Scheme symbol that starts with 
“?” and has at least one other character, for example ?x. Tala variables 
are untyped in the prototype. The Tala syntax for a Tala variable to be 
bound to a Tala expression is: 
 <pointer-bind> := (“<-” <tala-var>) 
This syntax specifies that a Tala variable is bound to the expression 
containing the pointer-bind expression. Expressions like (<- ?x) occur 
throughout this thesis to illustrate use of pointers for concept 
representation in Tala. 
A Tala variable may also occur in Tala expressions in place of any of 
the following: <noun-word>, <verb-word>, <prep-word>, 
<pronoun>, <det>, <adj-word>, <adv-word>. This enables pattern-
matching logic to bind the variable to a corresponding word in a Tala 
expression. Section 5.5.3 provides further information on pattern-
matching in the prototype. 
5.3.12 Inflections 
Hudson (2010) writes that English has only two rules of agreement 
for inflections: a rule specifying that a determiner agrees in number 
with its complement noun, and a rule specifying subject-verb agreement 
for number and tense. Per §3.4.1, the grammar for Tala is non-
prescriptive: Tala allows sentences that have incorrect inflections 
because such sentences though ungrammatical are generated by people 
in the real world, and Tala should be able to represent how sentences 
are actually expressed. Even so, the Tala grammar should facilitate 
conceptual processing and representation of sentences that have 
grammatical inflections. The following pages describe how English 
rules of agreement for inflections can be supported in the Tala syntax. 
5.3.12.1 Determiner-Complement Agreement 
In the Tala syntax above, the number feature of a noun specifies 
whether its usage is singular or plural. The Tala lexicon could specify 
whether individual determiners indicate singular or plural number, as 
follows: 
the – singular | plural ;(the box | the boxes) 
a – singular ;(a box) 
this – singular ;(this box) 
these – plural ;(these boxes) 
… 
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This information could be used for conceptual processing and 
representation of sentences that have internal agreement between 
pronouns and complement nouns. This is a topic for future research, 
which in principle is supportable in the TalaMind architecture. 
5.3.12.2 Subject-Verb Agreement 
Hudson (1999) describes an approach for subject-verb agreement, 
writing “The solution will have three components: a system of features 
for subjects, another system of features for verbs, and a pair of 
agreement rules.” The Tala syntax specified in previous sections 
includes Hudson’s features for subjects and verbs. The features for 
subjects (nouns and pronouns) are agreement-number and agreement-
person. The features for verbs are subject-number and subject-
person. Hudson’s agreement rules are: 
1. A verb's subject-number is the same as its subject's 
agreement-number. If a verb has a subject-number, it must 
agree; but if not, the rule is irrelevant.  
2. A verb's subject-person is the same as its subject's 
agreement-person. This only applies to BE, because this is 
the only verb that has a subject-person; and it only makes 
a difference when the subject is I. 
The features number and agreement-number normally have the 
same value (i.e., singular or plural), but this default can be overridden: 
I always has singular number but plural agreement-number. 
You always has plural agreement-number regardless of its 
number.  
In addition, Hudson writes: 
“…it may also be overridden when the subject's meaning allows 
it … For example, although two drops has plural number, it has 
singular agreement-number, and set allows either singular or 
plural agreement-number. Unfortunately I cannot offer a formal 
account of the semantic condition ‘when the subject’s meaning 
allows it’, but the analysis does at least provide the formal 
machinery which is presupposed by such an account.” 
According to Hudson, the feature agreement-person “distinguishes 
I from other subjects (by the values I and non-I). In modern standard 
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English this is only relevant to the verb BE, i.e. the feature is not 
relevant for subjects of other verbs.” 
The feature subject-number applies only to present-tense non-
modal verbs and BE. The form was, for example, is lexically defined as 
having singular subject-number. Other verbs, such as past-tense verbs, 
simply have no subject-number. The feature subject-person applies 
only to the one verb, BE, and has just one task: to distinguish forms that 
combine with I (i.e. am and was) from the other forms. Following is an 
example of these rules: 
You were sneezing. 
(be 
 (wusage verb) 
 (tense past) 
 (subject-number plural) 
  ;must agree with subject agreement-number 
 (subject-person non-I) ;must agree with subject 
  ;tense, subject-number and subject-person 
  ;select 'were' 
 (subj 
  (you 
   (wusage pronoun) 
   (number singular) 
   (agreement-number plural)  
    ;always plural for you 
   (agreement-person non-I) 
   ) 
  ) 
 (obj 
  (sneeze 
   (wusage verb) 
   (aspect continuous) 
   ] 
The TalaMind approach is not restricted to Hudson's rules for 
subject-verb agreement. Tala could accommodate other linguistic 
analyses than the ones presented here. 67 
5.4 Design of Conceptual Framework 
5.4.1 Requirements for a Conceptual Framework 
Per §§3.2.2 and 3.6.7, following is a preliminary list of requirements 
for a TalaMind conceptual framework: 
• Store concepts representing definitions of words. 
                                                          
67 In some thesis examples and prototype code, forms like (subj-
person third-singular) are used instead, i.e. not following Hudson’s 
approach to subject-verb agreement. 
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• Store concepts representing natural language constructions. 
• Store concepts representing current goals and thoughts. 
• Store executable concepts, for conceptual processing. 
• Represent semantic domains, mental spaces, conceptual 
blends, encyclopedic and commonsense knowledge. 
• Represent a perceived / projected reality (§2.2.3) with 
perceptions of the environment (percepts), and actions in the 
environment (effepts). 
• Represent an “event-memory”, storing knowledge of 
previous events. 
• Represent interactive contexts and mutual knowledge. 
• Represent theories, problem contexts and composite 
contexts. 
• Represent hypothetical contexts and support nested 
conceptual simulation. 
The following sections describe how many of the above features 
have been implemented in the prototype TalaMind demonstration 
system, to a very limited extent necessary to support TalaMind 
simulations. Per §1.6, fully implementing all of them would be a long-
term research effort, involving teams of researchers. More requirements 
for conceptual frameworks will be identified in future research on the 
TalaMind approach. 
5.4.2 Structure of the Conceptual Framework 
The prototype required a specific design for a conceptual 
framework, relative to the above requirements. Yet the TalaMind 
approach does not mandate any particular implementation technology, 
nor any particular design for a conceptual framework. 
The above list may be viewed as a general requirement to manage 
Tala concepts in different ‘locations’ 68  within a data structure (or 
collection of data structures) and to support different kinds of 
                                                          
68 One could imagine a structure (such as a hologram or neural net) 
that did not put Tala concepts in different locations, if one wished to 
take a different approach. 
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conceptual processing in different locations.  For instance, one location 
could correspond to definitions of words, another to perceived reality, 
another to event-memory, etc. Precisely how such locations are 
represented and accessed is a design choice.  
When creating a prototype, it’s necessary to start somewhere and 
“put a stake in the ground”, recognizing that design choices may need 
to be revised later. So, it was important to choose a data structure that 
allows easily defining and representing locations for Tala concepts, and 
easily changing locations later, if needed. Also, per §3.5.2 the design 
choice in this thesis is to represent Tala concepts using Lisp list 
structures. A resulting design choice was to write the prototype in 
JScheme, a dialect of Lisp implemented in Java.69 These design choices 
made list data structures natural options to consider for the conceptual 
framework. Finally, there was not a requirement for the demonstration 
system to support external corpora or large concept bases, and so there 
was not a requirement for efficiency and scalability in the prototype 
framework. 
All of these considerations led the author to create a nested list of 
association lists, as the data structure for the prototype conceptual 
framework. This structure evolved during the prototype effort, as the 
author decided somewhat arbitrarily where to store different kinds of 
Tala concepts within the framework. Following is its current state: 
  (mind 
   (concepts 
    (words) 
    (xconcepts 
     (percepts) 
     (mpercepts) 
     (goals) 
     (constructs) 
     )) 
   (subagents general mu nu) 
   (contexts 
    (p-reality ;perceived / projected reality 
     (percepts) 
     (effepts) 
     (mpercepts 
      (general) 
      (mu) 
      (nu) 
      ) 
     (meffepts 
                                                          
69 Besides supporting Lisp list structures, this enabled running the 
demonstration as an applet for thesis advisors to view on the Web. 
Design of Conceptual Framework 
203 
      (general) 
      (mu) 
      (nu) 
      ) 
     (constructs 
      (general) 
      (mu) 
      (nu) 
      ) 
     (construct-buffer 
      (general) 
      (mu) 
      (nu) 
      ) 
     (concepts 
      (encyclopedia) 
      (goals) 
      (thoughts) 
          (mental-spaces) 
      ) 
     (current-domains) 
     (event-memory)      
     (scenarios) 
     (systems) 
     ] 
It is not claimed that this list structure is optimal or required for 
future use – it is just part of a prototype. Tala concepts are inserted into 
and retrieved from the above list structure, and maintained from one 
time interval to the next, during a TalaMind simulation. The following 
pages discuss elements of this list structure in more detail. 
There may be some advantages for use of list structures in future to 
represent portions of conceptual frameworks, for replication in nested 
conceptual processing: It was helpful in programming the prototype to 
have standard paths to concepts in different parts of the framework, 
which could be reused in nested conceptual simulation. Other portions 
of the framework, such as the Tala lexicon and encyclopedic knowledge, 
will need data structures such as hashtables to be scalable. 
5.4.3 Perceived Reality – Percepts and Effepts 
The (p-reality) slot stores a Tala agent’s concepts for its perceived 
reality. It is located at the path (mind contexts p-reality) in the 
conceptual framework. Within perceived reality, Tala concepts 
representing perceptions and actions are stored in the (percepts) and 
(effepts) slots, respectively. The (percepts) slot is updated in each 
time interval to contain an agent’s current perceptions. As a result of 
processing executable concepts an agent may update its (effepts) slot, 
indicating actions to be performed in the environment. 
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The prototype logic simulates a conceptual interface (§1.5, Figure 1-
1) to the environment by sending effepts created by a Tala agent to 
other agents or external systems (e.g. the grain system), where they are 
processed as percepts in the perceived realities of other agents or as 
input-actions to simpler, behavioral systems (§5.4.17). 
Since Tala concepts represent syntactic structure of natural language 
expressions, effepts can describe physical actions (“Ben pounds grain”) 
or speech acts communicating concepts to other agents (“Ben says Leo 
try this flat bread”). Throughout this thesis, the term speech act is used 
according to Austin’s (1962) description of a ‘total speech act’, which 
includes locutionary as well as pragmatic (illocutionary and 
perlocutionary) acts. Though some authors have used the term 
primarily referring to illocutionary acts, by default here it refers to 
locutionary acts, which may entail illocutionary or perlocutionary acts. 
Pragmatic aspects have been addressed by discussions of conceptual 
processing in contexts (§3.6.7), with abduction and encyclopedic 
knowledge. 
5.4.4 Subagents, Mpercepts and Meffepts 
The prototype TalaMind system includes a society of mind 
(§2.3.3.2.1) for subagents within each Tala agent. These subagents can 
process executable concepts and communicate with each other by 
exchanging Tala concepts. Additionally, subagents can create external 
effepts for a Tala agent, and process the percepts of a Tala agent. The 
prototype provides three subagents for each Tala agent. These are called 
mu, nu and general, prefixed by the name of the Tala agent, e.g. Ben-mu. 
When a Tala subagent transmits a Tala concept for processing by 
other Tala subagents, it effectively performs a mental speech act 
(“meffept”). The concept is received by other Tala subagents as a mental 
percept (“mpercept”). The TalaMind logic treats mpercepts and meffepts 
analogously to percepts and effepts: meffepts are transmitted to other 
subagents and received by them as mpercepts, just as effepts are 
transmitted to other Tala agents and external systems, and received by 
them as percepts or input-actions. Thus, the TalaMind prototype 
simulates self-talk (mental discourse) within a Tala agent. 
5.4.5 Tala Lexicon 
The (words) slot of the conceptual framework contains definitions 
of words, expressed in the Tala mentalese. It is located at the path (mind 
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concepts words) in the conceptual framework. For example, 
following is a definition of food: 
 (food 
  (wusage noun) 
  (subj-of 
   (means 
    (obj 
     (object 
      (det any) 
      (obj-of 
       (eat 
        (wusage verb) 
        (modal can) 
        (subj 
         (animal 
          (wusage noun) 
          (det an) 
          ] 
This definition says “food means any object that an animal can eat”. 
The definition could be improved, of course, but is adequate for the 
demonstration. For the prototype demonstration, several nouns and 
verbs are used effectively as primitive words, even though they could 
be given definitions in principle (cf. §3.6.8). 
The TalaMind logic interprets some verbs to provide various kinds 
of processing within the conceptual framework. For example, “think” 
corresponds to a mental speech act by a Tala subagent, which may be 
perceived by other Tala subagents within the same Tala agent. Such 
speech acts are asserted and found in the (thoughts) slot of the 
conceptual framework. “Want” corresponds to asserting a concept in 
the (goals) slot of the conceptual framework. 
5.4.6 Encyclopedic Knowledge and Semantic Domains 
The (encyclopedia) slot stores encyclopedic knowledge for a Tala 
agent. For the prototype, encyclopedic knowledge has been created by 
hand, containing concepts in a few semantic domains. It uses the 
following structure for each domain: 
 (<domain-name> ;typically a noun, but could be a phrase 
  (domain-matrix ;domains that this domain refers to  
            )  
  (concepts 
   ;mentalese sentences in the domain 
   ;includes a definition of the domain-name 
   )) 
This gives encyclopedic knowledge a structure similar to a 
conventional encyclopedia. For example, the prototype includes a 
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semantic domain for knowledge about nuts: 
 (nut 
  (domain-matrix plant) 
  (concepts 
   a nut is an edible seed inside an inedible shell. 
   to eat a nut a human must remove its 
    inedible shell. 
  humans can eat nuts removed from shells. 
   humans can remove shells from nuts by pounding nuts  
    because pounding breaks shells off nuts. 
   )) 
The prototype encyclopedic knowledge also includes small semantic 
domains for grain and people.  
5.4.7 Current Domains 
The (current-domains) slot stores Tala mentalese concepts 
representing current discourse domains for a Tala agent, to support 
semantic disambiguation. These concepts may be used as indexes into 
encyclopedic knowledge. 
5.4.8 Mental Spaces and Conceptual Blends 
The (mental-spaces) slot in the TalaMind conceptual framework 
holds mental spaces, which have the following structure: 
 (<space-number> ;unique # for this space 
  (space-type ;e.g. "blend" 
   ) 
  (elements ;Tala nouns in the space 
   ) 
  (concepts ;Tala mentalese concepts in the space 
   )) 
This gives mental spaces a structure similar to semantic domains in 
encyclopedic knowledge, but allows mental spaces to be created 
separately and hold concepts developed tentatively (viz. §3.6.7.8). 
Conceptual blends are mental spaces that are created by blending 
concepts from other mental spaces (viz. §3.6.7.9). 
5.4.9 Scenarios 
The (scenarios) slot is used for creating nested concept 
frameworks that allow simulation of imagined future scenarios, i.e. 
nested conceptual simulation (viz. §6.3.5.2). These can be nested 
arbitrarily deep. Since scenarios are nested concept frameworks, they 
include much more structure than mental spaces, as implemented in the 
prototype: Scenarios include nested copies of projected-reality, 
xconcepts, etc., to enable simulating a hypothetical reality inside a Tala 
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agent’s mind, including a Tala agent’s simulation of other Tala agent’s 
minds or its own mind in hypothetical situations. 
5.4.10 Thoughts 
Within the prototype, the verb “think” is used to refer to mental 
speech acts, and the demonstration can display sentences like “Ben 
thinks people need more food sources”. The (thoughts) slot in the 
TalaMind conceptual framework holds Tala concepts developed and 
communicated as mental speech acts by subagents (§5.4.4). These 
concepts are communicated between subagents by the prototype’s 
interpretation of the verb “think”, which stores them in the subagent’s 
(meffepts) slot and the agent’s (thoughts) slot, and then copies them 
to the (mpercepts) slots of other subagents. These concepts may be 
retrieved via pattern-matching from the (thoughts) slot, using think 
as a pattern-matching verb within executable concepts. 
Of course, the transmission of a thought does not determine what 
other thoughts it may engender, i.e. how other Tala subagents may 
process it and potentially respond with other thoughts. Likewise, 
interpreting the verb think to transmit a thought does not specify the 
conceptual processing that occurred in the creation of the thought – 
different forms of conceptual processing can occur to create Tala 
concepts before they are communicated by mental speech acts. 
5.4.11 Goals 
The (goals) slot stores the current goals of a Tala agent, within its 
perceived reality. In the TalaMind demonstration, a goal is a Tala 
conceptual structure using the verb “want”. The object of a goal is itself 
a Tala mentalese expression. For example, a goal might be: 
   (want 
    (wusage verb) 
    (subj ?self) 
    (obj 
     (examine 
      (wusage verb) 
      (subj ?self) 
      (obj  
       (grain 
        (wusage noun)] 
This goal says in effect “I want to examine grain”, though it does not 
use an infinitive. 
5.4.12 Executable Concepts 
The (xconcepts) slot in the conceptual framework stores executable 
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concepts. Within this slot, executable concepts are organized according 
to whether they match percepts, mpercepts, goals or support processing 
constructions. The design of executable concepts is discussed in §5.5.2. 
5.4.13 Tala Constructions and Metaphors 
The (constructs) slot stores Tala constructions (§3.6.3.13). The 
conceptual framework provides constructs and construct-buffer 
slots for processing concepts produced by using constructions, located 
at the following paths in the conceptual framework: 
(mind contexts p-reality constructs) 
(mind contexts p-reality construct-buffer) 
These slots support translating Tala mentalese concepts to and from 
different forms. The slots have substructure to support processing of 
constructions by subagents of a Tala agent. The demonstration 
illustrates semantic disambiguation of metaphors by automatic 
translation via constructions (viz. §3.6.7.9). 
5.4.14 Event-Memory 
The (event-memory) slot stores a Tala agent’s memory of percepts 
and effepts within perceived reality, for each timestep of a simulation. 
The prototype logic automatically updates this slot during a simulation, 
and supports a Tala agent searching its event-memory slot to recall 
events. Note: at present the prototype does not store a Tala agent’s 
memory of its subagent’s mpercepts and meffepts, nor trace information 
about the executable concepts that produced them. These could be 
added in future research, to study reflection about thought processes. 
5.4.15 Systems 
The (systems) slot stores a Tala agent’s concepts about other 
systems (agents and objects) within its perceived reality. Its main use in 
the prototype is to store an agent’s internal name for grain, so that it can 
be referred to as flour, dough, flatbread, or leavened bread, as it is 
gradually transformed during the demonstration. 
5.4.16 The Reserved Variable ?self  
For each Tala agent, the reserved variable ?self  is automatically 
bound to an internally unique identifier for itself, when the Tala agent is 
created. For the prototype simulations, this unique identifier is just the 
name of each Tala agent, i.e. Ben or Leo. Conceptual processing is 
responsible for translating Tala concepts using first-person singular 
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pronouns into Tala concepts with the appropriate binding. For example, 
if Ben perceives that Leo says “I want X”, then Ben’s conceptual 
processing should translate this into “Leo wants X” (or whatever 
internal identifier  or pointer value that Ben uses to refer to Leo). 
Constructions may be used to perform these translations (§5.5.4). 
5.4.17 Virtual Environment 
For the TalaMind prototype, a virtual environment is needed in 
which Tala agents can communicate with each other, and interact with 
other, simpler systems representing objects in the environment. The 
author’s strategy in creating the TalaMind demonstration was to 
minimize work on implementing a virtual environment, and to avoid 
simulating spatial perceptions, graphics display, etc. So, for the 
demonstration a virtual environment for Tala agents is represented very 
simply by a list structure, called the reality list structure. It contains a 
collection of list structures representing systems, which contain 
information for Tala agents and simpler behavioral systems such as 
objects that can change state: 
 (reality 
 (systems 
  (<system-id> ;a unique id for each system, 
       ;e.g. Ben or grain 
  (body) 
  (behavior 
   (input-actions) 
   (output-actions) 
   (transitions) ;xconcepts 
   (current-state) 
   (start-state) 
   (end-states)) 
  (mind 
   . . . 
   ) 
  )] 
The information for each system in the TalaMind reality list 
structure has potentially three substructures, called body, behavior, and 
mind: 
• The (mind) substructure is the conceptual framework of a Tala 
agent described in the preceding sections, §5.4.1 through 
§5.4.16. It stores Tala mentalese conceptual structures 
representing the mind of a Tala agent, i.e. an agent’s concepts 
about the environment, other agents and itself. 
• The (behavior) substructure of a system supports storing and 
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representing the behavior of a system expressed as a finite-state 
machine, using Tala mentalese conceptual expressions. So, the 
(behavior) substructure supports modeling systems external 
to Tala agents, which do not have the internal complexity of 
Tala agents.  
In the demonstration, this is used to represent the behavior of 
wheat grains as Ben performs actions that eventually transform 
wheat into bread, and Leo tastes the results. The slots for -
state information contain Tala mentalese expressions 
describing states of a system. The (transitions) slot contains 
Tala executable concepts for changing state and/or performing 
output-actions, in response to input-actions on a system. 
Both output and input actions are also represented as Tala 
mentalese expressions. So a system with only a (behavior) 
substructure is easily described and interfaced with systems 
that have (mind) substructures. During each timestep, the 
prototype processes interactions between the conceptual 
frameworks of Tala agents, and behaviors of simpler systems. 
• The (body) substructure of a system is a stub for future use, to 
represent the physical structure of a system in a form that could 
support display and simulation, separate from whatever is 
represented within a system’s (mind) or (behavior). The 
author expects (body) may eventually have a structure similar 
to a computer graphics scenegraph, to allow description and 
display of a hierarchical structure of three-dimensional graphics 
objects. This could eventually support a three-dimensional, 
graphical display of TalaMind systems interacting in a 
simulation. 
5.5 Design of Conceptual Processes 
5.5.1 TalaMind Control Flow 
Routines written in JScheme implement a control flow for conceptual 
processing in the TalaMind demonstration system. In each timestep of a 
simulation, the prototype logic performs conceptual processing for both 
Tala agents and their subagents, and for behaviors of systems external 
to Tala agents, by calling the following functions written in JScheme: 
processAgentEffepts 
process the effepts generated by each Tala agent, causing 
input actions to Tala behavioral systems, and generating 
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percepts by other Tala agents. 
 
processSystemsOutputActions 
process the output actions generated by Tala behavioral 
systems, generating percepts for Tala agents (and 




for each Tala behavioral system, process its behavior 
methods for input-actions it has received during this 
timestep, to change state, generate output actions, and 
create percepts for Tala agents. 
 
processAgentsTalaMinds 
for each Tala agent, perform processing of its (mind) 
substructure. 
In the function processAgentsTalaMinds, processing of a Tala 
agent’s (mind) substructure consists of iterating in a loop 70, 71 executing 
the following functions (written in JScheme) until no new Tala 
conceptual structures are created by interpretation of executable 












Following are pseudocode descriptions of the above functions: 
 processAgentPercepts 
  for each percept in (contexts reality percepts) 
   for each subagent in (mind subagents) 
    for each xconcept in  
      (concepts xconcepts percepts subagent) 
     if the xconcept matches the percept  
     then perform the xconcept 
 
 processAgentMeffepts 
                                                          
70  In a simulation, agents generate output in different timesteps 
because each agent is driven by percepts of events generated by the 
other agent in a previous timestep. 
71 Executable concepts may generate new effepts, new meffepts or 
new constructs in each loop iteration. 
72 This is a no-op after the first time through the loop, since an agent 
does not receive new percepts until the start of a timestep. 
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  for each subagent in (mind subagents) 
   for each meffept of the subagent 
    display flatenglish or concept structure 
    of the meffept 
    copy the meffept to mpercepts of all 
    other subagents 
   delete meffepts of the subagent 
 
 processAgentMpercepts 
  for each subagent in (mind subagents) 
   for each mpercept of the subagent 
    for each xconcept in  
      (concepts xconcepts mpercepts subagent) 
     if the xconcept matches the mpercept 
     then perform the xconcept 
   delete mpercepts of the subagent 
 
 updateAgentConstructs 
  for each subagent in (mind subagents) 
   move all concepts  
    from (mind contexts p-reality  
      construct-buffer subagent) 
    to (mind contexts p-reality  
      constructs subagent) 
 
 processAgentConstructs 
  for each subagent in (mind subagents) 
   for each concept in  
     (mind contexts p-reality constructs subagent) 
    for each xconcept in  
      (mind concepts xconcepts  
       constructs subagent) 
     if the xconcept matches the construct 
     then perform the xconcept 
   delete concepts from (mind contexts p-reality 
         constructs subagent) 
  
 processAgentProcesses 
  for each process saved from a previous time-interval 
   if its do-condition and wait-condition  
     are satisfied 
    then resume the process after the point  
     it was suspended 
 
 processAgentGoals 
  for each goal in (concepts goals) not already  
    in-process or processed 
   determine if the goal has been satisfied 
    (i.e. if its object exists where specified 
     by the goal, where this is determined 
     by pattern matching candidate 
     concepts with goal-obj) 
   if the goal has been satisfied, then mark it 
    as processed 
    (so that it will be automatically removed) 
   else  
    if the object of the goal is to  
      know-definition of something  
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     (i.e. to pattern-match a  
      (know-definition ...) concept at  
      (concepts thoughts)) 
    then  
     call (getDefinition goal-obj ...) 
     ProcessXconceptsForGoal goal) 
     Mark the goal as processed 
    else call (ProcessXconceptsForGoal goal) 
  
 getDefinition goal-obj 
  (goal-obj is of form (know-definition ... (obj ...)), 
   where the obj of know-definition is a Tala  
   concept sentence.) 
   
  if the goal-obj has not previously checked 
   then call (hasTalaDefinitions?  
       know-definition-obj ...) 
    this will create a list of undefined words in  
    know-definition-obj 
      
    for each undefined word, create a new goal,  
     to have a definition for the word 
        (the agent has an xconcept to ask for  
     word definitions, to satisfy these goals) 
      
 ProcessXconceptsForGoal goal 
  for each xconcept at (concepts xconcepts) 
   if the xconcept subject matches the goal 
    then interpret the xconcept  
     (assert the xconcept's object) 
     (this may cause a new goal or 
      a new xconcept to be created) 
 
In the prototype, the above control flow is performed by a single-
threaded, sequential JScheme process running in Java. Thus, Tala agents 
are processed sequentially in each timestep, and Tala subagents are 
processed sequentially for each Tala agent. As the structure of the 
prototype conceptual framework indicates (§5.4.2), a Tala agent’s 
subagents each have access to all its executable concepts, percepts, 
goals, encyclopedic knowledge, etc. Tala subagents have individual 
mpercepts, meffepts, and concepts produced by using constructions 
(§§5.4.13, 5.5.4). In a more full and scalable design of a TalaMind 
architecture, it would be natural to use multi-threaded, parallel 
processing, and for Tala subagents to have other individual concepts 
and xconcepts, supporting a society of mind (§2.3.3.2.1). These are 
topics intended for future research. 
5.5.2 Design of Executable Concepts 
Extending the discussion in §3.2.1, we can identify several 
requirements for the design of executable concepts relative to the 
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TalaMind architecture for the prototype: An executable concept should 
be able to describe steps to perform that may include external actions 
and speech acts (effepts), internal mental actions and speech acts 
(meffepts), and assertions or deletions of concepts in the conceptual 
framework, including creation and modification of other executable 
concepts. An executable concept should be able to specify conditions 
that may include tests on percepts, goals, finding concepts within the 
conceptual framework, etc. The design of executable concepts for the 
demonstration system provides these features via the following design 
elements: 
 Use of structured conjunctions (if, then, else, steps, 
while, until) to provide syntax for conditional and 
iterative control expressions in Tala executable concepts. 
 Use of do and wait to specify an executable concept should 
operate or pause and resume across time-intervals of a 
TalaMind simulation. 
 Use of the structured conjunction how to support defining an 
executable concept as the method to be executed in 
performing a verb. 
 Use of  and, or, not  to support specifying and testing 
conditions. 
 Use of pattern-matching logic to locate and bind variables to 
(parts of) concepts in the conceptual framework based on 
partial specifications. 
 Use of the verb insert-step with prepositions into and 
after to support modifying executable concepts, by adding 
a new step before or after other steps in the xconcept. 
 Use of verbs think, say, want 73  to support creation of 
internal and external speech acts, and goals, respectively, 
                                                          
73  say, think, and want are verbs interpreted specifically in the 
design of the prototype, for support of speech acts (effepts), mental 
speech acts (meffepts), and goals. Other verbs (e.g. decide, infer or plan) 
could have specific interpretations in future designs of TalaMind 
architecture. 
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and to support matching previously created / perceived 
speech acts and goals, within the conceptual framework. 
For example, during part of the discovery of bread simulation a Tala 
executable concept with the following pseudocode description is 
processed across multiple time-intervals: 
   do 
  steps 
     think how can I make ?x softer 
     random-affect ?x 
     examine ?x 
     wait until perceive ?x 
     try to eat ?x 
     wait until perceive ?x 
  until 
     or 
    I think ?x is soft 
    and 
       I think ?x is a ?adjective ?substance 
       I think ?adjective means soft 
    I think ?x is a ruined mess 
The prototype TalaMind logic supports defining an executable 
concept as the ‘how’ method of a verb. When the verb random-affect 
is processed its definition is looked up in the lexicon, and a Tala 
xconcept with the following pseudocode description is found and 
executed: 
  random-affect ?x 
     means 
   affect ?x  
      adv randomly 
      how 
                     method 
     random-xor-execute 
         mash ?x 
         pound ?x 
         soak ?x in water 
         mix ?x in water 
The Tala primitive verb random-xor-execute randomly chooses one 
of the verbs within its scope, and executes it. Thus, random-affect 
results in a random action on ?x. In the demo, ?x is bound to grain. The 
prototype TalaMind logic transfers the random action (effept) to the 
finite-state behavior model of grain, which may cause grain to change 
state. The introduction of a random-choice verb provides a basic feature 
needed for demonstrations that do not follow a single, predefined flow. 
If a verb does not have a ‘how’ method defined in the lexicon, and it 
is not predefined as a Tala primitive verb, then it is treated by default as 
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an effept, i.e. an action to be transmitted to the object of the verb. Thus 
mash, soak, pound, mix are treated as effepts by default, and 
transmitted as input actions to the finite-state behavior model of grain. 
Tala may be considered a universal programming language. To be 
universal, a programming language need provide only three basic 
control structure mechanisms:  
• Sequential execution of one statement followed by another. 
• Conditional execution of one statement or another, based on 
the value of a Boolean variable. 
• Iterative execution of statements, until a Boolean variable is 
true.  
This result is generally attributed to Bohm & Jacopini (1966); see 
Harel (1980) for a detailed history, and Fleck (2001, pp.115-119) for a 
concise treatment, based on Knuth & Floyd (1971). 
The ability to define an executable concept as the ‘how’ method of a 
verb provides a means of abstraction in Tala, allowing complex 
behaviors to be named and accessed as units. Tala provides operations 
to create and modify concepts within the conceptual framework, using 
variables bound by pattern-matching. 
Since executable concepts are written in the same syntax as other 
Tala concepts, they can pattern-match and process other executable 
concepts, in addition to ordinary, non-executable Tala concepts. 
An xconcept can operate across multiple levels of the conceptual 
framework for a Tala agent. For example, an xconcept might match a 
concept in (contexts reality percepts) while the method might 
match or assert concepts in (contexts reality concepts thoughts) 
or in a nested scenario context. 
Xconcept-based inference (using if-then-else expressions) can 
operate directly on natural-language based conceptual structures, 
without use of other logical formalisms. 
5.5.3 Pattern Matching 
Per §3.6.6, Tala’s use of nested list structures to represent syntactic 
structures facilitates pattern-matching of Tala sentences, which 
combined with a syntax for variables in Tala, and representation of 
inference rules as if-then sentences, enables the mechanics of logical 
inference. For the prototype demonstration system, the author designed 
and implemented pattern-matching logic in JScheme so that a Tala 
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variable can match anything in a multi-level Tala conceptual structure. 
Variable bindings are then used to instantiate the conceptual structures 
asserted by Tala executable concepts. The Tala pattern matcher is 
flexible in matching concepts even if attributes (slots) are specified in a 
different order from a pattern, and will match a concept that has more 
attributes than those specified by a pattern. 
The demonstration system supports an unlimited number of Tala 
variables, which are created and bound dynamically only as needed for 
each Tala executable concept. A Java hashtable supports accessing 
variable bindings associated with each process instance of a Tala 
executable concept. This supports an executable concept running as a 
process across multiple Tala time intervals. 
The system also supports binding Tala variables to the sequence 
numbers of nested contexts, so that these can be referenced in Tala 
concepts. This enables the following output in the farmer’s dilemma 
simulation: 
1...2   Leo thinks scenario 1.1 is a win-win. 
For the demonstration system, this author’s priority in writing the 
pattern matcher has been to achieve flexibility very quickly, to match 
arbitrarily nested conceptual structures, without concern for efficiency 
of pattern matching. Improving efficiency is a topic for future research. 
At present it is not a problem that limits human observation of the 
simulations. 
5.5.4 Tala Constructions 
Tala constructions (viz. §3.6.3.13) are implemented as executable 
concepts in the TalaMind demonstration system using a primitive verb 
subformtrans. An example occurs in the discovery of bread story, 
where Ben generates an internal speech act (meffept) that the system 
displays as: 
Ben thinks humans perhaps must remove shells from grains to 
eat grains.. 
In this sentence, the preposition “to” indicates a temporal 
precedence relationship, between removing shells and eating nuts. This 
is translated using the construction: 
 (subformtrans 
  (wusage verb) 
  (subj 
   (?do1 
    (wusage verb) 
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    (modal must) 
    (subj ?c-subj) 
    (prep 
     (to 
      (?do2 
       (wusage verb) 
       ))))) 
  (obj 
   ;do1 must precede do2  
   (precede 
    (wusage verb) 
    (modal must) 
    (subj 
     (?do1 
      (wusage verb) 
      (subj ?c-subj) 
      ) 
     ) 
    (obj 
     (?do2 
      (wusage verb) 
      (subj ?c-subj) 
      ]   
The subject pattern of this construction matches Ben’s sentence 
(binding ?do1 to “remove”, ?do2 to “eat”, and ?c-subj to “humans”) 
and produces the object pattern as the translation. In doing this, it 
automatically copies information not specified in the subject pattern 
(e.g. “shells”, “grains”, and the prepositional phrase “from grains”) into 
appropriate locations for instantiation of the object pattern. So, these 
may be considered as “underspecified constructions”. 
The conventions followed for automatic copying are: 
• Information found in a concept matched by a construction’s 
subject but not specified in the construction’s subject, is 
copied to the construction’s object by default. 
• Information specified in the subject of a construction is kept 
in the construction’s object only if specified in the 
construction’s object. 
A Tala grammatical construction can be matched at any location 
within a Tala concept. Thus, Ben’s sentence above has an outer level 
“Ben thinks …”. The construction pattern-matching recurses within 
Ben’s sentence to match “humans must remove shells …”, and performs 
replacement within the construct generated, at the location where the 
construction was matched. So, the output generated by the construction 
is: 
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(Ben translates as) Ben thinks humans remove shells  
 from nuts must precede humans eat nuts. 
Hence, Tala grammatical constructions are composable: Multiple 
constructions can perform translations in combination, on different 
parts of a Tala concept. 
The subformtrans construction produces output concepts that go 
into a Tala subagent’s construct-buffer, which may be processed by 
other xconcepts or constructions. The author also implemented a 
construction called subformtransthink which uses the same logic to 
produce meffepts (mental actions) for a Tala subagent. This can support 
generation of concise metaphorical expressions as internal speech acts, 
which xconcepts can output as physical speech acts to other Tala agents. 
The demonstration system’s representation and processing of Tala 
grammatical constructions is fairly general in some respects, though 
more work remains for the future. As with semantic disambiguation in 
general, the goal has been to show one way that constructions could be 
supported within the TalaMind approach, without claiming a 
completely general method or solution at this point. 
The generality of constructions is based on several characteristics: 
 Both the subject and object of a construction may be 
arbitrarily simple or complex Tala mentalese conceptual 
structure patterns. 
 Tala variables may appear anywhere within a construction 
subject or object, and be bound to arbitrarily simple or 
complex structures. 
 A constructions’ subject pattern can be matched anywhere 
within a Tala mentalese expression, and replaced at that 
location by the instantiated object pattern.  
 Constructions are composable: they may be used in 
combination with each other to transform different subforms 
of a Tala mentalese expression. 
 Constructions are underspecified: Arbitrarily simple or 
complex conceptual structures not specified in a 
construction are processed according to a simple convention. 
This generality is illustrated by how constructions are used in 
several steps of the demo: 
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To translate “turn X into Y” as meaning “make X be Y”. 
To translate “turn over X to Y” as meaning “give X to Y”. 
To translate “must X to Y” as meaning “X must precede Y”. 
To translate “kick in X” as meaning “give X to me”. 
To translate “me” into a reference to the agent making an 
utterance. 
To translate “you” into a reference to the agent perceiving an 
utterance. 
However, these examples also indicate some important limitations in 
how Tala constructions are currently implemented. In several cases 
there are exceptions when these constructions do not apply, and 
mechanisms are not yet implemented to handle such exceptions. Thus, 
“turn X into Y” may be used in situations that are not metaphorical, 
where “turn” refers literally to a change of physical orientation: 
“turn the car into the driveway” 
“turn the boat into the wind” 
We would not wish74  to translate these instances as: 
“make the car be the driveway” 
“make the boat be the wind” 
One way to implement such conditionality would be to support 
processing of “suchthat” expressions, which would restrict application 
of constructions, along the following lines: 
   (subformtrans 
  (wusage verb) 
  (subj 
   (turn 
    (wusage verb) 
    (subj (?s (wusage noun))) 
    (obj (?x (wusage noun))) 
    (into (?y (wusage noun))) 
    (suchthat 
     ;?x does not normally change 
     ;physical orientation relative 
     ;to ?y 
                                                          
74  Though such metaphorical mistakes could be interesting as a 
source of new ideas… 
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     ))) 
  (obj 
   (make 
    (wusage verb) 
    (subj (?s (wusage noun))) 
    (obj 
     (be 
      (wusage verb) 
      (subj (?x (wusage noun))) 
      (obj (?y (wusage noun))) 
      ] 
The author has not implemented “suchthat”, because the present 
storyline does not cover enough different semantic domains to show 
these conditions positively: implementing “suchthat” would not change 
the current “discovery of bread” storyline.  
Similar limitations of current Tala construction logic are apparent in 
comparison to discussions given by other researchers. Constructions 
could be integrated with nested conceptual simulation, to support 
semantic disambiguation -- viz. Tyler and Evans (2003) discussion of 
semantic disambiguation for the preposition “over”. More work could 
be done to demonstrate the “evokes” characteristic of Embodied 
Construction Grammar, i.e. “the fact that a word or concept will often 
activate other related concepts” (Feldman, 2006, p. 289). 
It appears the most general way to implement semantic 
disambiguation for constructions would be to fully implement 
conceptual blends (§3.6.7.9). A partial implementation of conceptual 
blends in the TalaMind framework is described later. 
In principle such limitations in subformtrans may also be addressed 
in more general executable concepts, which can have arbitrarily 
complex logic, use nested conceptual simulation, and assert multiple 
concepts into the conceptual framework. Since Tala xconcepts match 
and assert natural-language based conceptual structures, and since Tala 
uses natural language-based conceptual structures to represent 
semantics, it follows that Tala executable concepts (xconcepts) are also 
in effect cognitive linguistics ‘constructions’: pairings of natural 
language forms with natural language semantics. 
5.5.5 Tala Processing of Goals 
The TalaMind prototype logic supports dynamic creation of goals 
and pattern-matching of goals with xconcepts, and automatically 
detects when goals have been satisfied. The logic also automatically 
deletes goals that have been satisfied and prevents attempting to 
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process goals that are already being processed by other xconcepts. 
However the logic does not automatically propagate satisfaction 
between goals, nor automatically retract goals if they are no longer 
needed. Per §1.6, this functionality was not implemented in the 
prototype, since it has been well-studied in previous research. It could 
be an enhancement in a future version of the system. 
5.6 Design of User Interface 
The TalaMind prototype demonstration is written using JScheme in 
a Java applet, so that simulations can be run by thesis reviewers using a 
Web browser that supports Java. 
5.6.1 Design of the TalaMind Applet 
When the user initially views the TalaMind applet, the following 






    During a TalaMind simulation, text is displayed showing concepts 
developed and communicated by Tala agents, and events that happen 
in the TalaMind environment. These are displayed as English sentences, 
with an option to view them as Tala concept list structures.  
Figure 5-1  Initial Display of TalaMind Applet 
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Following is output produced by running the TalaMind simulation: 
 
Figure 5-2  Output of a TalaMind Simulation 
 
The buttons on the left side of the applet have the following func-
tions: 
>  run simulation 
|| pause simulation 
+  step simulation one time interval 
|< return to start of simulation, or go to previous simulation 
>| advance to next simulation 
* toggle output between English and Tala concept display 
T display Tala concept framework 
? displays the above help information. 
By default, the TalaMind applet runs the discovery of bread 
simulation. The |< and >| buttons allow running earlier versions of the 
simulation, and the farmer’s dilemma simulation. 
Using * to toggle the output to show Tala concepts will produce the 
following output for a simulation (Figure 5-3): 
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Figure 5-3  Tala Concepts Created During a Simulation 
The T button displays concepts in the TalaMind framework. Its 
default setting is to display all percept xconcepts for Ben: 
 
Figure 5-4  Display of Ben's Percept Xconcepts 
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In addition to printing information about the other buttons, the help 
button ? also prints information about TalaMind applet commands: 
(sa)         show subagents in mental speech acts 
(sc)         show construction processing 
(sx)         prettyprint xconcepts when processed 
(dl n)      set debug level to n (default is 0) 
(show '(path))     show Tala concept framework at path 
Just above the center area of the applet is a text input field, for 
optional use to enter these commands. It supports evaluation of Scheme 
expressions entered by hand, for which evaluation results are displayed 
in the text display field. If the user enters (show '(reality)) in the 
text input field, the system will pretty-print all the concepts for Tala 
agents in the TalaMind environment. The path specified in a (show …) 
command will then be re-used by the T button.  
If the user types both the (sa) and (sc) commands, then the system 
will display output looking like this: 
 
 
Figure 5-5  Display of Subagent and Construction Processing 
The (sa) command displays the names of subagents (mu, nu, and 
general) producing internal speech acts within the storyline. 
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Using the (sc) command, additional steps will be displayed with 
prefixes of the form (Ben translates as) to show construction 
processing of Tala mentalese expressions. The source expression may be 
either a percept or mental percept (internal speech act), or a construct 
from a previous translation. Constructions operate in combination to 
perform different kinds of disambiguation. For example, some 
constructions translate metaphorical expressions, others translate 
personal pronouns (disambiguating “you” and “me” in separate steps), 
etc. 
If the user types (sx) the system will prettyprint xconcepts when 
they are executed during the demonstration, as shown in Figure 5-6. 
 
Figure 5-6  Display of Xconcept Execution During a Simulation 
 
5.6.2 FlatEnglish Display 
To make a TalaMind simulation easily understandable to people, the 
demonstration system uses logic (called FlatEnglish) written in JScheme 
to translate Tala conceptual structures into English sentences for display 






 (ask  
  (wusage verb) (tense present) 
  (subj Leo)  
  (indirect-obj Ben) 
  (obj  
   (turn  
    (wusage verb)  
    (modal can)  
    (sentence-class question)  
    (subj you)  
    (obj  
     (grain  
      (current-name grain)  
      (wusage noun) 
      )) 
    (into  
     (fare (wusage noun)  
      (for  
       (people (wusage noun)) 
        )))))  
  (subj-person third-singular] 
is translated by FlatEnglish logic into the text string:  
Leo asks Ben can you turn grain into fare for people? 
FlatEnglish is used throughout the demonstration to display speech 
acts between Tala agents, as well as to display actions performed by 
agents, internal speech acts by agents, etc. However, all communication 
between Tala agents (and within a Tala agent) is actually performed 
using Tala concept structures.  
FlatEnglish may be considered as a demonstration that in principle 
Tala concept structures can be translated into written text and used for 
speech generation. Its use enables the TalaMind demonstration to focus 
on concept processing, rather than natural language parsing or 
generation. 
5.7 Summary 
This chapter presented a design for a prototype demonstration 
system, in accordance with the analysis of Chapter 3. The design for the 
syntax of the Tala conceptual language is fairly general and flexible, 
addressing issues such as compound nouns, gerunds, compound verbs, 
verb tense, aspect and voice, nested prepositions, clitic possessive 
determiners, gerundive adjectives, shared dependencies, coordinating 
and subordinating / structured conjunctions, subject-verb agreement, 
etc. This coverage indicates a Tala syntax could be comprehensive for 
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English, though developing such a comprehensive syntax is a large 
effort that could occupy multiple researchers. 
The design for a prototype conceptual framework includes 
representations of perceived reality, subagents, a Tala lexicon, 
encyclopedic knowledge, mental spaces and conceptual blends, 
scenarios for nested conceptual simulation, executable concepts, 
grammatical constructions, and event memory. The design for 
prototype conceptual processes includes interpretation of executable 
concepts with pattern-matching, variable binding, conditional and 
iterative expressions, transmission of mental speech acts between 
subagents, nested conceptual simulation, conceptual blending, and 
composable interpretation of grammatical constructions.  
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6. Demonstration 
By consequence, or train of thoughts, I understand that 
succession of one thought to another which is called, to 
distinguish it from discourse in words, mental 
discourse. When a man thinketh on anything 
whatsoever, his next thought after is not altogether so 
casual as it seems to be. Not every thought to every 
thought succeeds indifferently...In sum, the discourse of 
the mind, when it is governed by design, is nothing but 
seeking, or the faculty of invention... a hunting out of 
the causes, of some effect, present or past; or of the 
effects, of some present or past cause… 
~ Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, 1651 75 
 
6.1 Overview 
The previous chapter presented the design of the TalaMind 
prototype demonstration system. This chapter discusses the execution 
of the demonstration system. It first presents the content of the 
simulations produced by running the system, and then discusses how 
these simulations illustrate that the TalaMind approach can potentially 
support the higher-level mentalities of human-level intelligence. 
Appendix B gives a step by step description of processing within the 
system, for one of the demonstration simulations. 
As noted previously, per §1.6 the prototype system cannot be 
claimed to actually achieve the higher-level mentalities of human-level 
intelligence, it can only illustrate how they may eventually be achieved. 
This use of illustration as a limited form of demonstration is similar to 
how a drawing may illustrate a fully operational machine. A drawing 
may outline the shape and structure of a machine, and describe its 
operation without providing all the details needed to construct the 
machine. In the same way, the prototype simulations use functioning 
code for conceptual processing to show how higher-level mentalities 
could potentially be supported, though without encyclopedic and 
                                                          
75  As quoted by William James in The Principles of Psychology, I, 
pp.395-396, 1890. Hobbes’ original spelling and capitalization were very 
different, e.g. ‘train’ was spelled ‘trayne’. 
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commonsense knowledge in a scalable, efficient architecture. These are 
needed to achieve human-level AI and are topics for the future, to 
leverage research in areas previously studied by others (viz. §§1.6, 7.7). 
6.2 Demonstration Content 
Per §5.2, the demonstration system is a functional prototype in 
which two Tala agents, named Ben and Leo, interact in a simulated 
environment. Each Tala agent has its own TalaMind conceptual 
framework and conceptual processes. To the human observer, a 
simulation is displayed as a sequence of English sentences, in effect a 
story, describing interactions between Ben and Leo, their actions and 
percepts in the environment, and their thoughts. The story that is 
simulated depends on the initial concepts that Ben and Leo have, their 
initial percepts of the simulated environment, and how their executable 
concepts process their perceptions to generate goals and actions, leading 
to further perceptions and actions at subsequent steps of the story. For 
the thesis demonstration, two stories have been simulated in which Ben 
is a cook and Leo is a farmer. The first is a story in which Ben and Leo 
discover how to make bread. The second is a story in which Ben and 
Leo agree to an exchange of wheat for bread, and then perform the 
exchange. 
6.2.1 The Discovery of Bread Story Simulation 
Initially in this story, neither Ben nor Leo know how to make bread, 
nor even what bread is, nor that such a thing as bread exists. We may 
imagine Leo is an ancient farmer who raises goats and grows wheat 
grasses for the goats to eat, but does not yet know how to eat wheat 
himself. Ben is an ancient food and drink maker, who knows about 
cooking meat and making beer, presumably from fermented wheat 
grass. 
The discovery of bread simulation includes output from a 
pseudorandom ‘discovery loop’: After removing shells from grain Ben 
performs a random sequence of actions to make grain softer for eating. 
This eventually results either in the discovery of dough, or in making 
grain a “ruined mess”. In the first case, Ben proceeds to discover how to 
make flat bread, and then leavened bread. In the second case, he says 
the problem is too difficult, and gives up. Following is an example of 




Initialized Discovery of Bread simulation. 
1...1   Leo has excess grain. 
1...1   Leo thinks Leo has excess grain. 
1...2   Leo tries to eat grain. 
1...3   Leo wants Ben to make edible grain. 
1...4   Leo says grain is not edible because grain is too hard. 
1...4   Leo asks Ben can you turn grain into fare for people?. 
1...4   Ben thinks Leo says grain is not food for people. 
1...4   Ben thinks Leo asks can Ben turn grain into food 
   for people?. 
1...4   Ben thinks why should Ben make grain be food for  
        people?. 
1...4   Ben thinks people need more food sources. 
1...4   Ben thinks if Ben feasibly can make grain be food for  
        people then Ben should make grain be food for people. 
1...4   Ben wants Ben to know whether humans perhaps can   
        eat grain.. 
1...4   Ben wants Ben to know how Ben can make grain be food 
        for people. 
1...4   Ben wants Ben to experiment with grain. 
1...4   Ben wants Ben to examine grain. 
1...5   Ben asks can you turn over some to me for experiments?. 
1...5   Leo thinks Ben asks can Leo turn over some grain to 
        me for experiments?. 
1...5   Leo thinks Ben asks can Leo turn over some grain to  
        Ben for experiments?. 
1...6   Leo gives some grain to Ben. 
1...7   Ben examines grain. 
1...8   Ben thinks wheat grains resemble nuts. 
1...8   Ben imagines an analogy from nuts to grain focused  
        on food for people. 
1...8   Ben thinks grain perhaps is an edible seed inside 
        an inedible shell. 
1...8   Ben thinks humans perhaps must remove shells from 
        grains to eat grains. 
1...8   Ben thinks humans perhaps can eat grains removed  
        from shells. 
1...8   Ben imagines the analogy from nuts to grain focused 
        on removeing shells. 
1...8   Ben thinks humans perhaps can remove shells from  
   grains by pounding grains because pounding 
        breaks shells off grains. 
1...9   Ben pounds grain. 
1...9   Ben examines grain. 
1...10  Ben thinks grain is removed from shells. 
1...11  Ben tries to eat grain. 
1...12  Ben thinks grain is not edible because grain 
        is very hard. 
1...12  Ben thinks how can Ben make softer grain?. 
1...13  Ben soaks grain in water. 
1...13  Ben examines grain. 
1...14  Ben thinks unshelled grain is soaked in water. 
1...15  Ben tries to eat grain. 
1...16  Ben thinks grain is not edible because grain is 
        rather hard. 
1...16  Ben thinks how can Ben make softer grain?. 
1...17  Ben mashs grain. 
1...17  Ben examines grain. 
Demonstration 
232 
1...18  Ben thinks grain is a gooey paste. 
1...18  Ben thinks grain that is a gooey paste will  
        be called dough. 
1...19  Ben tries to eat dough. 
1...20  Ben thinks dough is soft, too gooey, and tastes bland. 
1...20  Ben thinks dough is too gooey. 
1...21  Ben bakes dough. 
1...21  Ben examines baked dough. 
1...22  Ben thinks baked dough is a flat, semi-rigid object. 
1...22  Ben thinks baked dough that is a flat object will 
        be called flat bread. 
1...23  Ben tries to eat flat bread. 
1...23  Ben says baked dough that is a flat object 
        will be called flat bread. 
1...24  Ben thinks flat bread is edible, flat, not soft, 
        not gooey, and tastes crisp. 
1...24  Ben thinks flat bread is edible. 
1...25  Ben says Leo try this flat bread. 
1...26  Leo tries to eat flat bread. 
1...28  Leo says bread is edible, flat, not soft, not  
        gooey, and tastes crisp. 
1...28  Leo asks can you make thick, soft bread?. 
1...28  Ben thinks why should Ben make thick, soft bread?. 
1...28  Ben thinks people would prefer eating thick, soft bread 
   over eating flat bread. 
1...28  Ben wants Ben to make thick, soft bread. 
1...28  Ben thinks how can Ben make thick, soft bread?. 
1...28  Ben thinks how did Ben make flat bread?. 
1...29  Ben thinks how Ben made flat bread is steps Ben  
        pounds grain, Ben soaks grain in water, Ben  
        mashs grain, Ben bakes dough. 
1...29  Ben thinks how Ben made flat bread will be called 
        the flat bread process. 
1...29  Ben thinks how can Ben change the flat bread process 
        so bread is thick and soft?. 
1...29  Ben thinks what other features would thick, soft 
        bread have?. 
1...29  Ben thinks thick, soft bread would be less dense. 
1...29  Ben thinks thick, soft bread might have holes or 
        air pockets. 
1...29  Ben thinks air pockets in thick, soft bread  
        might resemble bubbles in bread. 
1...29  Ben thinks Ben might create bubbles in bread by 
        adding a drinkable liquid with bubbles to dough. 
1...30  Ben thinks Ben might create bubbles in bread by  
        adding beer foam to dough. 
1...31  Ben asks can you kick in more kernels for experiments?. 
1...31  Leo thinks Ben asks can Leo kick in more grain  
        for experiments?. 
1...32  Leo gives more grain to Ben. 
1...33  Ben pounds grain. 
1...33  Ben soaks grain in water. 
1...33  Ben mashs grain. 
1...33  Ben mixs the dough with beer foam. 
1...33  Ben bakes dough. 
1...33  Ben says Leo try this leavened bread. 
1...34  Leo tries to eat bread. 
1...36  Leo says bread is edible, thick, soft, tastes good,  
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        and not gooey. 
1...37  Ben says Eureka! 
Simulation ends. 
Each step of the form “Ben thinks …” is an internal speech act 
produced by a subagent of Ben communicating to another subagent of 
Ben, using the Tala mentalese as an interlingua. The net effect of this 
internal dialog is to allow Ben to perform most of the discovery of bread 
conceptual processing. These internal dialogs also support semantic 
disambiguation by Ben and Leo of each other’s utterances. Appendix B 
explains the conceptual processing between each of the steps above. 
It is not claimed the above story describes how humans actually 
discovered bread. The prototype will randomly simulate discovery of 
either of two processes: In some cases Ben will soak grain in water and 
then mash the grain in water, to make a gooey paste that he calls dough, 
before baking it. In other cases, Ben will mash grain to create flour first 
and then mix flour with water to make dough, before baking it. 76 
6.2.2 The Farmer’s Dilemma Story Simulation 
In this story, bread has already been discovered and sometime later, 
Ben and Leo (or perhaps their descendants with the same names) agree 
to perform an exchange of wheat for bread, and then carry out the 
agreement. This simulation produces the output: 
Initialized Farmer's Dilemma simulation. 
1...1  Leo says Leo has harvested wheat. 
1...2  Ben says Ben will give bread to Leo if Leo will 
       give wheat to Ben. 
1...2  Leo believes Ben is obligated to honor his promise 
       to exchange bread for wheat. 
1.1...3   Leo imagines Leo gives wheat to Ben. 
                                                          
76 The story simplifies the process for making bread, and omits steps 
of threshing and winnowing grain, describing just a single step 
“pounding grain”. One may imagine this is an ancient hulled wheat 
(e.g. emmer) with tough glumes (husks) for which pounding is required 
to release grains from glumes. (Free-threshing wheats, which do not 
require pounding to release grains from husks, are now widely used 
instead of hulled wheats – viz. Nesbitt & Samuel, 1995.) The use of beer 
foam to leaven bread does have an historical basis: Pliny the Elder 
wrote that the people of Gaul and Spain used the foam from beer to 
leaven bread and “hence it is that the bread in those countries is lighter 
than that made elsewhere” (Bostock & Riley, 1856, The  Natural  History 
of  Pliny, IV, Book XVIII, p. 26). 
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1.1.1...4   Leo imagines Ben gives bread to Leo. 
1.1.1...4   Leo imagines Leo is happy. 
1.1.1...5   Leo imagines Leo recommends Ben to others. 
1.1.1...5   Leo imagines Ben thinks Ben may gain business. 
1.1.1...5   Leo imagines Ben is happy. 
1.1.2...4   Leo imagines Ben does not give bread to Leo. 
1.1.2...4   Leo imagines Leo will be hungry. 
1.1.2...4   Leo imagines Leo is unhappy. 
1.1.2...5   Leo imagines Leo complains about Ben to others. 
1.1.2...5   Leo imagines Ben thinks Ben may lose business. 
1.1.2...5   Leo imagines Ben is unhappy. 
1.1...4   Leo imagines Ben gives bread to Leo. 
1.1...4   Leo imagines Leo is happy. 
1.1...5   Leo imagines Leo recommends Ben to others. 
1.1...5   Leo imagines Ben thinks Ben may gain business. 
1.1...5   Leo imagines Ben is happy. 
1...2  Leo thinks scenario 1.1 is a win-win. 
1...2  Leo expects Ben will honor his promise to exchange 
       bread for wheat. 
1.2...3   Leo imagines Leo says Leo declines the offer. 
1.2.1...4   Leo imagines Ben does not give bread to Leo. 
1.2.1...4   Leo imagines Leo will be hungry. 
1.2.1...4   Leo imagines Leo is unhappy. 
1.2...3   Leo imagines Leo is unhappy. 
1...2  Leo thinks scenario 1.2 is a lose for Leo. 
1...3  Leo gives wheat to Ben. 
1.1...4   Ben imagines Ben gives bread to Leo. 
1.1...4   Ben imagines Leo is happy. 
1.1...5   Ben imagines Leo recommends Ben to others. 
1.1...5   Ben imagines Ben thinks Ben may gain business. 
1.1...5   Ben imagines Ben is happy. 
1.2...4   Ben imagines Ben does not give bread to Leo. 
1.2...5   Ben imagines Leo complains about Ben to others. 
1.2...5   Ben imagines Ben thinks Ben may lose business. 
1.2...5   Ben imagines Ben is unhappy. 
1...4  Ben gives bread to Leo. 
1...4  Leo is happy. 
1...5  Leo recommends Ben to others. 
1...5  Ben thinks Ben may gain business. 
1...5  Ben is happy. 
Simulation ends. 
This story demonstrates multiple-levels of nested conceptual 
simulation in the TalaMind prototype, with meta-reasoning across the 
levels. Each line of simulation output is prefixed with numerical 
information of the form: <context-path>… <timestep>. Thus 1.1.1…5 
occurs at timestep 5 simulated in nested context 1.1.1. Context 
numbers are relative to each agent’s conceptual framework, i.e. context 
1.1 for Leo is a different context from 1.1 for Ben. 
This story simulation takes its name from the “Farmers’ Dilemma” in 
philosophy, which involves an analogous agreement between two 
farmers to exchange labor at different times (see Vanderschraaf & 
Sillari, 2007). 
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6.3 Illustration of Higher-Level Mentalities 
6.3.1 Natural Language Understanding 
The discovery of bread simulation illustrates how the TalaMind 
architecture can support semantic disambiguation and translation of 
metaphors, via conceptual processing of grammatical constructions and 
executable concepts. The demonstration system implements the 
following design elements: 
• Representation of semantic domains in encyclopedic 
knowledge, within the conceptual framework. 
• Executable concepts to track current topics of discourse 
(context), using the current-domains slot in the conceptual 
framework. 
• Executable concepts to perform semantic disambiguation of 
speech acts, by relating concepts mentioned in speech acts to 
concepts in semantic domains and current domains of 
discourse. 
• Grammatical constructions to translate metaphors in speech 
acts, such as “turn X into Y” into “make X be Y”. 
In the discovery of bread simulation, Ben processes an executable 
concept which uses the Tala lexicon to update the current-domains slot 
in his conceptual framework, so that “grain” and “food for people” are 
added as topics in current domains of discourse, as a side effect of Leo 
saying that grain is not edible. 
Ben then uses executable concepts and constructions to 
disambiguate 
1...4   Leo asks Ben can you turn grain into fare 
        for people?. 
as 
1...4   (Ben translates as) (mu) Ben thinks Leo asks can 
        Ben make grain be food for people?. 
To do this, Ben has an executable concept that disambiguates “fare” 
as “food”, based on fare having a definition as “food” and “food” being 
a current topic of discourse. Additionally, Ben uses a construction to 
disambiguate “you”, which matches you as a subject of a verb within 
the perceived speech act, and replaces you with Ben’s binding of ?self 
. Finally, Ben uses a construction to translate the common English 
metaphor “turn X into Y” into “make X be Y”. 
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A similar use of executable concepts and constructions, along with 
current-domain concepts, enables Leo to disambiguate  
1...5   Ben asks can you turn over some to me 
        for experiments?. 
 as 
1...5   (Leo translates as) (mu) Leo thinks Ben asks  
        can Leo give some grain to Ben for experiments?. 
Later in the simulation, another use of executable concepts and 
constructions, along with current-domain concepts, enables Leo to 
disambiguate  
1...31   Ben asks can you kick in more kernels 
         for experiments?. 
as 
1...31   (Leo translates as) (mu) Leo thinks Ben asks  
         can Leo give more grain to Ben for experiments?. 
Appendix B’s discussion of step by step processing gives further 
details about how these disambiguations are performed, which 
executable concepts and constructions are used, etc. 
6.3.2 Multi-Level Reasoning 
6.3.2.1 Deduction 
As discussed in Chapter 3, pattern-matching of Tala sentences is 
facilitated by Tala’s use of nested list structures to represent natural 
language syntactic structures. Combined with a syntax for variables in 
Tala, and representation of inference rules as if-then sentences, these 
symbolic processing mechanisms enable logical deduction within 
contexts. The TalaMind prototype includes an initial implementation of 
these mechanisms, which is used throughout the discovery of bread and 
farmer’s dilemma simulations.  
6.3.2.2 Induction 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the TalaMind architecture can support 
inductive inference. However, per the strategy described in §1.6, the 
TalaMind prototype does not illustrate this, since it is an area that has 
been explored in previous research on machine learning. Demonstration 
of higher-level forms of learning is discussed in §6.3.3. 
6.3.2.3 Abduction, Analogy, Causality, Purpose 
The discovery of bread simulation illustrates that reasoning and 
discovery by analogy may be intertwined with abductive reasoning 
about cause and effect, as well as reasoning about why and whether 
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something should be done, and whether it is possible and feasible to do 
something. 
At the beginning of the story, Ben reasons purposively about why 
and whether he should try to make grain edible: 
1...4   Ben thinks why should Ben make grain be food 
    for people?. 
1...4   Ben thinks people need more food sources. 
1...4   Ben thinks if Ben feasibly can make grain be food  
    for people then Ben should make grain be food 
        for people. 
Abductive analogical reasoning is illustrated in the following 
storyline steps: 
1...8   Ben thinks wheat grains resemble nuts. 
1...8   Ben imagines an analogy from nuts to grain focused 
        on food for people. 
1...8   Ben thinks grain perhaps is an edible seed inside  
        an inedible shell. 
1...8   Ben thinks humans perhaps must remove shells  
        from grains to eat grains. 
1...8   Ben thinks humans perhaps can eat grains removed  
        from shells. 
The abduction is reasoning to explain that perhaps grain is not edible 
because it is an edible seed inside an inedible shell, by an analogy of 
grain to nuts.  
Analogical, purposive and causal reasoning is illustrated by the 
steps: 
1...8   Ben imagines the analogy from nuts to grain  
        focused on removeing shells. 
1...8   Ben thinks humans perhaps can remove shells  
        from grains by pounding grains because  
        pounding breaks shells off grains. 
1...9   Ben pounds grain. 
Later in the story, Ben reasons purposively about why he should try 
to make leavened bread, and performs analogical, causal reasoning 
leading to the idea of mixing dough with beer foam to leaven bread: 
1...29   Ben thinks thick, soft bread would be less dense. 
1...29   Ben thinks thick, soft bread might have holes or 
         air pockets. 
1...29   Ben thinks air pockets in thick, soft bread 
         might resemble bubbles in bread. 
1...29   Ben thinks Ben might create bubbles in  
         bread by adding a drinkable liquid with 
         bubbles to dough. 
1...30   Ben thinks Ben might create bubbles in  
          bread by adding beer foam to dough. 
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The simulation shows that pattern-matching of concepts with 
structured conjunctions (how, why, because …) can enable executable 
concepts to perform causal and purposive reasoning. The system 
pattern-matches concept structures that express how and why 
relationships, and uses xconcepts to create chains of assertions of such 
concepts. 
6.3.2.4 Meta-Reasoning 
The TalaMind simulations illustrate that the Tala natural language 
mentalese is adequate for expressing both concepts and meta-concepts, 
within internal mental dialogs for subagents in a society of mind 
(§2.3.3.2.1). In the discovery of bread simulation, a form of meta-
reasoning occurs when Ben asks himself why he should make grain 
edible for people, and decides it would be worthwhile to do so: 
1...4   Ben thinks why should Ben make grain be food 
        for people?. 
1...4   Ben thinks people need more food sources. 
1...4   Ben thinks if Ben feasibly can make grain be food 
        for people then Ben should make grain be food 
        for people. 
Later in the discovery of bread simulation, Ben remembers how he 
created flat bread, and reasons about how to change the process, 
deciding to add beer to the dough before baking it. 
1...28   Ben thinks how did Ben make flat bread?. 
1...29   Ben thinks how Ben made flat bread is steps 
         Ben pounds grain, Ben soaks grain in water, 
         Ben mashs grain, Ben bakes dough. 
1...29   Ben thinks how Ben made flat bread will be  
         called the flat bread process. 
1...29   Ben thinks how can Ben change the flat bread  
         process so bread is thick and soft?. 
This illustrates that conceptual processes can create concepts to 
record traces of their execution, which can be the subject of observation 
and reasoning by other conceptual processes, and hence that reasoning 
about reasoning can be supported within a TalaMind architecture. 
In the farmer’s dilemma simulation, executable concepts in outer 
contexts access concepts in nested contexts, using observations for meta-
reasoning to state meta-concepts: 
1...2  Leo thinks scenario 1.1 is a win-win. 
This illustrates that TalaMind systems can in principle reason about 
contexts, treating them as objects that have properties. 
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6.3.3 Self-Development and Higher-Level Learning 
6.3.3.1 Analogy, Causality & Purpose in Learning 
The ‘discovery of bread’ simulation illustrates the potential of the 
TalaMind approach for learning by reasoning analogically. Ben’s 
discovery of bread is motivated by analogical reasons that vary in 
correctness, yet lead to discovering a process for making bread. 
Thus as noted previously, abductive analogical reasoning is used to 
explain that perhaps grain is not edible because it is an edible seed 
inside an inedible shell, by an analogy of grain to nuts. Using causal, 
purposive reasoning this explanation is tested successfully by pounding 
grain. 
Later, Ben reasons causally and analogically that adding beer foam 
to dough could make bread softer, because beer foam has bubbles and 
air pockets in soft bread might resemble bubbles in bread. This leads to 
a successful outcome, even though Ben’s reasoning does not correspond 
to the actual mechanism by which beer foam leavens bread. Leavening 
happens by fermentation, a process not deeply understood until 
Pasteur’s research in 1857, many centuries after leavened bread was 
discovered. The simulation illustrates that reasoning by analogy may 
lead to useful discoveries, prior to knowledge of underlying 
mechanisms. 
6.3.3.2 Learning by Reflection and Self-Programming 
The discovery of bread simulation illustrates how learning by 
reflection and self-programming can occur, when Ben recalls the process 
by which he made flat bread, and creates an executable concept 
representing this process, and then modifies the process by inserting a 
step to mix beer foam with the dough, before it is baked: 
1...28   Ben thinks how did Ben make flat bread?. 
1...29   Ben thinks how Ben made flat bread is steps 
         Ben pounds grain, Ben soaks grain in water,  
         Ben mashs grain, Ben bakes dough. 
1...29   Ben thinks how Ben made flat bread will be  
         called the flat bread process. 
1...29   Ben thinks how can Ben change the flat bread 
         process so bread is thick and soft?. 
… 
1...30   Ben thinks Ben might create bubbles in bread 
         by adding beer foam to dough. 
… 
1...33   Ben pounds grain. 
1...33   Ben soaks grain in water. 
1...33   Ben mashs grain. 
1...33   Ben mixs the dough with beer foam. 
Demonstration 
240 
1...33   Ben bakes dough. 
1...33   Ben says Leo try this leavened bread. 
This is an example of executable concepts creating and modifying 
other executable concepts. 
6.3.3.3 Learning by Invention of Languages 
The discovery of bread simulation shows this to a limited extent: 
Throughout the simulation, Ben invents names for new things he 
discovers how to make, i.e. “dough”, “flat bread”, and “leavened 
bread”. Invention of names is one element of learning and inventing 
languages. There is much more work to be done on this topic in future 
research. Section 3.7.2.3 discusses how this form of learning can in 
principle be supported very generally by the thesis approach. 
6.3.4 Curiosity 
Chapter 3 discussed curiosity at the level of human intelligence as 
the ability to ask relevant questions. The discovery of bread simulation 
illustrates this when Ben asks himself, “What other features would 
thick, soft bread have?” This is a relevant question to ask, because it 
leads to considering that thick, soft bread would be less dense than flat 
bread, and might have holes or bubbles in it. This leads to analogical 
reasoning that eventually creates leavened bread. An executable concept 
of the form: 
If I want to achieve X with properties Y 
Then ask what other properties Z would result in  
     X having properties Y 
And consider how to achieve X with properties Z 
could provide a general heuristic to create such questions. There is 
much more work to be done on the topic of curiosity in future research. 
Section 3.7.3 discusses how curiosity can in principle be supported 
generally by the thesis approach. 
6.3.5 Imagination 
Chapter 3 discusses how the TalaMind architecture can in principle 
support imagination, viewed as a higher-level mentality that allows us 
to conceive things we do not know how to accomplish, to conceive what 
will happen in hypothetical situations, and to consider ways to learn 
what we do not know or to accomplish what we do not know how to 
do. Imagination may leverage the multi-level reasoning and higher-
level learning abilities of human-level intelligence, including abductive, 
analogical, causal and purposive reasoning.  
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By this definition, the discovery of bread simulation illustrates an 
imaginative conceptual process. Ben uses analogical reasoning to 
conceive that grain may be an edible seed inside a shell, which might be 
freed from the shell by pounding it, like a nut. Later, Ben uses 
analogical reasoning to conceive that bread might be made thicker and 
lighter, by mixing a drinkable liquid with bubbles (beer) into the foam. 
6.3.5.1 Imagination via Conceptual Blends 
The TalaMind discovery of bread simulation illustrates a conceptual 
blend (§3.6.7.9) in the following steps:  
1...8   Ben thinks wheat grains resemble nuts. 
1...8   Ben imagines an analogy from nuts to grain focused 
        on food for people. 
In the step where Ben imagines an analogy from nuts to grain, 
focusing the analogy on food for people, 77 he creates a mental space 
(§3.6.7.8) that blends concepts from his semantic domain for nuts with 
an analogical mapping of grain to nuts: 
 (1 
  (space-type blend) 
  (elements grain seed shell human) 
  (concepts 
  grain perhaps is an edible seed inside an  
  inedible shell. 
  humans perhaps must remove shells from grains 
  to eat grains. 
  humans perhaps can eat grains removed from shells. 
   ] 
This analogy indicates it may be necessary to remove shells from 
grains to eat grains, but it does not contain a concept saying how to 
remove shells from grains. So, Ben blends more concepts from the 
semantic domain for nuts into the mental space, now focusing on 
removing shells.  
1...8   Ben imagines the analogy from nuts to grain focused 
        on removeing shells. 
This adds an analogous concept for how to remove shells from 
grains, so the mental space now includes: 
 
 
                                                          
77  The term ‘focus’ is used with a different connotation in the 
viewpoint, focus, event representation of tense-aspect systems in mental 




  (space-type blend) 
          (elements grain seed shell human) 
  (concepts 
  grain perhaps is an edible seed inside an  
          inedible shell. 
  humans perhaps must remove shells from grains 
          to eat grains. 
  humans perhaps can eat grains removed from shells. 
   humans perhaps can remove shells from grains 
               by pounding grains because pounding breaks 
               shells off grains. 
   ] 
 At this point, Ben has conjectured he may be able to remove shells 
from grain by pounding grain, as a result of an analogy between grain 
and nuts. Ben’s conceptual processing to do this could be summarized 
as what Turner (1994) called a TRAM heuristic (Transform-Recall-Adapt 
Method). The steps of a TRAM are: 
• Transform a problem description into a slightly different 
problem. 
• Recall a solution to the new problem description from 
previous situations in episodic memory. 
• Adapt the recalled solution to the original problem. 
In particular, this example corresponds to Turner’s Cross-Domain-
Solution TRAM. The TalaMind simulation illustrates how TRAM 
heuristics could be implemented via analogical reasoning using 
conceptual blends, with concepts expressed in a natural language 
mentalese. 
Implementing an initial version of conceptual blends for the 
TalaMind prototype was relatively straightforward, because use of 
natural language mentalese allows much of the processing to be done 
leveraging the syntactic structure of natural language sentences, to 
perform an analogical mapping of sentences from a semantic domain 
into a mental space.  
There is much more work that can be done on these topics. The 
prototype system only implements part of Fauconnier & Turner’s basic 
diagram (Figure 3-1) for a conceptual blend, which involves four mental 
spaces: A generic space of background information, two input spaces 
that have mapping relations defined between them, and a space that 
blends information from the two input spaces, using the mappings. In 
the prototype demonstration, small input spaces (semantic domains) 
represent knowledge about nuts and grain, and are used to create a 
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blend space representing an analogy from nuts to grain. The prototype 
selectively projects concepts (first related to eating, later related to 
removing shells) from the domain for nuts into the blend space, 
translating these into analogous concepts about grain in the blend space. 
The translation is effectively a composition conceptual process (§3.6.7.9). 
The step where Ben adds information about how to remove shells is 
effectively a completion conceptual process. These steps do not 
illustrate elaboration in the conceptual blend, i.e. “running the blend”. 
However, conceptual simulation is illustrated in the farmer’s dilemma 
demonstration, discussed below. 
By way of comparison, Pereira (2007) describes a system for 
processing conceptual blends that followed a bottom-up approach to 
knowledge representation. This involved creating semantic networks 
showing different kinds of binary relations between objects at lower-
levels, and writing algorithms to map and manage such networks, to 
perform processing for conceptual blends. While such approaches have 
been successful, they were doubtless much more labor-intensive to 
develop than the TalaMind approach. 
6.3.5.2 Imagination via Nested Conceptual Simulation 
The farmer’s dilemma simulation demonstrates conceptual processes 
in which Leo and Ben imagine what will happen in hypothetical 
situations, using nested conceptual simulation (§3.6.7.6). Leo imagines 
what Ben will think and do, and vice versa. 
For nested conceptual simulation in the prototype, conceptual 
processing creates contexts called scenarios in the conceptual 
framework, and simulates conceptual processes within scenarios. A 
scenario is essentially a complete copy of a Tala agent’s projected-
reality, with some hypothetical changes, nested within the conceptual 
framework. Scenarios may be nested within each other, to support 
evaluation of alternative directions a simulation could take, depending 
on choices of Tala agents. 
In the farmer’s dilemma, the TalaMind logic invokes a nested 
conceptual simulation when interpreting an xconcept method that 
contains an expression of the form: 
  (imagine 
   (wusage verb) 
   (subj ?self) 
   (obj 
    ... 
    )) 
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The variable ?self identifies the agent doing the imagining, who 
creates the nested context within its perceived reality. The object of the 
imagine verb contains xconcept statements specifying new concepts to 
add into a nested context. In addition, the nested context has many 
concepts automatically added into it: 
• Concept structures representing ?self and the other agents in 
perceived reality. 
• Concepts defining words that are known to ?self. 
• Concepts representing thoughts, goals, and encyclopedic 
knowledge for ?self . 
• Xconcepts that are known to ?self. 
When a Tala agent creates a nested context, it gives other simulated 
agents in the nested context its own concepts and xconcepts that it 
believes are mutual knowledge, i.e. it simulates them acting as it would 
in their situation. 78 In addition, it may give the other agents specific 
concepts it thinks they have.  
In the demonstration, nested conceptual simulation is used to 
simulate and predict alternative future continuations of the present as 
perceived by a Tala agent in its projected reality. For example, this is 
illustrated in the following steps: 
1.1...3   Leo imagines Leo gives wheat to Ben. 
1.1.1...4   Leo imagines Ben gives bread to Leo. 
1.1.1...4   Leo imagines Leo is happy. 
1.1.1...5   Leo imagines Leo recommends Ben to others. 
1.1.1...5   Leo imagines Ben thinks Ben may gain business. 
1.1.1...5   Leo imagines Ben is happy. 
1.1.2...4   Leo imagines Ben does not give bread to Leo. 
1.1.2...4   Leo imagines Leo will be hungry. 
1.1.2...4   Leo imagines Leo is unhappy. 
1.1.2...5   Leo imagines Leo complains about Ben to others. 
1.1.2...5   Leo imagines Ben thinks Ben may lose business. 
1.1.2...5   Leo imagines Ben is unhappy. 
In nested context 1.1.1, Leo imagines what will happen if he gives 
Ben wheat and Ben honors his promise to give bread in return, 
concluding they will both be happy. In the alternative nested context 
                                                          
78 In the farmer’s dilemma simulation, these concepts are physically 
copied into the nested context, since this required only a few lines of 
code, and is fast enough for a small concept base. In future research, an 
inheritance method could be implemented to access concepts from 
higher-level contexts.  
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1.1.2, Leo imagines what will happen if Ben does not honor his 
promise, concluding they will both be unhappy. With such reasoning, 
Leo decides to give wheat to Ben, and Ben honors his promise and gives 
bread to Leo. 
Essentially the same logic for nested conceptual simulation could be 
used to simulate scenarios that are independent of the present perceived 
reality, e.g. imaginary or theoretical situations being pondered by an 
agent. So, this type of logic could be used to simulate and reason about 
theories, stories, dreams, etc. Likewise, such logic could be used to 
simulate multiple levels of stories within stories, plays within plays, 
dreams within dreams, or combinations of these. These are topics for 
future research. 
6.3.6 Consciousness 
Chapter 3 discussed consciousness in terms of a system 
demonstrating the following abilities: 
Observation of an external environment 
Observation of oneself in relation to the external environment. 
Observation of internal thoughts. 
Observation of time: of the present, the past, and potential futures. 
Observation of hypothetical or imaginative thoughts. 
Reflective observation: Observation of having observations. 
Observation of an external environment is illustrated in the 
TalaMind demonstration by having each Tala agent access a ‘conceptual 
interface’, which provides percepts (concepts representing perceptions 
of an environment) to the Tala agent. Percepts are stored internally 
within an area for concepts representing projected reality in the Tala 
agent’s conceptual framework. 
The use of a reserved variable ?self  that is bound within each Tala 
agent to a unique internal identifier for itself, allows representation of 
percepts for relations between itself and other agents or objects in the 
external environment.  
Internal thoughts of a Tala agent are represented as internal speech 
acts (called ‘meffepts’) by subagents in a society of mind (§2.3.3.2.1). 
Meffepts are concepts expressed in the Tala conceptual language, used 
as a language of thought for the society of mind. Tala subagents can 
observe the speech acts of other subagents as internal, mental percepts 
(called ‘mpercepts’). This provides a mechanism for observation of 
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internal ‘self-talk’, within a Tala agent. 
The TalaMind conceptual framework supports representation of 
present and past percepts and effepts, giving a Tala agent the ability to 
observe and process concepts about the past and present. 
The TalaMind conceptual framework supports representation of 
hypothetical future contexts, giving a Tala agent the ability to observe 
hypothetical future situations and thoughts. This is shown in the 
farmer’s dilemma simulation. 
The Tala conceptual language allows representation of concepts that 
include or refer to concepts, supporting a form of reflective observation 
within a Tala agent. Thus, mpercepts could refer to percepts. 
6.4 Summary 
This chapter discussed how the prototype illustrates that the 
TalaMind approach could support the higher-level mentalities of 
human-level intelligence. The demonstration illustrates learning and 
discovery by reasoning analogically, causal and purposive reasoning, 
meta-reasoning, imagination via conceptual simulation, and internal 
dialog between subagents in a society of mind using a language of 
thought. It also illustrates support for semantic disambiguation, natural 
language constructions, metaphors, semantic domains, and conceptual 
blends, in communication between Tala agents. Appendix B gives a step 





We are made to exaggerate the importance of what 
work we do… Confucius said, “To know that we know 
what we know, and to know that we do not know what 
we do not know, that is true knowledge.” 
~ Henry David Thoreau, Walden, or Life in the Woods, 1854 
 
7.1 Overview 
Taken together, the preceding chapters support a plausibility 
argument that the TalaMind approach could achieve human-level AI if 
the approach were fully developed, though that would need to be a 
long-term research effort by multiple researchers. This chapter evaluates 
the strength of the argument and the merits of the thesis approach. 
7.2 Criteria for Evaluating Plausibility 
For a theoretical approach to be plausible it must be consistent with 
external facts and internally consistent in its logic. If it does not conform 
with conventional thinking, then it should provide reasons in favor of 
its direction. To be worthy of further investigation, it is strengthened if 
it provides ways to accomplish things found difficult in other 
approaches; if it is a novel approach that others have not previously 
tried and failed to accomplish; if one can provide a design and 
demonstration of a prototype for the approach; and if its further 
development involves research that in principle can be successful. These 
are the criteria for evaluating plausibility that will be considered in the 
following sections. 
7.3 Theoretical Issues and Objections 
This thesis has endeavored to address all the major theoretical issues 
and objections that might be raised against its approach, or against the 
possibility of achieving human-level AI in principle. 
Chapter 2 presented arguments that natural language understanding 
and human-level AI should be possible to achieve without physical 
human embodiment. Chapter 4 discussed the theoretical issues for AI 
identified by Dreyfus, the philosophical arguments against AI, 
including Searle’s Chinese Room argument, the Gödelian arguments of 
Penrose and Lucas, and implications of Penrose & Hameroff’s 
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hypothesis that human intelligence requires nanoscale quantum 
information processing. Chapter 4 discussed specific theoretical issues 
related to the thesis approach, including McCarthy’s objections to use of 
natural language as a mentalese, Minsky’s issues for representation and 
learning, and Chalmers’ ‘Hard Problem’ for explanations of 
consciousness. 
Considering these discussions, it does not appear that anyone has 
shown human-level AI is impossible in principle, nor that anyone has 
shown the TalaMind approach cannot succeed in principle. Rather, as 
will be discussed in the next sections, there are affirmative reasons to 
think it is plausible the TalaMind approach can succeed.  
It appears the strongest theoretical objections are the Gödelian 
arguments of Penrose and Lucas. However, there is no consensus that 
these arguments have proved human-level AI is impossible in principle. 
Rather, there is significant disagreement, and belief by several thinkers 
that Gödelian arguments do not show human-level intelligence is non-
computable. Baars’ (1995) remarks are apropos: 
“Impossibility arguments have a mixed record in science. … we 
have such historical examples as Bishop Berkeley's disproof of 
Newton's use of infinitesimals in the calculus. … physicists 
used the flawed calculus for two hundred years with great 
scientific success, until … the paradox was resolved by the 
discovery of converging series … The fact that people can walk 
is an effective counter to Zeno's Paradox. The fact that people 
can talk in sentences was Chomsky's counter to stimulus-
response theories of language.”  
Indeed, Lucas (forthcoming) accepts a mediation to the dispute 
proposed by Feferman (2011), which happens to be consistent with the 
TalaMind approach (§4.1.2.3). 
Also, it is not necessary for human-level AI to be successful that one 
side of the debate should be absolutely correct, and the other absolutely 
wrong. Even if computers cannot for some as yet unknown reason 
achieve every capability of human-level intelligence, computers may 
still arrive close to these capabilities.  
7.4 Affirmative Theoretical Arguments 
It is not enough to address theoretical issues and objections against 
an approach. Chapter 3 presented affirmative theoretical arguments and 
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explanations for how the TalaMind approach can be developed 
successfully. The chapter considered theoretical questions related to the 
TalaMind hypotheses and to how a system could in principle be 
designed according to the hypotheses. 
This section will not repeat Chapter 3’s theoretical analysis, but will 
offer some higher-level observations regarding plausibility. First, the 
theoretical arguments of the analysis are internally consistent, and 
synergetic: If semantics is represented by syntax, then different 
interpretations and implications correspond to different sentences, or to 
semantic annotations in the syntax of a sentence. Contexts can 
correspond to collections of sentences and the truth of a sentence can 
correspond to the existence of a sentence in a context without 
contradictions in the same context. Different kinds of contexts and 
conceptual processing can support higher-level mentalities. 
Second, the analysis showed that the TalaMind approach allows 
addressing theoretical questions that are not easily addressed by other, 
more conventional approaches. For instance, it supports reasoning in 
mathematical contexts, but also supports reasoning about people who 
have self-contradictory beliefs. Tala provides a language for reasoning 
with underspecification and for reasoning with sentences that have 
meaning yet which also have nonsensical interpretations. Tala sentences 
can declaratively describe recursive mutual knowledge. Tala sentences 
can express meta-concepts about contexts, such as statements about 
consistency and rules of conjecture. And the TalaMind approach 
facilitates representation and conceptual processing for higher-level 
mentalities, such as learning by analogical, causal and purposive 
reasoning, learning by self-programming, and imagination via 
conceptual blends. 
The TalaMind approach is quite different from other, more 
conventional approaches, yet Chapter 3’s analysis provides affirmative 
arguments that may be considered at least plausible, and worthy of 
further study and development.  
7.5 Design and Demonstration 
To provide a demonstration showing it is plausible the TalaMind 
approach can be successful, Chapter 5 presents a design for a prototype 
system having the TalaMind architecture. It presents a design for the 
syntax of the Tala conceptual language that is fairly general and flexible, 
addressing issues such as compound nouns, gerunds, compound verbs, 
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verb tense, aspect and voice, nested prepositions, clitic possessive 
determiners, gerundive adjectives, shared dependencies, coordinating 
and subordinating / structured conjunctions, subject-verb agreement, 
etc. Such coverage suggests it is plausible that a Tala syntax could be 
comprehensive for English, though developing a comprehensive Tala 
syntax for English is a very large effort (§5.3). 
Chapter 5 also presents a prototype design for a TalaMind 
conceptual framework and conceptual processes. The conceptual 
framework includes prototype representations of perceived reality, 
subagents, a Tala lexicon, encyclopedic knowledge, mental spaces and 
conceptual blends, scenarios for nested conceptual simulation, 
executable concepts, grammatical constructions, and event memory. 
The prototype conceptual processes include interpretation of executable 
concepts with pattern-matching, variable binding, conditional and 
iterative expressions, transmission of mental speech acts between 
subagents, nested conceptual simulation, conceptual blending, and 
composable interpretation of grammatical constructions. 
Chapter 6 discusses how the prototype illustrates that the TalaMind 
approach could potentially support the higher-level mentalities of 
human-level intelligence. The demonstration illustrates learning and 
discovery by reasoning analogically, causal and purposive reasoning, 
meta-reasoning, imagination via conceptual simulation, and internal 
dialog between subagents in a society of mind using a language of 
thought. It also illustrates support for semantic disambiguation, natural 
language constructions, metaphors, semantic domains, and conceptual 
blends, in communication between Tala agents. 
This illustration involves functioning code in a prototype system, but 
it can only be a small step toward the goal of human-level AI. The 
simulations show conceptual processing in a prototype TalaMind 
architecture, without encyclopedic and commonsense knowledge. These 
are needed to achieve human-level AI, and are topics for the future, to 
leverage research in areas previously studied by others (viz. §§1.6, 7.7). 
The fact that one can make workable design choices for a prototype 
demonstration of the approach, suggests it is plausible that a completely 
general, scalable version of TalaMind can be developed. 
7.6 Novelty in Relation to Previous Research 
The discussion of human-level intelligence in terms of higher-level 
mentalities, which people could say indicate human intelligence even 
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when understanding how these capabilities are demonstrated by a 
computer, is different from previous research focused on behavioristic 
comparisons, e.g. via the Turing Test. It is also different from research 
that seeks to achieve human-level AI through general approaches but 
does not specifically address individual, higher-level mentalities. The 
inclusion of consciousness as a higher-level mentality is different from 
approaches that separate artificial consciousness from artificial 
intelligence. 
This thesis discusses and demonstrates elements of three interrelated 
hypotheses motivating the TalaMind architecture. The author does not 
know of previous research that has presented an equivalent discussion 
and demonstration of these hypotheses as a combined approach. 
Chapter 2 discusses the relationship of the TalaMind hypotheses and 
architecture to previous research. Sloman’s (1978) discussion and 
subsequent work have been in a similar direction to this thesis; his 
(2008) discussion of “Generalised Languages” for innate representation 
(viz. §§2.2.1, 2.3.3.1) is similar though not identical to the TalaMind 
natural language mentalese hypothesis. Yudkowsky (2007) advocated a 
research direction somewhat similar to the approach investigated in this 
thesis (viz. §2.3.3.5). Doyle (1980) advocated an approach corresponding 
to a subset of the TalaMind architecture (viz. §2.3.5). 
This thesis is also essentially compatible with research toward 
human-level AI by Minsky (1986, 2006), Sowa (2011), and others. It is 
compatible with research on computational and cognitive linguistics by 
Bunt (1994 et seq.), Daelemans (1992 et seq.), Evans (2009), Fauconnier & 
Turner (1994 et seq.), Gliozzo et al. (2004 et seq.), Hudson (2007), 
Jackendoff (1983 et seq.), Langacker (1987 et seq.), Vogt (2000 et seq.), and 
others. Per §3.2.1, the TalaMind approach is open to use of formal logic 
leveraging or extending predicate calculus (e.g. Hobbs et al., 1993 et seq.; 
Vogel, 2001 et seq.) and to use of conceptual graph structures (Sowa, 
1984 et seq.).  It is compatible with McCarthy’s 1955 proposal to develop 
an artificial language for computers that would “correspond to English” 
and support self-reference and conjecture in problem-solving. It is 
compatible with Newell & Simon’s (1976) Physical Symbol Systems 
Hypothesis and Smith’s (1982) Knowledge Representation Hypothesis 
and Reflection Hypothesis. 
The nature, scope and content of the Tala language and TalaMind 
demonstration system appear to be new, in relation to previous 
research. While previous research has focused on specific elements, it 
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does not appear that previous research has presented a combined 
demonstration showing how a research approach could support 
learning and discovery by reasoning analogically, causal and purposive 
reasoning, meta-reasoning, imagination via conceptual simulation, and 
internal dialog between agents in a society of mind using a language of 
thought.  
7.7 Areas for Future AI Research 
The previous chapters have identified several areas for future AI 
research, to further develop the TalaMind approach. Many of these 
involve leveraging research in areas previously studied by others, 
which have been outside the scope of this thesis (§1.6). Following is an 
initial, high-level list: 
• Refine and extend representation of English syntax for Tala 
conceptual language. Represent English morphology and 
phonology. 
• Further develop semantic annotations within Tala and/or 
integrate Tala with other, formal languages for semantic 
annotation. 
• Extend TalaMind approach to use of other natural 
languages, as well as English. 
• Integrate with Wikipedia and natural language parsing, for 
encyclopedic knowledge. 
• Develop more scalable logic for Tala pattern-matching of 
large concept bases. 
• Further develop conceptual framework and conceptual 
processing logic to support reflection, self-programming 
and self-debugging of  executable concepts. 
• Further implement conceptual blend logic, for reasoning by 
analogy and processing of metaphors. 
• Further implement episodic memory, support discovery 
and reuse of  heuristics and memory structures for case-
based reasoning and creativity.  
• Further develop nested conceptual simulation. Extend to 
include methods for plausible story generation, e.g. case-
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based reasoning and creativity. 
• Extend causal and purposive reasoning to include Bayesian 
logic. 
• Further implement discovery loops for higher-level 
learning. 
• Implement learning and invention of language games, i.e. 
new languages and notations. 
• Integrate with representation and processing of non-
linguistic concepts. 
• Implement meta-reasoning for learning, and economy of 
mind logic. 
• Develop or integrate a commonsense component in 
multiple domains, e.g. using robotics with machine learning 
to acquire commonsense knowledge about physical 
environments, or using NLP algorithms to extract 
commonsense knowledge from linguistic corpora. 
• Further develop artificial consciousness within the 
TalaMind approach, including support for fringe 
consciousness and interplay between consciousness, 
understanding and unconsciousness. 
• Extend to include other research results from computational 
and cognitive linguistics, AI and cognitive science in 
general.  
These areas for future research may be viewed as achievable tasks 
that support the plausibility of the TalaMind approach, rather than as 
obstacles that decrease its plausibility, because research in these areas 
can in principle be successful and again, many of these involve 
leveraging successful research in areas previously studied by others. 
7.8 Plausibility of Thesis Approach 
Chapter 1 presented three hypotheses to address the open question 
central to this thesis: 
How could a system be designed to achieve human-level artificial intelligence? 
The previous sections review the criteria for judging the plausibility 
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that systems designed according to these hypotheses could eventually 
achieve human-level artificial intelligence, and support a conclusion 
that the TalaMind approach is a reasonable answer to the above 
question.  
Chapter 2 discussed alternative research toward the goal of human-
level AI. While the author expects the TalaMind approach is the best 
way to achieve human-level AI, this thesis does not claim that its 
approach is how a system should (rather than could) be designed to 
achieve human-level AI. Three arguments can be presented in favor of 
the TalaMind approach over other approaches in general, for designing 
a system to achieve human-level AI. 
The first argument is that the elements of the TalaMind approach are 
individually important and arguably essential to achieving human-level 
AI, and therefore any successful approach should include them, or 
something very much like them. Design inspection to verify support of 
higher-level mentalities is arguably essential to verify success in 
achieving human-level AI, per §2.1.1. Hypothesis I is arguably essential 
to ensure open-ended self-development of concepts in achieving 
human-level AI. Hypothesis II is arguably essential to ensure concise, 
general, open-ended representation of concepts, per Chapter 3’s 
analysis. Hypothesis III is arguably essential to support open-ended, 
multi-level cognition in human-level AI. The multi-level architecture 
shown in Figure 1-1 is arguably essential to support open-ended, 
situated cognition and behavior. 
The second argument is that the TalaMind approach may be more 
practical and likely to succeed than other approaches, because it may be 
more practical to verify its success. Per §2.1.1, inspection and analysis of 
a system’s design and operation is necessary to determine whether it 
supports the higher-level mentalities of human-level intelligence. This 
inspection will be facilitated if the system uses a conceptual language 
based on the syntax of a natural language, rather than a conceptual 
language more difficult for humans to understand. If the system is a 
black box, it is impossible to verify success. 
The third argument is that ethically a human-level AI system should 
be open to inspection by humans if it is ever to be used in any situation 
requiring human intelligence, because it will be important for people to 
inspect and understand its reasoning. Again, a system that reasons in a 
conceptual language based on English (or some other common natural 
language) will be more open to human inspection than a black box or a 
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system with an internal language that is difficult for people to 
understand. So, this suggests the TalaMind approach could be 
preferable to other approaches from an ethical perspective. 
The approach of reverse-engineering the human brain to achieve 
human-level AI (§2.3.3.4) is an exception to these arguments. That 
approach trades the design inspection and understanding of linguistic 
reasoning processes, offered by the TalaMind approach, for reliance on 
human neural processes simulated by computers. 
7.9 Future Applications and Related Issues in Economics 
The range of potential applications for human-level AI would 
include any application for human-level intelligence. This potential 
scope prompts the question: 
Should a system be designed to achieve human-level artificial intelligence? 
Some thinkers have suggested that even if it is theoretically possible 
to achieve human-level AI, such systems should not be created at all, for 
ethical reasons (viz. Weizenbaum, 1984; Joy, 2000). Russell & Norvig 
(2009) discuss potential negative consequences of AI technology, some 
of which were also discussed in Jackson (1974, 1985). The author 
believes that human intelligence can design and control AI to ensure it 
is beneficial to humanity, but a comprehensive discussion of all 
potential risks, and a resolution of this question, are beyond the bounds 
of this thesis. This section will focus on issues related to economic risks 
and benefits. 
In 1930, Keynes gave a name for a general problem in economics, 
writing: 
“We are being afflicted with a new disease of which some 
readers may not yet have heard the name, but of which they 
will hear a great deal in the years to come – namely, technological 
unemployment. This means unemployment due to our discovery 
of means of economising the use of labour outrunning the pace 
at which we can find new uses for labour.” 
In 1983, Leontief, Duchin, and Nilsson each wrote papers about the 
potential for automation79 and AI to cause long-lasting unemployment. 
                                                          
79 This section uses the term ‘automation’ in a very broad sense, to 
include the use of computers to provide goods and services throughout 
Evaluation 
256 
Leontief (1983a,b) reasoned the use of computers to replace human 
mental functions in producing goods and services would “progressively 
diminish” the need for human labor. Nilsson (1983) predicted AI would 
significantly reduce the total need for labor, particularly for white-collar 
and service sector jobs. Considering that computer technology would 
lead to a “dramatic reduction of labor requirements”, Duchin (1983) 
discussed methods for “large-scale distribution of income other than by 
paycheck.” 
In the past two decades, several authors have warned about this 
potential problem and suggested possible solutions. They include Albus 
(2011), Brain (2013), Brynjolfsson & McAfee (2011), Ford (2009), Reich 
(2009 et seq.), Rifkin (1995 et seq.), and others. So, several economists 
(Brynjolfsson, Duchin, Leontief, McAfee, Reich, Rifkin) and computer 
technologists (Albus, Brain, Ford, Nilsson) have discussed this problem 
and developed similar viewpoints.  
To be concise in referring to these authors, they will here be called 
Leontief-Duchin-Nilsson (LDN) theorists, focusing only on their arguments 
regarding technological unemployment, automation, and AI – they may 
disagree about other topics. It would be incorrect to call them Keynesian 
economists, since this term refers to Keynes’ theories more broadly. Nor 
is it accurate to call them Luddites or neo-Luddites, because they do not 
advocate halting technological progress. 
Economists in general disagree on whether technological 
unemployment can have widespread and long-lasting effects on 
workers and the economy. Many economists have considered it is not a 
significant problem, arguing that workers displaced by technology will 
eventually find jobs elsewhere, and the long-term effect on an economy 
will be positive.80 However, Leontief (1983b), who was awarded the 
Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1973, wrote: 
“The general theoretical proposition that the worker who loses 
his job in one industry will necessarily be able to find 
employment, possibly after appropriate retraining, in some 
other industry is as invalid as would be the assertion that horses 
that lost their jobs in transportation and agriculture can 
                                                                                                                                
an economy, i.e. not limited to manufacturing. This sense also includes 
‘computerization’ of goods and services. 
80 For instance, see Von Mises (1949, p.768) and Easterly (2001, p.53). 
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necessarily have been put to another economically productive 
use.” 
And Brynjolfsson & McAfee (2011) write: 
“There is no economic law that says that everyone, or even most 
people, automatically benefit from technological progress. 
People with little economics training intuitively grasp this 
point. They understand that some human workers may lose out 
in the race against the machine. Ironically, the best-educated 
economists are often the most resistant to this idea, as the 
standard models of economic growth implicitly assume that 
economic growth benefits all residents of a country. 
However…technological progress is not a rising tide that 
automatically raises all incomes. Even as overall wealth 
increases, there can be, and usually will be, winners and losers. 
And the losers are not necessarily some small segment of the 
labor force like buggy whip manufacturers. In principle, they 
can be a majority or even 90% or more of the population.”  
Since it is beyond the scope of this thesis to resolve disputes about 
theories of economics, the views of LDN theorists can at most be 
presented tentatively. Those writing in the past two decades roughly 
agree at least implicitly, and often explicitly, on the following points for 
the problem of technological unemployment: 
1. In the next several decades of the 21st century, automation 
and AI could lead to technological unemployment affecting 
millions of jobs at all income levels, in diverse occupations, 
and in both developed and developing nations. This could 
happen with current and near-term technologies, i.e. without 
human-level AI. It has already occurred for manufacturing, 
agriculture, and many service sector jobs. 
2. It will not be feasible for the world economy to create new 
jobs for the millions of displaced workers, offering 
equivalent incomes producing new products and services. 
3. Widespread technological unemployment could negatively 
impact the worldwide economy, because the market 
depends on mass consumption, which is funded by income 
from mass employment. LDN theorists vary in discussing 
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and describing the degree of impact. 
4. The problem is solvable by developing ways for 
governments and the economy to provide alternative 
incomes to people who are technologically unemployed. 
LDN theorists have proposed several methods for funding 
and distributing alternative incomes. 
5. The problem can and should be solved while preserving 
freedom of enterprise and a free market economy. 
6. The problem cannot be solved by halting or rolling back 
technological progress, because the world’s population 
depends on technology for economic survival and 
prosperity. 
7. Solutions to the problem could lead to greater prosperity, 
worldwide. LDN theorists vary in describing potential 
benefits: Nilsson envisioned automation and AI could 
provide the productive capacity to enable a transition from 
poverty to a “prosperous world society”. Ford suggested the 
extension of alternative incomes to people in poverty could 
create market demand supporting a ‘virtuous cycle’ of global 
economic growth. 
Space does not permit giving further details of LDN theorists’ 
arguments for these seven points – such a discussion is left for a future 
paper. 
Based on the arguments of LDN theorists, the possibility that AI 
could help eliminate global poverty may be considered a ‘potential best 
case event’ for the economic risks and benefits of AI. Yet while some 
authors 81  have argued humanity can achieve sustainable global 
prosperity even with a population of 15 billion people, many other 
scientists82 argue population must be limited to 8 billion in a sustainable 
                                                          
81 For instance, Kahn et al. (1976), Simon (1976 et seq.), and McCarthy 
(2003).  
82 For instance, Meadows et al. (1972 et seq.), Brown (1963 et seq.), and 
Ehrlich (1968 et seq.). These authors report that humanity’s ‘ecological 
footprint’ is already too large for sustainability. With this in mind, 
Meadows et al. (2004) discuss computer simulations showing 8 billion 
people could be sustained at “a level of well-being roughly equivalent 
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world economy, because of environmental issues including climate, 
ecology, energy, and natural resources.  The arguments of LDN theorists 
imply that, given freedom of enterprise and a free market, automation 
and AI would eventually cause widespread technological 
unemployment independently of environmental issues, though there is 
potential synergy in solutions on both fronts: Several LDN theorists 
have suggested that alternative incomes to address technological 
unemployment could also be used to help address environmental 
issues. That said, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss or 
advocate positions on specific environmental issues, population growth, 
etc. 
In addition to the potential best case event that AI could help 
eliminate world poverty, the author expects another benefit of human-
level AI could result from its application to the development of science. 
This could help develop scientific knowledge more rapidly and perhaps 
more objectively and completely than possible through human thought 
alone. If it is so applied, then human-level AI could help advance 
medicine, agriculture, energy systems, environmental sciences, and 
other areas of knowledge directly benefitting human prosperity and 
survival. 
Human-level AI may also be necessary to ensure the long-term 
prosperity of humanity, by enabling the economic development of outer 
space: If civilization remains confined to Earth then humanity is kept in 
an economy limited by the Earth’s resources. However, people are not 
biologically suited for lengthy space travel, with present technologies. 
To develop outer space it could be more cost-effective to use robots with 
human-level AI than to send people in spacecrafts that overcome the 
hazards of radiation and weightlessness, and provide water, food and 
air for space voyages lasting months or years. 
For the same reason, human-level AI may be necessary for the long-
term survival of humanity. To avoid the fate of the dinosaurs (whether 
from asteroids or super-volcanoes) our species may need economical, 
self-sustaining settlements off the Earth. Human-level AI may be 
necessary for mankind to spread throughout the solar system, and later 
the stars. 
                                                                                                                                
to the lower-income nations of present-day Europe … given reasonable 




With the help of your good hands: 
Gentle breath of yours my sails 
Must fill, or else my project fails, 
Which was to please. 
~ William Shakespeare, Prospero’s soliloquy in The Tempest, 1611 
 
Chapter 1 presented three hypotheses to address the open question: 
How could a system be designed to achieve human-level artificial intelligence? 
These hypotheses propose to develop an AI system using a language 
of thought called Tala, based on the syntax of a natural language; to 
design this system as a collection of concepts that can create and modify 
concepts to behave intelligently in an environment; and to use methods 
from cognitive linguistics such as mental spaces and conceptual blends 
for multiple levels of mental representation and computation. The 
TalaMind system architecture includes cognitive concept structures and 
associative data and analysis. This thesis cannot claim to actually 
achieve human-level AI, it can only present an approach that may 
eventually reach this goal. 
Chapter 2 discussed the relation of these hypotheses to previous 
research, and advocated design inspection as an approach to verifying 
whether a system achieves human-level AI. The chapter proposed that 
human-level intelligence should be defined as a collection of ‘higher-
level mentalities’, including natural language understanding, higher-
level learning, multi-level reasoning, imagination, and consciousness.  
Chapter 3 analyzed theoretical questions for the hypotheses, and 
discussed how a system could in principle be designed according to the 
hypotheses, to achieve the higher-level mentalities of human-level AI. It 
discussed theoretical issues for elements of the proposed TalaMind 
architecture, and presented affirmative theoretical arguments and 
explanations for how the TalaMind approach can be developed 
successfully.  
Chapter 4 discussed theoretical issues and objections that might be 
raised against the TalaMind approach, or against the possibility of 
achieving human-level AI in principle. No insurmountable objections 
Summation 
261 
were identified, and arguments refuting several objections were 
presented. 
Chapter 5 presented a design for a prototype demonstration system, 
in accordance with the analysis of Chapter 3. Its design for the syntax of 
the Tala conceptual language is fairly general and flexible, addressing 
issues such as compound nouns, gerunds, compound verbs, verb tense, 
aspect and voice, nested prepositions, clitic possessive determiners, 
gerundive adjectives, shared dependencies, coordinating and 
subordinating / structured conjunctions, subject-verb agreement, etc. 
This coverage indicates a Tala syntax could be comprehensive for 
English, though this is a future research effort. 
The system includes a prototype design for a TalaMind conceptual 
framework and conceptual processes. The conceptual framework 
includes prototype representations of perceived reality, subagents, a 
Tala lexicon, encyclopedic knowledge, mental spaces and conceptual 
blends, scenarios for nested conceptual simulation, executable concepts, 
grammatical constructions, and event memory. The prototype 
conceptual processes include interpretation of executable concepts with 
pattern-matching, variable binding, conditional and iterative 
expressions, transmission of internal speech acts between subagents, 
nested conceptual simulation, conceptual blending, and composable 
interpretation of grammatical constructions.  
Chapter 6 discussed how the prototype simulations illustrate that the 
TalaMind approach could potentially support the higher-level 
mentalities of human-level intelligence. Appendix B gives a step by step 
description of processing within the system, for one of the simulations. 
The simulations illustrate learning and discovery by reasoning 
analogically, causal and purposive reasoning, meta-reasoning, 
imagination via conceptual simulation, and internal dialog between 
subagents in a society of mind using a language of thought. The 
prototype also illustrates support for semantic disambiguation, natural 
language constructions, metaphors, semantic domains and conceptual 
blends, in communication between Tala agents. 
This illustration involves functioning code in a prototype system, but 
it can only be a small step toward the goal of human-level AI. The 
simulations show conceptual processing, though without encyclopedic 
and commonsense knowledge in a scalable version of the TalaMind 
architecture. These are needed to achieve human-level AI and are topics 
for the future, to leverage research in areas previously studied by others 
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(viz. §§1.6, 7.7). 
Taken together, Chapters 1 through 6 support a plausibility 
argument that the TalaMind approach could achieve human-level AI if 
the approach were fully developed. Chapter 7 evaluates the criteria for 
this argument. Potential risks and benefits resulting from the 
development of artificial intelligence have been discussed, focusing on 
issues related to economics. 
As stated in Chapter 1, the success criteria for this thesis will 
ultimately be whether researchers in the field deem that the proposed 
approach is a worthwhile direction for future research, given the 
arguments and evidence presented in these pages.  
Therefore, the success of this thesis is now in its readers’ hands, and 









“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a 
scornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean – 
neither more nor less.” 
~ Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass, 1871 
 
Following are definitions for certain words and phrases already in common 
usage, relative to usage in this work, as well as terms coined in this thesis 
(marked here by *). 
Causal Reasoning – reasoning about causes of actions and events. 
Computation – either discrete or continuous computation. 
Concept – a) Any thought, percept, effept, belief, idea, etc. b) In 
general throughout this thesis, the word concept is used to refer to 
linguistic concepts, i.e. concepts that can be represented as natural 
language expressions (Evans & Green, 2006, p. 158) The term conceptual 
structure refers to a concept expressed in the Tala language. The term 
non-linguistic concept refers to concepts at the archetype level or below 
(cf. Gärdenfors 2000, Murphy 2004). 
Conceptual Framework - An information architecture for managing 
an extensible collection of concepts, in general expressed via the 
mentalese. The conceptual framework supports processing and 
retention of concepts ranging from immediate thoughts and percepts to 
long term memory, including concepts representing definitions of 
words, knowledge about domains of discourse, memories of past 
events, etc. 
Conceptual Language – a language for expressing concepts 
internally within an intelligent system. More generally, a language of 
thought, or mentalese, for representing concepts that can be expressed 
by natural language sentences. 
Conceptual Process – A process that operates on concepts in a 




Conceptual Structure – A sentence expressed in the Tala conceptual 
language. 
Continuous Computation - Computation performed by continuous 
dynamical systems, i.e. systems having dynamics specified by 
continuous functions (e.g. differential equations) of state vectors of real 
or complex variables, changing continuously over time. (viz. 
Scheinerman, 1996; Graça 2007) 
Discrete Computation - Symbolic computation by computers, for 
which a general theoretical definition was given by Turing (1936).  
Effept *– (pronounced “eefept”) A Tala concept representing an 
action to be performed in the environment by a Tala agent. This may 
include a speech act. 
Executable Concept (xconcept) * – A concept that describes a 
process or behavior that may be performed by a Tala agent, i.e. a 
sequence of steps to perform, conditions and iterations, etc. The steps to 
perform may include effepts, meffepts, assertions or deletions of 
concepts in the conceptual framework, including creation and 
modification of other executable concepts. Conditions may include tests 
on percepts, goals, finding concepts within the conceptual framework, 
etc. Pattern-matching may be used to express conditions, so that an 
executable concept may process all or part of a Tala concept. 
Higher-Level Learning * – Used collectively to refer to forms of 
learning required for human-level intelligence, including self-
development of new ways of thinking, learning by creating 
explanations and testing predictions, learning about new domains by 
developing explanations based on analogies and metaphors with 
previously known domains, reasoning about ways to “debug” and 
improve behaviors and methods, learning and invention of natural 
languages, or language games, learning or inventing new 
representations. The phrase “higher-level learning” is used to 
distinguish these from lower-level forms of learning investigated in 
previous research on machine learning (viz. Valiant, 2013). 
Higher-Level Mentalities * – Used collectively to refer to 
consciousness, multi-level reasoning, higher-level learning, imagination, 
and understanding (in general and of natural language). 
Human AI – Short for human-level artificial intelligence. 
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Human-Level Artificial Intelligence – AI that demonstrates 
essential capabilities of human-level intelligence, such as human-level 
generality, originality, natural language understanding, effectiveness 
and robustness, efficiency, meta-cognition and multi-level reasoning, 
self-development and higher-level learning, imagination, consciousness, 
sociality, emotions and values. These terms are further discussed in 
§2.1.2. 
Intelligence Kernel * – A system of concepts that can create and 
modify concepts to behave intelligently within an environment. This is a 
way of describing a ‘baby machine’ approach to human-level artificial 
intelligence, as a self-extending system of concepts. 
Language of Thought - A language of symbolic expressions 
comprising conceptual structures that an AI system can develop or 
process. 
Leontief-Duchin-Nilsson (LDN) Theory * – The theory that 
automation and AI can cause technological unemployment, discussed in 
§7.9. See Leontief (1983 et seq.), Duchin (1983 et seq.), and Nilsson (1983 
et seq.). 
Meffept * – (pronounced “meefept”) A mental speech act (see next). 
Mental Speech Act * – The transmission of a Tala concept by a Tala 
subagent to other subagents within the society of mind of a Tala agent. 
This extends Austin’s (1962) description of speech acts as external, 
physical acts of communication between humans, to a corresponding 
idea of internal, mental acts within a society of mind (§2.3.3.2.1). 
Mpercept * – (pronounced “empercept”) A Tala subagent’s percept 
of another Tala subagent’s mental speech act (meffept). 
Multi-Level Reason, or Multi-Level Reasoning * – Used collectively 
to refer to reasoning capabilities of human-level intelligence at different 
levels of mentality, such as meta-reasoning, reasoning by analogy, 
causal and purposive reasoning, abduction, induction, and deduction. 
Nested Conceptual Simulation *– a Tala agent’s conceptual 
processing of hypothetical scenarios, with possible branching of 
scenarios based on alternative events, such as choices of simulated Tala 
agents within scenarios. 
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Non-Symbolic Information Processing – information processing 
that is not described in the symbolic computation paradigm (Turing 
machines), e.g. connectionist or holographic processing – though in 
principle such information processing may be possible to simulate 
symbolically. 
Percept – A concept representing a Tala agent’s perception of an 
object or event in its environment. 
Physical Symbol – A persistent physical pattern that can be 
accurately recognized and distinguished from other physical patterns, 
and that can be created, copied or erased, independently of other 
instances of patterns. A physical symbol may be a physical object, a 
pattern of energy, a state of an object, etc. It may not necessarily have a 
meaning or referent. 
Principle of Encyclopedic Semantics – “Word meaning cannot be 
understood independently of the vast repository of encyclopedic 
knowledge to which it is linked [and] grounded in human interaction 
with others (social experience) and the world around us (physical 
experience).” Viz. Evans & Green (2006, p. 206) and §3.2.2. 
Purposive Reasoning – reasoning about purpose or goals, e.g. for 
what purpose or goal did an agent perform an action, what should be 
done to achieve a goal, etc. This term is used instead of intentional 
reasoning, since intentional has a different sense in literature on 
philosophy of mind. Quoting Searle (2004, p. 174): “Intentionality-with-
a-t, as we have seen, is that property of the mind by which it is directed 
at or about or of objects and states of affairs in the world independent of 
itself.” 
Speech Act – Throughout this thesis, the term speech act is used 
according to Austin’s (1962) description of a ‘total speech act’, which 
includes locutionary as well as pragmatic (illocutionary and 
perlocutionary) acts. The term speech act is not limited to physical 
speech, and includes any physical creation of a natural language 
expression. 
Structurality Principle / Requirement for Tala * – Information 
about the syntax of individual natural language sentences needs to be 
represented in Tala conceptual structures. Viz. §3.5.2. 
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Tala * - The conceptual language defined in Chapter 5, with the 
proviso that this is only the initial version of the Tala language, open to 
revision and extension in future work. The name Tala is taken from the 
Indian musical framework for cyclic rhythms, pronounced “Tah-luh”, 
though the author pronounces it to rhyme with “ballad” and “salad”. 
The musical term tala is also spelled taal and taala, and coincidentally 
taal is Dutch for “language”. Tala is also the name of the unit of 
currency in Samoa. 
Tala Agent * – A system that implements the TalaMind architecture, 
to act as an agent within an environment. 
Tala Concept *  – A concept expressed in the Tala conceptual 
language. 
Tala Subagent * – A subagent within a Tala agent’s society of mind 
(§2.3.3.2.1). Tala subagents communicate with each other using mental 
speech acts expressed in the Tala language. 
TalaMind * - The theoretical approach of this thesis and its 
hypotheses, and to an architecture the thesis discusses for design of 
systems according to the hypotheses. TalaMind is also the name of the 
prototype system illustrating this approach. 
Technological Unemployment – “Unemployment due to our 
discovery of means of economising the use of labour outrunning the 
pace at which we can find new uses for labour” (Keynes, 1930). Viz. 
§7.9. 
Virtual Embodiment * – The ability of an intelligent system to 
understand and reason about physical reality, and to transcend the 
limitations of its physical body (or lack thereof) in reasoning about the 
environment. 
Xconcept * - See ‘Executable Concept’.  
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Appendix A. Theoretical Questions for Analysis of Approach 
For reference, following is a list of theoretical questions considered 
in Chapter 3. 
‽ What is required for a conceptual language to serve as a 
‘language of thought” for a system with human-level artificial 
intelligence? 
‽ What is the relation of thoughts expressible in natural language 
to the range of thoughts that need to be expressible in the Tala 
conceptual language, to achieve human-level AI? 
‽ What properties must the Tala conceptual language have, to 
represent concepts that can create and modify concepts, to 
behave intelligently in an environment? 
‽ What other properties must the Tala conceptual language have, 
to support human-level artificial intelligence? 
‽ To what extent might a conceptual language need to go beyond 
the syntax of a natural language? 
‽ What capabilities must the TalaMind conceptual framework 
have, to support achieving human-level AI, according to the 
TalaMind hypotheses? 
‽ What capabilities must the TalaMind conceptual processes have, 
to support achieving human-level AI, according to the TalaMind 
hypotheses? 
‽ Is it theoretically possible to use the syntax of a natural language 
to represent meaning in a conceptual language? 
‽ Is it theoretically possible to reason directly with natural 
language syntax? 
‽ Is it theoretically valid to choose English as a basis for the Tala 
conceptual language, rather than other natural languages? 
‽ Which elements of English syntax are important to Tala? What 
about morphology and phonology? 
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‽ Which theoretical option is chosen for representing English 
syntax in Tala? 
‽ How can the syntactic structure of individual natural language 
sentences be represented in Tala sentences, to support reasoning 
with syntactic structures? 
‽ How can a Tala agent represent the different possible meanings 
of an English word? 
‽ How can a Tala agent represent the specific senses of the words 
in a given sentence? 
‽ How can a Tala agent represent the specific referents of words in 
a given sentence? 
‽ How can a Tala agent determine the specific senses and referents 
of the words in a given sentence? 
‽ Can there be different Tala sentences that express the same 
concept? 
‽ How can a Tala agent represent different possible interpretations 
of an English sentence? 
‽ How can a Tala agent determine which interpretations of an 
English sentence are appropriate? 
‽ How can a Tala agent represent different possible implications of 
an English sentence? 
‽ How can a Tala agent determine which implications of an 
English sentence are appropriate? 
‽ How can logical inference be performed using the Tala 
conceptual language, working directly with natural language 
syntax? 
‽ How is truth represented in the TalaMind architecture? 
‽ How are negation and falsity represented in the TalaMind 
architecture? 
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‽ How does the TalaMind architecture guarantee that if a Tala 
sentence is true, its negation is false? 
‽ How can it be determined that two concepts are contradictory? 
‽ How does the TalaMind architecture guarantee that, if “John and 
Mary live in Chicago” is true, the sentence “Mary and John live 
in Chicago” is also true (both on the individual and on the 
collective readings)? 
‽ How can conceptual processing deal with the fact that the same 
concept may be expressed in different ways? 
‽ How can conceptual processing determine the implications of a 
metaphorical or metonymical expression? 
‽ What is context? 
‽ What types of contexts should be represented and processed in 
the TalaMind approach? 
‽ How can contexts be represented in the TalaMind approach? 
‽ Do contexts have attributes or features in the TalaMind 
approach? 
‽ Do contexts have internal structures in the TalaMind approach? 
‽ Does Tala contain primitive words, and if so, how are their 
meanings represented and determined? 
‽ What is theoretically required, to claim a system achieves each 
higher-level mentality? 
‽ How can each higher-level mentality be supported by the 





Appendix B. Processing in Discovery of Bread Simulation 
To provide a more detailed discussion of the execution of the 
demonstration system, this appendix shows the output produced if both 
the (sc) and (sa) commands described in §5.6.1 are used. These 
commands display processing of constructions and show subagents 
producing physical and mental actions. Since many of the executable 
concepts are fairly lengthy, they are not all reprinted in the following 
pages. Instead, concise English or pseudocode summaries are frequently 
given.  
When the Tala agent Leo is created in the simulation, the following 
Tala concept is asserted in his concept path (mind contexts p-
reality percepts mu): 
 (have 
  (wusage verb) 
  (subj Leo) 
  (obj 
   (grain 
    (wusage noun) 
    (adj excess) 
    ] 
Using the Tala FlatEnglish output logic (§0), this is displayed as: 
1...1  Leo has excess grain. 
1...1   (mu) Leo thinks Leo has excess grain. 
When the Tala agent Leo is created, he has an xconcept with the 
following description: 
 if I have excess X and sheep eat X, then try to eat X. 
Leo processes this to create an effept, which the system displays as: 
1...2   Leo tries to eat grain. 
When the simulation is started, a Tala behavioral system called 
grain is created, representing Leo’s wheat grain. The initial state of this 
collection of individual wheat grains is that they resemble nuts, i.e. they 
have shells (hulls). When Leo tries to eat grain, the system translates his 
effept into an input-action for the grain behavioral system. This input-
action is processed by an xconcept representing a finite-state behavior 
rule for the grain. Based on its current state, this rule causes the grain to 
generate an output-action, which Leo receives as a percept, in a Tala 
mentalese expression saying that grain is not edible. 
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Leo has an xconcept of the form: 
If I perceive X is not edible but sheep can eat X 
Then 
     Want Ben to make X edible for humans 
 And ask Ben if he can make X edible for humans 
 And add X and ‘food’ to my current semantic domains. 
The outputs displayed by processing this xconcept are: 
1...3   Leo wants Ben to make edible grain. 
1...4   Leo asks Ben can you turn grain into fare for people?. 83 
This xconcept is a “logical bridge” shortcut to support the 
simulation, which implicitly replaces several forms of knowledge and 
commonsense reasoning, such as: 
Leo does not know how to make X edible. 
Leo knows that Ben is a baker, and bakers can make inedible 
things edible. 
Leo knows that if he wants to do X but cannot do X himself, 
then he could want someone else to do X. 
Leo knows that if he wants someone to do X, he should ask 
them to do X. 
In principle this logical bridge could be eliminated and replaced by 
these other concepts and xconcepts, but to do so would not add 
significantly to the value of the demonstration, and would have 
increased the time needed to code and debug it. So, the author chose to 
use a shortcut for this part of the simulation. 
Leo’s elaborate wording of his request (“can you turn grain into fare 
for people?”) is built into the xconcept to help demonstrate 
disambiguation by Ben, in the next few steps below. In principle, 
constructions could have been written causing Leo to generate this 
wording from the simpler expression “can you make grain edible?”, but 
this was also not considered necessary, since constructions are 
demonstrated elsewhere in the simulation. Leo will remember that he 
mentioned ‘grain’ and ‘food’ by adding these words to his current 
semantic domains, which will later support disambiguating Ben’s 
utterances. Leo will remember that he wants Ben to make grain edible, 
which will help Leo decide to give Ben grain, later in the simulation. 
Leo also has a general xconcept that if he perceives something, he 
will say what he perceives. Since he has a percept that grain is not 
                                                          
83 The system’s FlatEnglish output has a bug causing it to generate an 
extra period at the end of some sentences. 
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edible, this xconcept causes him to say so:  
1...4   Leo says grain is not edible. 
Because of timing in the simulation logic, this statement is displayed 
before Leo asks Ben if he can turn grain into fare for people, but after 
Leo decides he wants Ben to make edible grain. 
As it happens with the current system logic, when Ben perceives 
Leo’s utterances, the first thing Ben does is to disambiguate “you” in 
Leo’s request. Ben does this by processing Leo’s question with a 
grammatical construction of the form: 
 (subformtrans 
  (wusage verb) 
  (trace) 
  (subj 
   (ask 
    (wusage verb) 
    (subj ?s) 
    (obj 
     (?verb 
      (wusage verb) 
      (subj you) 
      )))) 
  (obj 
   (ask 
    (wusage verb) 
    (subj ?s) 
    (obj 
     (?verb 
      (wusage verb) 
      (subj  
       (?self 
        (wusage noun) 
        ] 
This construction matches you as a subject of a verb within the 
speech act, and replaces you with Ben’s binding of ?self. The resulting 
construct is displayed by the system as: 
1...4   (Ben translates as) Leo asks Ben can Ben turn grain into 
fare for people?. 
Ben next processes Leo’s statement that grain is not edible, using an 
executable concept with the following description: 
if someone says x is not y and y means z  
then think they say x is not z. 
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This causes Ben’s (mu) subagent to search his Tala lexicon and find 
that “edible” means “food for people”, generating the internal speech 
event: 
1...4   (mu) Ben thinks Leo says grain is not food for people. 
This xconcept also causes Ben to add two Tala concepts to a new slot 
in his conceptual framework, located at (mind contexts p-reality 
current-domains): 
  (food  
 (wusage noun)  
 (for  
    (people  
    (wusage noun) 
    ))) 
 
  (grain 
 (wusage noun) 
     ) 
This represents that Ben now has “food for people” and “grain” as 
concepts in his perceived-reality list of current semantic domains being 
discussed with Leo. 
Ben next does further processing to disambiguate Leo’s question, 
which he now treats as “can Ben turn grain into fare for people?”. To 
disambiguate “fare”, Ben needs to know that the context of the dialog 
involves food, rather than some other meaning, such as payment for 
transportation. 
Ben’s (mu) subagent processes an executable concept, for which the 
logic may be described as: 
If someone asks can I turn X into Y for P 
Then 
If Y can mean Z 
   And (Z for P) is in current-domains 
Then think he asks can I turn X into Z for P 
In pattern-matching for this xconcept, X is bound to “grain”, Y is 
bound to “fare”, Z is bound to “food” and P is bound to “people”. Ben’s 
subagent finds in his lexicon that “fare” can mean “food”, and finds that 
“food for people” is in Ben’s list of current-domains being discussed. So 
this xconcept produces a  mental speech act displayed as: 
1...4   (mu) Ben thinks Leo asks can Ben turn grain into food for 
people?. 
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Ben next needs to process the common English metaphor that “turn 
X into Y” can mean “make X be Y”. To do this, Ben processes his above 
internal speech act with a construction that matches the subform “Turn 
X into Y” and translates it to “Make X be Y”. This construction is written 
in the Tala mentalese as: 
 (subformtrans 
  (wusage verb) 
  (subj 
   (turn 
    (wusage verb) 
    (subj (?s (wusage noun))) 
    (obj (?x (wusage noun))) 
    (into (?y (wusage noun))) 
    ) 
   ) 
  (obj 
   (make 
    (wusage verb) 
    (subj (?s (wusage noun))) 
    (obj 
     (be 
      (wusage verb) 
      (subj (?x (wusage noun))) 
      (obj (?y (wusage noun))) 
      ] 
This generates a construct displayed by the system as: 
1...4   (Ben translates as) (mu) Ben thinks Leo asks can Ben 
make grain be food for people?. 
So, at this point Ben has finished disambiguating Leo’s request “can 
you turn grain into fare for people?”. 
Ben has an xconcept with the following description: 
 If I think someone asks if I can make x be food,  
     Then if I can say I can 
  Else think why should I make x be food? 
Processing this xconcept causes the system to display: 
1...4   (nu) Ben thinks why should Ben make grain be food for 
people?. 
Ben has  xconcepts with the descriptions: 
 If I think why should I make X be Y 
     Then if I find info that people need more Y sources 
     Then think people need more Y sources 
 
 If I think people need more food sources 
   And I find info that Leo has excess X 
   And I find info that sheep eat X 
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   And I find info that X is not edible for people 
 Then think  
  if I can feasibly make X edible 
  then I should do so. 
These xconcepts summarize conceptual processing Ben could in 
principle perform to decide why he should try to make grain be food for 
people. This could include commonsense and domain-specific 
knowledge about economics, business, farming, cooking, etc., which is 
outside the scope of this thesis, per §1.6. Processing these xconcepts 
causes the system to display: 
1...4   (mu) Ben thinks people need more food sources. 
1...4   (nu) Ben thinks if Ben feasibly can make grain be food 
          for people then Ben should make grain be food for people. 
Ben has  an xconcept with the description: 
 If I think  
  (if I can feasibly make X edible 
           then I should do so) 
 Then I want to know whether humans can perhaps eat X 
   And I want to know how I can make X be food for people 
   And I want to experiment with X 
   And I want to examine X. 
Processing this xconcept causes the system to display: 
1...4    Ben wants Ben to know whether humans perhaps can 
           eat grain.. 
1...4    Ben wants Ben to know how Ben can make grain  
           be food for people. 
1...4    Ben wants Ben to experiment with grain. 
1...4    Ben wants Ben to examine grain. 
This xconcept is another logical bridge that replaces multiple kinds 
of commonsense knowledge and reasoning, such as: 
If I think I should do something,  
   then I want to know if it is possible,  
   i.e. if it perhaps could be done. 
If I think I should do something,  
   then I want to know how I could do it. 
If I want to know how I can make X be edible,  
   then I want to experiment with X. 
If I want to experiment with X,  
   then I want to examine X. 
Again, in principle this logical bridge could be eliminated and 
replaced by other concepts and xconcepts, but to do so would not add 
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significantly to the value of the demonstration. The first part of this 
xconcept:  
(if I think  
    (if I can feasibly make X edible I should do so)  
 then…)  
is written to match the concept previously generated by Ben (nu):  
(“if Ben feasibly can make grain be food for people  
 then Ben should make grain be food for people”)  
Metaphorically, it is the entrance to the logical bridge. The outputs from 
the logical bridge are the goals that Ben creates, i.e. the concepts 
representing that he wants to experiment with grain, to examine grain, 
etc., which drive his subsequent reasoning and actions. 
Ben has  an xconcept with the description: 
  If I want to experiment with X 
  Then ask Leo to turn over some to me for experiments. 
This causes the system to display: 
1...5   Ben asks can you turn over some to me for experiments?. 
Ben’s wording of his request is built into the xconcept, so that the 
request will require disambiguation by Leo. Ben could have expressed 
himself less ambiguously, of course, but one goal of the simulation is to 
illustrate disambiguation. 
This expression requires disambiguation by Leo in four ways: Leo 
needs to disambiguate “some” as a reference to “grain”. He needs to 
disambiguate “turn over” as the common English metaphorical 
expression for “give”. And Leo needs to disambiguate “me” as a 
reference to Ben and “you” as a reference to himself. 
Leo first disambiguates “you”, using the construction described 
above. The system displays this as: 
1...5  (Leo translates as) Ben asks can Leo turn over some  
         to me for experiments?. 
Leo next disambiguates “some” as “some grain”, using an xconcept 
which has the following description: 
If A asks can I turn over “some” to C for experiments 
Then 
If I want A to make X edible 
   And I have excess X 
   And X is in current-domains 
Then think A asks can I turn over some X to C 
   for experiments 
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In pattern-matching to process this xconcept, A is bound to “Ben”, 
and “C” is bound to “me”, though at this point “me” has not been 
disambiguated. Leo’s subagent finds that Leo wants Ben to make grain 
edible, that Leo has excess grain, and that grain is in Leo’s perceived-
reality current-domains for discussion. Since grain satisfies all these 
conditions, X is bound to “grain”.  
Thus, this logic disambiguates “some for experiments” to match 
whatever is in the context of discussion that Leo wants Ben to change, 
and which Leo has in excess. The xconcept produces a  mental speech 
act displayed as: 
1...5   (mu) Leo thinks Ben asks can Leo turn over some grain 
          to me for experiments?. 
Leo processes this internal speech act with a construction that 
matches and translates the subform “Turn over X to Y” into “Give X to 
Y”. This construction is written in the Tala mentalese as: 
 (subformtrans 
  (wusage verb) 
  (subj 
   (turn 
    (wusage verb) 
    (subj (?s (wusage noun))) 
    (over (?x (wusage noun))) 
    (to (?y (wusage noun))) 
    )) 
  (obj 
   (give 
    (wusage verb) 
    (subj (?s (wusage noun))) 
    (obj (?x (wusage noun))) 
    (to (?y (wusage noun)))] 
This produces the internal construct: 
1...5   (Leo translates as) (mu) Leo thinks Ben asks can Leo  
          give some grain to me for experiments?. 
Leo next disambiguates “me” to refer to Ben, using the grammatical 
construction: 
 (subformtrans 
  (wusage verb) 
  (subj 
   (ask 
    (wusage verb) 
    (subj ?s) 
    (obj 
     (?verb 
      (wusage verb) 
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      (to me) 
      )))) 
  (obj 
   (ask 
    (wusage verb) 
    (subj ?s) 
    (obj 
     (?verb 
      (wusage verb) 
      (to 
       (?s 
        (wusage noun) 
        ] 
This produces the internal construct: 
1...5   (Leo translates as) (mu) Leo thinks Ben asks can Leo 
          give some grain to Ben for experiments?. 
Leo processes this with an xconcept that has the description: 
If A asks me to give X to A 
Then 
If I want A to make X edible 
   And I have excess X 
Then give X to A 
Processing this xconcept causes Leo to generate an effept that the 
system displays as the event: 
1...6   Leo gives some grain to Ben. 
Ben has an xconcept with the description: 
If someone gives me X 
And I want to examine X 
Then examine X. 
Processing this xconcept causes the event: 
1...7   Ben examines grain. 
The grain receives Ben’s effept to examine grain as an input-action, 
and processes this with a finite-state behavior rule that causes it to 
transmit its current state back to Ben, which Ben receives as a percept. 
Its current state is that the individual wheat grains resemble nuts. 
Ben’s (mu) subagent has an xconcept to process percepts, and to 
report percepts using internal speech acts (meffepts) to other subagents. 
This causes Ben mu to generate an internal speech act that the system 
displays as: 
1...8   (mu) Ben thinks wheat grains resemble nuts. 
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Ben has an xconcept with the description: 
If X resembles Y 
   And I want to know if X is edible 
   And Y is edible 
Then imagine an analogy from Y to X focused on food 
 for people. 
The logic for this xconcept is actually more general, being written to 
match any action that an agent can perform on Y that Ben wants to 
perform on X. This xconcept causes Ben to create a mental space that 
blends concepts from his semantic domain for nuts with an analogical 
mapping of grain to nuts (§6.3.5.1): 
1...8   (nu) Ben imagines an analogy from nuts to grain  
          focused on food for people. 
Ben populates this mental space with concepts about grain that are 
analogs of concepts he has in his semantic domain for nuts. Ben’s 
semantic domain for nuts has the following content and structure: 
 (nut 
  (domain-matrix plant) 
  (concepts 
   a nut is an edible seed inside an inedible shell. 
   to eat a nut a human must remove its 
               inedible shell. 
  humans can eat nuts removed from shells. 
   humans can remove shells from nuts by pounding nuts  
   because pounding breaks shells off nuts. 
   )) 
 So, Ben creates a mental space for the analogy with the initial 
content: 
 (1 
  (space-type blend) 
  (elements grain seed shell human) 
  (concepts 
  grain perhaps is an edible seed inside an  
          inedible shell. 
  humans perhaps must remove shells from grains  
          to eat grains. 
  humans perhaps can eat grains removed from shells. 
   ] 
As the concepts are created, Ben’s (nu) subagent thinks them as 
internal speech acts: 
1...8   (nu) Ben thinks grain perhaps is an edible seed 
          inside an inedible shell. 
1...8   (nu) Ben thinks humans perhaps must remove shells 
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            from grains to eat grains. 
1...8   (nu) Ben thinks humans perhaps can eat grains 
           removed from shells. 
This analogy indicates it may be necessary to remove shells from 
grains to eat grains, but it does not contain a concept saying how to 
remove shells from grains, since the corresponding concept for nuts did 
not refer to eating nuts. 
Ben processes a construction that translates “must do X to Y” into “X 
must precede Y”, yielding: 
1...8   (Ben translates as) Ben thinks humans perhaps  
          remove shells from grains perhaps must precede  
          humans eat grains. 
Ben has an xconcept with the description: 
If remove S from X must precede eating X 
   And I want to know how to make X be food for people 
   And X resembles Y 
Then imagine an analogy from Y to X focused removing S. 
The logic for this xconcept is actually more general, being written to 
match any action that an agent can perform on S. When this xconcept is 
processed, the system displays: 
1...8   (mu) Ben imagines the analogy from nuts to grain 
          focused on removeing84 shells. 
In processing this xconcept, the logic finds the mental space that has 
already been created for the analogy from nuts to grain, rescans the 
concepts in the semantic domain for nuts, and adds analogous concepts 
for grain into the mental space, focusing on those concepts which refer 
to removing shells. (Concepts that are already in the mental space are 
not re-added.) This causes one new analogous concept to be added, 
which the system displays as: 
1...8   (mu) Ben thinks humans perhaps can remove shells 
          from grains by pounding grains because pounding 
          breaks shells off grains. 
Ben has an xconcept with the description: 
                                                          
84 The system’s FlatEnglish logic is not intelligent enough to remove 
the second “e” in “removeing”. 
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If I think  
    perhaps humans can remove shells from X  
      by pounding X 
    And perhaps humans must remove shells from X 
      to eat X 
Then pound X and examine X 
This yields: 
1...9   Ben pounds grain. 
1...9   Ben examines grain. 
The grain receives Ben’s effept to pound grain as an input-action, 
and processes this with a finite-state behavior rule, that has the 
description: 
If someone pounds grain  
   and its current state is that it resembles nuts,  
Then change its current state to be that grain has been 
   removed from shells. 
The grain then receives Ben’s effept to examine grain as an input-
action, and processes this with its finite-state behavior rule that causes it 
to transmit its current state back to Ben, which Ben receives as a percept. 
Ben’s (mu) subagent uses the xconcept described above to report 
percepts using internal speech acts (meffepts) to other subagents. This 
causes Ben (mu) to generate an internal speech act that the system 
displays as: 
1...10   (mu) Ben thinks grain is removed from shells. 
Ben has an xconcept with the description: 
If I think X is removed from shells 
    And perhaps humans can eat X that is removed 
    from shells 
Then try to eat x. 
This yields: 
1...11   Ben tries to eat grain. 
The grain receives Ben’s effept to eat grain as an input-action, and 
processes this with a finite-state behavior rule, which generates an 
output-action that Ben receives as a percept, in a Tala mentalese 
expression saying that grain is very hard. Ben (mu) reports this percept 
using an internal speech act which the system displays as: 
1...12   (mu) Ben thinks grain is not edible because grain is very 
hard. 
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Ben has an xconcept with the description: 
If I think ?x is not edible because ?x is very hard  
Then 
     do 
    steps 
       think how can I make ?x softer 
       random-affect ?x 
       examine ?x 
       wait until perceive ?x 
       try to eat ?x 
       wait until perceive ?x 
    until 
      or 
         I think ?x is soft 
     I think ?x is a ?adjective ?substance 
        and 
          I think ?adjective means (and soft …) 
     I think ?x is a ruined mess 
This xconcept creates a TalaMind process object that performs the 
Tala do-loop across multiple time-intervals. At each time-interval, the 
system checks the do-until condition and the currently active wait-until 
condition. If the do-until condition is not satisfied, and the wait-until 
condition is satisfied, then the system performs the next actions in the 
steps expression, after the satisfied wait-until condition. The system 
iterates, returning to the start of the steps expression after the final wait-
until condition. If the do-until condition is satisfied, then TalaMind 
stops performing the process-object: the do-loop has terminated and the 
process-object is garbage-collected. 
This process object does not prevent other executable concepts from 
being performed in parallel with it, during the same time intervals. So, 
for example if in performing the process object Ben examines grain and 
perceives that it is a gooey paste, a separate Tala xconcept can decide to 
call it “dough”, interleaved with the Tala process object trying to eat 
“dough”. 
The do-until condition causes the Tala do-loop to terminate if either 
Ben thinks that grain is soft, or that grain is a gooey paste (and thinks 
that gooey means soft, wet, and sticky), or that grain is a ruined mess. 
When the verb random-affect is processed its definition is looked 
up in the lexicon, and a Tala mentalese expression with the following 
pseudocode description is found and executed: 
  random-affect ?x 
     means 
    affect ?x  
       adv randomly 
       how 
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                     method 
        random-xor-execute 
        mash ?x 
        pound ?x 
        soak ?x in water 
        mix ?x in water 
The Tala primitive verb random-xor-execute randomly chooses 
one of the verbs within its scope, and executes it. Thus, random-affect 
results in a random action on grain. The random action is transferred 
within TalaMind to the finite-state behavior model of grain, which may 
cause grain to change state. 
So, the net result is that Ben performs a random sequence of actions 
on grain. After each action he examines grain and tries to eat it. The 
random sequence stops when he perceives that grain is soft, or  is a 
gooey paste (dough) or has become a ruined mess. 
Ben can create dough by removing shells from grain, soaking grain 
in water, and mashing grain that is soaked in water. If Ben tries to mash 
or pound grain after shells have been removed from grain, then grain 
becomes a gritty powder, which Ben decides to call flour. If Ben mixes 
flour with water, it becomes a gooey paste that he calls dough. If instead 
Ben just soaks flour in water, it becomes a ruined mess. Ben can also 
create a ruined mess by removing shells from grain, soaking grain in 
water, and then pounding grain in water (presumably splashing grain 
and water all about). The Tala do-loop does not prevent Ben from 
repeating actions: he may choose to pound grain repeatedly, or mash 
grain and then pound it, etc. 
Since this Tala do-loop can run for a variable number of time 
intervals, the step by step description from this point on is variable. 
Following is a specific sequence of actions produced by a particular 
execution of the do-loop: 
1...12    (mu) Ben thinks how can Ben make softer grain?. 
1...13    Ben soaks grain in water. 
1...13    Ben examines grain. 
1...14    (mu) Ben thinks unshelled grain is soaked in water. 
1...15    Ben tries to eat grain. 
1...16    (mu) Ben thinks grain is not edible because  
             grain is rather hard. 
1...16    (mu) Ben thinks how can Ben make softer grain?. 
1...17    Ben mashs grain. 
1...17    Ben examines grain. 
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1...18    (mu) Ben thinks grain is a gooey paste. 
1...18    (general) Ben thinks grain that is a gooey paste  
             will be called dough. 
1...19    Ben tries to eat dough. 
1...20   (mu) Ben thinks dough is soft, too gooey, and 
             tastes bland. 
At this point, the Tala do-loop has terminated. Ben’s internal speech 
act (meffept) that dough is soft, too gooey and tastes bland becomes an 
mpercept for Ben’s (nu) subagent, which uses an xconcept to isolate 
“too gooey” from the conjunction. 
1...20   (nu) Ben thinks dough is too gooey. 
Ben has an xconcept with the description: 
If I think X is too gooey 
   And humans cook Y to make Y rigid 
   And humans bake gooey food to cook food 
Then bake X and examine X. 
Since Ben has concepts representing knowledge that humans cook 
meat to make meat rigid and tasty, this causes Ben (mu) to generate two 
effepts that the system displays as: 
1...21   Ben bakes dough. 
1...21   Ben examines baked dough. 
The dough (i.e. the Tala behavior system for grain, now being called 
dough) receives Ben’s effept to bake dough as an input-action, and 
processes this with a finite-state behavior rule, which causes its current 
state to be “baked dough is a flat, rigid object”. 
The baked dough then receives Ben’s effept to examine it as an 
input-action, and processes this with its finite-state behavior rule that 
causes it to transmit its current state back to Ben, which Ben receives as 
a percept. Ben (mu) reports this percept by generating an internal 
speech act, which the system displays as: 
1...22   (mu) Ben thinks baked dough is a flat, semi-rigid object. 
Again Ben (mu) creates a goal to use a short name for anything Ben 
perceives, and Ben’s (general) subagent uses an xconcept to satisfy this 
goal, which causes it to retrieve the name “flat bread” for “baked dough 
that is a flat rigid object”, and to generate the internal speech act: 
1...22   (general) Ben thinks baked dough that is a flat  
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         object will be called flat bread. 
The xconcept also generates an external speech act, by which Ben 
communicates the new name to Leo. 
1...22   Ben says baked dough that is a flat object will be  
           called flat bread. 
(This external speech act is generated but not displayed by the 
system until after Ben processes the next xconcept.) 
Ben has an xconcept with the description: 
If I think X is a rigid object 
   and perhaps humans can eat X 
Then try to eat X. 
This causes Ben to generate an effept that the system displays as: 
1...23   Ben tries to eat flat bread. 
The bread (i.e. the Tala behavior system for grain, now being called 
flat bread) receives Ben’s effept to eat bread as an input-action, and 
processes this with a finite-state behavior rule, which generates an 
output-action that Ben receives as a percept, which Ben (mu) reports 
using an internal speech act: 
1...24   (mu) Ben thinks flat bread is edible, flat, not soft, 
            not gooey, and tastes crisp. 
This meffept becomes an mpercept for Ben’s (nu) subagent, which 
uses an xconcept to isolate “edible” from the conjunction. 
1...24   (nu) Ben thinks flat bread is edible. 
So, at this point, Ben has discovered how to make grain edible, and 
how to make bread, though it is not soft bread. He has not yet 
discovered how to leaven bread. 
Ben has an xconcept with the description: 
If I think X is edible 
Then ask Leo to try eating it. 
This yields: 
1...25   Ben says Leo try this flat bread. 
The system translates this effept into a percept for Leo, which Leo 
processes with an xconcept that causes Leo to generate an effept the 
system displays as: 
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1...26   Leo tries to eat flat bread. 
The grain behavior system receives Leo’s effept to eat bread as an 
input-action, and processes this with a finite-state behavior rule, which 
generates an output-action that Leo receives as a percept, in a Tala 
mentalese expression saying that bread is edible, flat, not soft, not 
gooey, and tastes crisp. Leo again uses his general xconcept that if he 
perceives something, he will say what he perceives, so Leo reports this 
percept with a speech act: 
1...28   Leo says bread is edible, flat, not soft, not gooey,  
            and tastes crisp. 
Now, Leo also has an xconcept with the description: 
If I perceive X is edible and flat but not soft, 
Then ask if X can be made thick and soft. 
This causes Leo to generate an effept that the system displays as: 
1...28   Leo asks can you make thick, soft bread?. 
Ben needs to disambiguate “you” in this sentence as a reference to 
himself. To do this, Ben processes the construction described at the 
beginning of the demo. The system displays this as: 
1...28   (Ben translates as) Leo asks can Ben make thick,  
            soft bread?. 
Ben uses an xconcept: 
If someone asks if I can make thick soft X 
Then think why should I make thick soft X? 
This yields: 
1...28   (mu) Ben thinks why should Ben make thick, soft bread?. 
Ben has  xconcepts with the descriptions: 
If I think why should I make thick soft X? 
Then think perhaps people would prefer eating thick  
   soft X over eating flat X. 
If I think perhaps people would prefer eating thick soft  
   X over eating flat X 
Then think how can I make thick soft X? 
     And want to make thick soft X. 
These xconcepts summarize conceptual processing Ben could in 
principle perform to decide why he should try to make leavened bread, 
Appendix B. Processing in Discovery of Bread Simulation 
289 
rather than just flat bread. This could include commonsense and 
domain-specific knowledge about economics, business, farming, 
cooking, etc., which is outside the scope of this thesis, per §1.6. 
Processing these xconcepts causes the system to display: 
1...28   (nu) Ben thinks people would prefer eating thick,  
            soft bread over eating flat bread. 
1...28   Ben wants Ben to make thick, soft bread. 
1...28   (mu) Ben thinks how can Ben make thick, soft bread?. 
Ben next processes an xconcept with the description: 
If I think how can I make thick soft X? 
Then think how did I make flat X? 
Yielding: 
1...28   (nu) Ben thinks how did Ben make flat bread?. 
This starts Ben’s conceptual processing for reasoning about how to 
modify the process for making flat bread, so that it makes leavened 
bread. He next processes an xconcept described by the following 
pseudocode: 
If I think how did I make flat X? 
Then 
  (msetvar 
     (wusage verb) 
     (subj ?self) 
     (obj ?method)  
     (to 
        (mrecall-effept-steps 
           (wusage verb) 
           (subj ?self) 
           (obj  
              (?effept 
                 (subj ?self) 
                 (obj grain) 
                 )) 
           (from 
              Leo says grain not edible) 
           (to 
              Leo says grain edible) 
           (except 
              (or 
                 Eating grain 
                 Examining grain 
                 )))) 
   Think how I made flat bread is ?method                  
This processes an internal primitive verb mrecall-effept-steps 
which Ben uses to scan his memory of previous events, and collect all 
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the effepts he performed on grain, from the time that Leo said grain was 
not edible to the time that Leo said grain (flat bread) is edible, except for 
Ben’s effepts that involved eating or examining grain. The primitive 
verb collects all of these effepts into a list of steps, which is bound by 
another primitive verb to the Tala variable ?method. The xconcept then 
generates an internal speech action, thinking the result: 
1...29   (mu) Ben thinks how Ben made flat bread is steps 
            Ben pounds grain, Ben soaks grain in water, Ben  
            mashs grain, Ben bakes dough. 
Next, Ben processes an xconcept with the description: 
If I think how I made flat X is ?method 
Then  
    think how I made flat X will be called  
       the flat X process. 
    And think how can I change the flat X process  
       so X is thick and soft? 
The system displays: 
1...29   (nu) Ben thinks how Ben made flat bread will  
            be called the flat bread process. 
1...29   (nu) Ben thinks how can Ben change the flat 
            bread process so bread is thick and soft?. 
Ben now processes an xconcept with the description: 
If I think how can I change the flat X process  
    so X is thick and soft? 
Then think what other features would thick, soft X have? 
The system displays: 
1...29   (mu) Ben thinks what other features would thick,  
            soft bread have?. 
The next xconcept processed is: 
If I think what other features would thick, soft X have? 
Then  
   think thick, soft X would be less dense. 
   And think thick, soft X might have holes or air pockets. 
   And think air pockets in thick soft, X might  
      resemble bubbles in X. 
The system displays: 
1...29  (nu) Ben thinks thick, soft bread would be less dense. 
1...29  (nu) Ben thinks thick, soft bread might have holes 
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            or air pockets. 
1...29  (nu) Ben thinks air pockets in thick, soft bread  
           might resemble bubbles in bread. 
Next Ben processes the xconcept: 
If I think air pockets in thick soft, X might  
    resemble bubbles in X 
Then think I might create bubbles in X by adding 
    a drinkable liquid with bubbles to dough. 
yielding 
1...29   (mu) Ben thinks Ben might create bubbles in bread  
            by adding a drinkable liquid with bubbles to dough. 
The next xconcept processed is: 
If I think I might create bubbles in X by  
    adding a drinkable liquid with bubbles to dough. 
And I find info that beer foam has bubbles 
Then think I might create bubbles in X by adding 
    beer foam to dough. 
creating 
1...30   (nu) Ben thinks Ben might create bubbles in bread 
            by adding beer foam to dough. 
Ben next processes an xconcept described by the following 
pseudocode: 
If I think I might create bubbles in X by  
    adding beer foam to dough 
And I want to make thick, soft X 
And how I made flat X is ?new-method  
Then 
  (insert-step 
     (wusage verb) 
     (subj ?self) 
     (obj 
        Mix dough with beer foam  
     )  
     (into ?new-method) 
     (before 
        Bake dough 
        ) 
      ) 
  (insert-step 
     (wusage verb) 
     (subj ?self) 
     (obj 
        Say Leo try this leavened bread 
     )  
     (into ?new-method) 
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     (after 
        Bake dough 
        ) 
      ) 
  (msave-xconcept-for-percept 
     (wusage verb) 
     (subj ?self) 
     (obj 
        If someone gives me more grain 
        Then ?new-method 
        ) 
     ) 
   Ask Leo can you kick in more kernels for experiments? 
This xconcept illustrates elements of self-programming in the 
TalaMind architecture. When it is processed, it matches Ben’s thought 
that he might create bubbles in bread by adding beer foam to dough, 
and binds his recollection of how he made flat bread to the Tala variable 
?new-method. The xconcept then inserts a step to mix dough with beer 
foam into ?new-method just before dough is baked and inserts a step to 
ask Leo to try the new bread after dough is baked. The xconcept then 
creates and saves a new xconcept that will perform ?new-method if 
someone gives Ben more grain. Finally, the xconcept asks Leo if he can 
kick in more kernels for experiments. 
So, the above xconcept performs conceptual processing that creates a 
new xconcept that will implement and test Ben’s thought that he might 
create bubbles in bread by adding beer foam to dough. As a result of 
processing the above xconcept, the system displays: 
1...31   Ben asks can you kick in more kernels for experiments?. 
Leo needs to disambiguate Ben’s question in four ways: 1) 
disambiguate “you” as a reference to himself; 2) disambiguate “kernels” 
as “grain”; 3) disambiguate “kick in” as a common English metaphor 
meaning “give to”; 4) disambiguate the unspecified object of “to” as 
Ben. Ben’s metaphorical wording of his request is built into his 
xconcept, so that Leo will need to perform disambiguation, again since 
one goal of the simulation is to illustrate disambiguation. 
Leo’s first disambiguates “you” by applying the construction 
described above in step 1…4. The system displays this as: 
1...31   (Leo translates as) Ben asks can Leo kick in more 
            kernels for experiments?. 
Next, Leo disambiguates “kernel”, using an xconcept with the 
following logic: 
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If A asks can I kick in more X for experiments 
Then 
If X can mean Y 
And G is in current-domains 
And G can mean Y 
And I want A to make G edible 
And I have excess G 
Then 
   think A asks can I kick in more G for experiments 
In processing this xconcept, A is bound to Ben and X is bound to 
“kernels”. Leo finds that “kernels” can mean “seeds”, and therefore 
binds Y to “seeds”. Leo finds that “grain” satisfies all the conditions for 
G, binding G to “grain”. As a result, Leo generates a mental speech act 
that the system displays as: 
1...31   (mu) Leo thinks Ben asks can Leo kick in more  
            grain for experiments?. 
Next, Leo applies a construction to disambiguate “kick in”. The Tala 
mentalese for this construction is: 
 (subformtrans 
  (wusage verb) 
  (subj 
   (kick 
    (wusage verb) 
    (subj (?s (wusage noun))) 
    (in (?x (wusage noun))) 
    )) 
  (obj 
   (give 
    (wusage verb) 
    (subj (?s (wusage noun))) 
    (obj (?x (wusage noun))) 
    (to me) 
    ] 
The default object “me” is a simplification, not adequate in general. 
For example, someone asking for a donation to a charity might say 
“Could you kick in twenty dollars?” meaning “give to the charity” 
rather than “give to me”. This simplification may be considered a 
logical bridge supporting the demonstration, in place of additional 
commonsense knowledge and reasoning. It is removable in principle, 
but doing so would require additional design and coding, and is left as 
a topic for future research. 
Applying this construction yields an internal mental event the 
system displays as: 
1...31   (Leo translates as) (mu) Leo thinks Ben asks  
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            can Leo give more grain to me for experiments?. 
Finally, Leo disambiguates the phrase “to me” as “to Ben”, using the 
construct described above for disambiguating “me” in step 1...5. This 
yields: 
1...31   (Leo translates as) (mu) Leo thinks Ben asks  
            can Leo give more grain to Ben for experiments?. 
Leo has an xconcept that may be described as: 
If I think A asks can I give more X to A for experiments 
Then 
If I want A to make X edible 
 And X is current-domains 
 And I have excess X 
Then 
   Give more X to A 
In processing this xconcept, A is bound to Ben and X is bound to 
“grain”. Leo finds that he wants Ben to make grain edible, that grain is 
in current-domains for discussion and that he has excess grain. As a 
result, Leo generates an effept (physical action) that the system displays 
as: 
1...32   Leo gives more grain to Ben. 
This effept resets the grain behavior system current state to its initial 
state, i.e. unprocessed grain that resembles nuts.  
Now  Ben performs the new xconcept that he created at the end of 
timestep 1…26 above, to test what happens if he performs all the steps to 
make flat bread, and mixes beer foam into the dough before it is baked. 
The system displays: 
1...33   Ben pounds grain. 
1...33   Ben soaks grain in water. 
1...33   Ben mashs grain. 
1...33   Ben mixs the dough with beer foam. 
1...33   Ben bakes dough. 
1...33   Ben says Leo try this leavened bread. 
When these effepts are processed, the grain behavior system 
responds as before to Ben’s effepts for pounding, soaking and mashing 
grain. The new effept for mixing beer foam into dough causes the 
dough to change state to become “leavened dough”. When leavened 
dough is baked, it changes state to become “leavened bread”. 
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In response to Ben’s request to try the leavened bread, Leo generates 
an effept the system displays as: 
1...34   Leo tries to eat bread. 
The leavened bread (i.e. the Tala behavior system for grain) receives 
Leo’s effept to eat bread as an input-action, and processes this with a 
finite-state behavior rule, which generates an output-action that Leo 
receives as a percept, in a Tala mentalese expression saying that bread is 
edible, thick, soft, tastes good, and not gooey. Leo again uses his general 
xconcept that if he perceives something, he will say what he perceives: 
1...36   Leo says bread is edible, thick, soft, tastes good, and  
            not gooey. 
To conclude the demonstration, Ben has a logical bridge xconcept 
with the description: 
If someone says bread is edible, thick, soft, tastes  
   good, and not gooey 
Then say Eureka! 
And so, the final step of this instance of the discovery of bread 
demonstration displays:  
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Remco de Boer (VU) 
Architectural Knowledge 
Management: Supporting 
Architects and Auditors  
33. Khiet Truong (UT) How Does 
Real Affect Affect Affect 
Recognition In Speech? 
34. Inge van de Weerd (UU) 
Advancing in Software Product 
Management: An Incremental 
Method Engineering Approach  
35. Wouter Koelewijn (UL) 
Privacy en Politiegegevens; Over 
geautomatiseerde normatieve 
informatie-uitwisseling 
36. Marco Kalz (OUN) Placement 
Support for Learners in Learning 
Networks  
37. Hendrik Drachsler (OUN) 
Navigation Support for Learners 
in Informal Learning Networks 
38. Riina Vuorikari (OU) Tags and 
self-organisation: a metadata 
ecology for learning resources in 
a multilingual context  
39. Christian Stahl (TU/e), 
Humboldt-Universitaet zu 
Berlin) Service Substitution - A 
SIKS Dissertation Series 
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Behavioral Approach Based on 
Petri Nets  
40. Stephan Raaijmakers (UvT) 
Multinomial Language 
Learning: Investigations into the 
Geometry of Language  
41. Igor Berezhnyy (UvT) Digital 
Analysis of Paintings  
42. Toine Bogers (UvT) 
Recommender Systems for Social 
Bookmarking  
43. Virginia Nunes Leal 
Franqueira (UT) Finding 
Multi-step Attacks in Computer 
Networks using Heuristic Search 
and Mobile Ambients  
44. Roberto Santana Tapia (UT) 
Assessing Business-IT 
Alignment in Networked 
Organizations  
45. Jilles Vreeken (UU) Making 
Pattern Mining Useful  
46. Loredana Afanasiev (UvA) 
Querying XML: Benchmarks 
and Recursion 
2010 
1. Matthijs van Leeuwen (UU) 
Patterns that Matter  
2. Ingo Wassink (UT) Work flows 
in Life Science 
3. Joost Geurts (CWI) A 
Document Engineering Model 
and Processing Framework for 
Multimedia documents  
4. Olga Kulyk (UT) Do You Know 
What I Know? Situational 
Awareness of Co-located Teams 
in Multidisplay Environments 
5. Claudia Hauff (UT) Predicting 
the Effectiveness of Queries and 
Retrieval Systems  
6. Sander Bakkes (UvT) Rapid 
Adaptation of Video Game AI 
7. Wim Fikkert (UT) Gesture 
interaction at a Distance  
8. Krzysztof Siewicz (UL) 
Towards an Improved 
Regulatory Framework of Free 
Software. Protecting user 
freedoms in a world of software 
communities and eGovernments 
9. Hugo Kielman (UL) A Politiele 
gegevensverwerking en Privacy, 
Naar een effectieve waarborging 
10. Rebecca Ong (UL) Mobile 
Communication and Protection 
of Children  
11. Adriaan Ter Mors (TUD) The 
world according to MARP: 
Multi-Agent Route Planning  
12. Susan van den Braak (UU) 
Sensemaking software for crime 
analysis 
13. Gianluigi Folino (RUN) High 
Performance Data Mining using 
Bio-inspired techniques  
14. Sander van Splunter (VU) 
Automated Web Service 
Reconfiguration 
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15. Lianne Bodenstaff (UT) 
Managing Dependency Relations 
in Inter-Organizational Models  
16. Sicco Verwer (TUD) Efficient 
Identification of Timed 
Automata, theory and practice 
17. Spyros Kotoulas (VU) Scalable 
Discovery of Networked 
Resources: Algorithms, 
Infrastructure, Applications 
18. Charlotte Gerritsen (VU) 
Caught in the Act: Investigating 
Crime by Agent-Based 
Simulation 
19. Henriette Cramer (UvA) 
People's Responses to 
Autonomous and Adaptive 
Systems 
20. Ivo Swartjes (UT) Whose Story 
Is It Anyway? How Improv 
Informs Agency and Authorship 
of Emergent Narrative  
21. Harold van Heerde (UT) 
Privacy-aware data management 
by means of data degradation 
22. Michiel Hildebrand (CWI) 
End-user Support for Access 
to\\ Heterogeneous Linked Data  
23. Bas Steunebrink (UU) The 
Logical Structure of Emotions 
24. Dmytro Tykhonov (TUD) 
Designing Generic and Efficient 
Negotiation Strategies  
25. Zulfiqar Ali Memon (VU) 
Modelling Human-Awareness 
for Ambient Agents: A Human 
Mindreading Perspective 
26. Ying Zhang (CWI) XRPC: 
Efficient Distributed Query 
Processing on Heterogeneous 
XQuery Engines 
27. Marten Voulon (UL) 
Automatisch contracteren 
28. Arne Koopman (UU) 
Characteristic Relational 
Patterns 
29. Stratos Idreos(CWI) Database 
Cracking: Towards Auto-tuning 
Database Kernels  
30. Marieke van Erp (UvT) 
Accessing Natural History - 
Discoveries in data cleaning, 
structuring, and retrieval 
31. Victor de Boer (UvA) Ontology 
Enrichment from Heterogeneous 
Sources on the Web 
32. Marcel Hiel (UvT) An 
Adaptive Service Oriented 
Architecture: Automatically 
solving Interoperability Problems  
33. Robin Aly (UT) Modeling 
Representation Uncertainty in 
Concept-Based Multimedia 
Retrieval  
34. Teduh Dirgahayu (UT) 
Interaction Design in Service 
Compositions 
35. Dolf Trieschnigg (UT) Proof of 
Concept: Concept-based 
Biomedical Information Retrieval  
36. Jose Janssen (OU) Paving the 
Way for Lifelong Learning; 
Facilitating competence 
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development through a learning 
path specification 
37. Niels Lohmann (TU/e) 
Correctness of services and their 
composition 
38. Dirk Fahland (TU/e) From 
Scenarios to components 
39. Ghazanfar Farooq Siddiqui 
(VU) Integrative modeling of 
emotions in virtual agents 
40. Mark van Assem (VU) 
Converting and Integrating 
Vocabularies for the Semantic 
Web 
41. Guillaume Chaslot (UM) 
Monte-Carlo Tree Search 
42. Sybren de Kinderen (VU) 
Needs-driven service bundling in 
a multi-supplier setting - the 
computational e3-service 
approach 
43. Peter van Kranenburg (UU) A 
Computational Approach to 
Content-Based Retrieval of Folk 
Song Melodies 
44. Pieter Bellekens (TU/e) An 
Approach towards Context-
sensitive and User-adapted 
Access to Heterogeneous Data 
Sources, Illustrated in the 
Television Domain 
45. Vasilios Andrikopoulos (UvT) 
A theory and model for the 
evolution of software services 




47. Chen Li (UT) Mining Process 
Model Variants: Challenges, 
Techniques, Examples  
48. Withdrawn 
49. Jahn-Takeshi Saito (UM) 
Solving difficult game positions  
50. Bouke Huurnink (UvA) Search 
in Audiovisual Broadcast 
Archives 
51. Alia Khairia Amin (CWI) 
Understanding and supporting 
information seeking tasks in 
multiple sources  
52. Peter-Paul van Maanen (VU) 
Adaptive Support for Human-
Computer Teams: Exploring the 
Use of Cognitive Models of Trust 
and Attention  
53. Edgar Meij (UvA) Combining 
Concepts and Language Models 
for Information Access 
2011 
1. Botond Cseke (RUN) 
Variational Algorithms for 
Bayesian Inference in Latent 
Gaussian Models 
2. Nick Tinnemeier (UU) 
Organizing Agent 
Organizations. Syntax and 
Operational Semantics of an 
Organization-Oriented 
Programming Language 
3. Jan Martijn van der Werf 
(TU/e) Compositional Design 
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and Verification of Component-
Based Information Systems 
4. Hado van Hasselt (UU) 
Insights in Reinforcement 
Learning; Formal analysis and 
empirical evaluation of temporal-
difference learning algorithms 
5. Base van der Raadt (VU) 
Enterprise Architecture Coming 
of Age - Increasing the 
Performance of an Emerging 
Discipline. 
6. Yiwen Wang (TU/e) 
Semantically-Enhanced 
Recommendations in Cultural 
Heritage 
7. Yujia Cao (UT) Multimodal 
Information Presentation for 
High Load Human Computer 
Interaction 
8. Nieske Vergunst (UU) BDI-
based Generation of Robust Task-
Oriented Dialogues 
9. Tim de Jong (OU) 
Contextualised Mobile Media for 
Learning 
10. Bart Bogaert (UvT) Cloud 
Content Contention 
11. Dhaval Vyas (UT) Designing 
for Awareness: An Experience-
focused HCI Perspective 
12. Carmen Bratosin (TU/e) Grid 
Architecture for Distributed 
Process Mining 
13. Xiaoyu Mao (UvT) Airport 
under Control. Multiagent 
Scheduling for Airport Ground 
Handling 
14. Milan Lovric (EUR) Behavioral 
Finance and Agent-Based 
Artificial Markets 
15. Marijn Koolen (UvA) The 
Meaning of Structure: the Value 
of Link Evidence for Information 
Retrieval 
16. Maarten Schadd (UM) 
Selective Search in Games of 
Different Complexity 
17. Jiyin He (UvA) Exploring Topic 
Structure: Coherence, Diversity 
and Relatedness 
18. Mark Ponsen (UM) Strategic 
Decision-Making in complex 
games  
19. Ellen Rusman (OU) The 
Mind’s Eye on Personal Profiles 
20. Qing Gu (VU) Guiding service-
oriented software engineering - 
A view-based approach  
21. Linda Terlouw (TUD) 
Modularization and Specification 
of Service-Oriented Systems  
22. Junte Zhang (UvA) System 
Evaluation of Archival 
Description and Access  
23. Wouter Weerkamp (UvA) 
Finding People and their 
Utterances in Social Media  
24. Herwin van Welbergen (UT) 
Behavior Generation for 
Interpersonal Coordination with 
Virtual Humans On Specifying, 
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Scheduling and Realizing 
Multimodal Virtual Human 
Behavior  
25. Syed Waqar ul Qounain Jaffry 
(VU) Analysis and Validation of 
Models for Trust Dynamics 
26. Matthijs Aart Pontier (VU) 
Virtual Agents for Human 
Communication - Emotion 
Regulation and Involvement-
Distance Trade-Offs in 
Embodied Conversational Agents 
and Robots  
27. Aniel Bhulai (VU) Dynamic 
website optimization through 
autonomous management of 
design patterns 
28. Rianne Kaptein(UvA) Effective 
Focused Retrieval by Exploiting 
Query Context and Document 
Structure  
29. Faisal Kamiran (TU/e) 
Discrimination-aware 
Classification 
30. Egon van den Broek (UT) 
Affective Signal Processing 
(ASP): Unraveling the mystery 
of emotions  
31. Ludo Waltman (EUR) 
Computational and Game-
Theoretic Approaches for 
Modeling Bounded Rationality 
32. Nees-Jan van Eck (EUR) 
Methodological Advances in 
Bibliometric Mapping of Science  
33. Tom van der Weide (UU) 
Arguing to Motivate Decisions 
34. Paolo Turrini (UU) Strategic 
Reasoning in Interdependence: 
Logical and Game-theoretical 
Investigations  
35. Maaike Harbers (UU) 
Explaining Agent Behavior in 
Virtual Training  
36. Erik van der Spek (UU) 
Experiments in serious game 
design: a cognitive approach  
37. Adriana Burlutiu (RUN) 
Machine Learning for Pairwise 
Data, Applications for Preference 
Learning and Supervised 
Network Inference  
38. Nyree Lemmens (UM) Bee-
inspired Distributed 
Optimization 
39. Joost Westra (UU) Organizing 
Adaptation using Agents in 
Serious Games  
40. Viktor Clerc (VU) Architectural 
Knowledge Management in 
Global Software Development  
41. Luan Ibraimi (UT) 
Cryptographically Enforced 
Distributed Data Access Control  
42. Michal Sindlar (UU) 
Explaining Behavior through 
Mental State Attribution  
43. Henk van der Schuur (UU) 
Process Improvement through 
Software Operation Knowledge  
44. Boris Reuderink (UT) Robust 
Brain-Computer Interfaces  
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45. Herman Stehouwer (UvT) 
Statistical Language Models for 
Alternative Sequence Selection  
46. Beibei Hu (TUD) Towards 
Contextualized Information 
Delivery: A Rule-based 
Architecture for the Domain of 
Mobile Police Work  
47. Azizi Bin Ab Aziz(VU) 
Exploring Computational 
Models for Intelligent Support of 
Persons with Depression  
48. Mark Ter Maat (UT) Response 
Selection and Turn-taking for a 
Sensitive Artificial Listening 
Agent  
49. Andreea Niculescu (UT) 
Conversational interfaces for 
task-oriented spoken dialogues: 
design aspects influencing 
interaction quality 
2012 
1. Terry Kakeeto (UvT) 
Relationship Marketing for 
SMEs in Uganda 
2. Muhammad Umair (VU) 
Adaptivity, emotion, and 
Rationality in Human and 
Ambient Agent Models 
3. Adam Vanya (VU) Supporting 
Architecture Evolution by 
Mining Software Repositories 
4. Jurriaan Souer (UU) 
Development of Content 
Management System-based Web 
Applications 
5.  Marijn Plomp (UU) Maturing 
Interorganisational Information 
Systems 
6. Wolfgang Reinhardt (OU) 
Awareness Support for 
Knowledge Workers in Research 
Networks 
7. Rianne van Lambalgen (VU) 
When the Going Gets Tough: 
Exploring Agent-based Models of 
Human Performance under 
Demanding Conditions 
8. Gerben de Vries (UvA) Kernel 
Methods for Vessel Trajectories 
9. Ricardo Neisse (UT) Trust and 
Privacy Management Support 
for Context-Aware Service 
Platforms 
10. David Smits (TU/e) Towards a 
Generic Distributed Adaptive 
Hypermedia Environment 
11. J.C.B. Rantham Prabhakara 
(TU/e) Process Mining in the 
Large: Preprocessing, Discovery, 
and Diagnostics 
12. Kees van der Sluijs (TU/e) 
Model Driven Design and Data 
Integration in Semantic Web 
Information Systems 
13. Suleman Shahid (UvT) Fun 
and Face: Exploring non-verbal 
expressions of emotion during 
playful interactions 
14. Evgeny Knutov (TU/e) Generic 
Adaptation Framework for 
Unifying Adaptive Web-based 
Systems 
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15. Natalie van der Wal (VU) 
Social Agents. Agent-Based 
Modelling of Integrated Internal 
and Social Dynamics of 
Cognitive and Affective 
Processes. 
16. Fiemke Both (VU) Helping 
people by understanding them - 
Ambient Agents supporting task 
execution and depression 
treatment 
17. Amal Elgammal (UvT) 
Towards a Comprehensive 
Framework for Business Process 
Compliance 
18. Eltjo Poort (VU) Improving 
Solution Architecting Practices  
19. Helen Schonenberg (TU/e) 
What's Next? Operational 
Support for Business Process 
Execution 
20. Ali Bahramisharif (RUN) 
Covert Visual Spatial Attention, 
a Robust Paradigm for Brain-
Computer Interfacing 
21. Roberto Cornacchia (TUD) 
Querying Sparse Matrices for 
Information Retrieval 
22. Thijs Vis (UvT) Intelligence, 
politie en veiligheidsdienst: 
verenigbare grootheden?  
23. Christian Muehl (UT) Toward 
Affective Brain-Computer 
Interfaces: Exploring the 
Neurophysiology of Affect 
during Human Media 
Interaction 
24. Laurens van der Werff (UT) 
Evaluation of Noisy Transcripts 
for Spoken Document Retrieval  
25. Silja Eckartz (UT) Managing 
the Business Case Development 
in Inter-Organizational IT 
Projects: A Methodology and its 
Application  
26. Emile de Maat (UvA) Making 
Sense of Legal Text 
27. Hayrettin Gürkök (UT) Mind 
the Sheep! User Experience 
Evaluation & Brain-Computer 
Interface Games 
28. Nancy Pascall (UvT) 
Engendering Technology 
Empowering Women 
29. Almer Tigelaar (UT) Peer-to-
Peer Information Retrieval 
30. Alina Pommeranz (TUD) 
Designing Human-Centered 
Systems for Reflective Decision 
Making 
31. Emily Bagarukayo (RUN) A 
Learning by Construction 
Approach for Higher Order 
Cognitive Skills Improvement, 
Building Capacity and 
Infrastructure 
32. Wietske Visser (TUD) 
Qualitative multi-criteria 
preference representation and 
reasoning 
33. Rory Sie (OU) Coalitions in 
Cooperation Networks 
(COCOON) 
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34. Pavol Jancura (RUN) 
Evolutionary analysis in PPI 
networks and applications 
35. Evert Haasdijk (VU) Never Too 
Old To Learn - On-line 
Evolution of Controllers in 
Swarm-and Modular Robotics 
36. Denis Ssebugwawo (RUN) 
Analysis and Evaluation of 
Collaborative Modeling 
Processes 
37. Agnes Nakakawa (RUN) A 
Collaboration Process for 
Enterprise Architecture Creation 
38. Selmar Smit (VU) Parameter 
Tuning and Scientific Testing in 
Evolutionary Algorithms 
39. Hassan Fatemi (UT) Risk-
aware design of value and 
coordination networks 
40. Agus Gunawan (UvT) 
Information Access for SMEs in 
Indonesia 
41. Sebastian Kelle (OU) Game 
Design Patterns for Learning 
42. Dominique Verpoorten (OU) 
Reflection Amplifiers in self-
regulated Learning 
43. Withdrawn  
44. Anna Tordai (VU) On 
Combining Alignment 
Techniques  
45. Benedikt Kratz (UvT) A Model 
and Language for Business-
aware Transactions 
46. Simon Carter (UVA) 
Exploration and Exploitation of 
Multilingual Data for Statistical 
Machine Translation  
47. Manos Tsagkias (UVA) 
Mining Social Media: Tracking 
Content and Predicting Behavior 
48. Jorn Bakker (TUE) Handling 
Abrupt Changes in Evolving 
Time-series Data  
49. Michael Kaisers (UM) 
Learning against Learning - 
Evolutionary dynamics of 
reinforcement learning 
algorithms in strategic 
interactions 
50. Steven van Kervel (TUD) 
Ontology driven Enterprise 
Information Systems 
Engineering 
51. Jeroen de Jong (TUD) 
Heuristics in Dynamic 
Scheduling; a practical 
framework with a case study in 
elevator dispatching  
2013 
1. Viorel Milea (EUR) News 
Analytics for Financial Decision 
Support 
2. Erietta Liarou (CWI) 
MonetDB/DataCell: Leveraging 
the Column-store Database 
Technology for Efficient and 
Scalable Stream Processing 
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3. Szymon Klarman (VU) 
Reasoning with Contexts in 
Description Logics 
4. Chetan Yadati (TUD) 
Coordinating autonomous 
planning and scheduling  
5. Dulce Pumareja (UT) 
Groupware Requirements 
Evolutions Patterns 
6. Romulo Goncalves (CWI) The 
Data Cyclotron: Juggling Data 
and Queries for a Data 
Warehouse Audience 
7. Giel van Lankveld (UT) 
Quantifying Individual Player 
Differences  
8. Robbert-Jan Merk (VU) 
Making enemies: cognitive 
modeling for opponent agents in 
fighter pilot simulators 
9. Fabio Gori (RUN) 
Metagenomic Data Analysis: 
Computational Methods and 
Applications 
10. Jeewanie Jayasinghe 
Arachchige (UvT) A Unified 
Modeling Framework for 
Service Design  
11. Evangelos Pournaras (TUD) 
Multi-level Reconfigurable Self-
organization in Overlay 
Services 
12. Marian Razavian (VU) 
Knowledge-driven Migration to 
Services 
13. Mohammad Safiri(UT) 
Service Tailoring: User-centric 
creation of integrated IT-based 
homecare services to support 
independent living of elderly 
14. Jafar Tanha (UVA) Ensemble 
Approaches to Semi-Supervised 
Learning  
15. Daniel Hennes (UM) 
Multiagent Learning - 
Dynamic Games and 
Applications 
16. Eric Kok (UU) Exploring the 
practical benefits of 
argumentation in multi-agent 
deliberation 
17. Koen Kok (VU) The 
PowerMatcher: Smart 
Coordination for the Smart 
Electricity Grid 
18. Jeroen Janssens (UvT) Outlier 
Selection and One-Class 
Classification 
19. Renze Steenhuizen (TUD) 
Coordinated Multi-Agent 
Planning and Scheduling 
20. Katja Hofmann (UvA) Fast 
and Reliable Online Learning to 
Rank for Information Retrieval 
21. Sander Wubben (UvT) Text-
to-text generation by 
monolingual machine 
translation 
22. Tom Claassen (RUN) Causal 
Discovery and Logic 
23. Patricio de Alencar Silva 
(UvT) Value Activity 
Monitoring 
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24. Haitham Bou Ammar (UM) 
Automated Transfer in 
Reinforcement Learning 
25. Agnieszka Anna Latoszek-
Berendsen (UM) Intention-
based Decision Support. A new 
way of representing and 
implementing clinical guidelines 
in a Decision Support System 
26. Alireza Zarghami (UT) 
Architectural Support for 
Dynamic Homecare Service 
Provisioning 
27. Mohammad Huq (UT) 
Inference-based Framework 
Managing Data Provenance 
28. Frans van der Sluis (UT) 
When Complexity becomes 
Interesting: An Inquiry into the 
Information eXperience 
29. Iwan de Kok (UT) Listening 
Heads 
30. Joyce Nakatumba (TUE) 
Resource-Aware Business 
Process Management: Analysis 
and Support 
31. Dinh Khoa Nguyen (UvT) 
Blueprint Model and Language 
for Engineering Cloud 
Applications 
32. Kamakshi Rajagopal (OUN) 
Networking For Learning; The 
role of Networking in a Lifelong 
Learner's Professional 
Development 
33. Qi Gao (TUD) User Modeling 
and Personalization in the 
Microblogging Sphere  
34. Kien Tjin-Kam-Jet (UT) 
Distributed Deep Web Search 
35. Abdallah El Ali (UvA) 
Minimal Mobile Human 
Computer  
36. Than Lam Hoang (TUe) 
Pattern Mining in Data 
Streams 
37. Dirk Börner (OUN) Ambient 
Learning Displays 
38. Eelco den Heijer (VU) 
Autonomous Evolutionary Art 
39. Joop de Jong (TUD) A Method 
for Enterprise Ontology based 
Design of Enterprise 
Information Systems 
40. Pim Nijssen (UM) Monte-
Carlo Tree Search for Multi-
Player Games 
41. Jochem Liem (UVA) 
Supporting the Conceptual 
Modelling of Dynamic Systems: 
A Knowledge Engineering 
Perspective on Qualitative 
Reasoning 
42. Léon Planken (TUD) 
Algorithms for Simple Temporal 
Reasoning 
43. Marc Bron (UVA) Exploration 
and Contextualization through 
Interaction and Concepts 
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2014 
1. Nicola Barile (UU) Studies in 
Learning Monotone Models 
from Data 
2. Fiona Tuliyano (RUN) 
Combining System Dynamics 
with a Domain Modeling 
Method 
3. Sergio Raul Duarte Torres 
(UT) Information Retrieval for 
Children: Search Behavior and 
Solutions 
4. Hanna Jochmann-Mannak 
(UT) Websites for children: 
search strategies and interface 
design - Three studies on 
children's search performance 
and evaluation 
5. Jurriaan van Reijsen (UU) 
Knowledge Perspectives on 
Advancing Dynamic Capability 
6. Damian Tamburri (VU) 
Supporting Networked Software 
Development  
7. Arya Adriansyah (TUE) 
Aligning Observed and Modeled 
Behavior 
8. Samur Araujo (TUD) Data 
Integration over Distributed 
and Heterogeneous Data 
Endpoints 
9. Philip C. Jackson, Jr. (UvT) 
Toward Human-Level Artificial 
Intelligence – Representation 
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Abstract 
      This doctoral thesis presents a novel research approach toward 
human-level artificial intelligence.   
      The approach involves developing an AI system using a 
language of thought based on the unconstrained syntax of a natural 
language; designing this system as a collection of concepts that can 
create and modify concepts, expressed in the language of thought, 
to behave intelligently in an environment; and using methods from 
cognitive linguistics such as mental spaces and conceptual blends 
for multiple levels of mental representation and computation. 
Proposing a design inspection alternative to the Turing Test, these 
pages discuss ‘higher-level mentalities’ of human intelligence, which 
include natural language understanding, higher-level forms of 
learning and reasoning, imagination, and consciousness. 
      This thesis endeavors to address all the major theoretical issues 
and objections that might be raised against its approach, or against 
the possibility of achieving human-level AI in principle. No 
insurmountable objections are identified, and arguments refuting 
several objections are presented. 
      This thesis describes the design of a prototype demonstration 
system, and discusses processing within the system that illustrates 
the potential of the research approach to achieve human-level AI. 
      This thesis cannot claim to actually achieve human-level AI, it 
can only present an approach that may eventually reach this goal. 
 
